Succintly
"Saddam Hussein's history, capability and intent, and the serious and long-term threat he posed to a vital region, to America's allies and to our national security.
First, Saddam had used WMD ? against Iran in the mid-1980s, and he later used them against his own people, killing more than 5,000 civilians in the Iraqi Kurdish town of Halabja in March 1988.
Second, Saddam had possessed WMD, as he acknowledged to the United Nations after his ouster from Kuwait in February 1991. Moreover, until at least the early 1990s, U.S., British, French, German and Israeli intelligence agencies had underestimated his biological and nuclear programs. And all of them ? along with the Clinton administration, the U.N. and both supporters and opponents of last year's war ? assumed Saddam still had substantial quantities of WMD.
Third, Saddam had maintained the capability to produce WMD. In 1991, the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) discovered that Iraq possessed a workable design for an implosion-type nuclear weapon though not yet the necessary fissile material. If the material could be obtained elsewhere ? from Russia, Pakistan or North Korea ? Iraq was believed able to produce a bomb within a year. Iraq retained facilities as well as teams of scientists and engineers. And during the past year, the Iraq Survey Group, the U.S. inspection team, discovered a program to develop long-range missiles. The overall evidence led the team's head, David Kay, to say "Iraq was in clear violation" of a U.N. resolution demanding full accounting of WMD.
Fourth, Saddam had the intent. After the withdrawal of U.N. inspectors in 1998 and the erosion of international support for sanctions, Saddam counted on being free sooner or later to fully resume oil sales and rebuild his weapons. He continued to menace his neighbors, brutalize his people and cooperate with terrorist groups. He told Arab journalists in late 2002 that he was playing for time in the face of renewed American and coalition pressure.
In the aftermath of 9/11 and as murderously evident in Madrid, it is far better to act decisively against the most lethal threats rather than hope to deter them or to retaliate following a mass casualty attack. As British Prime Minister Tony Blair has said, 9/11 altered the balance of risk. Ultimately, the nature of Saddam's regime, his record of aggression and his capability and intent posed a major strategic threat. Despite the bitter and often partisan controversies that have erupted about the path to war, the case for the use of force remains compelling."
You want to hope the bad guys go away Six? Not me. Appeasement never works.