Is this guy Fred Hall, NYTelecom, or one of LDH's or Essie's relatives?
------------------------------------------------------
[NYJW] sued his former employer, [Defendant], alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e. Proceeding pro se, [NYJW] argued his case to a jury beginning January 12, 199[8].
On January 15, 1998 the jury returned a verdict awarding [NYJW] $210,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000,000 in punitive damages. Presently before the Court are plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to conform to the proof at trial and [Defendant's] application to reduce the award to $300,000 under the applicable statutory scheme. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's motion is denied, and defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
[NYJW] was fired from the [Defendant] on March 11, 1995. [NYJW], who is black, alleges that he was treated differently than were white employees during his employment and that he was fired and then not re-hired because of his race.
Plaintiff brought the instant action under Title VII and represented himself during pretrial motions and at trial.
From the evidence adduced at trial, the jury could have found that [Defendant] denied [NYJW] prompt access to medical care after he was injured in the workplace, delaying his eventual trip to the hospital by a number of hours. The jury could further have concluded that [Defendant's] actions in this regard were either motivated by plaintiff's race or by stereotypes about the behavior of persons of plaintiff's race.
The parties further disputed the events leading up to [NYJW's] termination. While [Defendant] alleged that [NYJW] was fired because he posed a threat to his co-workers, the jury could reasonably have found that the only "source" from which [Defendant] could derive a potential threat is stereotypes about the dangers posed by large black men. While [NYJW] is, indeed, a physically large individual, no evidence was adduced to suggest that he has ever assaulted, threatened, or in any way imperiled anyone. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that [NYJW], a Jehovah's Witness minister, has devoted his adult life to activities designed to foster peace in the community.The jury could further have credited [NYJW's] account that on the date of his termination his immediate supervisor called him a "nigger," despite the supervisor's testimony that he never uses, or used, such epithets. Finally, the jury could reasonably have found that racist cartoons left in [NYJW's] locker at work were left there by [Defendant's] employees. After two days of trial and two days of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict in favor of [NYJW]. Its verdict form stated that plaintiff was entitled to $210,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000,000 in punitive damages. The jury was instructed that compensatory damages, on the facts of the case as adduced by the evidence, included past pain and suffering and past economic loss.
After trial, [Defendant] moved to reduce the verdict to $300,000, pursuant to the limitations on damages set forth in 42
U. S. C. § 1981a. In response, plaintiff retained counsel and moved to amend his complaint to state claims under 42 U. S. C. 5 1981 and the New York Human Rights Law, N. Y. Exec. L. S: 296,
and to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
...
...
...
Under this precedent, then, the $300,000 cap in the present case must include both compensatory and punitive damages.
As the jury was instructed, however, compensatory damages includes backpay. Under 5 1981a, backpay is separate from the cap and plaintiff is entitled to have any demonstrated backpay recovery excluded from the $300,000 cap. The evidence, however, does not establish plaintiff's hourly wage. No evidence was
introduced regarding effort by [NYJW] to secure other employment nor regarding failure on his part to secure other employment. No evidence was introduced regarding any raises, for cost of living
or for promotion, that [NYJW] would have received had he remained at [Defendant]. Under this precedent, then, the $300,000 cap in the present case must include both compensatory and punitive damages.
As the jury was instructed, however, compensatory damages includes backpay. Under 5 1981a, backpay is separate from the cap and plaintiff is entitled to have any demonstrated backpay recovery excluded from the $300,000 cap. The evidence, however, does not establish plaintiff's hourly wage. No evidence was
introduced regarding effort by [NYJW] to secure other employment nor regarding failure on his part to secure other employment. No evidence was introduced regarding any raises, for cost of living
or for promotion, that [NYJW] would have received had he remained at [Defendant] until the time of trial. Thus, although the
statute would have allowed [NYJW] to recover demonstrated backpay in addition to the $300,000 imposed by the cap, in the absence of any relevant evidence the amount of his backpay is indeterminate
and therefore speculative. [NYJW's] total recovery from the jury's verdict is therefore $300,000. Plaintiff is also entitled to recover attorney's fees.
...
Plaintiff having prevailed, he is entitled to be recompensed for the fees incurred by his counsel in defending against [Defendant's] attempt to reduce the judgment, and for the fees incurred in preparing the motion to amend the complaint.
Accordingly, plaintiff is directed to settle a judgment on notice encompassing an award of $300,000 and a reasonable
attorneys fee, documenting the fee arrangement and the hours
spent by his counsel.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to furnish a filed copy of the within to all parties, to the magistrate judge, and
to chambers.
SO ORDERED.
Dated : Brooklyn, New York May 20, 1998