Interesting...I thought this would have been over with by now. I hope the judge is just being extra cautious...
Nevertheless, I performed a quick review of the cases/secondary sources associated with § 995.710 when I first posted that I that I did not think the WTBTS would be able to substitute real property. Copying what I found back then…
Secondary Source
Except to the extent that the statute providing for a bond precludes a deposit in lieu of bond or limits the form of deposit, a provision of the Code of Civil Procedure permits a party who is required to post a bond to make a deposit in lieu thereof. For example, the statute provides that any of the following may be deposited: cash, bearer bonds or notes of the United States or California, certificates of deposit, assigned savings accounts, and investment certificates or share accounts issued by savings and loan associations or credit unions. 1 The statute permits only a deposit of liquid assets, not a “deposit” of real property in the form of an executed deed. 2
4 Cal. Jur. 3d Appellate Review § 420
Case Law
Footnote two cites Markley, which uses basic statutory interpretation to say that the list is not open to judicial expansion:
“Section 995.710 permits a party who is required to post a bond to make a deposit in lieu of bond, and specifies the assets which are acceptable as such a deposit. Thus, under subdivision (a), “any of the following” may be deposited: cash, bearer bonds or notes of the United States or California, certificates of deposit, assigned savings accounts, and investment certificates or share accounts issued by savings and loan associations or credit unions. Subdivision (c) merely provides that the deposit “shall be accompanied by an agreement executed by the principal authorizing the officer [i.e. the appropriate custodial officer; see section 995.160] to collect, sell, or otherwise apply the deposit to enforce the liability of the principal on the deposit.” That subdivision does not purport to expand the list of acceptable deposits in subdivision (a); it only provides that the deposits must be accompanied by the authority to dispose of them on behalf of the beneficiary. Nothing in the language of subdivision (a) suggests that its list is subject to judicial expansion, and we deem the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius to be applicable. Thus, the court's order was not justified under the cited statutory provision.”
Markley v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. App. 4th 738, 745, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 328, 332 (1992)
FYI. This is a Fourth District, Division 2 case. I didn’t look up Conti’s appellate jurisdiction. This case has a caution flag in Westlaw, but a quick check of the citing cases didn't seem to indicate that anything overruled the issue of acceptable assets. This case is also cited in the CA. Judicial Benchbook.