ABiblestudent, Thanks for your report.
I wish to address your
“4. The newly introduced nonfeasance theory (i.e., failure to act when action is required) by Richard Simons was not supported by evidence.”
A nonfeasance theory was the thrust of Simons’ entire case at trial. Indeed, from Simons‘ opening statement through post-trial motions—including his punitive damages argument— Simons repeatedly and consistently pressed a nonfeasance theory of liability. Post-trial, however, clear and overwhelming legal precedent established that there was never a special relationship between Candace and defendants.
Richard Simons, in his RESPONDENT’S BRIEF, all but abandoned his nonfeasance arguments that so impressed Judge Robert McGuiness and the lay jurors. Why would he do such a thing? Perhaps someone explained the Principles of American tort law relevant to nonfeasance liability claims.
“It is black-letter law that one may have an affirmative duty to protect another from harm where a special relationship exists. The critical question, therefore, is whether there existed some special relationship between [Plaintiff] and defendants which would give rise to an affirmative duty to act.” —Justice Kaufman, Supreme Court of California,1988
In order to survive a motion to dismiss a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must set forth specific facts constituting the alleged relationship with sufficient particularity to enable the court to determine whether, if true, such facts could give rise to a fiduciary relationship.
A court must determine whether a voluntary organization such as a church has a special relationship with its members that gives rise to a duty to protect those members from other members of the organization.
A court must have before it specific facts constituting the basic elements of a fiduciary relationship, […] specific aspects of the plaintiff’s relationship with the church that are distinct from those of its relationship with any other members, adult or child, of the church.
The fact is, at trial, Simons put before the Court NO “specific aspects of the plaintiff’s relationship with the church that [were] distinct from those of its relationship with any other members, adult or child, of the church”. Regardless, via Juarez, Judge McGuiness gave Simons a “bye”. When hindsight— or whatever—exposed his own and the trial court’s errors, Simons attempted to salvage what little remained of his case. He only compounded his problems.
"It is a firmly entrenched principle of appellate practice that litigants must adhere to the theory on which a case was tried. Stated otherwise, a litigant may not change his or her position on appeal and assert a new theory. To permit this change in strategy would be unfair to the trial court and the opposing litigant." (Hines v. California Coastal Com 'n, Bd. of Supervisors of Sonoma (20 1 0) 186 Cal.App.4th 830, 846-847.)
In his RESPONDENT’S BRIEF Simons simply asserted a new and wholly different theory of liability—misfeasance. Simons’ Brief violated “a firmly entrenched principle of appellate practice that litigants must adhere to the theory on which a case was tried.”
Simons’ Brief opened with the sentence:
Plaintiff Jane Doe (Candace Conti) was nine years old when the elders of defendant North Fremont Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses (“Congregation”) repeatedly assigned her to participate with Jonathan Kendrick, a man known to them as a child molester, in the Congregation’s door-to-door ministry known as “field service.”
Simons repeated versions of his— assigned Candace to Kendrick— 37 times in his Brief. However, nowhere in evidence is Candace assigned to perform field service with Kendrick. Simons just made it up. The Appellate Court will not find Simons’ CRITICAL FACT in evidence. The justices will see no basis for Simons’ ARGUMENT I, III, IV, and V. The justices have observed, no doubt, the 37 holes in Simons’ Brief.