OHIO NUKE PLANT – COMMENTARY
The following is taken from the Washington Post article by Victor Gilinsky, former Commissioner of the NRC, is interesting, yet deserves some commentary about his conclusions, and analysis:
”You wouldn't know it from the bland pronouncements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), but the U.S. nuclear industry just had its closest brush with disaster since the 1979 Three Mile Island accident.”This lead in sentence right away is sensationalistic by using the word disaster, and by making comparisons to TMI, thus conjuring up images of some fearful event that would bring ominous results. TMI was not a disaster in the sense that no one outside the plant or even inside the plant were harmed. The total off-site radiation dose was equivalent to 3 dental x-rays within the 3 mile evacuation zone around the plant.
Even with all the operator errors, and some design deficiencies, the plant eventually shut down safely. There was partial core melt, which is considered the worst case scenario for an American design nuclear power plant. Given this ‘brush with disaster’ as Mr. Gilinsky likes to label it, let see what else he has to say:
”The Davis-Besse nuclear power plant, located about 30 miles east of Toledo, Ohio, was operating with a rust hole in the top of its reactor pressure vessel -- a hole wide and deep enough to put your fist into. All that was left to contain the reactor's highly pressurized supply of cooling water around the reactor core was a three-eighths inch liner of stainless steel, and the liner had started to bulge ominously. If the liner had burst, it would have drained cooling water vital for safety and also threatened the reactor's emergency shutdown system.”The TMI accident was similar to what Gilinsky talks about, in that the TMI Pressurizer (a component that keeps the 650 Deg water in the reactor from boiling by way of maintaining the super heated water under great pressure), lost a valve at the top of its head, and the same water loss was incurred that Mr. Gilinsky speaks of with respect to his concerns for Davis Besse. TMI would have safely shut down had plant operators let system run as designed. Likewise, had the Reactor Liner burst at Davis Besse, the plant would have shut down safely.
In the post TMI era, the NRC and the industry studied closely all the events. I have the complete report on hand as to what happened and the lessons learned. The industry and the NRC implemented new regulations, design changes, and operator training improvements that incorporated the lessons from TMI as well as other needed improvements resulting from advanced technology.
Had the Davis Besse plant Reactor Liner ruptured, then the safety systems, backed up by 4 system trains, would have immediately gone into action and responded by placing the reactor into safe shut-down, and flooded it with additional needed cooling water via the RHR system. For Mr. Gilinsky to claim some disaster equal to TMI, is using his experience and position to sensationalize an event that he should well know has been accounted for via the L.O.C.A. (Loss of Coolant Accident) design considerations. Safe shutdown equipment is specifically designed to withstand and function, or at lest not improperly operate, through a LOCA ... an event that is initially several hours long through the peak of high temperature, high pressure, chemical spray, humidity, and radiation, followed by a long cool down period of 2 to 4 weeks.
”The plant operator's neglect is bad enough. If this had occurred in Russia, we would be saying it could never happen here. Equally disturbing is the NRC's barely audible response.”It was this statement that concerned me the most. Mr. Gilinsky is indirectly alluding to the Chernoyble Nuclear plant disaster. It is not a stretch to realize that he is capitalizing on additional sensationalism with this inference. Russian plant design parted ways with the western nations back in the 1950s. Western design plants went with water moderated design and double a containment, whereas Russian (Soviet) design went with graphite moderated design with a single containment. The Russians used an inferior design to save money and time. A Boric acid rust hole could not happen in a Russian design, because they do not use this solution. So Mr. Gilinshy’s statement is a red herring.
His second statement about the seeming silence of the NRC goes back to the days when the NRC acted like an enemy of the nuclear industry, which was never their intended purpose. The NRC was put in place to monitor compliance of each plant to its license, to provide independent assessment of events, and mandate specific changes in systems, components, design, or operations to assure the health and safety of the public. They were never intended to become an alarmist organization, or meant to run to the media with sensational news, crying foul.
”The preliminary report of First Energy, the nuclear plant owner, details what happened. During a routine refueling shutdown in February, the company inspected several dozen nozzles to check for cracks, as required by the NRC. The nozzles, located on the head of the reactor vessel, permit control rods to enter the vessel to shut down the reactor, quickly if necessary. A workman discovered the rust hole by luck -- when he happened to bang into one of the control rod tubes coming out of the top of the reactor and it moved. If the reactor had gone back into operation, as it very nearly did, the consequences could have been enormous in terms of public safety as well as the future of the nuclear industry.”Notice that he references a Preliminary report: These are NOT conclusive, and are designed to give the initial take on what was discovered. The actual event will be studied for months to come, and will have several Interim reports and then a Final report detailing the complete analysis. I have personally been involved in events where the Preliminary reports looked very damning – one such report was started by a Quality Assurance person, fueled by a disgruntled electrical craftsman. Upon further study and testing, it was found that the issue was minor, and the early reports were blown out of proportion. While I cannot say this about the Davis Besse incident, because I am not directly involved, experience tells me that we need to wait on the Final report before making any specific assertions.
Today’s NRC is more understanding of this, especially after earlier years where some at the highest levels of the NRC were anti-nuclear, and their objectivity was cluttered with emotional sentiments. If the event turns out to be as serious as Mr. Gilinsky claims it is, then the NRC will publish this, and the media will be prognosticating and sensationalizing to its heart’s delight.
Mr. Gilinsky also sensationalizes again by stating that the results of restarting the reactor would have been “enormous in terms of public safety.” The truth is the TMI accident was worst case possible scenario with core met. This means that the Control Rods were not inserted adequately, resulting in the inability to stop the nuclear chain reaction, and partial core melt. Yet, the public was not harmed, nor would have been. Likewise, had Davis Besse had a LOCA due to a breech in the Reactor Vessel Head, the ultimate results would not have been any worst that what happened at TMI.
”It turned out that corrosion had reduced 70 pounds of steel, half a foot thick, to rust. The corrosion was caused by boric acid on the outside of the head. How did the acid get there? The water inside the reactor vessel contains dissolved boric acid, which is used to assist reactor control. Because boric acid corrodes carbon steel, the reactor vessel's interior is lined with stainless steel. The boric acid is not supposed to get to the vessel's exterior, which remains vulnerable to corrosion. But at Davis-Besse the reactor's water leaked through cracks -- it still isn't clear which ones -- and created a boric acid crust on the outside of the reactor head.”Assuming that Gilinsky is correct in his knowledge of the report then I am far more concerned with the cracks in the Reactor Liner that would permit Boric Acid to leak through to the vessel in the first place. Given that scenario, then I believe that the Ractor is gone, and will have to be replaced or the plant decommissioned.
What also intrigues me, is that he never mentions that fact that the solution is not Boric Acid alone, but is buffered with Sodium Hydroxide (NaOH) to balance the pH to less acidic levels. Highly acidic solutions are about 1 to 2 on the pH scale. The neutral point is 7. When Boric Acid is buffered by NaOH, it has an actual acidic level of 4 to 4.5. Citrus fruit is about 3 on the scale. Milk is 6.5. Plus the buffered solution is further diluted in a significant amount of water. Still, I am not surprised at some corrosion. But the fact that Mr. Gilinsky never mentions that the solution is buffered may lead reader to believe that a high acidic solution is present, with a contact rating of 2.0. If the corrosion is as significant as Mr. Gilinsky reports, then I would take a closer look at the NaOH content to see if somehow the buffering process was improperly done, and for how long that may have been the case.
”This accumulation and damage doesn't happen overnight. The company report explains the hole hadn't been found earlier because, "Boric acid that accumulated on the top of the [Reactor Pressure Vessel] head over a period of years inhibited the station's ability to confirm visually that neither nozzle leakage nor vessel corrosion was occurring." In plain English that means that the company watched the boric acid crust cover an increasing area of the head for years and did nothing about it.”As damning that quoted company statement is, I would have to see the context, review the current data and see what else is going on. I find it hard to believe that they merely watched the Boric acid crust and used the crust as an excuse not to check things out.
This means that the Boric Acid / NaOH solution was exiting the Vessel Head: Prior to the development of the fist size hole, the acid was finding other points of egress, perhaps around a loose Rod nozzle ... maybe the result of maintenance occasionally hitting the nozzle causing hairline cracks.
One has to wonder too why the point of rust was just focused on a fist sized hole: Acid solution is not selective, but attacks whatever surface it touches. Once acid escapes the stainless steel liner it will migrate, under great pressure, to the entire vessel surface facing the reactor core. The rust damage should have been nearly uniform. For the damage to be located in a specific spot the size of a fist compared to nearly 15 feet of surface area is an improbable scenario. Something is not right about the report and/or Mr. Gilinsky’s interpretation of it.
Also not stated by Mr. Gilinsky is that the VP of Nuclear is personally liable for a $100,000 fine and 5 years in jail for failure to be proactive in discovering problems and then covering them over. The risk is too great to let that happen. Also individual plant workers, be they engineers, licensed control room operators, or maintenance workers are also liable for stiff fines and jail time for willfully allowing a serious problem to continue.
Certainly, if the plant operators were willing to cover over such a problem and take such a risk, then they would not make such an open admission of guilt. So, I find this entire point suspect until context and data are available, which they ill be in reports that will be made public.
Mr. Gilinsky’s quote of the company report seems odd taken out of context. It would be like a homeowner saying that they did not repair the roof because they could not see where the leaks were due to all the water running into the house. There is something very fishy with this. If Gilinsky is correct, then by all means shut the plant down for good, and start putting people in jail.
”That's not all. Some of the reactor vessel rust became airborne and clogged the reactor building's air filters. The filters had previously been changed monthly, but from 1999 on they had to be changed every other day. The company's report says the possibility of corrosion "was not recognized as a safety significant issue by the staff and management of the plant." Obviously the NRC, which had inspectors on site, did not recognize it either.”Unbelievable – literally! I am more curious to find out if the fist size hole was something else due to the nozzle being accidentally hit ... and the resulting damage appears as if the hole was caused by rust ... there is just something not right here, but I lack enough details outside Mr. Gilinsky’s statements and quotes to make any additional assessment on this aspect.
Also, if the Boric acid crust was covering all evidence of rust, how could the rust then escape from under the crust and clog the air filters? The rust must have already long been exposed at the surface level ... and the maintenance worker would not have had to bang any holes in the vessel head, for the evidence would be clear. There would also be evidence of rust particles on the crust surface, yet non are identified.
”How important is this? The reactor vessel head resembles a rounded lid that is bolted to the vessel. It's about 15 feet in diameter. The reactor vessel and the vessel head are designed and manufactured with exquisite care from special steel a half-foot thick (with the thin liner of stainless steel). The vessel and head of every reactor have to be monitored throughout their life to make sure that radiation has not caused the metal to become brittle. This is vital because the NRC licensed the plant on the assumption that a break in the reactor vessel is not credible. As a result, the reactor's safety analysis does not deal with breaks in the vessel wall.”FSAR and UFSAR: Each plant has what is called a Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and an Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) or similarly named updated report that its license is based on. The updated report modifies the licensing criteria when modifications and improvements are made to the plant, or corrective actions are taken to make it more conservative. For example, PWRs, like Davis Besse, the Steam Generator tubes have an allowable leak rate. As the Steam Generator ages, some tubes discovered to have inter-granular and stress corrosion cracking, can be sleeved internally ... this reduces flow rates, and efficiency in power production ... so the FSAR is updated to modify allowable leak rates and increase monitoring. This change modifies the licensing basis on which the NRC monitors for compliance.
Affect on other plants: Likely, Boiling Water Reactors (BWR) will not be affected. The Davis Besse plant, I believe is a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) because these use the heavy flat cover, and have overhead nozzles that operate the Control Rod Drives and use Boric Acid. So other PWR plants around the nation will be inspected for this situation of boric acid / sodium hydroxide leakage. Gilinsky is correct in saying that vessel breaks are not viewed as credible. A crack in the heavy steel construction of the outer vessel is not a credible given the actual heat and torturous path of radioactive particles to reach it and cause damage. But, he is incorrect in suggesting that a serious breach in not dealt with in the FSAR or UFSAR. While not specifically addressing the Reactor Vessel, the very fact that LOCA’s are addressed would include any point where coolant could be lost, resulting in shut down and continuous flooding of the reactor via one of the safety systems.
”The reactor's emergency actions operators are trained to cope with breaks in pipes, not the vessel. Some safety systems might work for such a break; then again they might not. The problem was not studied. There would likely be unforeseen complications.The rust that allegedly is caused by the Boric Acid crust is at the top of the Vessel Head. So the incident was not occurring at the Vessel side or bottom. This scenario is not accounted for, and is also not the problem at Davis Besse. Nevertheless, the Operators are most certainly trained to deal with a LOCA ... each operator has his/her license renewed every 90 days by passing rigid training of all systems operations, including safe shutdown of the Reactor during a LOCA. I have personally been through this program, successfully passed all operational testing including power up, normal and emergency shutdown, SCRAMs, LOCA and Safe Shutdown. I was never a licensed operator, but as part of my training, I had to go through this program so that my work on safe shutdown equipment was done with a complete understanding of these systems from design and operation.
Therefore. had the Nozzle ejected due to rust, or the Stainless Steel Liner breached and allowed coolant to jettison through the fist size rust hole, a LOCA alarm would have been initiated, and then the operators would have shut down the Reactor by procedure ... and the reactor would have been flooded until a safe cold shutdown was achieved. For Gilinsky to suggest that the Vessel treatment was not analyzed for such a breech, and therefore the operators are ill-equipped to deal with this is absurd. Notice that he allows for the fact that the safety systems may work ... but may not ... this suggests to me that he does not know or understand the safety-related systems, the training, and the testing that have been done to deal with a LOCA. Otherwise, he would absolutely know which systems would operate and then be able to say for a certainty whether they could cope with a LOCA originating from a hole in the top of the Vessel head.
”An obvious complication would involve malfunctioning of the control rod system that is supposed to stop the chain reaction in an emergency. There is no backup to the control rods for immediate shutdown.NOT TRUE!: Some older plants have 2 or 3 safety trains, but typically plants have 4 safety trains. The Control Rod Drive system is backed up. Assuming that a steamn jet damaged all 4 safety train electrical controls, then there is a fail-safe mechanical release on PWR’s for gravity drop of the rods in the event of a SCRAM during a LOCA. For Gilinsky to suggest that there is no back up betrays his ignorance at best. SCRAM stands for Safety Control Rod Ax Man, a term coined in the early days of testing small laboratory size reactors, where the test facility literally had rods suspended mechanically, and this could be released by a rope holding the device. The Ax man, in an emergency, would take an Ax and cut the safety rope that allowed the rods to instantly drop. The term was retained, and is used to this day to identify the emergency mechanical release of control rods. In BWRs the Control Rods move up from the bottom, and always have to be driven by the CRD mechanism. But BWRs would not have the type of problems that PWRs have as they run at lower temperatures and pressures. They are not exposed to the steam which would be at the top of the vessel in the internal steam compartment, similar in function to an external steam generator. This issue is clearly affecting only PWRs.
”The plant's safety analysis considers the possibility that a limited number of rods, out of several dozen, could fail to drop. The control rod adjacent to the rust hole would have been one of these. But what about the damage that might be caused to other control rod drives above the head if a hole in the vessel unleashed a jet of steam and water coming out of the pressurized vessel?”Credible Scenario? While the water would not pose any real issue, a steam jet out of the top of the Reactor Vessel Head “could” pose serious problems for the adjacent CRD’s (Control Rod Drives). This would be true if the trajectory of the steam was aimed in a way that would make a direct hit on the adjacent CRDs. This would be limited though, and the number of CRDs affected would be few. However, the mechanical SCRAM would still allow Rods to drop ... and the steam would not impede this process that I am aware of. I would need to check CRD design, but my recollection is that they are not very vulnerable as they are heavy equipment.
”A telling sign that the industry understands the seriousness of the Davis-Besse problem is the silence from the Nuclear Energy Institute, the industry's lobbying arm, which is usually quick to spin a nuclear story. All in all, what happened at Davis-Besse was a narrow escape.”I have never seen a ‘spin’ article come out of the nuclear industry. Typically, the nuclear industry is shy about making any public statements, pro or con with respect to such events. At Trojan Nuclear Plant, the utility owner, Portland General Electric, would not spend a great deal of money rebutting the anti-nuclear lobby, even when deliberate lies were told by the opposition. This greatly frustrated employees who knew good and damn well that these anti-nuclear lobbies were lying through their teeth to the public.
An example is a glossy brochure that I received in the mail accusing the Trojan operators of placing spent fuel rods on the banks of the Columbia river ... a deliberate, willful, malicious lie designed to deceive and scare the public ... they would say this during voting for Ballot Measures designed to close Trojan. Such measures came up every two years. Fortunately, the Oregon voters, by a consistent 60% to 70% majority, always voted to keep Trojan open. Trojan, by the way, is a PWR similar to Davis Besse and TMI.
Instead, the Industry tends to let itself be hurt by lies: Portland General Electric even had an anti-nuclear administrative worker who worked downtown, not in the nuclear department, who would go on TV ads during voting time and state his opposition to the company owning and operating a nuclear plant ... and cite events that he embellished in order to scare people ... yet the utility never took action against him. On the other hand, the utility would not permit plant-side workers and engineers from rebutting the falsehoods and embellishments and sensationalizing. I have seen this culture in more than one utility that owns and operates nuclear power plants.
“But that isn't the way the NRC has described it in public. The agency's spokesperson told the media that the rust hole didn't pose a safety threat. If the last bit of metal had failed and "allowed steam to escape," the NRC official said, safety systems would have immediately cooled the reactor. Anyway, he said, there would have been no danger to the public. "It's only when you get into the what-ifs that you would have had any leakage from the reactor cooling system." The man was talking through his hat. In reality, the NRC doesn't know what would have happened because the possibility has been considered too unlikely to plan for.”The NRC spokesperson was NOT “talking through his hat!” The NRC spokesperson was stating the truth, and Mr. Gilinsky cannot handle this as it refutes his obvious bias. A professional seeks the truth and withholds judgment until the facts are in. Yes, Davis Besse event might have been serious, and I cannot judge that, but given what Gilinsky says thus far, and the limited quotes he selects to make, tells me that it is even more important to withhold judgment until the Final Report is complete.
What if?: The NRC spokesperson clearly stated the ‘what if’ in the event that steam escaped, and the reactor would be shut down. The additional ‘what ifs’ deal with leakage from the cooling system ... yet this is what would likely happen if steam escaped, the hole is large enough for coolant to escape. It is called a LOCA, and yet Mr. Gilinsky walks all around that issue. It matters not that the LOCA initiates from the Vessel Head or a large pipe break ... loss of coolant is loss of coolant, no matter where is comes from. And the plant is designed with multiple safety trains to cope with a LOCA. The industry did learn from past errors.
”The failure to face up to reality reflects an unhealthy situation. Such spokesmen say what their bosses want them to say, and for several years, the NRC has been knocking itself out to please the industry. The situation worsened in 1998 when the NRC's Senate oversight committee, Environment and Public Works, with strong prompting from the industry association, threatened the NRC with a sharp budget cut. The NRC chairman got the message and revamped the agency's regulatory approach along the lines suggested by the industry. The current commission has by and large continued the same approach, but with a less experienced senior staff. The previous chairman had forced the resignation of the agency's most experienced and competent top officials, who had showed an unwelcome independence of mind.”No Mr. Gilinsky, this is not exactly what happened: The NRC finally got rid of less than objective idiots who had an anti-nuclear bias, who were lobbied by the anti-nuclear fear-mongers, and who had an agenda to shut down the nuclear industry at any little provocation. How can I say this?
Whistle-blower laws in the nuclear industry: Of all industries in the USA, the nuclear industry has the best and strongest “Whistle-Blower” laws. Any worker from a beginner apprentice through journeyman, from a new engineer to top engineering management, to the NRC, is highly protected. So much so, that many lay in wait for such events, make their reports and hope that someone tries to suppress it ... for they stand to gain huge monetary awards for being so injuriously inhibited to altar the truth. I have seen utilities face this. If, for example, an on site NRC inspector discovered the Vessel Head problem at Davis Besse, he would have been more than happy to make a big issue, as this would boost his/her career as a problem finder, and anyone who tried to blunt their findings would end up on the wrong side of the table in court spelling the word D-e-f-e-n-d-a-n-t!
The fact that the NRC spokesperson just freely told the truth, without sensationalism, tells me that there was nothing more to the issue than that. Had it been more, they would be more than happy to make a big case out of it. The media would be right there with plenty of journalists and TV talk show hosts milking it to death.
”Just before Davis-Besse's problem surfaced, the NRC gave the plant its quarterly rating under the new rating system. Davis-Besse got the top grade in all 18 categories. From my experience in two terms as an NRC commissioner, during which I visited most of the plants, including this one, I find it inconceivable that everything was fine at Davis-Besse except for one corrosion hole in the reactor vessel. If the plant managers let this problem go, they must have let others go, too. People working in nuclear plants are pretty smart and generally want to do a good job. But they stop asking questions about things that aren't right when they know what answer management is going to give them. At that point, danger lurks.”My above response about Whistle Blowers defeats this asinine statement by Mr. Gilinsky: It is also absurd to conclude, especially at this early stage that because one problem is identified, others must be there because one problem must somehow mean a sloppy-cover-up-mentality. Rather, it is because nuclear plant workers like their jobs that they want the plant to run right. The last thing a nuclear worker needs it to cover up a problem that would result in the permanent shutdown of the plant, ending their job.
The truth about management! In my years in nuclear power plant construction and operations, I have never once been told to give an answer to please top management, but rather it was demanded and rewarded if we told the blunt facts. At Trojan, during the period we were about to power up and go back on line, one of my test programs was Critical Path to that action ... and the top PGE officials, including the Vice President of Nuclear himself, held a meeting with the engineering staff. He set middle management aside to keep quiet so he could hear the raw truth from me ... I was grilled over and over ... and told it like is was ... My experience is one of many, and I have never found a single fellow employee at any plant who felt they could not speak the truth.
The only time an employee will hide the truth is when they screwed up and failed to follow proper procedure, and the incident is serious enough to warrant their termination. But even this is rare, because the vast majority of issues have multiple sets of eyes from various departments, such as Operations, Maintenance, Engineering, Quality Assurance, Security, Duty Fire Watch, Rad Protection, and Management at all levels – it is just too hard to hide problems, so the incentive is to report it within the Corrective Action system, and get it fixed. ... So, it becomes obvious that Mr. Gilinsky is blowing smoke up our collective asses, and betraying his lack of expertise in working in a nuclear plant and working out the problems that arise.
The Corrective Action programs at each nuclear site are enormous. Every employee, even administrative clerks are trained in this procedure, and are vehemently instructed over and over as part of retraining, to report any problem they observe and experience. Each plant has a team of experts who evaluate the safety impact of each Corrective Action submitted, and those that are obvious safety issues get top priority. If a even a clerk feels that their Corrective Action is not given proper attention, and feels it is a safety concern, they can appeal to the top management, and the NRC, and if necessary directly to Congressional over-site. You can believe that top management will never let it go that far, because they will bend over backwards to correct the problem, and satisfy the individual employee.
”The NRC has investigated and has now asked other plants to check to make sure they are not suffering from the Davis-Besse problem, but on an unhurried schedule.”If the Davis Besse event posed a serious urgency, the schedule would be hurried: What is not stated here is that the NRC does not see an immediate problem. If this were truly an immediate problem, the NRC would definitely require shutdown of all PWRs to inspect them. Because if the nuclear industry goes down, the NRC is out of a job, so they need plants to run safely and efficiently to help keep the industry healthy. Individuals in the NRC can be seriously sanctioned with criminal penalities if they hide the truth of such a serious event. Far better to shut down plants to inspect than to let a serious problem run amuck.
Therefore, each PWR can conduct this inspection during refueling outage or even an unscheduled outage. Better during the refueling outage, because they can remove the Vessel Head and inspect it thoroughly. Also, what Mr. Gilinsky fails to state is that the NRC puts out advisories and bulletins that warn of the problem, and I have no doubt that they would have told any PWR plant that already noticed acidic crust formations to shut down early ... but there is no reason to shut down plants that have not observed these problems.
Refueling cycles run anywhere from 12 to 24 months, but are often about every 18 months. Trojan had a 12 month refueling cycle. Refueling cycles are not on the same schedule around the nation, because it takes a specialty team to conduct them. These teams travel to various plants to conduct the refueling. So in the next 12 months, most PWRs will be refueled, and will be properly inspected for Boric acid crust formations on the vessel, and likely will be more thoroughly inspected throughout the plant, even though the NRC will not mandate this. Utilities want these plants to run properly. The workers at the plants do not want an accident.
To a greater extent than ever before we are relying for nuclear safety on the self-regulation of the nuclear operators. Most of them have done a good job, steadily improving their performance. But there are limits to the idea put forward by the industry that post-deregulation financial pressures make for better safety because the operators want to protect their investment. As we know, short-term bottom line orientation also leads some to overreaching, defer necessary modifications or neglect maintenance. Congress and NRC management need to acknowledge that private and public incentives differ.Here is a more clear alternative, one that reflects what is really going on: First, and foremost, even with a more objective and balanced NRC, the nuclear utilities do not regulate themselves. They are regulated by the NRC, Additionally, each State has its own regulatory body that has its own independent on-site inspectors. Even little Oregon with its one nuclear plant had its own nuclear regulatory laws, and on site inspectors.
The Industry decided to freeze design: From the early 1990s, nuclear plants were downsized, and modifications were put on hold or abandoned altogether. However, these were wish-list modifications, often created by the NRC and utility engineers so that they could keep their departments going, ever hiring more and more technical experts, building never ending budgets. Plant owners around the country decided that this had to be bought into a check and balance.
The Mods postponed or abandoned were not critical to the safety and operation of the plant. None of the system modifications necessary to correct problems or make necessary safety improvements in nuclear plants have ever been abandoned. But, there are still bound to be problems no matter how much work goes on. It is part of the risk ... but, it is a very low risk. Even Mr. Gilinsky TMI disaster, the worst case scenario for American nuclear plants, resulted in no loss of life, and would never have. That is the inherent design of western nuclear plants.
”The late Morris Udall, who as chairman of the House Interior Committee was the principal congressional overseer of the NRC in its early years, used to say that a forceful and respected NRC was an essential condition of nuclear power. It is still true.”No one disputes this ... and the NRC continues to be forceful. What took place in recent years was a roll back of abuses by an NRC run-a-muck with Keystone cops who trampled the civil rights of many nuclear power plant employees. The current NRC continues to be forceful and do its job, but now with greater balance as an independent regulatory body, and not as the government arm of the anti-nuclear lobby who sole mission is to end the nuclear industry, even with lies, distortions, and sensationalized fear-mongering.
Victor Gilinsky, a Washington-based consultant on energy, was an NRC commissioner from 1975 to 1984Note regarding Mr. Gilinsky: Personally, I am a big supporter of an active and healthy NRC who sticks to a mission of maintaining the health and safety of the public. I believe, however, that Mr. Gilinsky’s expressed views, while interesting, and perhaps partially correct, are nevertheless omitting important facts, using sensationalism, and reflect the days when the NRC was trying to be in the anti-nuclear public relations business. As a veteran of the nuclear business, I and my professional colleagues became very aware of which NRC Commissioners were honest and fair, and which ones cried wolf for their own self-serving interests.
Before I can accept Mr. Gilinsky’s implications that the nuclear utility industry is in bed with the current NRC, complicit in cutting safety corners, I have learned the hard way that all the facts need to be seen by several parties to improve the possibility that the results will be judged in an unbiased way ... with truth as the prime concern. If the truth is that Davis Besse operators ignored a serious and growing problem, then so be it, and report this to the public. If not, then report whatever the truth is, especially without spinning it pro or con regarding the performance of the utility’s staff or management.
Given Mr. Gilinsky’s comments as they are, omitting important facts that need consideration, such as the buffering of boric acid issue, the safety systems designed to deal with a LOCA, and misrepresenting relations between staff and management, and other problems associated with Mr. Gilinsky’s comments as discussed above, I am inclined to accept current NRC statements and wait until more facts are in evidence so that a more accurate conclusion may be drawn.