Undisfellowshipped,
My comment regarding the length of your post was more of a pre-comment concession that I was going to be brief and not fully rise to all of your points than it was a criticism of your length. By all means, speak at the length you choose.
Spook said: "An evidential scientistic naturalism would more accurately be stated as follows: "Since by observation most things are best understood naturally, then probably as a provisional belief, those things which lack full natural explanations due to limitations on observation are very likely natural as well."
I don't have a problem with that, but why should we accept a "provisionary belief" in a natural cause for things in which science cannot even measure, such as who or what existed before the physical Universe, and the existence of rational inference (which cannot fit into an only-physical world)? |
This is an example of "Hume's Guillotine" going on (Treatise On Human Nature). My statement is an "is" statement. Your response is an "ought" statement. If I introduced normative language it wouldn't mean much unless we had first agreed on what we "ought" to do. If there isn't an absolute "ought" about what we should do, that's fine be me, I'm not defending absolute normative judgements. My statement stands as an asessment of the natural world which is almost uncontestable or at least as broadly accepted as any idea could reasonably be.
I'd prefer not to use normative language here. I'll again use a description:
1. People accept this naturalistic conclusion in most situations becuase of the function of the mind, unless they have a strong personal reason to do otherwise, all esle being equal.
2. Unless strong personal reasons to disbelieve in naturalism can be established broadly to other people, then the naturalist has no rational reason to abandon naturalism.
3. Furthermore, when categories of "strong personal reasons" can be broadly examined under naturalism, at least some strong personal reasons can be rationally rejected.
4. The naturalistic assumption can then be applied to strong personal reasons and becomes stronger if it is true that "Since most personal reasons to believe in God are either logically incompatible with the identical reasons held by others or else have natural explanations, then probably any given anecdotal reason to believe in God should be rejected.
1:) Physical matter came into existence. 2:) Physical matter could not have existed before it came into existence. 3:) Therefore, there is no physical cause for physical matter coming into existence. |
The phlosophical problems with (1) flow from the lack of information and the limitation of our use of language. Here are some facts to consider:
1. That anything has "come into existance" is very different than thinking in terms of "cause." Words like "physical" tend to confuse what is at issue. For example, does your definition of "Physical" include energy? Does it include non-theistic metaphysical concepts?
2. Premise (3) does not follow from premise (1), even if premise one were true. Your usage of cause has many implications theists don't usually deal with. By cause, we generally mean that any state of affairs characterized by the set of situations {Sa, Sb, Sc...Sn} at time Tn, had a temporally prior state of {S-a, S-b,S-c....S-n} at T-n. In general, if something "had to have a cause" then it "had to have a prior state." If it didn't have a prior state, it didn't have a cause. Inserting a metapysical entity which "exists" but "doesn't exist" in any common understanding of words will always be an argument from ignorance or a case of special pleading. That the universe had some state {Sa0, Sb0, Sc0....Sn0} in no way entails that this state was non-existance. I also falsifies the claim that it could have a prior "cause."
What we know about the early history of the universe is tentative and abstract to a profoucnd degree. If the theist wants to latch on to this as some certain scientific conclusion, then by their same judgements I would hold that they have to accept biological evolution, in general. Because the latter is much better supported by any standard of evidence than any of the claims about the early history of the universe. If we can't know the latter, we can't know the former.
On the language, feeling we have a responsibility is different from a metaphysical responsibility actually existing. Feeling like we have "absolute" or "objective" moral values is different than them existing. I don't have to account for the existance of something which I don't think exists.
Further we already agreed there is more evidence for naturalism, unless you're recounting that. Your claim entails the assumption that the magnitude of one or a few lines of evidence is so great that the majority of evidence should be ignored. I have demonstrated that we don't know or can't know that.
You are still right to say
"If the universe began to exist and it is possible for something else to exist not included in the universe, then it is possible that this something is God."
But if you assume that, then it is just as possible, in this state of complete hypothetical ignorance, that any number of hypothetical non-theistic possibilities could equally answer this dilemma.
The description of "faith" or "trust" if you'd rather is your judgement and belongs in another argument. This argument could take the form of...
1. Since we all get our information from either the external environment or else existential personal experiences, we cannot be fully confident in the truth of anything.
2. Any "knowledge" claim therefore involves a degree of trust in others or ourself.
3. (For some reason) It is more legitimate to trust one's own personal experiences than it is to trust the consensus of empirical information as conveyed by others because the former involves trusting one person (yourself) while the latter involves trusting many people.
I'll leave that one.
I'll also leave the AFE, since my main contention with your criticism contained in the argument from morals has already been stated by me: The naturalist, even if absolute standards of right and wrong don't exist can still falsify the theists argument for TWO reasons:
1. He can use the theists own definitions as contained in the argument to internally falsify the claim.
2. He can argue EVIDENTIALLY from more/less better/worse in objective terms. LESS suffering is different from "no" suffering. This is stronger because then theists often have to defend why we have the "optimum" level of suffering according to God's highest priority.
