Northeast Grid outages "may" have been caused by MSBlaster worm...
by reporter 14 Replies latest social current
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drwtsn32
Yeah, and monkeys "may" be flying out of my arse.
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Scully
It "may" not have posted the second time too.
Love, Scully
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reporter
Take this with a grain of salt, of course, but here's an article between two techies bantering on BugTraq on a CNN story reporting that the power outage may have been caused by a variant of MSBlaster...
http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/333505
To: BugTraq Subject: Re: CNN: 'Explores Possibility that Power Outage is Related to Internet Worm' Date: Aug 15 2003 6:09PM Author: Bernie, CTA <cta hcsin net> Message-ID: <3F3CE988.5505.5E2696@localhost> In-Reply-To: <1a6301c362b2$03178680$6401a8c0@satan> It is ridiculous to accept that a lightning strike could knock
out the grid, or the transmission system is over stressed. There
are many redundant fault, limit and Voltage-Surge Protection
safeguards and related instrumentation and switchgear installed
at the distribution centers and sub stations along the Power
Grid that would have tripped to prevent or otherwise divert such
a major outage.
I believe that the outage was caused by the MSblaster, or its
mutation, which was besieged upon the respective vulnerability
in certain control and monitoring systems (SCADA and otherwise)
running MS 2000 or XP, located different points along the Grid.
Some of these systems are accessible via the Internet, while
others are accessible by POTS dialup, or private Frame relay and
dedicated connectivity.
Being an old PLC automation and control hack let me say that
there is a very good plausibility that the recent East Coast
power outage was due to an attack by an MBlaster variant on the
SCADA system at the power plant master terminal, or more likely
at several of the remote terminal units "RTU". SCADA runs under
Win2000 / XP and the telemetry to the RTU is accessible via the
Internet.
From what I recall SCADA based monitoring and control systems
were installed at many water / sewer processing, gas and oil
processing, and hydro-electric plants.
I also believe that yesterdays flooding of a generator sub-
facility in Philadelphia was also due to an MBlaster variant
attack on the SCADA or similarly Win 2000 / XP based system.
To make things worst, the Web Interface is MS ActiveX. Now lets
see, how can one craft an ActiveX vuln vector into the blaster?
Oh, and for the wardrivers, SCADA can be access via wireless
connections on the road? puts a new perspective on sniffing
around sewer plants.
It is also reasonable to assume that we could have a similar
security threat regarding those system (SCADA and otherwise
based on MS 2000 or XP) involved in the control, data
acquisition, and maintenance of other critical infrastructure,
such as inter/intra state GAS Distribution, Nuclear Plant
Monitoring, Water and Sewer Processing, and city Traffic
Control. IMO
I think we will see a lot of finger pointing by government
agencies, Utilities, and politicians for the Grid outage, until
someone confess to the security dilemma and vulnerabilities in
the systems which are involved in running this critical
infrastructure.
Regardless of whether the Grid outage can be attributed to the
blaster or its variant, this is not entirely a Microsoft
problem, as it reeks of poor System Security Engineering
practiced by the Utility Companies, and associated equipment and
technology suppliers.
Nonetheless, the incident will cause lots of money to be
earmarked by the US and Canadian Governments, to be spent in an
attempt to solve the problem, or more specifically calm the
public.
This incident should be fully investigated, and regulations
passed to ensure that the Utility companies and their suppliers
develop and implement proper safeguards that will help prevent
or at least significantly mitigate the effects of such a
catastrophe.
Conversely, I do not want to see our Government directly
involved in yet another "business", which has such a controlling
impact over our individual lives.
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On 14 Aug 2003 at 15:18, Geoff Shively wrote:
> Just flipped on CNN, watching the masses snake through the
> streets of Manhattan as correspondents state that this could be
> an affect of the blaster worm.
>
> Interesting but I don't see how an worm of this magnitude
> (smaller than that of Slammer/Sapphire and others) could
> influence DCS and SCADA systems around the US, particularly just
> in the North East.
>
> Thoughts?
>
>
> Cheers,
>
> Geoff Shively, CHO
> PivX Solutions, LLC
>
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****************************************************
Bernie
Chief Technology Architect
Chief Security Officer
cta hcsin net
Euclidean Systems, Inc.
*******************************************************
// "There is no expedient to which a man will not go
// to avoid the pure labor of honest thinking."
// Honest thought, the real business capital.
// Observe> Think> Plan> Think> Do> Think>
******************************************************* -
reporter
Simon, there's a problem with the page embed code here. In fact, all the reply and topic posting shows "Done, but with errors on page" on the bottom bar, even before typing or posting anything.
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drwtsn32
Perhaps some of the control systems are running 2000 or XP, but why would those machines ever be connected to the public Internet? Also, this power failure is almost exactly like the same failure that happened in 1965. http://www.cmpco.com/about/system/blackout.html I don't believe Windows '65 had this vulnerability.
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reporter
Also, this power failure is almost exactly like the same failure that happened in 1965.
True enough.
Perhaps some of the control systems are running 2000 or XP, but why would those machines ever be connected to the public Internet?
He says so, in these two paragraphs...
Being an old PLC automation and control hack let me say that
The "telemetry to the remote terminal units" is accessible via the Internet. Why? That's a good question. Obviously, the administrators want convenient access. But, as in all these types of situations, we trade security for convenience. That's not a good tradeoff.
there is a very good plausibility that the recent East Coast
power outage was due to an attack by an MBlaster variant on the
SCADA system at the power plant master terminal, or more likely
at several of the remote terminal units "RTU". SCADA runs under
Win2000 / XP and the telemetry to the RTU is accessible via the
Internet.
From what I recall SCADA based monitoring and control systems
were installed at many water / sewer processing, gas and oil
processing, and hydro-electric plants. -
Nathan Natas
Win65... I think I have that on 5 1/4" floppies in the basement somewhere... didn't it come with a web enabled version of PONG?
I agree with Doc. The most effective firewall is this: no connection to the internet. Any sysop that would not raise holy hell over the issue of permitting an internal process control computer to also function as a web portal deserves to be night manager at Taco Bell.
I believe that upon close examination, "LightningStrike ' 03" will be shown to be virtually indistinguishable from "LightningStrike ' 65". That "technology" has not changed much in billions and billions of years.
"Would you like some of our green border sauce with your Super Grande Juevos Supreme Nachos?"
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drwtsn32
Ok, I am aware that some utilities will utilize the Internet, but no one in their right mind would ever set this up in without some sort of security (VPN, encryption, authentication, etc). In addition, this blaster worm really only causes the machine to reboot. I can't imagine someone would use a consumer operating system for such critical equipment if simply rebooting the computer would cause an outage.
Sorry, but I don't think it's very plausible at all.
