The last I'll say on this is that we seem to agree that the quote is somewhat irrelevant. As I mentioned in one of my previous posts, I found the brief to be preachy and spend little time on the legal merits. The author seemed to be more interested in "giving a witness" than persuading the court. An amicus brief is a proper vehicle for providing background information that might not be appropriate for the parties' briefs, and this one probably stretches the rubber band pretty far in this regard. With that said, I don't know that this alone equals misleading, and it absolutely is not a violation of court rules or legal ethics. If you could make a dollar for every irrelevant statement you could find in an amicus brief, you'd have quite an earning opportunity.
As an aside, you note " the issue before the court, which issue had to do with modern transfusion practice and Watchtower theology."
Respectfully, that was not the issue before the Florida Supreme Court. The two issues were whether a state interest (the welfare of her minor children) can be asserted to override a patient's refusal of medical treatment, and if so, whether that interest outweighs a patient's right to privacy and religious freedom. These are broad issues, neither of which has to do with Watchtower Theology or modern transfusion practice, and indeed demonstrating that BluesBrother is correct that this whole thing was irrelevant. As the Florida Supreme Court eventually wrote:
T he arguments made in this Court present two basic issues. First, we must determine whether it is appropriate for a hospital to assert the state interests in an attempt to defeat a patient's decision to forgo emergency medical treatment. Second, assuming the state interests were properly presented in this case, we must decide whether Patricia's rejection of a blood transfusion constituted, as the district court found, abandonment of the couple's minor children and amounted to a state interest that was compelling enough to override her constitutional rights of privacy and religious freedom, by the least intrusive means available.
In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d, at 822.