Stratton vs.WTBTS revisited

WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOCIETY v. VILLAGE, STRATTON, 536 U.S. 150 (2002)
122 S.Ct. 2080 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, INC., et al. v.
VILLAGE OF STRATTON et al. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT No. 00-1737. Argued February 26, 2002
Decided June 17, 2002 Respondent Village of Stratton (Village) promulgated an ordinance that,
inter alia, prohibits "canvassers" from "going in and upon" private
residential property to promote any "cause" without first obtaining a
permit from the mayor's office by completing and signing a registration
form. Petitioners, a society and a congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses
that publish and distribute religious materials, brought this action
for injunctive relief, alleging that the ordinance violates their First
Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion, free speech, and
freedom of the press. The District Court upheld most provisions of the
ordinance as valid, content-neutral regulations, although it did
require the Village to accept narrowing constructions of several
provisions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Among its rulings, that court
held that the ordinance was content neutral and of general
applicability and therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny; rejected
petitioners' argument that the ordinance is overbroad because it
impairs the right to distribute pamphlets anonymously that was
recognized in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 ;
concluded that the Village's interests in protecting its residents from
fraud and undue annoyance and its desire to prevent criminals from
posing as canvassers in order to defraud its residents were sufficient
bases on which to justify the regulation; and distinguished this
Court's earlier cases protecting the Jehovah's Witnesses ministry.

Held: The ordinance's provisions making it a misdemeanor to engage in
door-to-door advocacy without first registering with the mayor and
receiving a permit violate the First Amendment as it applies to
religious proselytizing, anonymous political speech, and the
distribution of handbills. Pp. 160-169.

(a) For over 50 years, this Court has invalidated on First Amendment
grounds restrictions on door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering by
Jehovah's Witnesses. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 .
Although those cases do not directly control the question at issue,
they yield several themes that guide the Court. Among other things,
Page 151
those cases emphasize that the hand distribution of religious tracts is
ages old and has the same claim as more orthodox practices to the
guarantees of freedom of religion, speech, and press, e.g., id., at
109; discuss extensively the historical importance of door-to-door
canvassing and pamphleteering as vehicles for the dissemination of
ideas, e.g., Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147 ,
164 , but recognize the legitimate interests a town may have in some
form of regulation, particularly when the solicitation of money is
involved, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 , 306 , or the
prevention of burglary is a legitimate concern, Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 , 144 ; make clear that there must be a balance
between such interests and the effect of the regulations on First
Amendment rights, e.g., ibid.; and demonstrate that the Jehovah's
Witnesses have not struggled for their rights alone, but for those many
who are poorly financed and rely extensively upon this method of
communication, see, e.g., id., at 144-146, including nonreligious
groups and individuals, see, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 ,
539-540 . Pp. 160-164.

(b) The Court need not resolve the parties' dispute as to what standard
of review to use here because the breadth of speech affected by the
ordinance and the nature of the regulation make it clear that the Sixth
Circuit erred in upholding it. There is no doubt that the interests the
ordinance assertedly serves — the prevention of fraud and crime
and the protection of residents' privacy — are important and that
the Village may seek to safeguard them through some form of regulation
of solicitation activity. However, the amount of speech covered by the
ordinance raises serious concerns. Had its provisions been construed to
apply only to commercial activities and the solicitation of funds,
arguably the ordinance would have been tailored to the Village's
interest in protecting its residents' privacy and preventing fraud.
Yet, the Village's administration of its ordinance unquestionably
demonstrates that it applies to a significant number of noncommercial
"canvassers" promoting a wide variety of "causes." The pernicious
effect of the permit requirement is illustrated by, e.g., the
requirement that a canvasser be identified in a permit application
filed in the mayor's office and made available for public inspection,
which necessarily results in a surrender of the anonymity this Court
has protected. Also central to the Court's conclusion that the
ordinance does not pass First Amendment scrutiny is that it is not
tailored to the Village's stated interests. Even if the interest in
preventing fraud could adequately support the ordinance insofar as it
applies to commercial transactions and the solicitation of funds, that
interest provides no support for its application to petitioners, to
political campaigns, or to enlisting support for unpopular causes. The
Village's
Page 152
argument that the ordinance is nonetheless valid because it serves
the two additional interests of protecting residents' privacy and
the prevention of crime is unpersuasive. As to the former, an
unchallenged ordinance section authorizing residents to post "No
Solicitation" signs, coupled with their unquestioned right to refuse to
engage in conversation with unwelcome visitors, provides ample
protection for unwilling listeners. As to the latter, it seems unlikely
that the lack of a permit would preclude criminals from knocking on
doors and engaging in conversations not covered by the ordinance, and,
in any event, there is no evidence in the record of a special crime
problem related to door-to-door solicitation. Pp. 164-169.

240 F.3d 553 , reversed and remanded. Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'Connor,
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a
concurring opinion, in which Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Scalia,
J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J.,
joined. Rehnquist, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 172. Paul D. Polidoro argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the
briefs were Philip Brumley, Richard D. Moake, and Donald T. Ridley.

Abraham Cantor argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.

David M. Gormley, State Solicitor of Ohio, argued the cause for the
State of Ohio et al. as amici curiae in support of respondents. With
him on the brief were Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio,
Elise W. Porter and Kirk A. Lindsey, Assistant Solicitors, and the
Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Richard
Blumenthal of Connecticut, Steve Carter of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller
of Iowa, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of
Maryland, Thomas Reilly of Massachusetts, Frankie Sue Del Papa of
Nevada, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, and Hoke MacMillan of
Wyoming.[fn*]

[fn*] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Commonwealth
of the Northern Mariana Islands by Herbert D. Soll, Attorney General,
David Collins, and Karen M. Klaver; for the Center for Individual Freedom
by Eric S. Jaffe; for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints by
Von G. Keetch; for the Electronic Privacy Information Center et al. by
Marc Rotenberg, Steven R. Shapiro, and Raymond Vasvari; and for
RealCampaignReform.org, Inc., et al. by William J. Olson, John S. Miles,
and Herbert W. Titus.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Ohio
Municipal League by Barry M. Byron and John E. Gotherman; and for the
International Municipal Lawyers Association et al. by Richard Ruda and
James I. Crowley.

Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Brennan Center for Justice
by Burt Neuborne, Deborah Goldberg, and Richard L. Hasen; and for
Independent Baptist Churches of America by Thomas W. King III.
Page 153 JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioners contend that a village ordinance making it a misdemeanor to
engage in door-to-door advocacy with-out first registering with the mayor
and receiving a permit violates the First Amendment. Through this facial
challenge, we consider the door-to-door canvassing regulation not only as
it applies to religious proselytizing, but also to anonymous political
speech and the distribution of handbills.

I

Petitioner Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc.,
coordinates the preaching activities of Jehovah's Witnesses throughout
the United States and publishes Bibles and religious periodicals that are
widely distributed. Petitioner Wellsville, Ohio, Congregation of
Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc., supervises the activities of approximately 59
members in a part of Ohio that includes the Village of Stratton
(Village). Petitioners offer religious literature without cost to anyone
interested in reading it. They allege that they do not solicit
contributions or orders for the sale of merchandise or services, but they
do accept donations.

Petitioners brought this action against the Village and its mayor in
the United States District Court for the Southern
Page 154
District of Ohio, seeking an injunction against the enforcement of
several sections of Ordinance No. 1998-5 regulating uninvited peddling
and solicitation on private property in the Village. Petitioners'
complaint alleged that the ordinance violated several constitutional
rights, including the free exercise of religion, free speech, and the
freedom of the press. App. 10a-44a. The District Court conducted a
bench trial at which evidence of the administration of the ordinance
and its effect on petitioners was introduced.

Section 116.01 prohibits "canvassers" and others from "going in and
upon" private residential property for the purpose of promoting any
"cause" without first having obtained a permit pursuant to §
116.03.[fn1] That section provides that any canvasser who intends to go on
private property to promote a cause must obtain a "Solicitation Permit"
from the office of the mayor; there is no charge for the permit, and
apparently one is issued routinely after an applicant
Page 155
fills out a fairly detailed "Solicitor's Registration Form."[fn2]
The canvasser is then authorized to go upon premises that he listed
on the registration form, but he must carry the permit upon his person
and exhibit it whenever requested to do so by a police officer or by
a resident.[fn3] The ordinance
Page 156
sets forth grounds for the denial or revocation of a permit,[fn4]
but the record before us does not show that any application has been
denied or that any permit has been revoked. Petitioners did not apply
for a permit.

A section of the ordinance that petitioners do not challenge
establishes a procedure by which a resident may prohibit solicitation
even by holders of permits. If the resident files a "No Solicitation
Registration Form" with the mayor, and also posts a "No Solicitation"
sign on his property, no uninvited canvassers may enter his property,
unless they are specifically authorized to do so in the "No Solicitation
Registration Form" itself.[fn5] Only 32 of the Village's 278 residents
Page 157
filed such forms. Each of the forms in the record contains a list of 19
suggested exceptions;[fn6] on one form, a resident checked 17
exceptions, thereby excluding only "Jehovah's Witnesses" and "Political
Candidates" from the list of invited canvassers. Although Jehovah's
Witnesses do not consider themselves to be "solicitors" because they make
no charge for their literature or their teaching, leaders of the church
testified at trial that they would honor "no solicitation" signs in the
Village. They also explained at trial that they did not apply for a
permit because they derive their authority to
Page 158
preach from Scripture.[fn7] "For us to seek a permit from a
municipality to preach we feel would almost be an insult to God."
App. 321a.

Petitioners introduced some evidence that the ordinance was the product
of the mayor's hostility to their ministry, but the District Court
credited the mayor's testimony that it had been designed to protect the
privacy rights of the Village residents, specifically to protect them
"from `flim flam' con artists who prey on small town populations."
61 F. Supp.2d 734 , 736 (S.D.Ohio 1999). Nevertheless, the court concluded
that the terms of the ordinance applied to the activities of petitioners
as well as to "business or political canvassers," id., at 737, 738.

The District Court upheld most provisions of the ordinance as valid,
content-neutral regulations that did not infringe on petitioners' First
Amendment rights. The court did, however, require the Village to accept
narrowing constructions of three provisions. First, the court viewed the
requirement in § 116.03(b)(5) that the applicant must list the
specific address of each residence to be visited as potentially invalid,
but cured by the Village's agreement to attach to the form a list of
willing residents. Id., at 737. Second, it held that petitioners could
comply with § 116.03(b)(6) by merely stating their purpose as "the
Jehovah's Witness ministry." Id., at 738. And third, it held that §
116.05, which limited canvassing to the hours before 5 p.m., was invalid
on its face and should be replaced with a provision referring to
"reasonable hours of the day." Id., at 739. As so modified, the court
held the ordinance constitutionally valid as applied to petitioners and
dismissed the case.
Page 159

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 240 F.3d 553
(2001). It held that the ordinance was "content neutral and of general
applicability and therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny." Id., at
560. It rejected petitioners' reliance on the discussion of laws
affecting both the free exercise of religion and free speech in
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990),[fn8] because that "language was dicta and therefore not binding."
240 F.3d, at 561 . It also rejected petitioners' argument that the
ordinance is overbroad because it impairs the right to distribute
pamphlets anonymously that we recognized in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), reasoning that "the very act of going
door-to-door requires the canvassers to reveal a portion of their
identities." 240 F.3d, at 563 . The Court of Appeals concluded that the
interests promoted by the Village — "protecting its residents from
fraud and undue annoyance" — as well as the harm that it seeks to
prevent — "criminals posing as canvassers in order to defraud its
residents" — though"by no means overwhelming," were sufficient to
justify the regulation. Id., at 565-566. The court distinguished earlier
cases protecting the Jehovah's Witnesses ministry because those cases
either involved
Page 160
a flat prohibition on the dissemination of ideas, e.g., Martin
v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), or an ordinance that
left the issuance of a permit to the discretion of a municipal officer,
see, e.g.,Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 , 302 (1940).

In dissent, Judge Gilman expressed the opinion that by subjecting
noncommercial solicitation to the permit requirements, the ordinance
significantly restricted a substantial quantity of speech unrelated to
the Village's interest in eliminating fraud and unwanted annoyance. In
his view, the Village "failed to demonstrate either the reality of the
harm or the efficacy of the restriction." 240 F.3d, at 572 .

We granted certiorari to decide the following question: "Does a
municipal ordinance that requires one to obtain a permit prior to
engaging in the door-to-door advocacy of a political cause and to display
upon demand the permit, which contains one's name, violate the First
Amendment protection accorded to anonymous pamphleteering or discourse?"
534 U.S. 971 (2001); Pet. for Cert. i.[fn9]

II

For over 50 years, the Court has invalidated restrictions on
door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering.[fn10] It is more than
historical accident that most of these cases involved First Amendment
challenges brought by Jehovah's Witnesses, because door-to-door
canvassing is mandated by their religion. As we noted in Murdock v.
Pennsylvania,
Page 161
319 U.S. 105 , 108 (1943), the Jehovah's Witnesses "claim to
follow the example of Paul, teaching `publicly, and from house to house.'
Acts 20:20. They take literally the mandate of the Scriptures, `Go ye
into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature.' Mark
16:15. In doing so they believe that they are obeying a commandment of
God." Moreover, because they lack significant financial resources, the
ability of the Witnesses to proselytize is seriously diminished by
regulations that burden their efforts to canvass door-to-door.

Although our past cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses, most of which
were decided shortly before and during World War II, do not directly
control the question we confront today, they provide both a historical
and analytical backdrop for consideration of petitioners' First Amendment
claim that the breadth of the Village's ordinance offends the First
Amendment.[fn11] Those cases involved petty offenses that raised
constitutional questions of the most serious magnitude — questions
that implicated the free exercise of religion, the freedom of speech, and
the freedom of the press. From these decisions, several themes emerge
that guide our consideration of the ordinance at issue here.

First, the cases emphasize the value of the speech involved. For
example, in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, the Court noted that "hand
distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of missionary
evangelism — as old as the history of printing presses. It has been
a potent force in various religious movements down through the years. .
. . This form of religious activity occupies the same high estate under
the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching from the
pulpits. It has the same claim to protection as the more orthodox and
conventional exercises of religion.
Page 162
It also has the same claim as the others to the guarantees of freedom
of speech and freedom of the press." Id., at 108-109.

In addition, the cases discuss extensively the historical importance of
door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering as vehicles for the
dissemination of ideas. In Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington),
308 U.S. 147 (1939), the petitioner was a Jehovah's Witness who had been
convicted of canvassing without a permit based on evidence that she had
gone from house to house offering to leave books or booklets. Writing for
the Court, Justice Roberts stated that "pamphlets have proved most
effective instruments in the dissemination of opinion. And perhaps the
most effective way of bringing them to the notice of individuals is their
distribution at the homes of the people. On this method of communication
the ordinance imposes censorship, abuse of which engendered the struggle
in England which eventuated in the establishment of the doctrine of the
freedom of the press embodied in our Constitution. To require a
censorship through license which makes impossible the free and
unhampered distribution of pamphlets strikes at the very heart of the
constitutional guarantees." Id., at 164 (emphasis added).

Despite the emphasis on the important role that door-to-door canvassing
and pamphleteering has played in our constitutional tradition of free and
open discussion, these early cases also recognized the interests a town
may have in some form of regulation, particularly when the solicitation
of money is involved. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940),
the Court held that an ordinance requiring Jehovah's Witnesses to obtain
a license before soliciting door to door was invalid because the issuance
of the license depended on the exercise of discretion by a city
official. Our opinion recognized that "a State may protect its citizens
from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community,
before permitting him publicly to solicit funds
Page 163
for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act
for the cause which he purports to represent." Id., at 306.
Similarly, in Martin v. City of Struthers, the Court recognized
crime prevention as a legitimate interest served by these ordinances
and noted that "burglars frequently pose as canvassers, either in
order that they may have a pretense to discover whether a house is
empty and hence ripe for burglary, or for the purpose of spying out
the premises in order that they may return later." 319 U.S., at 144 .
Despite recognition of these interests as legitimate, our precedent
is clear that there must be a balance between these interests and
the effect of the regulations on First Amendment rights. We "must `be
astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation' and must
`weigh the circumstances and . . . appraise the substantiality of the
reasons advanced in support of the regulation.'" Ibid. (quoting
Schneider, 308 U.S., at 161 ).

Finally, the cases demonstrate that efforts of the Jehovah's Witnesses
to resist speech regulation have not been a struggle for their rights
alone. In Martin, after cataloging the many groups that rely extensively
upon this method of communication, the Court summarized that "[d]oor to
door distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes
of little people." 319 U.S., at 144-146 .

That the Jehovah's Witnesses are not the only "little people" who face
the risk of silencing by regulations like the Village's is exemplified by
our cases involving nonreligious speech. See, e.g., Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); Hynes v. Mayor
and Council of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516 (1945). In Thomas, the issue was whether a labor leader
could be required to obtain a permit before delivering a speech to
prospective union members. After reviewing the Jehovah's Witnesses cases
discussed above, the Court observed:
Page 164

"As a matter of principle a requirement of
registration in order to make a public speech would
seem generally incompatible with an exercise of the
rights of free speech and free assembly. . . .

. . . . .

"If the exercise of the rights of free speech and free
assembly cannot be made a crime, we do not think this
can be accomplished by the device of requiring
previous registration as a condition for exercising
them and making such a condition the foundation for
restraining in advance their exercise and for imposing
a penalty for violating such a restraining order. So
long as no more is involved than exercise of the
rights of free speech and free assembly, it is immune
to such a restriction. If one who solicits support for
the cause of labor may be required to register as a
condition to the exercise of his right to make a
public speech, so may he who seeks to rally support
for any social, business, religious or political
cause. We think a requirement that one must register
before he undertakes to make a public speech to enlist
support for a lawful movement is quite incompatible
with the requirements of the First Amendment." Id., at
539-540.

Although these World War II-era cases provide guidance for our
consideration of the question presented, they do not answer one
preliminary issue that the parties adamantly dispute. That is, what
standard of review ought we use in assessing the constitutionality of
this ordinance. We find it unnecessary, however, to resolve that dispute
because the breadth of speech affected by the ordinance and the nature of
the regulation make it clear that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding
it.

III

The Village argues that three interests are served by its ordinance:
the prevention of fraud, the prevention of crime,
Page 165
and the protection of residents' privacy. We have no difficulty
concluding, in light of our precedent, that these are important
interests that the Village may seek to safeguard through some form
of regulation of solicitation activity. We must also look, however,
to the amount of speech covered by the ordinance and whether
there is an appropriate balance between the affected speech and
the governmental interests that the ordinance purports to serve.

The text of the Village's ordinance prohibits "canvassers" from going
on private property for the purpose of explaining or promoting any
"cause," unless they receive a permit and the residents visited have not
opted for a "no solicitation" sign. Had this provision been construed to
apply only to commercial activities and the solicitation of funds,
arguably the ordinance would have been tailored to the Village's interest
in protecting the privacy of its residents and preventing fraud. Yet,
even though the Village has explained that the ordinance was adopted to
serve those interests, it has never contended that it should be so
narrowly interpreted. To the contrary, the Village's administration of
its ordinance unquestionably demonstrates that the provisions apply to a
significant number of noncommercial "canvassers" promoting a wide variety
of "causes." Indeed, on the "No Solicitation Forms" provided to the
residents, the canvassers include "Camp Fire Girls," "Jehovah's
Witnesses," "Political Candidates," "Trick or Treaters during Halloween
Season," and "Persons Affiliated with Stratton Church." The ordinance
unquestionably applies, not only to religious causes, but to political
activity as well. It would seem to extend to "residents casually
soliciting the votes of neighbors,"[fn12] or ringing doorbells to enlist
support for employing a more efficient garbage collector.

The mere fact that the ordinance covers so much speech raises
constitutional concerns. It is offensive — not only to
Page 166
the values protected by the First Amendment, but to the very notion of
a free society — that in the context of everyday public discourse
a citizen must first inform the government of her desire to speak to
her neighbors and then obtain a permit to do so. Even if the issuance
of permits by the mayor's office is a ministerial task that is performed
promptly and at no cost to the applicant, a law requiring a permit to
engage in such speech constitutes a dramatic departure from our national
heritage and constitutional tradition. Three obvious examples illustrate
the pernicious effect of such a permit requirement.

First, as our cases involving distribution of unsigned handbills
demonstrate,[fn13] there are a significant number of persons who support
causes anonymously.[fn14] "The decision in favorof anonymity may be
motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by concern about
social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one's
privacy as possible." McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n,
514 U.S., at 341-342 . The requirement that a canvasser must be identified in a permit
application filed in the mayor's office and available for public
inspection necessarily results in a surrender of that anonymity. Although
it is true, as the Court of Appeals suggested, see 240 F.3d, at 563 , that
persons who are known to the resident reveal their allegiance to a group
or cause when they present themselves at the front door to advocate an
issue or to deliver a handbill, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding
that the ordinance does not implicate anonymity interests. The Sixth
Circuit's reasoning is undermined by
Page 167
our decision in Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation,
Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999). The badge requirement that
we invalidated in Buckley applied to petition circulators seeking
signatures in face-to-face interactions. The fact that circulators revealed
their physical identities did not foreclose our consideration of the
circulators' interest in maintaining their anonymity. In the Village,
strangers to the resident certainly maintain their anonymity, and the
ordinance may preclude such persons from canvassing for unpopular causes.
Such preclusion may well be justified in some situations — for
example, by the special state interest in protecting the integrity of a
ballot-initiative process, see ibid., or by the interest in
preventing fraudulent commercial transactions. The Village ordinance,
however, sweeps more broadly, covering unpopular causes unrelated to
commercial transactions or to any special interest in protecting the
electoral process.

Second, requiring a permit as a prior condition on the exercise of the
right to speak imposes an objective burden on some speech of citizens
holding religious or patriotic views. As our World War II-era cases
dramatically demonstrate, there are a significant number of persons whose
religious scruples will prevent them from applying for such a license.
There are no doubt other patriotic citizens, who have such firm
convictions about their constitutional right to engage in uninhibited
debate in the context of door-to-door advocacy, that they would prefer
silence to speech licensed by a petty official.

Third, there is a significant amount of spontaneous speech that is
effectively banned by the ordinance. A person who made a decision on a
holiday or a weekend to take an active part in a political campaign could
not begin to pass out handbills until after he or she obtained the
required permit. Even a spontaneous decision to go across the street and
urge a neighbor to vote against the mayor could not lawfully be
implemented without first obtaining the mayor's permission.
Page 168
In this respect, the regulation is analogous to the circulation
licensing tax the Court invalidated in Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). In Grosjean, while
discussing the history of the Free Press Clause of the First
Amendment, the Court stated that " '[t]he evils to be prevented
were not the censorship of the press merely, but any action of
the government by means of which it might prevent such free and general
discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the
people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens.'" Id., at
249-250 (quoting 2T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 886 (8th ed.
1927)); see also Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).

The breadth and unprecedented nature of this regulation does not alone
render the ordinance invalid. Also central to our conclusion that the
ordinance does not pass First Amendment scrutiny is that it is not
tailored to the Village's stated interests. Even if the interest in
preventing fraud could adequately support the ordinance insofar as it
applies to commercial transactions and the solicitation of funds, that
interest provides no support for its application to petitioners, to
political campaigns, or to enlisting support for unpopular causes. The
Village, however, argues that the ordinance is nonetheless valid because
it serves the two additional interests of protecting the privacy of the
resident and the prevention of crime.

With respect to the former, it seems clear that § 107 of the
ordinance, which provides for the posting of "No Solicitation" signs and
which is not challenged in this case, coupled with the resident's
unquestioned right to refuse to engage in conversation with unwelcome
visitors, provides ample protection for the unwilling listener.
Schaumburg, 444 U.S., at 639 ("[T]he provision permitting homeowners to
bar solicitors from their property by posting [no solicitation]
signs . . . suggest[s] the availability of less intrusive and more
effective measures to protect privacy"). The annoyance caused by an
Page 169
uninvited knock on the front door is the same whether or not the
visitor is armed with a permit.

With respect to the latter, it seems unlikely that the absence of a
permit would preclude criminals from knocking on doors and engaging in
conversations not covered by the ordinance. They might, for example, ask
for directions or permission to use the telephone, or pose as surveyers
or census takers. See n. 1, supra. Or they might register under a false
name with impunity because the ordinance contains no provision for
verifying an applicant's identity or organizational credentials.
Moreover, the Village did not assert an interest in crime prevention
below, and there is an absence of any evidence of a special crime problem
related to door-to-door solicitation in the record before us.

The rhetoric used in the World War II-era opinions that repeatedly
saved petitioners' coreligionists from petty prosecutions reflected the
Court's evaluation of the First Amendment freedoms that are implicated in
this case. The value judgment that then motivated a united democratic
people fighting to defend those very freedoms from totalitarian attack is
unchanged. It motivates our decision today.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

[fn1] Section 116.01 provides: "The practice of going in and upon private
property and/or the private residences of Village residents in the Village
by canvassers, solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or
transient vendors of merchandise or services, not having been invited to
do so by the owners or occupants of such private property or residences,
and not having first obtained a permit pursuant to Section 116.03 of this
Chapter, for the purpose of advertising, promoting, selling and/or
explaining any product, service, organization or cause, or for the
purpose of soliciting orders for the sale of goods, wares, merchandise or
services, is hereby declared to be a nuisance and is prohibited." App. to
Brief for Respondents 2a. The Village has interpreted the term
"canvassers" to include Jehovah's Witnesses and the term "cause" to
include their ministry. The ordinance does not appear to require a permit
for a surveyor since such an individual would not be entering private
property "for the purpose of advertising, promoting, selling and/or
explaining any product, service, organization or cause, or for the
purpose of soliciting orders for the sale of goods, wares, merchandise or
services." Thus, contrary to the assumption of the dissent in its heavy
reliance on the example from Dartmouth, post, at 172-173, 177, 179 (opinion
of Rehnquist, C.J.), the Village's ordinance would have done nothing
to prevent that tragic crime.

[fn2] Section 116.03 provides:

"(a) No canvasser, solicitor, peddler, hawker,
itinerant merchant or transient vendor of merchandise
or services who is described in Section 116.01 of this
Chapter and who intends to go in or upon private
property or a private residence in the Village for any
of the purposes described in Section 116.01, shall go
in or upon such private property or residence without
first registering in the office of the Mayor and
obtaining a Solicitation Permit.

"(b) The registration required by subsection (a)
hereof shall be made by filing a Solicitor's
Registration Form, at the office of the Mayor, on a
form furnished for such purpose. The Form shall be
completed by the Registrant and it shall then contain
the following information:

"(1) The name and home address of the Registrant and
Registrant's residence for five years next preceding
the date of registration;

"(2) A brief description of the nature and purpose of
the business, promotion, solicitation, organization,
cause, and/or the goods or services offered;

"(3) The name and address of the employer or
affiliated organization, with credentials from the
employer or organization showing the exact
relationship and authority of the Applicant;

"(4) The length of time for which the privilege to
canvass or solicit is desired;

"(5) The specific address of each private residence at
which the Registrant intends to engage in the conduct
described in Section 116.01 of this Chapter, and,

"(6) Such other information concerning the Registrant
and its business or purpose as may be reasonably
necessary to accurately describe the nature of the
privilege desired." Brief for Respondents 3a-4a.

[fn3] Section 116.04 provides: "Each Registrant who complies with Section
116.03(b) shall be furnished a Solicitation Permit. The permit shall
indicate that the applicant has registered as required by Section 116.03
of this Chapter. No permittee shall go in or upon any premises not listed
on the Registrant's Solicitor's Registration Form.

"Each person shall at all times, while exercising the privilege
in the Village incident to such permit, carry upon his person his
permit and the same shall be exhibited by such person whenever he
is requested to do so by any police officer or by any person who
is solicited." Id., at 4a.

[fn4] Section 116.06 provides: "Permits described in Section 116.04 of
this Chapter may be denied or revoked by the Mayor for any one or
more of the following reasons:

"(a) Incomplete information provided by the Registrant
in the Solicitor's Registration Form.

"(b) Fraud or misrepresentation contained in the
Solicitor's Registration Form.

"(c) Fraud, misrepresentation or false statements made
in the course of conducting the activity.

"(d) Violation of any of the provisions of this
chapter or of other Codified Ordinances or of any
State or Federal Law.

"(e) Conducting canvassing, soliciting or business in
such a manner as to constitute a trespass upon private
property.

"(f) The permittee ceases to possess the
qualifications required in this chapter for the
original registration." Id., at 5a.

[fn5] Section 116.07 provides, in part: "(a) Notwithstanding the
provisions of any other Section of this Chapter 116, any person, firm or
corporation who is the owner or lawful occupant of private property
within the territorial limits of the Village of Stratton, Ohio, may
prohibit the practice of going in or upon the private property and/or the
private residence of such owner or occupant, by uninvited canvassers,
solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient vendors,
by registering its property in accordance with Subdivision (b) of this
Section and by posting upon each such registered property a sign which
reads `No Solicitation' in a location which is reasonably visible to
persons who intend to enter upon such property.

"(b) The registration authorized by Subsection (a) hereof shall be made
by filing a `No Solicitation Registration Form', at the office of the
Mayor, on a form furnished for such purpose. The form shall be completed
by the property owner or occupant and it shall then contain the following
information: . . . ." Id., at 6a.

[fn6] The suggested exceptions listed on the form are:

1. Scouting Organizations

2. Camp Fire Girls

3. Children's Sports Organizations

4. Children's Solicitation for Supporting School Activities

5. Volunteer Fire Dept.

6. Jehovah's Witnesses

7. Political Candidates

8. Beauty Products Sales People

9. Watkins Sales

10. Christmas Carolers

11. Parcel Delivery

12. Little League

13. Trick or Treaters during Halloween Season

14. Police

15. Campaigners

16. Newspaper Carriers

17. Persons Affiliated with Stratton Church

18. Food Salesmen

19. Salespersons. App. 229a.

Apparently the ordinance would prohibit each of these 19 categories
from canvassing unless expressly exempted.

[fn7] Specifically, from the Book of "Matthew chapter 28, verses 19 and
20, which we take as our commission to preach. . . . So Jesus, by
example, instituted a house-to-house search for people so as to preach
the good news to them. And that's the activity that Jehovah's Witnesses
engage in, even as Christ's apostles did after his resurrection to
heaven." Id., at 313a-314a.

[fn8] "The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment
bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously
motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but
the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press, see Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S., at 304-307 (invalidating a licensing system for
religious and charitable solicitations under which the administrator had
discretion to deny a license to any cause he deemed nonreligious);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (invalidating a flat tax on
solicitation as applied to the dissemination of religious ideas);
Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (same), or the right of
parents, acknowledged in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925), to direct the education of their children, see Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (invalidating compulsory school-attendance
laws as applied to Amish parents who refused on religious grounds to send
their children to school)." 494 U.S., at 881 (footnote omitted).

[fn9] In their briefs and at oral argument, the parties debated a factual
issue embedded in the question presented, namely, whether the permit
contains the speaker's name. We need not resolve this factual dispute in
order to answer whether the ordinance's registration requirement abridges
so much protected speech that it is invalid on its face.

[fn10] Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976);
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413
(1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State
(Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U.S. 444 (1938).

[fn11] The question presented is similar to one raised, but not decided,
in Hynes. The ordinance that we held invalid in that case on vagueness
grounds required advance notice to the police before "casually soliciting
the votes of neighbors." 425 U.S., at 620 , n. 4.

[fn12] Hynes, 425 U.S., at 620 , n. 4.

[fn13] Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).

[fn14] Although the Jehovah's Witnesses do not themselves object to a
loss of anonymity, they bring this facial challenge in part on the basis
of overbreadth. We may, therefore, consider the impact of this ordinance
on the free speech rights of individuals who are deterred from speaking
because the registration provision would require them to forgo their
right to speak anonymously. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 , 612
(1973). JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER and JUSTICE GINSBURG join,
concurring. While joining the Court's opinion, I write separately to note that the
dissent's "crime prevention" justification for this ordinance is not a
strong one. Cf. post, at 176-180 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.).
For one thing, there is no indication that the legislative body that
passed the ordinance considered this justification. Stratton did not rely
on the rationale in the courts below, see 61 F. Supp.2d 734 , 736
(S.D.Ohio 1999) (opinion of the District Court describing the
Page 170
ordinance as "constructed to protect the Village residents from `flim
flam' con artists"); 240 F.3d 553 , 565 (CA6 2001) (opinion
of the Court of Appeals describing interests as "protecting [the
Village's] residents from fraud and undue annoyance"), and its general
references to "deter[ing] crime" in its brief to this Court cannot
fairly be construed to include anything other than the fraud it
discusses specifically. Brief for Respondents 14-18.

In the intermediate scrutiny context, the Court ordinarily does not
supply reasons the legislative body has not given. Cf. United States v.
Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 , 816 (2000) ("When the
Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of proving
the constitutionality of its actions" (emphasis added)). That does not
mean, as The Chief Justice suggests, that only a government with a
"battery of constitutional lawyers," post, at 172, could satisfy this
burden. It does mean that we expect a government to give its real reasons
for passing an ordinance. Legislators, in even the smallest town, are
perfectly able to do so — sometimes better on their own than with
too many lawyers, e.g., a "battery," trying to offer their advice. I can
only conclude that if the village of Stratton thought preventing
burglaries and violent crimes was an important justification for this
ordinance, it would have said so.

But it is not just that. It is also intuitively implausible to think
that Stratton's ordinance serves any governmental interest in preventing
such crimes. As the Court notes, several categories of potential
criminals will remain entirely untouched by the ordinance. Ante, at 17,
2, n. 1. And as to those who might be affected by it, "[w]e have never
accepted mere conjecture as adequate to carry a First Amendment burden,"
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 , 392 (2000). Even
less readily should we accept such implausible conjecture offered not by
the party itself but only by an amicus, see Brief for Ohio et al. as
Amici Curiae 5-6.
Page 171

Because Stratton did not rely on the crime prevention justification,
because Stratton has not now "present[ed] more than anecdote and
supposition," Playboy Entertainment Group, supra, at 822, and because the
relationship between the interest and the ordinance is doubtful, I am
unwilling to assume that these conjectured benefits outweigh the cost of
abridging the speech covered by the ordinance. JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, concurring in the
judgment. I concur in the judgment, for many but not all of the reasons set forth
in the opinion for the Court. I do not agree, for example, that one of
the causes of the invalidity of Stratton's ordinance is that some people
have a religious objection to applying for a permit, and others (posited
by the Court) "have such firm convictions about their constitutional
right to engage in uninhibited debate in the context of door-to-door
advocacy, that they would prefer silence to speech licensed by a petty
official." Ante, at 167.

If a licensing requirement is otherwise lawful, it is in my view not
invalidated by the fact that some people will choose, for religious
reasons, to forgo speech rather than observe it. That would convert an
invalid free-exercise claim, see Employment Div., Dept. of Human
Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), into a valid free-speech
claim — and a more destructive one at that. Whereas the
free-exercise claim, if acknowledged, would merely exempt Jehovah's
Witnesses from the licensing requirement, the free-speech claim exempts
everybody, thanks to Jehovah's Witnesses.

As for the Court's fairytale category of "patriotic citizens," ante,
at 16, who would rather be silenced than licensed in a manner that the
Constitution (but for their "patriotic" objection) would permit: If our
free-speech jurisprudence is to be determined by the predicted behavior
of such crackpots, we are in a sorry state indeed.
Page 172 CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. Stratton is a village of 278 people located along the Ohio River where
the borders of Ohio, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania converge. It is
strung out along a multilane highway connecting it with the cities of
East Liverpool to the north and Steubenville and Weirton, West Virginia,
to the south. One may doubt how much legal help a village of this size
has available in drafting an ordinance such as the present one, but even
if it had availed itself of a battery of constitutional lawyers, they
would have been of little use in the town's effort. For the Court today
ignores the cases on which those lawyers would have relied, and comes up
with newly fashioned doctrine. This doctrine contravenes well-established
precedent, renders local governments largely impotent to address the very
real safety threat that canvassers pose, and may actually result in less
of the door-to-door communication that it seeks to protect.

More than half a century ago we recognized that canvassers, "whether
selling pots or distributing leaflets, may lessen the peaceful enjoyment
of a home," and that "burglars frequently pose as canvassers, either in
order that they may have a pretense to discover whether a house is empty
and hence ripe for burglary, or for the purpose of spying out the
premises in order that they may return later." Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 , 144 (1943). These problems continue to be
associated with door-to-door canvassing, as are even graver ones.

A recent double murder in Hanover, New Hampshire, a town of
approximately 7,500 that would appear tranquil to most Americans but would
probably seem like a bustling town of Dartmouth College students to
Stratton residents, illustrates these dangers. Two teenagers murdered a
married couple of Dartmouth College professors, Half and Susanne Zantop,
in the Zantops' home. Investigators have concluded, based on the
confession of one of the teenagers, that the teenagers went door-to-door
intent on stealing
Page 173
access numbers to bank debit cards and then killing their owners. See
Dartmouth Professors Called Random Targets, Washington Post, Feb. 20,
2002, p. A2. Their modusoperandi was to tell residents
that they were conducting an environmental survey for school. They
canvassed a few homes where no one answered. At another, the resident did
not allow them in to conduct the "survey." They were allowed into the
Zantop home. After conducting the phony environmental survey, they
stabbed the Zantops to death. See ibid.

In order to reduce these very grave risks associated with canvassing,
the 278 "`little people,'" ante, at 12, of Stratton, who, unlike
petitioners, do not have a team of attorneys at their ready disposal, see
Jehovah's Witnesses May Make High Court History Again, Legal Times, Feb.
25, 2002, p. 1 (noting that petitioners have a team of 12 lawyers in
their New York headquarters), enacted the ordinance at issue here. The
residents did not prohibit door-to-door communication; they simply
required that canvassers obtain a permit before going door-to-door. And
the village does not have the discretion to reject an applicant who
completes the application.

The town had little reason to suspect that the negligible burden of
having to obtain a permit runs afoul of the First Amendment. For over 60
years, we have categorically stated that a permit requirement for
door-to-door canvassers, which gives no discretion to the issuing
authority, is constitutional. The District Court and Court of Appeals,
relying on our cases, upheld the ordinance. The Court today, however,
abruptly changes course and invalidates the ordinance.

The Court speaks of the "historical and analytical backdrop for
consideration of petitioners' First Amendment claim," ante, at 9. But
this "backdrop" is one of longstanding and unwavering approval of a
permit requirement like Stratton's. Our early decisions in this area
expressly
Page 174
sanction a law that merely requires a canvasser to register. In
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 , 306 (1940), we stated that
"[w]ithout doubt a State may protect its citizens from fraudulent
solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting
him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity
and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent."
In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 , 116 (1943), we contrasted the
license tax struck down in that case with "merely a registration
ordinance calling for an identification of the solicitors so as to give
the authorities some basis for investigating strangers coming into the
community." And Martin, supra, at 148, states that a "city can punish
those who call at a home in defiance of the previously expressed will of
the occupant and, in addition, can by identification devices control the
abuse of the privilege by criminals posing as canvassers."

It is telling that Justices Douglas and Black, perhaps the two Justices
in this Court's history most identified with an expansive view of the
First Amendment, authored, respectively, Murdock and Martin. Their
belief in the constitutionality of the permit requirement that the Court
strikes down today demonstrates just how far the Court's present
jurisprudence has strayed from the core concerns of the First Amendment.

We reaffirmed our view that a discretionless permit requirement is
constitutional in Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610
(1976). Hynes, though striking down a registration ordinance on vagueness
grounds, noted that "the Court has consistently recognized a
municipality's power to protect its citizens from crime and undue
annoyance by regulating soliciting and canvassing. A narrowly drawn
ordinance, that does not vest in municipal officials the undefined power
to determine what messages residents will hear, may serve these important
interests without running afoul of the First Amendment." Id., at
616-617.
Page 175

The Stratton ordinance suffers from none of the defects deemed fatal in
these earlier decisions. The ordinance does not prohibit door-to-door
canvassing; it merely requires that canvassers fill out a form and
receive a permit. Cf. Martin, supra. The mayor does not exercise any
discretion in deciding who receives a permit; approval of the permit is
automatic upon proper completion of the form. Cf. Cantwell, supra. And
petitioners do not contend in this Court that the ordinance is vague. Cf.
Hynes, supra.

Just as troubling as the Court's ignoring over 60 years of precedent is
the difficulty of discerning from the Court's opinion what exactly it is
about the Stratton ordinance that renders it unconstitutional. It is not
clear what test the Court is applying, or under which part of that
indeterminate test the ordinance fails. See ante, at 13 (finding it
"unnecessary . . . to resolve" what standard of review applies to the
ordinance). We are instead told that the "breadth of speech affected" and
"the nature of the regulation" render the permit requirement
unconstitutional. Ibid. Under a straightforward application of the
applicable First Amendment framework, however, the ordinance easily passes
muster.

There is no support in our case law for applying anything more
stringent than intermediate scrutiny to the ordinance. The ordinance is
content neutral and does not bar anyone from going door-to-door in
Stratton. It merely regulates the manner in which one must canvass: A
canvasser must first obtain a permit. It is, or perhaps I should say
was, settled that the "government may impose reasonable restrictions on
the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions
`are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,
that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information.'" Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781 , 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 , 293 (1984)). Earlier
Page 176
this Term, the Court reaffirmed that this test applies to content-neutral
time, place, or manner restrictions on speech in public forums. See
Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316 (2002).

The Court suggests that Stratton's regulation of speech warrants
greater scrutiny. Ante, at 13. But it would be puzzling if regulations of
speech taking place on another citizen's private property warranted
greater scrutiny than regulations of speech taking place in public
forums. Common sense and our precedent say just the opposite. In Hynes,
the Court explained: "`Of all the methods of spreading unpopular ideas,
[house-to-house canvassing] seems the least entitled to extensive
protection. The possibilities of persuasion are slight compared with the
certainties of annoyance. Great as is the value of exposing citizens to
novel views, home is one place where a man ought to be able to shut
himself up in his own ideas if he desires.'" 425 U.S., at 619 (quoting
Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 406 (1954)). In Ward, the
Court held that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate "even in a public
forum," 491 U.S., at 791 (emphasis added), appropriately recognizing that
speech enjoys greater protection in a public forum that has been opened to
all citizens, see ibid. Indeed, we have held that the mere proximity of
private residential property to a public forum permits more extensive
regulation of speech taking place at the public forum than would
otherwise be allowed. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 , 483-484
(1988). Surely then, intermediate scrutiny applies to a content-neutral
regulation of speech that occurs not just near, but at, another citizen's
private residence.

The Stratton regulation is aimed at three significant governmental
interests: the prevention of fraud, the prevention of crime, and the
protection of privacy.[fn1] The Court concedes
Page 177
that "in light of our precedent, . . . these are important interests
that [Stratton] may seek to safeguard through some form of regulation
of solicitation activity." Ante, at 13. Although initially
recognizing the important interest in preventing crime, the Court later
indicates that the "absence of any evidence of a special crime problem
related to door-to-door solicitation in the record before us" lessens
this interest. Ante, at 17-18. But the village is entitled
to rely on our assertion in Martin that door-to-door canvassing
poses a risk of crime, see Erie v. Pap's A. M., 529 U.S. 277 ,
297 (2000) (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41
(1986)), and the experience of other jurisdictions with crime stemming
from door-to-door canvassing, see 529 U.S., at 297 ; Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 , 393 , n. 6 (2000).

The double murder in Hanover described above is but one tragic example
of the crime threat posed by door-to-door canvassing. Other recent
examples include a man soliciting gardening jobs door-to-door who tied up
and robbed elderly residents, see Van Derbken, 98-Year-Old Latest Victim
in Series of Home Invasions, San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 13, 2000, p.
A18, a door-to-door vacuum cleaner salesman who raped a woman, see
Employers Liable for Rape by Salesman, Texas Lawyer, Jan. 11, 1999, p.
2, and a man going door-to-door purportedly on behalf of a church group
who committed multiple sexual assaults, see Ingersoll, Sex Crime Suspect
Traveled with Church Group, Wis. State Journal, Feb. 19, 2000, p. 1B. The
Constitution does not require that Stratton first endure its own crime
wave before it takes measures to prevent crime.

What is more, the Court soon forgets both the privacy and crime
interests. It finds the ordinance too broad because it applies to a
"significant number of noncommercial `canvassers.'" Ante, at 14. But
noncommercial canvassers, for example, those purporting to conduct
environmental surveys for school, see supra, at 172-173, can violate no
trespassing
Page 178
signs and engage in burglaries and violent crimes just as easily as
commercial canvassers can. See Martin, 319 U.S., at 144
(canvassers, "whether selling pots or distributing leaflets, may lessen
the peaceful enjoyment of a home" and "sp[y] out" homes for burglaries
(emphasis added)). Stratton's ordinance is thus narrowly tailored. It
applies to everyone who poses the risks associated with door-to-door
canvassing, i.e., it applies to everyone who canvasses door-to-door. The
Court takes what should be a virtue of the ordinance — that it is
content neutral, cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 ,
501 (1996) ("[O]ur commercial speech cases have recognized the dangers
that attend governmental attempts to single out certain messages for
suppression") — and turns it into a vice.

The next question is whether the ordinance serves the important
interests of protecting privacy and preventing fraud and crime. With
respect to the interest in protecting privacy, the Court concludes that
"[t]he annoyance caused by an uninvited knock on the front door is the
same whether or not the visitor is armed with a permit." Ante, at 17.
True, but that misses the key point: The permit requirement results in
fewer uninvited knocks. Those who have complied with the permit
requirement are less likely to visit residences with no trespassing
signs, as it is much easier for the authorities to track them down.

The Court also fails to grasp how the permit requirement serves
Stratton's interest in preventing crime.[fn2] We have approved of permit
requirements for those engaging in protected First Amendment activity
because of a commonsense recognition that their existence both deters
and helps detect wrongdoing. See, e.g., Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist.,
534 U.S. 316
Page 179
(2002) (upholding a permit requirement aimed, in part, at preventing
unlawful uses of a park and assuring financial accountability for
damage caused by the event). And while some people, intent on committing
burglaries or violent crimes, are not likely to be deterred by the
prospect of a misdemeanor for violating the permit ordinance, the
ordinance's effectiveness does not depend on criminals registering.

The ordinance prevents and detects serious crime by making it a crime
not to register. Take the Hanover double murder discussed earlier. The
murderers did not achieve their objective until they visited their fifth
home over a period of seven months. If Hanover had a permit requirement,
the teens may have been stopped before they achieved their objective. One
of the residents they visited may have informed the police that there
were two canvassers who lacked a permit. Such neighborly vigilance,
though perhaps foreign to those residing in modern day cities, is not
uncommon in small towns. Or the police on their own may have discovered
that two canvassers were violating the ordinance. Apprehension for
violating the permit requirement may well have frustrated the teenagers'
objectives; it certainly would have assisted in solving the murders had
the teenagers gone ahead with their plan.[fn3]

Of course, the Stratton ordinance does not guarantee that no canvasser
will ever commit a burglary or violent crime. The Court seems to think
this dooms the ordinance, erecting an insurmountable hurdle that a law
must provide a fool-proof method of preventing crime. In order to survive
intermediate scrutiny, however, a law need not solve the crime
Page 180
problem, it need only further the interest in preventing crime. Some
deterrence of serious criminal activity is more than enough to survive
intermediate scrutiny.

The final requirement of intermediate scrutiny is that a regulation
leave open ample alternatives for expression. Undoubtedly, ample
alternatives exist here. Most obviously, canvassers are free to go
door-to-door after filling out the permit application. And those without
permits may communicate on public sidewalks, on street corners, through
the mail, or through the telephone.

Intermediate scrutiny analysis thus confirms what our cases have long
said: A discretionless permit requirement for canvassers does not violate
the First Amendment. Today, the Court elevates its concern with what is,
at most, a negligible burden on door-to-door communication above this
established proposition. Ironically, however, today's decision may result
in less of the door-to-door communication that the Court extols. As the
Court recognizes, any homeowner may place a "No Solicitation" sign on his
or her property, and it is a crime to violate that sign. Ante, at 17. In
light of today's decision depriving Stratton residents of the degree of
accountability and safety that the permit requirement provides, more and
more residents may decide to place these signs in their yards and cut off
door-to-door communication altogether.

[fn1] Of course, fraud itself may be a crime. I assume, as does the
majority, that the interest in preventing "crime" refers to a separate
interest in preventing burglaries and violent crimes.

[fn2] It is sufficient that the ordinance serves the important interest
of protecting residents' privacy. A law need only serve a governmental
interest. Because the Court's treatment of Stratton's interest in
preventing crime gives short shrift to Stratton's attempt to deal with a
very serious problem, I address that issue as well.

[fn3] Indeed, an increased focus on apprehending criminals for "petty"
offenses, such as not paying subway fares, is credited with the dramatic
reduction in violent crimes in New York City during the last decade.
See, e.g., M. Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a
Big Difference (2000). If this works in New York City, surely it can work
in a small village like Stratton.
Page 181

Stratton vs.WTBTS revisited

Junction-Guy

Honesty

crazyblondeb

Junction-Guy

betterdaze

Sunspot

Junction-Guy

blondie

betterdaze

looking_glass

Share this