as threatened above. JT should recognize this; I credit him with
originally quoting it on old H2O.
These are some of the 'Church Law' precepts that are used as a shield by various religious institutions.
Begin Quote:
LEGAL ANALYSIS
[16] The First Amendment to the United States Constitution and art VI, §3 of the South Dakota Constitution preclude civil courts from entertaining religious disputes over doctrine, leaving adjudication of those issues to ecclesiastical tribunals of the appropriate church. The fact that a portion of the dispute involves property claims does not preclude this constitutional application and protection. Even when possession or ownership of church property is disputed in a civil court, "there is substantial danger that the State will become entangled in essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrinal beliefs." Milivojevich, 426 US at 709, 96 SCt at 2380, 49 LEd2d at 162.
[T]he First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes. First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice. If civil courts undertake to resolve such controversies in order to adjudicate the property dispute, the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern ... . The
First Amendment therefore commands civil courts to decided church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine.
Id. at 709-10, 96 SCt at 2380-1, 49 LEd2d at 163. (Citations omitted).
Milivojevich is factually applicable as it involves a dispute between two Bishops regarding who had the authority to control the church body, property and assets. An attempt by a secular court to adjudicate such disputes "frequently necessitates the interpretation of ambiguous religious law and usage." Id. at 708, 96 SCt at 2380, 49 LEd2d at 162. It is improper for a secular court to evaluate conflicting testimony concerning internal church procedures. Id. at 717-18, 96 SCt at 2384-5, 49 LEd2d at 167-68. The reason for this ecclesiastical abstention doctrine rests squarely with the non-secular nature of the subject matter of the dispute:
The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect. The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of the contravened questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government of the individual members, congregations, and officers within the general association, is unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total
subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed. It is the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organization itself provides for.
Id. at 710-11, 96 SCt at 2381, 49 LEd2d at 163-4 (citing Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall 679, 728-29, 20 LEd 666 (1872)).
[17] In Drevlow a minister sued the Missouri Synod Lutheran Church for the torts of libel, negligence and intentional interference with his legitimate expectancy of employment. 991 F2d at 469. He claimed the church improperly put derogatory information about he and his wife in his personnel file. Under church rules, this information precluded him from receiving a pastorate at a Synod congregation. When considering the ecclesiastical decisions of the Synod, the Eighth Circuit noted it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over employment decisions where religious beliefs, procedures or law were implicated. Id. at 471. See also Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F2d 360 (8thCir 1991) (claims of chaplain against Episcopal hospital for employment discrimination dismissed as involving religious questions); Kaufmann v. Sheehan, 707 F2d 355 (8thCir 1983) (claims of priest against Roman Catholic Church for defamation and conspiracy dismissed as involving religious questions); Belin v. West, 864 SW2d 838 (Ark 1993) (claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation and tortious interference with business expectation dismissed as Bishop's authority over employment of minister by congregation rested on religious doctrine); O'Conner, 885 P2d 361; Pierce v. Iowa-Missouri Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 534 NW2d 425 (Iowa 1995); Parish of the Advent v. Protestant Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts, 426 Mass 268, 688 NE2d 923 (1997); Basich v. Board of Pensions, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, 540 NW2d 82 (MinnApp 1995) cert denied, 519 US 810, 117 SCt 55, 136 LEd2d 18 (1996) (dispute over church investment of pension funds involved ecclesiastical issues of church policy).(10)
[18] Secular courts will adjudicate disputes under the "neutral principles of law" doctrine. Jones v. Wolf, 443 US 595, 99 SCt 3020, 61 LEd2d 775 (1979). We discussed this doctrine in Foss v. Dykstra:
The neutral-principles approach calls for a completely secular examination by civil courts into church documents, deeds to the property in question, state statutes and other relevant evidence to determine ownership. The key to the neutral-principles approach is that such determination is to be made "exclusively on objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges."
342 NW2d 220, 222 (SD 1983) (citing Foss v. Dykstra, 319 NW2d 499, 500 (SD 1982) (quoting Jones, 443 US at 603, 99 SCt at 3025, 61 LEd2d at 785)).
However, as determined in Jones, the neutral-principles of law rationale runs afoul of the First Amendment and likewise art VI, §3 of the South Dakota Constitution when church doctrine and policy "pervade" the documents governing the church, which in the case before us are the colony's Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws. Plaintiffs counter that "[s]imply put the Corporation, Colony, and Church have turned their back on the Plaintiffs."
[19] Because the secular law knows no heresy, is committed to the support of no religious dogma and the establishment of no sect, how are we to adjudicate this dispute "to effectuate the tenets of the Hutterian Church," ... and decide whether the Defendants are allowing the Plaintiffs to "live together in a farming community, without individual ownership of personal or real property and that they should devote their labors in harmony with the dictates of God's teachings" Are the property claims to be adjudicated by the courts of this State based upon "[a]ll rights of membership, grounds for
their expulsion and managerial rules over the members of the corporation and over the property of the corporation [as] prescribed by the By-Laws none of which shall be contrary to the tenets, rules or faith of the Hutterian Church" With respect to the operation of the colony how do we apply the following By-Law?
All members of this Corporation shall recognize and abide by the rules of the Hutterian church, and each of them and all of them do renounce the right to hold private property; and each and all of the members agree to abide by the rules, regulations, directives, and authority of the presiding bishop or bishops of the Hutterian Church to which all members of this corporation, through its local church, belong.
[20] All acts complained of by the Plaintiffs arose from their
excommunication from the church and attempted expulsion from the colony. It is suggested that we conduct an examination to determine whether these acts were done with malice thus purporting to negate any claim of religious privilege. Given the neutral principals of law limitation, how do we determine whether malice exists by the Defendants under the following "tenets, rules or faith of the Hutterian church" which was the basis for the plaintiffs' excommunication and attempted expulsion?
If your brother sins against you, go and tell him his fault, between you and him alone. If he listens to you, you have gained your brother. But if he does not listen, take one or two others along with you, that every word may be confirmed by the evidence of two or three witnesses. If he refuses to listen to them, tell it to the church; and if he refuses to listen even to the church, let him be to you as a Gentile and a tax collector. Matthew, 18:15-18 (Revised Standard Version, 1952 Ed). As in Jones, issues of church doctrine and policy are pervasive. 443 US at 609, n7, 99 SCt at 3028, n7, 61 LEd2d at 788, n7. "It is axiomatic that the guidance of the state cannot substitute for that of the Holy Spirit and that a courtroom is
not the place to review a church's determination of 'God's appointed.'"
Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F2d 1164, 1170 (4thCir 1985).
[21] Plaintiffs in their brief concede all actions they complain of either occurred at the colony or involve its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws. This colony was founded in 1941. The record is void of any discord among the colony members prior to the current religious schism.
[22] Another Hutterite Colony schism occurred in Wollman v. Poinsett Hutterian Brethren, Inc., 844 FSupp 539 (DSD 1994). After analyzing the dispute provoked by the Rev. Kleinsasser-Rev. Wipf controversy, the court concluded:
The Court is unable to envision any set of facts which would more entangle the Court in matters of religious doctrine and practice. The religious communal system presented in this case involves more than matters of religious faith, it involves a religious lifestyle. Any individual Hutterian colony member's entire life--essentially from cradle to grave--is governed by the church. Any resolution of a property dispute between a colony and its members would require extensive inquiry into religious doctrine and beliefs. It would be a gross violation of the First Amendment and Supreme Court mandates for this Court to become involved in this dispute. Id. at 543. (Emphasis added).
[23] We agree with this analysis. The record indicates there is no separation of religious life from a secular life in a Hutterite colony because there is no separate secular life. The colony is run and its members, whether the followers of Rev. Kleinsasser or Rev. Wipf, all conduct their lives on religious absolutes based on the Bible and the Ten Commandments, "Thou shalt ... and Thou shalt not." There are no separate secular shades of gray. Likewise, suing every man, woman, child and baby in their individual capacity who remain in the congregation is simply the same as suing the colony church congregation as the individual members renounce all rights to private ownership of property as a requirement for continued membership in the colony and its church. Plaintiffs in their complaint concede the core of the dispute when they declare both the Plaintiffs and
Defendants are "members of the Hutterian church located at the Bur Oaks Hutterian Brethren ... and Tschetter Colony ... ."
[24] We are not ecclesiastical jurists of the Hutterite faith and have no constitutional basis to interfere with this religious dispute. If there is an earthly forum for adjudication of Plaintiffs' allegations, it is not the secular courts of this State. Kaufman, 707 F2d at 359. For the above reasons we hold adjudication of Plaintiffs' claims by the courts of this state is precluded by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and art VI, §3 of the South Dakota Constitution. As such, we affirm the circuit court.
