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loveis
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Oral Arguments Before the NH Supreme Court in Berry v. Watchtower
by hawkaw infeel free to listen to the oral arguments in front of the court by the watchtower counsel and the berry ladies counsel at below link.
remember this is a civil action brought by the berry ladies against the watchtower et.al for failing to report the abuse.
the berrys lost summary motion and have appealed.
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13
Oral Arguments Before the NH Supreme Court in Berry v. Watchtower
by hawkaw infeel free to listen to the oral arguments in front of the court by the watchtower counsel and the berry ladies counsel at below link.
remember this is a civil action brought by the berry ladies against the watchtower et.al for failing to report the abuse.
the berrys lost summary motion and have appealed.
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loveis
Hawkaw: Welcome back, hadn't heard from you for awhile. If you examine my profile, you'll see that I've been busy with a number of threads about the Berry case. Here is a repeat of something I posted on another thread-- the complete decision (by the Minnesota Court of Appeals earlier this year) in the Heidi Meyer case. I posted it because many of the issues and arguments are very similar to those cited in the Berry case, and I emboldened various portions of the decision that highlighted these issues. I would appreciate your comments. What do you think? Will the New Hampshire Supreme Court justices see these matters differently? STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A03-1142
Heidi Meyer, et al.,
Appellants,
vs.
Derek Lindala,
Respondent,
Annandale Congregation of Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses, et al.,
Respondents.
Filed March 9, 2004
Affirmed
Robert H. Schumacher, Judge
Wright County District Court
File No. C1022072
Cynthia J. Waldt, Jeffrey R. Anderson, Jeff Anderson & Associates, P.A., E-1000 First National Bank Building, 332 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for appellants)
Linda M. Ojala, Kurzman, Grant & Ojala, 219 Southeast Main Street, Suite 403, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for respondent Lindala)
Lindsay G. Arthur, Jr., Sally J. Ferguson, Keesha M. Gaskins, Kirsten J. Hansen, Arthur, Chapman, Kettering, Smetak & Pikala, P.A., 500 Young Quinlan Building, 81 South Ninth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402-3214 (for respondents Annandale Congregation of Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses and Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York)
Considered and decided by Schumacher , Presiding Judge; Willis , Judge; and Wright , Judge.
S Y L L A B U S
1. The duty of an organization to protect its members from injury by a third party arises only where there is a special relationship between an organization and its members.
2. Minnesota's child abuse reporting act, Minn. Stat. § 626.556 (2000), does not provide for a civil cause of action.
O P I N I O N
ROBERT H. SCHUMACHER , Judge
Appellants Heidi Meyer and Jane L A Doe challenge the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of respondents Annandale Congregation of Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses (Annandale Congregation) and Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. (Watchtower). Meyer and Doe argue Annandale Congregation and Watchtower owed a common law duty of care, had a special relationship with Meyer and Doe giving rise to a special duty of care, and are liable for negligence because they failed to report child abuse as mandated under Minn. Stat. § 626.556 (2000)[1]. Annandale Congregation and Watchtower argue the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.
FACTS
During the times of the alleged wrongdoing, Meyer and Doe, their parents, and respondent Derek Lindala were members of Annandale Congregation, a congregation of the Jehovah's Witnesses. Annandale Congregation is managed by Watchtower's governing body. The governing body has authority over every person and all matters in Annandale Congregation, including discipline of individual members and furthering the overall welfare of the congregation. The governing body appoints elders to each congregation, including Annandale Congregation, to act as spiritual leaders.
Meyer and Doe state that Jehovah's Witnesses doctrine requires members "to associate only with other members of the Jehovah's Witnesses organization and avoid association with other people who are not Jehovah's Witnesses." In their depositions, Meyer and Doe stated that members are expected to bring all allegations of wrongdoing to congregation elders. If a member makes an allegation of wrongdoing to anyone other than an elder, including law enforcement, that person can be accused of gossip or slander, which are punishable offenses within the organization. According to Jehovah's Witnesses doctrine, wrongdoing cannot be proven without two eyewitnesses to the wrongful act, nondisputable evidence, or confession by the wrongdoer. According to Richard Olson, the presiding overseer of Annandale Congregation, upon hearing allegations of child abuse, the elders of Annandale Congregation contact legal counsel at Watchtower and make a report to authorities if directed to do so by counsel.
According to affiant Rebecca Mumford, in approximately 1989 the elders of Annandale Congregation received information that Lindala had sexually abused his younger sister. At the time, Mumford was a Jehovah's Witness and friend to Lindala's sister. Lindala was approximately 17 years old and his sister was six years old. The elders investigated the allegation, did not immediately report the information to law enforcement, and allowed Lindala to continue as a member of Annandale Congregation.
From 1989 to 1992, Meyer was repeatedly sexually assaulted by Lindala while she was between the ages of 10 and 12. The abuse occurred at various locations, including Lindala's parents' home. Meyer reported the abuse to her parents in approximately 1994. Meyer and her father then reported the abuse to elders of Annandale Congregation. Watchtower was also informed. The elders instructed Meyer not to report the abuse to anyone and threatened she would be "disfellowed" if she did so. Disfellowship is the act of excommunication from the organization.
In 1991, while she was 10 or 11 years old, Doe was sexually assaulted by Lindala. The incident took place in the basement of Lindala's parents' home. Doe and her father immediately reported the incident to elders of Annandale Congregation. The elders told Doe and her father they would be investigating the allegation and threatened Doe and her father with disfellowship if they reported the matter to anyone, including other congregation members or the police. Watchtower was informed of the incident by letter in December 1993.
On July 1, 2002, Meyer and Doe commenced a lawsuit in Wright County District Court against Lindala, Annandale Congregation, and Watchtower. The suit alleged sexual battery of both Meyer and Doe by Lindala. The suit also alleged negligence by Annandale Congregation and Watchtower, arguing the parties were liable for not taking action to report Lindala's conduct to authorities and by holding him out to Annandale Congregation as an appropriate person with whom to associate. On motion by Annandale Congregation and Watchtower, the district court granted summary judgment on the claim of negligence. The court found Meyer and Doe had not shown a special relationship existed between the parties, Annandale Congregation and Watchtower did not owe Meyer and Doe a duty of care, and their injuries were not proximately caused by Annandale Congregation or Watchtower. The court also held any failure to comply with Chapter 626 of Minnesota Statutes on the part of Annandale Congregation and Watchtower did not create a private cause of action.
ISSUES
1. Does the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit judicial consideration of Meyer and Doe's claims for negligence?
2. Did the district court err by granting Annandale Congregation and Watchtower's motion for summary judgment, finding there was no duty of care owed to Meyer and Doe by Annandale Congregation and Watchtower?
3. Did the district court err by granting Annandale Congregation and Watchtower's motion for summary judgment, finding Minn. Stat. § 626.556 does not provide for a civil cause of action for failure to report known child abuse?
ANALYSIS
1. Annandale Congregation and Watchtower argue the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes subject matter jurisdiction. Constitutional questions should not be decided unless doing so is necessary "to dispose of the case at bar ." State v. Hoyt, 304 N.W.2d 884, 888 (Minn. 1981). Because we decide this case on other grounds, we do not address the merit of this claim.
2. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993). "On an appeal from summary judgment, we ask two questions: (1) whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and (2) whether the lower courts erred in their application of the law." State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990).
The basic elements of a negligence claim are (1) the existence of a duty, (2) breach of that duty, (3) injury proximately caused by the breach, and (4) damages. Schweich v. Ziegler, Inc., 463 N.W.2d 722, 729 (Minn. 1990). Meyer and Doe argue Annandale Congregation and Watchtower owed a duty to protect them from Lindala after they learned in 1989 that he had sexually assaulted a child because they had control over investigating the allegations of wrongdoing, reporting child abuse to authorities, and informing congregants that Lindala was not a safe person with whom to associate. But an affirmative duty to act only arises when a special relationship exists between the parties. "The fact that an actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action . . . unless a special relationship exists . . . between the actor and the other which gives the other the right to protection." Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Minn. 1993) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). Meyer and Doe must first prove that a special relationship existed between the parties that placed an affirmative duty to act on the part of Annandale Congregation and Watchtower.
A special relationship exists where one party has custody of another under circumstances that deprive the other of normal opportunities for self-protection. Harper, 499 N.W.2d at 474. "Typically, the plaintiff is in some respect particularly vulnerable and dependent on the defendant, who in turn holds considerable power over the plaintiff's welfare." Donaldson v. Young Women's Christian Assoc. of Duluth, 539 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Minn. 1995).
Here, Meyer and Doe argue the district court erred in finding there was no special relationship between Meyer and Doe and Annandale Congregation and Watchtower. Meyer and Doe point to the Jehovah's Witnesses doctrine which provides that members rely on congregation elders for all of their concerns, to the specific exclusion of governmental bodies or agencies, as the source of Annandale Congregation and Watchtower's control and therefore a special relationship exists. Meyer and Doe further point to doctrine that members only associate with other Jehovah's Witnesses who are in good standing with the organization, the organization's standard for proof of wrongdoing, and the punishment of disfellowship for gossip or slander. Meyer and Doe argue that this amounts to significant control, which deprived Meyer and Doe of normal opportunities for self-protection.
But, unlike previous cases where a special relationship was found, Annandale Congregation and Watchtower did not have custody or control over Meyer and Doe at the time of the alleged misconduct. The incidents of sexual misconduct took place at Lindala's residence, on a snowmobile, and in an automobile. Meyer and Doe do not argue that the misconduct took place during Annandale Congregation functions or on Annandale Congregation property. Cf. Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 483-84 (Minn. 1979) (noting "special relationships exist between parents and children, masters and servants, possessors of land and licensees, common carriers and their customers, or people who have custody of a person with dangerous propensities"). Moreover, Meyer and Doe's contention of control is premised on faith-based advice given to Meyer, Doe, and other congregants by the elders of Annandale Congregation.
Providing faith-based advice or instruction, without more, does not create a special relationship. Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 807, 821-26 (Minn. App. 1995) (finding no special relationship between Christian Science church and critically ill child who died, where church's teachings inspired parent to care for child through prayer, and parent, when hiring Christian Science nurse, relied on church's listing of individuals that met requirements for faith-based care; but finding special relationship where Christian Science nurse accepted responsibility to care for child in his home in return for cash wages), review denied (Minn. May 31, 1995). Here, as in Lundman, mere knowledge coupled with power is insufficient to impose a duty. Id. at 826. "When it comes to restraining religious conduct, it is the obligation of the state . . . to impose [the] necessary limitations[.]" Id.
A special duty may also arise where one accepts responsibility to protect another, although there was no initial duty. Walsh v. Pagra Air Taxi, Inc., 282 N.W.2d 567, 570 (Minn. 1979) (finding special duty where city, while having no affirmative duty to assist in preservation of private property, voluntarily undertook to render fire protection services to airport users); Abresch v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 246 Minn. 408, 414, 75 N.W.2d 206, 210 (Minn. 1956) (finding special duty where telephone company has held itself out to public as willing to convey messages in case of certain emergencies such as fire).
Here, Meyer and Doe again point to the organization's doctrine that requires members to bring complaints exclusively to the attention of elders and argue that this is a voluntary undertaking of an affirmative duty to investigate allegations of wrongdoing and protect congregants from future wrongful acts. We disagree. Annandale Congregation and Watchtower espoused religious faith and doctrine and, according to Meyer and Doe, threatened excommunication for failure to adhere to that doctrine. By doing so, Annandale Congregation and Watchtower did not assume a duty owed to Meyer and Doe but rather acted within their constitutional right to religious freedom, which includes the authority to "independently decide matters of faith and doctrine" and "to believe and speak what it will." Lundman, 530 N.W.2d at 826.
The district court did not err in finding a special relationship did not exist between the parties. Because there is no special relationship, there is no duty, and we need not reach the issues of breach or causation. The district court did not err in applying the law or in granting Annandale Congregation and Watchtower's motion for summary judgment.
3. Meyer and Doe's brief to this court argues Annandale Congregation and Watchtower's failure to report abuse, in violation of Minnesota's child abuse reporting act, is negligence per se. See Minn. Stat. § 626.556 (requiring certain professionals to report to welfare agencies or police suspected neglect, physical abuse, or sexual abuse of children and providing that failure to report as mandated is misdemeanor). In their reply brief, Meyer and Doe argue they do not claim that a violation of the reporting statute is "negligence," but rather argue "violation of the statute is evidence of negligence per se." (Alteration in original.) We disagree. This court previously determined that section 626.556 does not create a private cause of action for violation of its reporting requirements or create a duty which could be enforced through a common-law negligence action. See Valtakis v. Putnam, 504 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Minn. App. 1993) (refusing to impose civil remedy for violation of Minn. Stat. § 626.556 (1990) where legislature provided criminal remedy and did not provide civil remedy).
D E C I S I O N
The district court did not err in finding there was no special relationship between the parties and therefore no duty owed. Annandale Congregation and Watchtower are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Failure of Annandale Congregation and Watchtower to comply with Minn. Stat. § 626.556 did not create a private cause of action.
Affirmed.
[1] We note Meyer and Doe allege Annandale Congregation and Watchtower breached duties imposed under versions of the Minnesota child abuse reporting statutes in effect from 1989 to 1994 but brought suit against them in July 2002. Thus, the case is governed primarily by Minn. Stat. § 626.556 (2000). Because the 2000 version of the reporting statute is substantively the same as that in previous years, we cite the 2000 version of the reporting statute in this opinion.
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J.W. Congregation Cleared of Abuse Charges
by Kenneson in.
the following article comes out of minnesota and is entitled "annandale church isn't liable in abuse suit.".
i'm off to work now, so don't have time to comment, but would like to post it before i leave.. http://www.startribune.com/stories/462/4655055.html
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loveis
Here is the full text of the decision, with key portions (most of which highlight issues also common to the Berry girls' pending New Hampshire case) highlighted in bold. What do you think of the justices' reasoning? (Note: "Jane Doe" is Amber Long, who did not reveal her identity when the case was originally filed but did choose to do so later.)
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A03-1142
Heidi Meyer, et al.,
Appellants,
vs.
Derek Lindala,
Respondent,
Annandale Congregation of Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses, et al.,
Respondents.
Filed March 9, 2004
Affirmed
Robert H. Schumacher, Judge
Wright County District Court
File No. C1022072
Cynthia J. Waldt, Jeffrey R. Anderson, Jeff Anderson & Associates, P.A., E-1000 First National Bank Building, 332 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for appellants)
Linda M. Ojala, Kurzman, Grant & Ojala, 219 Southeast Main Street, Suite 403, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for respondent Lindala)
Lindsay G. Arthur, Jr., Sally J. Ferguson, Keesha M. Gaskins, Kirsten J. Hansen, Arthur, Chapman, Kettering, Smetak & Pikala, P.A., 500 Young Quinlan Building, 81 South Ninth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402-3214 (for respondents Annandale Congregation of Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses and Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York)
Considered and decided by Schumacher , Presiding Judge; Willis , Judge; and Wright , Judge.
S Y L L A B U S
1. The duty of an organization to protect its members from injury by a third party arises only where there is a special relationship between an organization and its members.
2. Minnesota's child abuse reporting act, Minn. Stat. § 626.556 (2000), does not provide for a civil cause of action.
O P I N I O N
ROBERT H. SCHUMACHER , Judge
Appellants Heidi Meyer and Jane L A Doe challenge the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of respondents Annandale Congregation of Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses (Annandale Congregation) and Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. (Watchtower). Meyer and Doe argue Annandale Congregation and Watchtower owed a common law duty of care, had a special relationship with Meyer and Doe giving rise to a special duty of care, and are liable for negligence because they failed to report child abuse as mandated under Minn. Stat. § 626.556 (2000)[1]. Annandale Congregation and Watchtower argue the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.
FACTS
During the times of the alleged wrongdoing, Meyer and Doe, their parents, and respondent Derek Lindala were members of Annandale Congregation, a congregation of the Jehovah's Witnesses. Annandale Congregation is managed by Watchtower's governing body. The governing body has authority over every person and all matters in Annandale Congregation, including discipline of individual members and furthering the overall welfare of the congregation. The governing body appoints elders to each congregation, including Annandale Congregation, to act as spiritual leaders.
Meyer and Doe state that Jehovah's Witnesses doctrine requires members "to associate only with other members of the Jehovah's Witnesses organization and avoid association with other people who are not Jehovah's Witnesses." In their depositions, Meyer and Doe stated that members are expected to bring all allegations of wrongdoing to congregation elders. If a member makes an allegation of wrongdoing to anyone other than an elder, including law enforcement, that person can be accused of gossip or slander, which are punishable offenses within the organization. According to Jehovah's Witnesses doctrine, wrongdoing cannot be proven without two eyewitnesses to the wrongful act, nondisputable evidence, or confession by the wrongdoer. According to Richard Olson, the presiding overseer of Annandale Congregation, upon hearing allegations of child abuse, the elders of Annandale Congregation contact legal counsel at Watchtower and make a report to authorities if directed to do so by counsel.
According to affiant Rebecca Mumford, in approximately 1989 the elders of Annandale Congregation received information that Lindala had sexually abused his younger sister. At the time, Mumford was a Jehovah's Witness and friend to Lindala's sister. Lindala was approximately 17 years old and his sister was six years old. The elders investigated the allegation, did not immediately report the information to law enforcement, and allowed Lindala to continue as a member of Annandale Congregation.
From 1989 to 1992, Meyer was repeatedly sexually assaulted by Lindala while she was between the ages of 10 and 12. The abuse occurred at various locations, including Lindala's parents' home. Meyer reported the abuse to her parents in approximately 1994. Meyer and her father then reported the abuse to elders of Annandale Congregation. Watchtower was also informed. The elders instructed Meyer not to report the abuse to anyone and threatened she would be "disfellowed" if she did so. Disfellowship is the act of excommunication from the organization.
In 1991, while she was 10 or 11 years old, Doe was sexually assaulted by Lindala. The incident took place in the basement of Lindala's parents' home. Doe and her father immediately reported the incident to elders of Annandale Congregation. The elders told Doe and her father they would be investigating the allegation and threatened Doe and her father with disfellowship if they reported the matter to anyone, including other congregation members or the police. Watchtower was informed of the incident by letter in December 1993.
On July 1, 2002, Meyer and Doe commenced a lawsuit in Wright County District Court against Lindala, Annandale Congregation, and Watchtower. The suit alleged sexual battery of both Meyer and Doe by Lindala. The suit also alleged negligence by Annandale Congregation and Watchtower, arguing the parties were liable for not taking action to report Lindala's conduct to authorities and by holding him out to Annandale Congregation as an appropriate person with whom to associate. On motion by Annandale Congregation and Watchtower, the district court granted summary judgment on the claim of negligence. The court found Meyer and Doe had not shown a special relationship existed between the parties, Annandale Congregation and Watchtower did not owe Meyer and Doe a duty of care, and their injuries were not proximately caused by Annandale Congregation or Watchtower. The court also held any failure to comply with Chapter 626 of Minnesota Statutes on the part of Annandale Congregation and Watchtower did not create a private cause of action.
ISSUES
1. Does the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit judicial consideration of Meyer and Doe's claims for negligence?
2. Did the district court err by granting Annandale Congregation and Watchtower's motion for summary judgment, finding there was no duty of care owed to Meyer and Doe by Annandale Congregation and Watchtower?
3. Did the district court err by granting Annandale Congregation and Watchtower's motion for summary judgment, finding Minn. Stat. § 626.556 does not provide for a civil cause of action for failure to report known child abuse?
ANALYSIS
1. Annandale Congregation and Watchtower argue the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes subject matter jurisdiction. Constitutional questions should not be decided unless doing so is necessary "to dispose of the case at bar ." State v. Hoyt, 304 N.W.2d 884, 888 (Minn. 1981). Because we decide this case on other grounds, we do not address the merit of this claim.
2. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993). "On an appeal from summary judgment, we ask two questions: (1) whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and (2) whether the lower courts erred in their application of the law." State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990).
The basic elements of a negligence claim are (1) the existence of a duty, (2) breach of that duty, (3) injury proximately caused by the breach, and (4) damages. Schweich v. Ziegler, Inc., 463 N.W.2d 722, 729 (Minn. 1990). Meyer and Doe argue Annandale Congregation and Watchtower owed a duty to protect them from Lindala after they learned in 1989 that he had sexually assaulted a child because they had control over investigating the allegations of wrongdoing, reporting child abuse to authorities, and informing congregants that Lindala was not a safe person with whom to associate. But an affirmative duty to act only arises when a special relationship exists between the parties. "The fact that an actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action . . . unless a special relationship exists . . . between the actor and the other which gives the other the right to protection." Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Minn. 1993) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). Meyer and Doe must first prove that a special relationship existed between the parties that placed an affirmative duty to act on the part of Annandale Congregation and Watchtower.
A special relationship exists where one party has custody of another under circumstances that deprive the other of normal opportunities for self-protection. Harper, 499 N.W.2d at 474. "Typically, the plaintiff is in some respect particularly vulnerable and dependent on the defendant, who in turn holds considerable power over the plaintiff's welfare." Donaldson v. Young Women's Christian Assoc. of Duluth, 539 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Minn. 1995).
Here, Meyer and Doe argue the district court erred in finding there was no special relationship between Meyer and Doe and Annandale Congregation and Watchtower. Meyer and Doe point to the Jehovah's Witnesses doctrine which provides that members rely on congregation elders for all of their concerns, to the specific exclusion of governmental bodies or agencies, as the source of Annandale Congregation and Watchtower's control and therefore a special relationship exists. Meyer and Doe further point to doctrine that members only associate with other Jehovah's Witnesses who are in good standing with the organization, the organization's standard for proof of wrongdoing, and the punishment of disfellowship for gossip or slander. Meyer and Doe argue that this amounts to significant control, which deprived Meyer and Doe of normal opportunities for self-protection.
But, unlike previous cases where a special relationship was found, Annandale Congregation and Watchtower did not have custody or control over Meyer and Doe at the time of the alleged misconduct. The incidents of sexual misconduct took place at Lindala's residence, on a snowmobile, and in an automobile. Meyer and Doe do not argue that the misconduct took place during Annandale Congregation functions or on Annandale Congregation property. Cf. Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 483-84 (Minn. 1979) (noting "special relationships exist between parents and children, masters and servants, possessors of land and licensees, common carriers and their customers, or people who have custody of a person with dangerous propensities"). Moreover, Meyer and Doe's contention of control is premised on faith-based advice given to Meyer, Doe, and other congregants by the elders of Annandale Congregation.
Providing faith-based advice or instruction, without more, does not create a special relationship. Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 807, 821-26 (Minn. App. 1995) (finding no special relationship between Christian Science church and critically ill child who died, where church's teachings inspired parent to care for child through prayer, and parent, when hiring Christian Science nurse, relied on church's listing of individuals that met requirements for faith-based care; but finding special relationship where Christian Science nurse accepted responsibility to care for child in his home in return for cash wages), review denied (Minn. May 31, 1995). Here, as in Lundman, mere knowledge coupled with power is insufficient to impose a duty. Id. at 826. "When it comes to restraining religious conduct, it is the obligation of the state . . . to impose [the] necessary limitations[.]" Id.
A special duty may also arise where one accepts responsibility to protect another, although there was no initial duty. Walsh v. Pagra Air Taxi, Inc., 282 N.W.2d 567, 570 (Minn. 1979) (finding special duty where city, while having no affirmative duty to assist in preservation of private property, voluntarily undertook to render fire protection services to airport users); Abresch v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 246 Minn. 408, 414, 75 N.W.2d 206, 210 (Minn. 1956) (finding special duty where telephone company has held itself out to public as willing to convey messages in case of certain emergencies such as fire).
Here, Meyer and Doe again point to the organization's doctrine that requires members to bring complaints exclusively to the attention of elders and argue that this is a voluntary undertaking of an affirmative duty to investigate allegations of wrongdoing and protect congregants from future wrongful acts. We disagree. Annandale Congregation and Watchtower espoused religious faith and doctrine and, according to Meyer and Doe, threatened excommunication for failure to adhere to that doctrine. By doing so, Annandale Congregation and Watchtower did not assume a duty owed to Meyer and Doe but rather acted within their constitutional right to religious freedom, which includes the authority to "independently decide matters of faith and doctrine" and "to believe and speak what it will." Lundman, 530 N.W.2d at 826.
The district court did not err in finding a special relationship did not exist between the parties. Because there is no special relationship, there is no duty, and we need not reach the issues of breach or causation. The district court did not err in applying the law or in granting Annandale Congregation and Watchtower's motion for summary judgment.
3. Meyer and Doe's brief to this court argues Annandale Congregation and Watchtower's failure to report abuse, in violation of Minnesota's child abuse reporting act, is negligence per se. See Minn. Stat. § 626.556 (requiring certain professionals to report to welfare agencies or police suspected neglect, physical abuse, or sexual abuse of children and providing that failure to report as mandated is misdemeanor). In their reply brief, Meyer and Doe argue they do not claim that a violation of the reporting statute is "negligence," but rather argue "violation of the statute is evidence of negligence per se." (Alteration in original.) We disagree. This court previously determined that section 626.556 does not create a private cause of action for violation of its reporting requirements or create a duty which could be enforced through a common-law negligence action. See Valtakis v. Putnam, 504 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Minn. App. 1993) (refusing to impose civil remedy for violation of Minn. Stat. § 626.556 (1990) where legislature provided criminal remedy and did not provide civil remedy).
D E C I S I O N
The district court did not err in finding there was no special relationship between the parties and therefore no duty owed. Annandale Congregation and Watchtower are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Failure of Annandale Congregation and Watchtower to comply with Minn. Stat. § 626.556 did not create a private cause of action.
Affirmed.
[1] We note Meyer and Doe allege Annandale Congregation and Watchtower breached duties imposed under versions of the Minnesota child abuse reporting statutes in effect from 1989 to 1994 but brought suit against them in July 2002. Thus, the case is governed primarily by Minn. Stat. § 626.556 (2000). Because the 2000 version of the reporting statute is substantively the same as that in previous years, we cite the 2000 version of the reporting statute in this opinion.
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46
J.W. Congregation Cleared of Abuse Charges
by Kenneson in.
the following article comes out of minnesota and is entitled "annandale church isn't liable in abuse suit.".
i'm off to work now, so don't have time to comment, but would like to post it before i leave.. http://www.startribune.com/stories/462/4655055.html
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loveis
Thought I might resurrect this thread about the Heidi Meyer case, since we are currently awaiting a decision from the New Hampshire Supreme Court in the Berry girls' case, and many of the facts and issues are the same or very similar.
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12
Article on NH JW Abuse Case--Paul Berry
by blondie inin the jehovah's witness church, the elders were allowed to tell other church members because everyone in the church is considered an ordained minister.
but they were not allowed to tell authorities outside the church, the court records said.
i wonder if she misunderstood?.
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loveis
Attorneys for the sisters and the church are fighting the case on several fronts, and it's possible the Supreme Court could decide the case in a way that does not speak to the gray area between the mandatory reporting law and the law allowing religious privilege. The justices could, for example, agree with the church attorneys' claims that the case should be dismissed because it falls outside the statute of limitations.
Yes, that is very true. It is entirely possible that the justices may not even decide or comment on the issue of whether or not the abuse reporting law trumps the religious confidentiality law.
Listening to the audio of the oral arguments, what I got is that first and foremost (even more so than the issue of abuse reporting versus religious privilege) was the question of D U T Y. That is, did the congregation or the WTS owe a DUTY (common-law or otherwise) to report the abuse, otherwise help protect from abuse, or counsel properly for the situation? This is vitally important because, since this is a CIVIL case, if there is no duty, there is no case--period, end of story; slam-dunk victory for the WTS. Indeed, the trial court judge ruled that there was indeed such a duty (back in February 2003), and it was on that basis that he denied the WTS motion to dismiss the case OUTRIGHT, at the start. (When he did grant a motion to dismiss LATER, in June 2003, from the arguments, and the pages of the trial court decision cited by the judge, it again was evidently at least partially due to the issue of DUTY and not COMPLETELY because of religious privilege.)
If you listen to the audio, the Berry girls' lawyer, Marci Hamilton, comes across as fluent, eloquent, and knowledgeable in her arguments. OTOH, the WTS lawyer, Donald Gardner, does not come across as being as fluent, is sometimes halting, and at one point even seems arrogant/angry that the justices do not appear to be buying his WTS spin of the case.
So, the girls evidently have the best representing them. Marci is also a columnist and advocate on child abuse issues, and here is one of her more excellent columns that I remember:
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20040506.html
Why Ensuring Accountability for Clergy Sexual Abuse of Children Has Proved So Difficult,
Even Though It Remains So Crucial
By MARCI HAMILTON [email protected]Thursday, May. 06, 2004
When the Boston Globe finally spotlighted the issue of sexual abuse of children by clergy, everyone agreed something had to be done. But sadly, the solutions have so far have been neither far-reaching nor effective.
What happened? The story dropped from the headlines. And the solutions often got lost in the machinations of the legislatures and the powers that be. It takes incredible doggedness to keep political institutions focused on an issue, especially when the media's attentions have shifted elsewhere.
The record to date for legislatures and prosecutors dealing with clergy abuse is mixed, at best. As the following examples make clear, bringing the Catholic Church to account for the thousands of children who were raped and sexually molested is still going to take enormous fortitude on the part of activists and far-sighted public leaders. Despite the time that has passed since the Globe's revelations sparked public outrage, much remains to be done.
It has become evident, also, that addressing the Catholic Church's problem alone -- difficult as that will be -- will still not be enough. Six thousand victims of Jehovah's Witnesses clergy recently made themselves known. Meanwhile, the Lutheran Church just settled a multi-million-dollar clergy abuse lawsuit.
This is a public health, criminal, and civil law crisis of staggering proportions that few, if any, have fully comprehended. The actions taken now will reverberate throughout the United States in years to come. That makes it all the more important that these actions be appropriate, prompt, and effective.
But so far, they have fallen woefully short of the mark -- as I will explain in discussing a Wisconsin law passed last week, the disappointing lack of enforcement of the New Hampshire settlement agreement, and an Illinois case of alleged abuse by a priest who appears to a recidivist -- a case in which the Church refuses to comply with court ordered discovery.
Wisconsin's Statute of Limitations Debate: A Huge Disappointment
Statutes of limitations on childhood sexual abuse are far too short. In far too many states, the statute of limitations typically ran before the victims were even psychologically capable of filing charges or suing for damages. And this legal reality doubtless enabled accusers to continue with their predations.
Getting rid of the statute of limitations on child sexual abuse should be a top priority. Maine and Alaska wisely have no statute of limitations for such abuse. Other states should follow suit and abolish -- or at least dramatically lengthen -- theirs. There is no excuse for a statute that begins to run before the victim is a well into adulthood with the maturity to be able to withstand the gauntlet of prosecution and litigation.
Statutes of limitations are not mandated by the Constitution, nor are they set in stone. They are merely procedural, technical rules.
Granted, the state cannot make its criminal statute of limitations retroactive, as the Supreme Court held in Stogner v. California
. But that particular rule--grounded in the Ex Post Facto Clause -- does not apply to civil statutes of limitation.As the Court has held in Landgraf v. USI Film Products and Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, legislatures have broad latitude to choose whatever statute of limitations serves the interest of fairness -- including having no statute of limitations at all. In the latter case, the Court explained:
"Statutes of limitations find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than logic. They represent expedients, rather than principles . . . . They are by definition arbitrary . . . [and] have come into law not through the judicial process but through legislation. They represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate . . . [and are] good only by legislative grace, [subject] to a relatively large degree of legislative control."
Statutes of limitations have a worthy goal: to increase the likelihood that the evidence in court will be reasonably reliable. But there are other ways to serve that goal -- such as the rules of evidence, which will be applied at any child sexual abuse trial, as they will at any other trial. We can count on judges to keep unreliable evidence out of court; we need not presume, through a statute of limitations, that evidence, like milk, must have a sell-by date.
And they have one goal that makes little sense in the context of child sexual abuse: To permit potential defendants to "rest easy," at some point, in the knowledge that they will not be prosecuted.
This goal makes sense when a crime is very minor (people should not lose sleep over their past littering forever) or when it might not have been a crime at all (people should not have to worry forever about that dicey tax deduction). But it makes no sense for the sexual abuse of children.
Indeed, when pedophiles "rest easy," we should all be afraid. Pedophiles rarely have only one victim; giving them a "bye" for past abuse, simply because the abuse occurred a certain number of years ago, only puts other victims in danger. Consider the Catholic Church's now well-publicized practice of providing pedophile priests one set of children after another to terrorize and harm.
So states have all abolished their statutes of limitations for child sexual abuse, right? Wrong.
Consider Wisconsin's example. In fall 2003, I testified before the Wisconsin state legislature. There, a bill was pending that would have extended the criminal and civil statutes of limitations for all future victims of abuse. But victims of past abuse (who filled the room and testified for hours) also implored the legislature to extend the civil statute of limitations retroactively.
As I explained (on behalf of the Survivors Network of Those Abused by Priests), such a statute would have been entirely constitutional. The Supreme Court has been clear: Criminal statutes of limitations cannot be retroactively extended; the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause prevents it. But it's plain that that clause does not apply to civil statutes of limitations. Moreover, Wisconsin, like other courts, had evolved from an earlier rule prohibiting retroactive civil statutes of limitations into a rule that permitted the legislature broad latitude where the circumstances warranted. The victims implored the members to add to the bill a provision that would have extended the civil statute of limitations retroactively.
Despite the clear precedent, some members pressed the incorrect argument that there was a constitutional problem with a retroactive change to the civil statute of limitations. And sadly, last week, Wisconsin's Governor Jim Doyle signed a version of the law that addresses only future, not past victims. The new law is without question a step in the right direction, but it is woefully deficient.
The current law extends the statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse into the future, and the clergy will now be required to report known child abuse. Past victims, however, were provided no means of bringing the Church to accountability for the decades of harm it knew about and fostered.
Green Bay Bishop David Zubik could not have been more exuberant in his praise for the bill, which he said would "bring[] justice to those harmed." From a shortsighted perspective, he has reason to be happy, but the reason has nothing to do with justice. The bill protects the Church's coffers from the many victims it permitted to be abused -- and in effect, protects the Church from the heinous mistakes it made during the long era of secrecy. At the same time, it gives the Church a remarkable public relations moment.
The appearance of progress in Wisconsin masks the reality of retrenchment.
The New Hampshire Agreement's Bright Start and Murky PresentLike the Wisconsin legislature's focus on clergy sexual abuse, New Hampshire's agreement with the Bishop of Manchester seemed very hopeful.
In New Hampshire, everything seemed to go as it should: The prosecutors were aggressive, and the Church did not offer flimsy First Amendment excuses to try to avoid complying with the investigation; instead, it opened its files for the authorities. Finally, the Church entered into a settlement -- the only one of its kind -- in which the Diocese admitted criminal liability.
The New Hampshire experience, then, seemed like the first gasp of oxygen after swimming too far underwater. But such optimism turned out to be premature.
One of the many conditions of the settlement was that the Church would keep its files available to prosecutors, and that the Attorney General's Office would conduct an annual audit to ensure compliance with the terms of the agreement.
Guess what? The agreement was signed December 10, 2002, and no audit of any kind has been done.
The reason is money. The agreement did not specify whether the AG's Office or the Church would pay for the audit, and both are claiming tight budgets. As a result, victims and their families feel betrayed by both. It appears it may take a lawsuit by victims to push the Church into doing what it agreed to do almost two years ago.
The early appearance of accountability on both sides is disintegrating quickly into the reality of the previous status quo: No one is actively watching to make sure children are not being harmed.
An Illinois Example: Bishop Wilton Gregory Is Held In Contempt of CourtA third example of bad behavior by the Church with respect to addressing clergy sexual abuse, is not just deeply disappointing, but disgusting.
A priest named Raymond Kownacki in Illinois was alleged to have persuaded a family to let a teenage girl go with him to a new diocese in order to attend a better school. But there, according to the family, he repeatedly raped and beat her. When she became pregnant, the family alleges, he performed a chemical and manual abortion. But her case was dismissed on statute of limitations grounds.
Now two other victims have come forward. In one case, the plaintiff requested Kownacki's mental health records. The court ordered the Church to produce them, but it refused. The result was that the Court held the Diocese in contempt.
Sadly, this particular diocese is headed by the President of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops -- Bishop Wilton Gregory, of Belleville, Illinois. He has repeatedly apologized to victims on behalf of the Conference, while cameras rolled. But now those apologies ring hollow, when his own diocese refuses to comply with a court order crucial to a victim's case. This is the leader who was supposed to lead the United States bishops to a new and better policy, and now we have proof of his actual intentions: just more of the same.
These three examples are just anecdotes in the war on childhood sexual abuse in the United States. They prove that this war is far from over.
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Article on NH JW Abuse Case--Paul Berry
by blondie inin the jehovah's witness church, the elders were allowed to tell other church members because everyone in the church is considered an ordained minister.
but they were not allowed to tell authorities outside the church, the court records said.
i wonder if she misunderstood?.
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loveis
Here again is the link to the audio of the actual oral arguments presented before the court on October 20th:
http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme/recordings/2004/2003-0779.mp3
36 minutes long but worth it. (You might download the whole thing first before trying to play it, to avoid problems--5 MB is its size.)
The article is wrong about at least 2 things: Paul Berry was never an elder, though he was a ministerial servant for some time. Also, it was Marci Hamilton (who is BTW an excellent columnist on child abuse and advocate for vicitms), not O'Connor, who actually argued the case before the High Court for the Berry girls (though O'Connor and others were involved with preparing the briefs and other parts of the case).
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"You'll still be handled as a disfellowshipped person."
by Fleur inthat was the response that i got from a relative when i asked if they would shun me if i came to my grandmother's memorial service.. the same relative thinks that i should go, despite that because it's a public event but that if i did i should realize that i'd still be handled as a df'd person.
meaning, they would all shun me.. i have for days been trying to help this relative arrange my grandmother's burial with another relative who has refused to sign necessary papers.
i even offered to pay for said burial out of my own pocket if money were an issue.
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loveis
What is the policy of attending a relative's funeral in a church now?
*** w02 5/15 p. 28 Questions From Readers ***
Questions
From ReadersWould
it be advisable for a true Christian to attend a funeral or a wedding in a church?Our taking part in any form of false religion is displeasing to Jehovah and must be avoided. (2 Corinthians 6:14-17; Revelation 18:4) A church funeral is a religious service that likely involves a sermon advocating such unscriptural ideas as the immortality of the soul and a heavenly reward for all good people. It may also include such practices as making the sign of the cross and joining in prayer with the priest or minister. Prayers and other religious exercises contrary to Bible teaching may also be a part of a religious wedding ceremony held in a church or elsewhere. Being in a group where everyone else is engaging in a false religious act, a Christian may find it difficult to resist the pressure to join in. How unwise to expose oneself to such pressure!
What if a Christian feels obligated to attend a funeral or a wedding held in a church? An unbelieving husband, for example, may urge his Christian wife to be with him on such an occasion. Could she join him as a quiet observer? Out of regard for her husband?s wishes, the wife may decide to go with him, being determined not to share in any religious ceremonies. On the other hand, she may decide not to go, reasoning that the emotional pressure of the circumstances could prove to be too much for her, perhaps causing her to compromise godly principles. The decision would be hers to make. She definitely would want to be settled in her heart, having a clean conscience.?1 Timothy 1:19.
In any case, it would be to her advantage to explain to her husband that she could not conscientiously share in any religious ceremonies or join in the singing of hymns or bow her head when prayer is offered. On the basis of her explanation, he may conclude that his wife?s presence could give rise to a situation that might be unpleasant to him. He may choose to go alone out of love for his wife, respect for her beliefs, or a desire to avoid any embarrassment. But if he insists that she go with him, she might go as a mere observer.
Not to be overlooked is the effect our attending a service in a religious building might have on fellow believers. Could it injure the conscience of some? Might their resistance to avoid engaging in idolatry be weakened? "Make sure of the more important things," admonishes the apostle Paul, "so that you may be flawless and not be stumbling others up to the day of Christ."?Philippians 1:10.
If the occasion involves a close fleshly relative, there may be additional family pressures. In any case, a Christian must carefully weigh all the factors involved. Under certain circumstances he or she may conclude that no difficulties would arise from attending a church funeral or wedding as an observer. However, the circumstances may be such that by attending, the likely injury to one?s own conscience or to that of others would outweigh the possible benefits of being present. Whatever the situation, the Christian should make sure that the decision will not interfere with his preserving a good conscience before God and men.
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Honour Your Parents No Matter How Bad They Are..
by Englishman in..and by logical extension, imho, you'll always show a deep respect for your brooklyn parent too.. look at this from a young people ask article:.
>>>>>parents who are hot-tempered or immoral, who are drunkards, or who bicker with each other?are they really worthy of honor?
yes, for the bible condemns holding any parent "in derision.
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loveis
In all fairness, the following qualifying footnote is provided on the subject:
We are not referring here to cases of physical or sexual abuse in which a youth may need to seek professional help from outside the home.
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LISTEN TO ORAL ARGUMENTS IN JW ABUSE CASE! (Berry Girls, NH Supreme Court)
by loveis inif you have an mp3 player (windows media player should be fine), just click on this link to hear them hash it out!
http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme/recordings/2004/2003-0779.mp3.
(if you need to catch up on the history of the berry girls case, this ongoing new hampshire supreme court appeal was discussed in more detail in these recent threads:) .
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loveis
bttt as we eagerly await the court's verdict
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LISTEN TO ORAL ARGUMENTS IN JW ABUSE CASE!! (Berry girls, NH Supreme Court)
by loveis inif you have an mp3 player (windows media player should be fine), just click on this link to hear them hash it out!.
http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme/recordings/2004/2003-0779.mp3.
(if you need to catch up on the history of the berry girls case, this ongoing new hampshire supreme court appeal was discussed in more detail in these recent threads:).
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loveis
Marci Hamilton appears to be an awesome litigator for child abuse issues! Just Google "Marci Hamilton attorney". A great columnist on the issue too.