Following are some #'d paragraphs of the Judges words, with my "Blondie-Style" comments in red.
[8] Bethany was discharged from the Alberta Children’s Hospital in Calgary on July 13, 2002. She was placed under the care of the defendant doctors Turner and Belch at the Cross Cancer Institute in Edmonton. They tried treatments (arsenic trioxide and Vitamin C) that did not involve blood transfusions. Further treatment at the Cross Cancer Institute was unsuccessful, and Bethany died on September 5 , 2002.
In July 02, WT attorneys convince judge to get her into Turner & Belch. The WT attorneys probably also convinced the Turner doctors to try arsenic! Bethany stops the blood transfusions, takes arsenic, then died. HMMMMM????? Fishier than a large mouth bass to me.
[35] The statement of claim pleads misrepresentation and deceit, which are well established causes of action. The particular misrepresentation is alleged to be that the defendants told Bethany that "blood transfusions . . . would not help cure her cancer and intentionally misstated to Bethany that a chemotherapy/blood transfusion treatment protocol for her leukemia was experimental when in fact it was not" (Statement of Claim, para. 27(a)).
The WT says chemotherapy/blood transfusions are experimental???? WTF???? Arsenic is experimental!!!!! Is the world still flat, Brady?
The use of the word "intentional" is interesting. If found to be true and given arsenic, then Alberta Police may be able to try "negligent homicide" or the Canadian equal.
[36]....Freedom of religion does not include any right to impose religious beliefs on third parties.
The WT imposes it's blood doctrine through the use of disfellowshipping and shunning, WT appointed attorneys who will report back to other elders if the patient takes blood, and a gestapo hospital liasion. While the court held that Canada does not have "undue coercion", I think the court left the door open for Lawrence to argue "imposes".
[37] Freedom of religion is subject to those limitations that are justifiable in a free and democratic society. The boundaries of freedom of religion are too unclear to warrant striking out this pleading. It is not at all clear to what extent a religious adherent can convince another person to take actions for religious reasons that will cause him or her bodily harm or even death, even if the religious belief is sincerely held. Assume, as an example, that a religious adherent persuades a third party diabetic that he or she should stop taking insulin, and that divine intervention will cure him or her. Assume further that the diabetic follows this advice and dies as a result. Can it be said that the estate of the deceased would have no cause of action against the religious adherent? If the religious adherent withheld antibiotics from a sick person, either in favour of a divine healing, or in favour of traditional herbal remedies, is the religious adherent immune from an action if the patient dies? Cases such as
R.B. v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto , [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 at paras. 86, 107, 114, 212-7, 225-6; R. v. Tutton , [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1392; R. v. Canhoto (1999), 127 O.A.C. 147, 140 C.C.C. (3d) 321; B. (V.) v. Cairns (2003), 65 O.R. (3d) 343 at para. 139; Rex v. Elder , [1925] 3 D.L.R. 447, [1925] 2 W.W.R. 545, 35 Man. R. 161, 44 C.C.C. 75 (C.A.); R. v. Brooks (1902), 9 B.C.R. 13, 5 C.C.C. 372 (Ct. Crim. App.); and R. v. Lewis (1903), 6 O.L.R. 132, 7 C.C.C. 261 (C.A.) show that the answer to these questions is far from clear.
The court is saying that Jim Jones would not have been protected. Neither should the WT Society.
[38] It might be that the Charter protected right of freedom of religion would protect actions of this sort if they are honestly held. It might be argued at trial that there is no reasonable limit that would be recognized in a free and democratic society that would prevent the religious dherent from giving such medical advice. It is not, however, appropriate to decide such difficult questions in a motion to strike out pleadings. Whether religious views provide a defence to or justification for misrepresentations that cause bodily harm or death should only be decided on a full factual record. It is not "plain and obvious" that a sincerely held religious belief would be an answer to a claim where application of the religious doctrine is said to have caused a death.
Full factual record = trial by jury or judge. Who thinks the WT wants to go to a trial with a jury of non-JWs, including Catholics?
Application = action. The court is saying that people can have internal thougths & beliefs, but when those beliefs turn into action, then the government can step in. What if the belief is suicide bombings by Muslims? When the consequence of the application of the religious belief is killing or bodily harm, the Canadian government can not allow it. Neither a suicide bomber or Shane Brady can use "religious belief" after killing another with bombs or arsenic.
[39] In any event, the pleadings will not require any examination of the "truth" of the respondents’ beliefs about blood transfusions. The misrepresentations pleaded are that it was falsely represented (i) that blood transfusions are an experimental treatment, and (ii) that blood transfusion treatment is ineffective. There is no indication on the record that either of these topics are the subject of any religious belief of the respondents. The record indicates that the respondents are opposed to transfusions as a matter of faith, not because they are experimental or ineffective.
When the WT states medical facts, they are not talking about religious beliefs. The WT can be sued for misstating medical facts.
[40] While the claims in misrepresentation cannot be struck, it must be made clear that the objective validity of the belief of the respondents that blood transfusions are prohibited by scripture is not an issue in this litigation, will not be the subject of discovery or production, and will not be an issue at trial. This is so even though the respondents may raise their sincerely held religious beliefs as a defence or justification.
Can't bring up Acts/Noah law in court.
[41] The chambers judge also struck the allegations of misrepresentation on the basis that no particulars were provided as required by Rule 115. A pleading that discloses a cause of action, but Page: 10 is perhaps deficient through a lack of particulars, should not be struck out under Rule 129 without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to provide particulars. In any event, it is not clear what particulars are missing. The substance of the misrepresentations is well stated. The pleading deposes that the misrepresentations were made between February 15 , 2002 and July 29 , 2002. If the respondents th th believe other particulars are required, and that they are prejudiced by any alleged lack of particulars, the appropriate application can be brought.
....
[44] The lawyer respondents argue that they were not counsel for Bethany after July 2002. That is a question of fact, but in any event the statement of claim (paras. 19(a), 27 (a) and (f)) alleges misrepresentations as early as February 2002. The exact scope of the allegations (especially considering the possibility of amendment to clarify the remaining allegations now that large portions have been struck) is not sufficiently clear to justify striking these pleadings. If the misrepresentations started in February, 2002, and continued through the period of transfusions, their effect in the period following the end of the transfusions is not plain and obvious.
What Shane Brady misrepresented (see above) on Bethany betwen Feb 15, 2002 and July 29, 2002 colored her mind and effected her may have lingered until her death. While I was not at the trial, I wonder if Shane argued that WT misreprensentations were done before Bethany died, therefore WT can't be held accountable as Bethany was making her own decisions after July 2002 up through her death. This is the yellow bellied snake argument. Disgusting book publishing cult, this is. I think the court is disgusted at this weak argument. Everyone can see through it.
Skeeter
