To cofty
You didn't choose a third option. Logically there is no third option. You just don't understand the question.
I understand the dilemma perfectly, both horns fail. Where in the equation does it state that I am limited to two choices, especially when both are wrong? Same as gambling, knowing that the game is stacked against you.
You chose Divine Command Theory which is one of the two options.
Need to go back and read again. Both horns of the dilemma addresses the DCT.
According to divine command theory, things are morally good or bad, or morally obligatory, permissible, or prohibited, solely because of God’s will or commands.
If the theist gives the first answer to the Euthyphro dilemma, holding that morally good acts are willed by God because they are morally good, then he faces the independence problem; if morally good acts are willed by God because they are morally good, then they must be morally good prior to and so independently of God’s willing them.
If the theist gives the second answer to the Euthyphro dilemma, holding that morally good acts are morally good because they are willed by God, then he faces the
The arbitrariness problem is the problem that divine command theory appears to base morality on mere whims of God. If divine command theory is true, it seems, then God’s commands can neither be informed nor sanctioned by morality. How, though, can such morally arbitrary commands be the foundation of morality?
The emptiness problem is that on the divine command analysis of moral goodness, statements like “God is good” and “God’s commands are good” are rendered empty tautologies: “God acts in accordance with his commands” and “God’s commands are in accordance with his commands”.
The problem of abhorrent commands is that divine command theory appears to entail that if God were to command abhorrent acts—malicious deception, wanton cruelty, etc.—those acts would become morally good. {Philosophy of Religion]
My answer is simple
We do not need to refute either of the two horns of this dilemma because the dilemma it presents is a false. There is a third alternative, namely God wills something because He is good. What I mean by that? I mean that God’s own nature is the standard of goodness, His commandments to us are expressions of His nature.
So moral values are not independent of God because God's character defines what is good. His nature His moral standards define good and bad.
The morally good or bad is determined by God's nature,
The morally right and wrong is determined by God's will.
God wills something because God is good, if something is right because God wills it.
That means that when god commands his people to take slaves and commit infanticide you are obliged to declare such actions as morally perfect.
I will explain more about slavery and infanticide shortly. You have totally missed the point.
I addressed slavery in ancient times, the laws were to protect the slave. As to infanticide why bring it up if you have nothing to show for it. BTW the one that keeps missing the point is you. Suggest you research your material.