F.Y.I., The fallacy is the same in both the above arguments. That is equating improbability of coming about by chance, with improbability of existence, for something that need not have come about by chance. Such an argument in reality can only be used to show that God, or Dawkins is improbable as to coming about by chance, and not necessarily also improbable as to existence.Note what happens to the same arguments when the consistent phrase "by chance" is added (and not omitted) to premise #3.
Example A
- "Complex things are improbable as to chance. (The greater the statistical improbability, the less plausible is chance as a solution: that is what improbable means).
- Life is very complex and therefore improbable by chance.
- However complex life is though, any creator of such life would have to be even more complex, hense even more improbable by chance.
Example B
- "Complex things are improbable as to chance. (The greater the statistical improbability, the less plausible is chance as a solution: that is what improbable means).
- The new atheist books ("The God Delusion", "Portable Atheist", etc,) are complex, hense improbable by chance.
- However complex the books are though, any creator of such a book would have to be even more complex, hense even more improbable by chance.
Observe how how the arguements now at best only prove improbability of coming about by chance and not also improbability of existence, since the creators in question (i.e.Dawkins, Hitchens, God,) need not also have come about by chance). Threfore the concluding point that they "almost certainly do not exist" is now easily seen as an invalid deduction.