Sheperdless:
Part of the claim is that because the elders did not report the matter to the proper authorities that she is now able to bring a private claim against the elders fro the non-reporting.
Berry v Watchtower Bible and Tract Society
Because we hold that Watchtower and Wilton Congregation have no common law duty to protect the plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs may not bring a private cause of action for the alleged failure of the elders to comply with RSA 169-C:29, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' action, albeit for different reasons. We need not, therefore, address the remaining arguments.
John Doe v Roman Catholic Diocese of Galveston-Houston
Treatises and legal commentaries examining a duty to report child abuse address the issue in the context of state reporting statutes. See, e.g., 43 C.J.S. Infants § 117 (2007) (“There is authority that a failure to comply with a statute imposing a duty on specified persons, institutions, or agencies to report known or suspected child abuse may give rise to a private cause of action against that person, institution, or agency failing to do so ....”);
Arabaugh v Board of Education County of Pedelton
Accordingly we conclude that West Virginia Code § 49–6A–2 does not give rise to an implied private civil cause of action, in addition to criminal penalties imposed by the statute, for failure to report suspected child abuse where an individual with a duty to report under the statute is alleged to have had reasonable cause to suspect that a child is being abused and has failed to report suspected abuse. The same conclusion has been reached by a decided majority of states which have applied factors comparable to those in Hurley when considering whether a private cause of action was implied through mandatory reporting statutes similar to ours.
Fischer v Metclaf:
The legislature established that violation of the mandatory reporting provision would constitute a second degree misdemeanor. To find a legislative intent to provide a *791 private right of action against non-reporters, we would have to ignore the well-established rule that a court may not disregard the plain purpose and language of the statutes to bring about what some of its members may conceive to be a more proper result. Vocelle v. Knight Bros. Paper Co., 118 So.2d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960). Mindful that the courts may not “supply an omission that to all appearances was not in the minds of the legislators when the law was enacted,” Special Disability Trust Fund, Dept. of Labor & Employment Sec. v. Motor & Compressor Co., 446 So.2d 224 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); see Armstrong v. Edgewater, 157 So.2d 422 (Fla.1963), we hold that S.M. Fischer is not afforded a civil cause of action for the failure of her father's psychiatrist to report alleged abuse.
Doe 1 v North Central Behavorial Health Systems
Holdings: The Appellate Court,
McDade, J., held that:
1 Abused and Neglected Child
Reporting Act did not provide an implied
private right of action to children;
2 children did not fall within definition of “abused children” under Act;
3 clinic had no duty to
report abuse under the Act; and
4 clinic had no common law duty to
report abuse by one of its patients
Bradley v Ray:
Next friend brought action on child's behalf against child's stepfather, child's mother, psychologist, and widow of second psychologist, as defendant ad litem for injuries sustained as result of alleged prolonged sexual abuse by stepfather. The Circuit Court, Boone County, Gene Hamilton, J., dismissed petition against psychologist and widow for failure to state claim, and next friend appealed. The Court of Appeals, Laura Denvir Stith, J., held that: (1) as matter of first impression, psychologists owe common-law duty to child to warn appropriate authorities that client presents serious danger of future violence to readily ascertainable victim; (2) as matter of first impression, statute requiring psychologists to report suspected sexual abuse did not create private cause of action; (3) petition did not state claim against psychologists for aiding and abetting stepfather's sexual abuse; and (4) claim of prima facie tort failed to allege requisite intentional lawful act.
