Attacks on U.S. Forces Highest Since Surge Began

nvrgnbk

Just proves we are winning!
LOL!
IRAQI OFFENSIVE
Attacks on U.S. Forces Soared at End of March
Government Assault On Shiite Militias Drew Americans In
By Sudarsan Raghavan Washington Post Foreign Service
Wednesday, April 2, 2008; Page A12
BAGHDAD, April 1 -- Attacks against U.S. troops and Iraqi security forces soared across Baghdad in the last week of March to the highest levels since the deployment of additional U.S. troops here reached full strength last June, according to U.S. military data and analysis.

The sharp spike in attacks, in response to an ill-prepared Iraqi government offensive in the southern city of Basra last week, underscores the fragility of the U.S. military's hard-won security gains in Iraq and how easily those gains can be erased.
"Last week was clearly a bad week and shows the tenuous nature of security, which is something we've been stressing for some time now," Navy Rear Adm. Gregory J. Smith, the U.S. military's chief spokesman, wrote in an e-mail response to questions. "Security in Iraq is not irreversible, and any number of actors can affect the level of violence if and when they choose to."
Over the week that began March 25, when the offensive began in Basra, there were 728 attacks against U.S. coalition forces, Iraqi security forces and civilians across Iraq, according to U.S. military data obtained by The Washington Post. Of these, 430 -- or almost 60 percent of the attacks -- occurred in Baghdad, the major focus of last year's buildup of 30,000 additional U.S. troops. The forces have begun to withdraw, and the rest are to be gone by the end of July.
In comparison, the average weekly attack rate in Baghdad last June was 326 attacks, according to U.S. military statistics.
By Monday, a day after Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr ordered his Mahdi Army militiamen to lay down their arms, the attacks quickly subsided close to levels seen before the government offensive.
On March 23 and 24, the two days before the offensive began, there were, respectively, 42 and 38 attacks across Iraq. On each of those days, there were only 14 attacks in Baghdad. Over the next few days, attacks in the capital spiked to as many as six times that number.
The rapid containment of the fighting suggests that the "surge" of U.S. forces is but one factor in bringing down violence in Iraq and that in Shiite areas, a cease-fire imposed by Sadr on his militiamen last August may be more significant.
The reduction in violence across Iraq on Monday, which appeared to continue Tuesday, also highlights the power Sadr wields on Iraq's streets and the control he exerts over much of his militia, despite assertions by U.S. military commanders that the cleric's movement has been weakened by the buildup.
The figures and analysis offer more evidence of how swiftly U.S. forces were drawn into a power struggle unfolding between Sadr and rival Shiite groups that lead Iraq's government, mainly Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's Dawa party and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, led by Abdul Aziz-Hakim.
The data, said U.S. military officials who provided the information on condition of anonymity because it was not authorized for release, are a preliminary but thorough accounting that could be readjusted slightly.
The data include attacks against U.S. troops, Iraqi security forces and civilians. U.S. forces bore the brunt of those attacks last week, suggesting that they were taking the lead combat role in many areas or were perceived by Mahdi Army fighters to be taking the lead. The data square with on-the-ground reports that American soldiers were involved in battles and were being targeted with roadside bombs, rocket-propelled grenades and other weapons in many Shiite enclaves of Baghdad.
During one 24-hour period -- beginning at 9 p.m. Friday -- 77 attacks were mounted in Baghdad. They included 12 roadside bombs detonated and six found before they exploded. There were six mortar attacks, six rocket-propelled grenade attacks and six rocket attacks. There were also 21 attacks involving multiple weapons, most by Shiite fighters targeting patrols in the neighborhoods of New Baghdad and Karrada.
In interviews, some Mahdi Army commanders and fighters said they saw the Basra offensive as an opportunity to attack U.S. troops in Baghdad after nearly a year of standing down under Sadr's orders.
"It was a big happiness," said Khadim al-Saadi, a Mahdi Army leader in Sadr City, where many of the fiercest battles against U.S. troops occurred. "The main reason for the degradation of our lives is the presence of the occupiers on our land."
A senior U.S. military official, using an acronym for the Mahdi Army, said, "This one-week spike in violence and the subsequent decrease, it has everything to do with Sadr and his control over mainstream JAM." He said Iran also played a role in brokering the deal between Sadr and the Iraqi government that led to Sadr's statement ordering his men to lay down their arms.
In Sadr City on Tuesday, conditions remained tense. A curfew was still in effect there, though it had been lifted over most of the rest of Baghdad, and U.S. forces continued to patrol the vast Shiite district.
Mahdi Army commanders said fighters had withdrawn from the streets. But Saadi warned that if U.S. troops remained, the situation could quickly change. "For every action, there's a reaction," he said.
In Basra, life continued to return to the streets. Traffic moved freely. Government offices began to reopen, although schools and universities remained closed.
Still, police braced for more violence. "There is a condition of unstableness and suspense that a new attack might by implemented by the JAM militants," a police official said on condition of anonymity.
"I'm not optimistic about this calmness," said Usama Abdul Rahman, 35, a government employee. "It is the silence that precedes the storm."
Special correspondents Aahad Ali in Basra and K.I. Ibrahim, Naseer Nouri and Dalya Hassan in Baghdad contributed to this report.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/01/AR2008040103165.html?hpid=artslot
Gopher

Last week, right after Bush and McCain were talking about successes in Iraq, Baghdad and the American 'green zone' became the focus of the heaviest insurgent attacks yet. "Duck and cover" was the catch-phrase inside the supposedly impervious green zone. What the hell does Bush mean by success or progress?
None of the Bush Administration's standards of success have been met in ANY meaningful way. Ever since 2003, Bush and his team keep moving back the goal posts of "success". It is obvious they never had intention of getting out, success or not (in spite of what was told the American people). America is losing a war it has no business in. America is stirring up outrage just by being there, and in effect creating more terrorists who communicate and incite each other to hatred over the Internet (and we know how volatile Internet forums can be).
I hope this war becomes and stays the primary issue of the American presidential campaign. If America had invested hundreds of billions of dollars in energy independence instead of this stupid military action, it'd be so much farther ahead.
nvrgnbk
If America had invested hundreds of billions of dollars in energy independence instead of this stupid military action, it'd be so much farther ahead.
So true, Gopher.
Here's an early 2007 article about the cost of the war.
One recent projection puts the total cost at close to $3 trillion.
What $1.2 Trillion Can Buy
By DAVID LEONHARDT Published: January 17, 2007
The human mind isn’t very well equipped to make sense of a figure like $1.2 trillion. We don’t deal with a trillion of anything in our daily lives, and so when we come across such a big number, it is hard to distinguish it from any other big number. Millions, billions, a trillion — they all start to sound the same.

Skip to next paragraph
Multimedia

Graphic
Putting the Annual Cost of War in Perspective
Related
Reader Responses (January 17, 2007)

More on the Economics of the Iraq War:
The analysis by Scott Wallsten and Katrina Kosec is available here. Since it was published, they have increased some of their cost estimates.
The analysis by Linda Bilmes and Joseph Stiglitz appeared in the Milken Institute Review and is available here.
Likewise, some of their cost estimates — like those covering health care and disability payments for veterans — have risen since the article appeared.
At the outset of the war, William Nordhaus, an economist at Yale, wrote an essay examining why countries typically underestimate the cost of wars.
The way to come to grips with $1.2 trillion is to forget about the number itself and think instead about what you could buy with the money. When you do that, a trillion stops sounding anything like millions or billions.
For starters, $1.2 trillion would pay for an unprecedented public health campaign — a doubling of cancer research funding, treatment for every American whose diabetes or heart disease is now going unmanaged and a global immunization campaign to save millions of children’s lives.
Combined, the cost of running those programs for a decade wouldn’t use up even half our money pot. So we could then turn to poverty and education, starting with universal preschool for every 3- and 4-year-old child across the country. The city of New Orleans could also receive a huge increase in reconstruction funds.
The final big chunk of the money could go to national security. The recommendations of the 9/11 Commission that have not been put in place — better baggage and cargo screening, stronger measures against nuclear proliferation — could be enacted. Financing for the war in Afghanistan could be increased to beat back the Taliban’s recent gains, and a peacekeeping force could put a stop to the genocide in Darfur.
All that would be one way to spend $1.2 trillion. Here would be another:
The war in Iraq.
In the days before the war almost five years ago, the Pentagon estimated that it would cost about $50 billion. Democratic staff members in Congress largely agreed. Lawrence Lindsey, a White House economic adviser, was a bit more realistic, predicting that the cost could go as high as $200 billion, but President Bush fired him in part for saying so.
These estimates probably would have turned out to be too optimistic even if the war had gone well. Throughout history, people have typically underestimated the cost of war, as William Nordhaus, a Yale economist, has pointed out.
But the deteriorating situation in Iraq has caused the initial predictions to be off the mark by a scale that is difficult to fathom. The operation itself — the helicopters, the tanks, the fuel needed to run them, the combat pay for enlisted troops, the salaries of reservists and contractors, the rebuilding of Iraq — is costing more than $300 million a day, estimates Scott Wallsten, an economist in Washington.
That translates into a couple of billion dollars a week and, over the full course of the war, an eventual total of $700 billion in direct spending.
The two best-known analyses of the war’s costs agree on this figure, but they diverge from there. Linda Bilmes, at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, and Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel laureate and former Clinton administration adviser, put a total price tag of more than $2 trillion on the war. They include a number of indirect costs, like the economic stimulus that the war funds would have provided if they had been spent in this country.
Mr. Wallsten, who worked with Katrina Kosec, another economist, argues for a figure closer to $1 trillion in today’s dollars. My own estimate falls on the conservative side, largely because it focuses on the actual money that Americans would have been able to spend in the absence of a war. I didn’t even attempt to put a monetary value on the more than 3,000 American deaths in the war.
Besides the direct military spending, I’m including the gas tax that the war has effectively imposed on American families (to the benefit of oil-producing countries like Iran, Russia and Saudi Arabia). At the start of 2003, a barrel of oil was selling for $30. Since then, the average price has been about $50. Attributing even $5 of this difference to the conflict adds another $150 billion to the war’s price tag, Ms. Bilmes and Mr. Stiglitz say.
The war has also guaranteed some big future expenses. Replacing the hardware used in Iraq and otherwise getting the United States military back into its prewar fighting shape could cost $100 billion. And if this war’s veterans receive disability payments and medical care at the same rate as veterans of the first gulf war, their health costs will add up to $250 billion. If the disability rate matches Vietnam’s, the number climbs higher. Either way, Ms. Bilmes says, “It’s like a miniature Medicare.”
In economic terms, you can think of these medical costs as the difference between how productive the soldiers would have been as, say, computer programmers or firefighters and how productive they will be as wounded veterans. In human terms, you can think of soldiers like Jason Poole, a young corporal profiled in The New York Times last year. Before the war, he had planned to be a teacher. After being hit by a roadside bomb in 2004, he spent hundreds of hours learning to walk and talk again, and he now splits his time between a community college and a hospital in Northern California.
Whatever number you use for the war’s total cost, it will tower over costs that normally seem prohibitive. Right now, including everything, the war is costing about $200 billion a year.
Treating heart disease and diabetes, by contrast, would probably cost about $50 billion a year. The remaining 9/11 Commission recommendations — held up in Congress partly because of their cost — might cost somewhat less. Universal preschool would be $35 billion. In Afghanistan, $10 billion could make a real difference. At the National Cancer Institute, annual budget is about $6 billion.
“This war has skewed our thinking about resources,” said Mr. Wallsten, a senior fellow at the Progress and Freedom Foundation, a conservative-leaning research group. “In the context of the war, $20 billion is nothing.”
As it happens, $20 billion is not a bad ballpark estimate for the added cost of Mr. Bush’s planned surge in troops. By itself, of course, that price tag doesn’t mean the surge is a bad idea. If it offers the best chance to stabilize Iraq, then it may well be the right option.
But the standard shouldn’t simply be whether a surge is better than the most popular alternative — a far-less-expensive political strategy that includes getting tough with the Iraqi government. The standard should be whether the surge would be better than the political strategy plus whatever else might be accomplished with the $20 billion.
This time, it would be nice to have that discussion before the troops reach Iraq.

[email protected]
BurnTheShips

The Sunni Al-Qaeda forces have largely been contained.
It appears that the Shia militants are being dealt with now in the south and in the Shia parts of Baghdad.
The increase in attacks is related to a U.S. offensive, and not necessarily a change in the situation. When you engage a foe, attacks increase.
The wording of article in parts appears to try to spin this as a failure of Gen Petraeus' strategy, which in reality has been enormously successful.
From the article:
By Monday, a day after Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr ordered his Mahdi Army militiamen to lay down their arms, the attacks quickly subsided close to levels seen before the government offensive.
And buried farther downpage:
The rapid containment of the fighting suggests that the "surge" of U.S. forces is but one factor in bringing down violence in Iraq and that in Shiite areas, a cease-fire imposed by Sadr on his militiamen last August may be more significant.
That part right there makes it look like Sadr's ceasefire and not the U.S. strategy that is taking effect. If Sadr thought his militia could secure a military victory, he would never have ceasefired.
More:

Return to the Article

April 02, 2008
Whittling Away at Sadr
ByAustin Bay
After his outlaw militiamen raised white flags and skedaddled from their latest round of combat with the Iraqi Army, radical Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr declared victory.
He always does. He understands media bravado. He wagers that survival bandaged by bombast and swathed in sensational headlines is a short-term triumph. Survive long enough, and Sadr bets he will prevail.
This time, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki issued a contrarian press release, however, calling the Iraqi Army's anti-militia operations in southern Iraq a "success."
A dispute over casualties in the firefights has ensued, as it always does. An Iraqi Interior Ministry spokesman alleged that Sadr's militia had been hit hard in six days of fighting, suffering 215 dead, 155 arrested and approximately 600 wounded. The government spokesman gave no casualty figures for Iraqi security forces.
No one, of course, could offer an independent confirmation, but if the numbers are accurate they provide an indirect confirmation of reports that Sadr's Mahdi Militia (Jaish al-Mahdi, hence the acronym JAM) had at least a couple thousand fighters scattered throughout southern Iraq. This is not shocking news, but a reason to launch a limited offensive when opportunity appeared.
Numbers, however, are a very limited gauge. The firefights, white flags, media debate and, for that matter, the Iraqi-led anti-militia offensive itself are the visible manifestations of a slow, opaque and occasionally violent political and psychological struggle that in the long term is likely democratic Iraq's most decisive: the control, reduction and eventual elimination of Shia gangs and terrorists strongly influenced if not directly supported by Iran.
Other Shia militia and gangs confront Iraq, but Sadr is the most vexing case. His father, a leading Shia cleric, was murdered -- many Iraqis believe at the order of Saddam Hussein. That makes his father a political and religious symbol.
And Sadr knows it. So do his financiers.
For four years, the U.S.-led coalition and the Iraqi government have intermittently sparred with Sadr, sometimes in parliament, sometimes in the streets.
The Iraqi government's strategy has been to bring former insurgents into the political process. Since interim Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi articulated that goal in mid-2004, the central government's complex array of enemies has sought to thwart that program.
Saddam's old cohorts managed to convince themselves that if they spread enough money around, killed enough people and hammered the U.S. electorate with bloody headlines the United States would leave and the Iraqi government would eventually collapse -- and they would return to power. Saddam's capture, trial and execution has all but snuffed out the old-line Baathists. Recall Maliki stoutly defended his decision to carry out the court's sentence of capital punishment. He bet with Saddam dead the tyrant's cult of personality would wither. It has.
Al-Qaida pursued the same strategy of blood for headlines. Al-Qaida in Iraq tried to ignite a sectarian war -- its now-dead emir, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, made that goal explicit in February 2004. Al-Qaida massacred en masse, to the point that U.S. Sen. Harry Reid (D for Defeatist) declared the war in Iraq lost. Then, the Sunni tribes in Anbar turned on al-Qaida. Sunni political integration is by no means complete, but al-Qaida has failed.
Now the Shia-led Iraqi government focuses on its chief Shia nemesis. How the Iraqi government handles Sadr matters. In August 2004, Sadr's thugs grabbed the Grand Mosque in Najaf. Sadr was counting on Americans to bomb the mosque. The United States opted to follow the political lead of Shia Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Sistani's aides told coalition officers: "Let us deal with Sadr. We know how to handle him and will do so. However, the coalition must not make him a martyr."
The Iraqi way often appears to be indecisive, until you learn to look at its counter-insurgency methods in the frame of achieving political success, instead of the frame of American presidential elections.
In southern Iraq and east Baghdad, Sadr once again lost street face. Despite the predictable media umbrage, this translates into political deterioration.
Think of the Iraqi anti-Sadr method as a form of suffocation, a political war waged with the blessing of Ayatollah Sistani that requires daily economic and political action, persistent police efforts and occasional military thrusts.

Copyright 2008, Creators Syndicate Inc.

Page Printed from: http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/04/whittling_away_at_sadr.html at April 02, 2008 - 07:16:22 AM PDT

BurnTheShips

The Basra Business
What we know and what we don't.
by Frederick W. Kagan
& Kimberly Kagan
04/01/2008 5:01:00 PM

MUCH OF THE DISCUSSION about recent Iraqi operations against illegal Shia militias has focused on issues about which we do not yet know enough to make sound judgments, overlooking important conclusions that are already clear. Coming days and weeks will provide greater insight into whether Maliki or Sadr gained or lost from this undertaking; how well or badly the Iraqi Security Forces performed; and what kind of deal (if any) the Iraqi Government accepted in return for Sadr's order to stand down his forces. The following lists provide a brief summary of what we can say with confidence about recent operations and what we cannot.

What We Know:

* The legitimate Government of Iraq and its legally-constituted security forces launched a security operation against illegal, foreign-backed, insurgent and criminal militias serving leaders who openly call for the defeat and humiliation of the United States and its allies in Iraq and throughout the region. We can be ambivalent about the political motivations of Maliki and his allies, but we cannot be ambivalent about the outcome of this combat between our open allies and our open enemies.

* The Sadrists and Special Groups failed to set Iraq alight despite their efforts--Iraqi forces kept the Five Cities area (Najaf, Karbala, Hillah, Diwaniyah, and Kut) under control with very little Coalition assistance; Iraqi and Coalition forces kept Baghdad under control.

* Sadr never moved to return to Iraq, ordered his forces to stop fighting without achieving anything, and further demonstrated his dependence on (and control by) Iran.

* Maliki demonstrated a surprising and remarkable commitment to fighting Iranian-backed Special Groups, Sadr's Jaish al Mahdi (the Mahdi Army, or JAM), and even criminal elements of JAM. The Iraqi Government has loudly declared that "enforcing the law" applies to Shia areas as well as Sunni. Maliki has called Shia militias "worse than al Qaeda." These are things we've been pressing him to do for nearly two years.

* We've said all along that we did not think the ISF was ready to take care of the security situation on its own. Maliki was overconfident and overly-optimistic. But for those who keep pressing the Iraqis to "step up," here's absolute proof that they are willing. Are we willing to support them when they do what we demand? Can anyone reasonably argue that they will do better if we pull out completely?

* On March 30, Sadr ordered his followers to stop fighting. This decision contrasts with his 2004 decision to fight on, and his continued presence in Iran combined with this surrender results from weakness, rather than strength.

* The ISF operation did not clear Basra or destroy either Special Groups or the Mahdi Army.

* But the ISF performed remarkably well, moving numerous units to Basra on short notice, establishing them in the city, engaging in hard fighting, and stopping only when Sadr caved.

* Special Groups launched concerted attacks in Baghdad and in the Five Cities area (the Shia heartland), but were repulsed by ISF forces acting almost alone in the Five Cities area and by a combination of ISF and Coalition forces in Baghdad.

* Throughout the operation, the Iraqi Government acted calmly and purposefully, the ISF reported for duty (the number of reported "defectors" etc. was trivial compared to the tens of thousands of forces that fought loyally), moved and fought as directed, mostly with minimal Coalition support.

What We Don't Know

* Why did Maliki launch the operation when he did?

* What was his precise aim? He continually spoke about fighting "criminal elements," but then issued an ultimatum for the disarmament of all JAM (a task clearly beyond the means of the forces he sent to Basra).

* How well did the ISF fight in Basra and, in general, what actually happened there? The absence of partnered Coalition Forces in the city makes it extremely difficult to understand the nature of the fighting and the Iraqi forces' performance--long experience in the limitations of stringers and "eyewitnesses" or hospital sources in places where we did know what had actually happened should leave us skeptical of all initial reports of combat coming out of Basra.

* Who will gain or lose more credit in the eyes of the Iraqi people, and particularly the Shia-Maliki or Sadr? The answer to this question probably depends on what happens next.

* Did Maliki accept a deal with Sadr in return for his stand-down order and, if so, what was involved? We know what Sadr's demands were (at least publicly), but he ordered his forces to stop fighting before Maliki publicly accepted his terms.

* Will Maliki persist in his efforts to disarm JAM and Special Groups or will he lose his nerve? The answer to this question probably depends in large part on whether or not the United States shows a willingness to support the Iraqi Government.

* How will JAM and Special Groups react? Will they continue with or accelerate the offensive they had already been conducting since the start of the year, or has this operation blunted that offensive and thrown them off-balance?

* What does the agreement between tribal leaders in Dhi Qar Province and the Iraqi Government portend? Will the government accept "sons of Iraq" in Shia areas? This development could be the start of a significant shift in the political sands in southern Iraq--or not.

* There are already signs of increasing tension between Sadr and Iran--will they increase or decrease after this conflict?

This operation offers a number of extremely positive signs about the willingness of the Iraqi Government to address a fundamental challenge that has been plaguing it (and us) since 2004, the ability of the ISF to absorb country-wide efforts to light up the Shia community, and the increasingly overt malign role Iran is playing in the conflict. It can provide us with a critical opportunity to increase our influence in Shia Iraq and help encourage the development of local political movements there as we have done in Sunni areas. Most of all, it is the most overt and decisive recent engagement between our Iraqi allies and their Iranian foes. We should have no doubt about where our interests lie.

Frederick W. Kagan, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, is the author of The End of the Old Order: Napoleon and Europe, 1801-1805. Kimberly Kagan, the president of the Institute for the Study of War, is the author of The Eye of Command. Her reports and analysis of the Iraq war are available at understandingwar.org.

potentialJWconvertswife

I agree with Gopher- we had no business going there in the first place, now we are fighting a never ending war that also can NEVER be won. These opposing religious forces have been fighting each other for thousands of years and they have no plans of stopping any time soon. Now our American soldiers are caught in the middle and dying because of it. The cost is unimaginable in both terms of dollars and human lives lost. Three trillion dollars???! I can't even begin to comprehend what that number means! But the bottom line is this- it means money spent on a war that was gone into under false pretenses and can never be won. What about the people in the street who have been forced out of their homes due to mortgage foreclosure? - they could use even just a fraction of that money to bale them out. -Potential
Fadeout

Potential: "What about the people in the street who have been forced out of their homes due to mortgage foreclosure? - they could use even just a fraction of that money to bale them out."
I know that everyone feels they are entitled to be rescued from any difficulty they get themselves into through their own ignorance, greed, and lack of planning, but thankfully no such asinine plan is on the horizon.
For the most part, these "people in the street" (although most of the former homeowners I know rent a place instead) made terrible decisions of their own free will and screwed themselves financially.
There are a number of uses for my tax dollars that I'd prefer to the war in Iraq, but bailing out people whose greed exceeded their incomes ain't one of them.
potentialJWconvertswife

Fade- If the president can call for economic stimulus then he can damned well help those folks out- a measly $600 ain't sh*t and isn't going to do much to help the economy imo. Yes, it's true many of those folks screwed themselves, but that doesn't mean the mortgage companies didn't have a hand in it, approving folks for loans they knew they couldn't afford. Check the thread regarding tent cities and you'll see that many of those who went thru foreclosures cannot afford to rent, and are in fact living in tents or wherever they can find a spot. This morning I saw a heartbreaking piece on the news about the pets that are paying the price now- their owners loose their homes and they have to give up their pets to move to an apartment (if they're lucky) or feed their families. I don't know what the answer is, but those people need help. I think you'd probably feel differently if you were in the same situation... -Potential
BurnTheShips

Fade- If the president can call for economic stimulus then he can damned well help those folks out- a measly $600 ain't sh*t and isn't going to do much to help the economy imo. Yes, it's true many of those folks screwed themselves, but that doesn't mean the mortgage companies didn't have a hand in it, approving folks for loans they knew they couldn't afford.
Just cancel income tax for everyone for a year.
potentialJWconvertswife

Burn- that could help! Oops- I think this thread has been hijacked... I didn't mean to! -Potential

Attacks on U.S. Forces Highest Since Surge Began

Just proves we are winning!

LOL!

IRAQI OFFENSIVE

Attacks on U.S. Forces Soared at End of March

Government Assault On Shiite Militias Drew Americans In

Multimedia

Putting the Annual Cost of War in Perspective

Related

Reader Responses (January 17, 2007)

More on the Economics of the Iraq War:

Whittling Away at Sadr

Share this