| At the heart of every successful relationship theres a mystery. But few, surely, hold such mystery as the lonely coupling of George Bush and Tony Blair. They represent many opposites: reluctant politician, earnest striver; plain-spoken reserve, articulate guile; 1960s conformist, counter-culture dabbler; realist, idealist; gut, brain. I cant imagine that many people, two years ago, would have bet on Blairs becoming Bushs closest ally in world politics. Blair, after all, was chummy with Bill Clinton, a man George W has come to disdain. And Bushs breezy style, doggedness and lack of curiosity are not qualities known to endear him to liberal elites among which Blair is so effortlessly at home. But there you are. Events have thrown them together; or, rather, events have unveiled shared convictions that increasingly make the Bush-Blair relationship a pivot around which the rest of the world turns. In Britain some describe Blair as Bushs poodle. But from the American perspective, Blairs role is more like a literate pit bull. From the beginning of the war on terror, Blair emerged as Americans favourite foreign leader, the one figure who seemed genuinely to understand the gravity of what had happened and could articulate as forcefully as Americans. His appearance in the gallery at Bushs September 20 speech to Congress last year resonated widely and must surely have made an impact on him as well. In subsequent months Blair could go into the reasons for the new war in ways that Bush couldnt outside of set speeches. Bushs occasional aloofness from public debate meant his administration often lost the 24-hour news cycle spin. But the constantly arguing Blair filled, and fills, the gaps. Blair was smart enough to realise two fundamental things. The first is the mood of the American public. Many outsiders still dont fully appreciate that the steeliness of Bushs war on terror is not entirely a function of his leadership, but also of his followership his sense that this is what Americans, deep down, demand. Blair, with his acute antennae for public mood, probably saw that war was inevitable and that this time Americans were in no mood to compromise. So he calculated that his interests lay in joining the hegemon, not opposing it. Blairs second intuition was that with Bush, the most important element is personal rapport and trust. He sensed that an intimate bond with Bush would give the British prime minister more influence than any other world leader in the post-September 11 world. The deliberate approach to the Afghanistan war, the ultimatum to the Taliban, the use of the Northern Alliance and subsequent commitment to more ambitious nation-building than Bush had been comfortable with all this was directly affected by Blairs convictions on the subject. Blairs recent high point in influence was Bushs UN speech outlining the case against Iraq. In the August heat, as the administration internally debated political and diplomatic strategy, it was Blairs insistence on going through the UN that gave extra impetus to the administrations final tactical decision. The only reason his voice was taken so seriously was because his loyalty had already been proven. This is some achievement. The prime minister has unequalled clout with the president and also unusually large influence with other world leaders, with whom he is playing a longer, subtler game. Few countries will have the same economic leverage over a post-Saddam Iraq than Britain; none will have any say in military or diplomatic strategy in coming months as Britain will. If the war is successful, Britain will have a key role as adjunct to the hyperpower that will be reorienting the balance of power in the entire Middle East. For Bush, Blair is a very useful, perhaps even indispensable, domestic tool. Without him it would be far easier for the Democrats to portray the president as a reckless provocateur. But where Blair really comes in handy is in persuading wobbly American elites especially liberal ones that the case for war is not necessarily a conservative one. Blair reminds American liberals of their own principles. When he describes the way Saddam gassed his own citizens, invaded his neighbours, fomented terrorism around the globe and now aims to develop chemical, biological and nuclear arms, American liberals hear a strong voice speaking their own language in the pursuit of security. This matters. As Slate magazine recently said: Since September 11 of last year, Tony Blair has roamed the globe in support of the US-led war on terror. Hes travelled to India, to Pakistan, to Israel, Syria, Egypt and elsewhere and served as an intermediary between President Bush and European leaders. But overlooked has been the boost (Blairs) backing gives Bush within the United States, by virtue of his appeal to American liberal elites and intellectuals. Blair isnt just Bushs ambassador to the world hes Bushs ambassador to America. The American right is also impressed. In its opinionated citadels, Blair is praised as one of the few leaders who gets it, who sees why America feels differently about external threats after September 11, and understands the presidents commitment to combating terrorism wherever it lurks. Blair is also the only foreign leader to repeatedly excoriate anti-Americanism and its role in driving the cause for appeasing Saddam. Combine that with liberals respect for his principles of international collective action and you have a prime minister with more sway over American elites than even Thatcher had. All of which makes the next phase in the war on terror a riveting spectacle. The Bush-Blair alliance has so far been a relatively easy one. But Saddams familiar gamesmanship with inspectors has added a new twist and could split the war-phobic UN. Last week, it was the Blair governments dismissal of the Iraqi letter that won headlines in America and helped solidify the White Houses message. Once again, Blair provided key rhetorical and moral support. But Blairs policy of going through the UN to force Iraqi compliance is hazardous. If the security council splits, if many countries oppose a swift imposition of UN resolutions on Iraq, Blair will have to choose. Go it alone with the Americans, or run for cover? Blair wants to finesse these choices, as does the White House. It might not be easy, and would come down to what is, perhaps, the simple linchpin of the Bush-Blair connection: the conviction that we are involved in a profound global struggle in which Saddams regime is clearly on the side of evil. Bush believes this and so does Blair. Perhaps its reading the classified reports of Saddams tyranny, its Hitlerian brutality and moral shamelessness, that has convinced Blair of this. Perhaps his Christian faith, shared with Bush, acknowledges that there are times when evil cannot be appeased, ignored or simply forgotten. But both men clearly hold that there are times when political leaders must act simply because it is the right and moral thing to do, moments when conscience matters in fact, when conscience is the only thing that matters. This core conviction is what will keep Blair and Bush together in the coming difficult and dark months. The forging of a new and potent Anglo-American relationship for the next century could well be the result. END. Englishman . | 
