Should Jesus be worshipped?

by Melody 55 Replies latest watchtower bible

  • aqwsed12345
    aqwsed12345
    @Blotty

    John 4:24 neither excludes Christ from worship nor establishes a “zero-sum” economy of devotion. Jesus is answering a Samaritan dispute about sacred geography; the point is that henceforth true worship is “in Spirit and in truth.” In Johannine idiom λήθεια is not an abstraction but a person: “I am … the truth” (14:6). Worship “in truth” is therefore worship mediated by, and ordered around, the incarnate Logos. The Fourth Gospel immediately illustrates the point: the man born blind confesses “Lord, I believe,” and προσκύνησεν ατ—he worshipped Jesus, an action the evangelist records without censure (9:38). The narrative culminates when Thomas addresses the risen Christ “My Lord and my God!” (20:28). John 5:23 then supplies the theological key: the Father wills “that all may honor the Son just as they honor the Father; whoever refuses such honor to the Son refuses it to the Father.” Far from delimiting Christ’s cultic status, John 4 prepares for it.

    The Arian reading assumes John 4:24 establishes an exclusive worship of the Father, yet this overlooks the narrative arc of John’s Gospel, where Jesus positions himself as the focal point of true worship. The Samaritan woman’s question about the proper location of worship (Mount Gerizim or Jerusalem) is transcended by Jesus’ declaration that worship will now occur “in spirit and truth,” a shift not merely about interiority but tied explicitly to his own person. As Lozano notes in his analysis of John 9:38 (pp. 148–154), the healed man’s act of proskuneō toward Jesus is a climactic confession of faith, accepted without rebuke, aligning with Jesus’ self-identification as “the truth” (John 14:6). Far from excluding the Son, John 4:24 presupposes his mediatorial role: worship “in truth” is worship through Christ, who embodies the divine presence (cf. John 2:19–21, where Jesus is the new temple). The Arian isolation of this verse from its Christological framework distorts its meaning, ignoring how John consistently depicts Jesus as the recipient of worship (e.g., John 20:28, “My Lord and my God!”) within a monotheistic paradigm.

    Psalm 45:7(6 MT) does not license addressing any Davidide as “God” in a polytheistic/henotheistic sense. The decisive witness is Hebrews 1:8, which cites the verse in the LXX form, “Your throne, O God, is for ever and ever,” and applies it to the Son. Modern translations that cumbersome the syntax into “God is your throne” are primarily driven by dogmatic discomfort, not by Hebrew grammar—the construct reading required is “extremely unusual” where a pronominal suffix is present, as specialists have long noted. Lozano’s monograph sums up the scholarly consensus: the author of Hebrews deploys the catena precisely to show that the Son is addressed with titles, functions and honors proper to YHWH, and that the angelic προσκύνησις of Hebrews 1:6 “most closely approximates the ideal celestial worship of God enthroned in heaven”.

    he Hebrew text’s ambiguity (“Your throne, O God” versus “Your throne is God”) is resolved in Hebrews 1:8–9, where the NT explicitly applies this verse to the Son, identifying him as “God” (theos) in a fully divine sense, not a human king granted honorific divinity. Lozano’s discussion of Hebrews (pp. 164–185) highlights how the author contrasts the Son’s eternal throne with the angels’ subservience, commanding all angels to proskuneō him (Heb 1:6). This is not henotheism but a radical inclusion of Christ within God’s identity, fulfilling the psalm’s ultimate intent. The Arian suggestion that biblical writers were henotheists lacks evidence; Second-Temple Judaism fiercely guarded monotheism, and the NT’s application of divine titles to Jesus (e.g., YHWH texts like Joel 2:32 in Rom 10:13) reflects this continuity, not a departure into polytheism.

    The vocative reading of Hebrews 1:8 has historically dominated not because of arbitrary theological preference but because it best fits the syntax and rhetorical parallelism with the surrounding verses, both in Hebrews and in the Septuagint version of Psalm 45:6 (44:7 LXX). The claim that the verb “is” is not present and can be supplied in various places in the clause is correct, but this is a common feature of classical and Koine Greek, which frequently omits the copula when the sense is clear. Context and expected usage—especially in royal or liturgical addresses—support the vocative reading. The construction θρόνος σου, Θεός” finds its closest parallels in vocative utterances elsewhere in Greek literature, and to interpret Θεός here as nominative requires a forced, awkward syntax that is not natural for the context of direct address, especially in a passage framed by addresses to persons.

    The attempt to make the definite article before Θεός determinative for the nominative reading is unconvincing. The presence or absence of the article with theos in the NT does not rigidly determine whether it is definite, qualitative, or vocative. Indeed, in the Septuagint and in the NT alike, the article can and does appear with vocatives, especially in poetic and elevated contexts. To assert otherwise is to ignore the flexibility and complexity of Koine usage, as has been thoroughly demonstrated in modern studies of Greek grammar.

    Psalm 45 is undoubtedly a royal wedding psalm addressed, in its immediate context, to the Davidic king. However, this does not mean the psalm’s Christological application is illegitimate, nor does it preclude a higher, theological sense in which the king is addressed as God. The ancient Near Eastern context reveals that the Davidic king, as God’s anointed, stood in a unique covenantal relationship with YHWH, even being called God’s “son” (cf. Psalm 2:7). But nowhere is a merely human king called “God” in such an absolute and unqualified manner as occurs in Psalm 45:6. The explanations offered in various study Bibles and by certain commentators—that the king is called “god” only in a representative sense or as a courtly hyperbole—fail to do justice to the unique language of the psalm. When the NT author, under inspiration, selects this passage to describe Christ, he is not simply reproducing an honorific for an ancient king, but is presenting Christ as the eschatological fulfillment and the ultimate referent of the Davidic covenant.

    The consistent testimony of the NT is that the OT passages about the Davidic king reach their fullness and proper meaning only in Christ (cf. Acts 2:29-36; Luke 1:32-33). The early Church, steeped in the Septuagint, recognized in such passages a typology that pointed forward to the Messiah’s divine status. The argument that calling Jesus “God” in this context is no more significant than calling an ancient Israelite king “god” is anachronistic and fails to appreciate both the Christological hermeneutics of the NT and the qualitative difference introduced by the resurrection and exaltation of Christ as “heir of all things” (Heb. 1:2).

    The context of Hebrews 1 further militates against the anti-Trinitarian reading. The entire chapter is a sustained argument for the Son’s superiority over angels, employing a catena of OT quotations that ascribe to the Son prerogatives and honors reserved for God alone: the Son is “the radiance of the glory of God and the exact imprint of his nature” (v. 3); he is the Creator and Sustainer of all things (vv. 2-3, 10-12); he sits at God’s right hand (v. 3, 13); and he is worshiped by all angels (v. 6). In this context, the direct address of the Son as “God” (ho theos) is not an anomaly but the culmination of the author’s argument.

    Appeals to “representative” language—wherein the king or Jesus is called “God” only as a regent or agent—fail to account for the unique absolute language and the immediate context of Hebrews 1:8-9. The passage does not merely attribute a functional role to the Son but ascribes to him the eternal throne and scepter of divine righteousness. The subsequent citation in Hebrews 1:10-12, which explicitly applies to the Son a passage about YHWH as Creator (Psalm 102:25-27), leaves no doubt that the author intends his audience to understand the Son as sharing fully in the identity and prerogatives of the one true God.

    The frequent attempt to dilute the force of Hebrews 1:8 by reference to Jesus being “anointed” by God (v. 9) is equally misplaced. The anointing of the Messiah in Psalm 45 and its fulfillment in Christ does not entail ontological inferiority but points to the messianic office, a theme common to NT Christology. The anointed King of Psalm 2 is declared to be “begotten” of God (a title which, in the NT, is taken up in the highest sense in reference to the preexistent Son), yet he is the object of the nations’ worship and the possessor of universal dominion. To say that Jesus’ anointing by God negates his deity is a category error, conflating the incarnational economy with the Son’s eternal divine status.

    The oft-invoked analogue of 1 Chronicles 29:20 proves nothing. As Lozano observes, classical Greek freely uses a single finite verb with two objects of unequal status—divine and human—without implying identical reverence; the Chronicler’s audience knows that David is mortal whereas YHWH alone is the object of cult. The NT itself exploits that polyvalence: Peter rejects Cornelius’ prostration (Acts 10:25-26) and the angel forbids John’s (Rev 19:10; 22:8-9), establishing a literary contrast by which Jesus’ ready acceptance of προσκύνησις marks him out as sharing the divine identity. The Chronicler distinguishes between divine worship (proskuneō to YHWH) and royal homage (proskuneō to David), with the king’s authority clearly derivative. Lozano notes (pp. 38–41) that such acts of reverence to humans in the OT never blur the Creator-creature divide, unlike the NT’s portrayal of Jesus. In Revelation 5:13–14, by contrast, the Lamb shares the divine throne and receives identical proskuneō and doxology with the Father, a unified worship that transcends mere homage. The Arian claim that this grouping under one verb implies a lesser worship for Jesus ignores the qualitative leap in the NT, where Christ’s proskuneō is cultic, not civil, as evidenced by its rejection when offered to Peter (Acts 10:25–26) or angels (Rev 19:10).

    The argument that Mosaic Law’s elasticity allows worship of a human figure without idolatry if God commands it is irrelevant to the NT’s context. Under the old covenant, no human—king or otherwise—receives cultic worship; the Law (e.g., Deut 6:13) reserves this for YHWH alone. The NT, operating under the new covenant, presents Jesus not as a human intermediary but as the divine Son incarnate, worthy of proskuneō in a way that fulfills, not violates, monotheism. Lozano’s analysis across the Gospels demonstrates that Jesus’ acceptance of proskuneō (e.g., Matt 14:33; Luke 24:52; John 9:38) consistently signals his divine status, not a sanctioned human honor. The Arian appeal to pre-Christian flexibility thus fails to account for the Christological redefinition of worship in the new covenant.

    The patristic citations appealed to as proto-Arian are no help to an Arian thesis. Justin Martyr explains to his pagan audience that Christians “worship [σεβόμεθα] the Fashioner of the universe” and that they do so through “the Son who came from Him and taught us these things” (1 Apology 13). Justin’s own liturgical description is explicit: in the Eucharist the community “chants hymns and prayers to the Father through the name of the Son and of the Holy Spirit” (1 Apology 65–67), thereby coordinating the Three within a single act of worship. Origen is still clearer: Christians render “entire and undivided worship [σέβας διαίρετον] to the supreme God through His Son, the Logos” (Contra Celsum 8.12). “Through” (δι’) is no demotion; it is the same preposition Paul uses for creation itself (1 Cor 8:6). Patristic theosis texts do not flatten the Creator–creature distinction. When Clement says that “the Word of God became man in order that you might learn from Man how man might become god” (Prot. protr. 1.8), he is describing participatory transformation by grace, not an ontological elevation to unbegotten Deity; Clement expressly restricts latreía to the one uncreated God.

    Origen’s theology, while complex and occasionally subordinationist in tone, does not deny the Son’s deity. In Contra Celsum 8.12, he asserts the Son is not a different God, but the same God as the Father, affirming a shared divine essence despite hierarchical language. Justin Martyr, in Dialogue with Trypho 56, calls the Son “another God” in a functional sense, yet in First Apology 13, he unequivocally includes the Son as worthy of worship alongside the Father, consistent with early Christian practice. The Arian claim of henotheism—worshipping multiple gods with one supreme—mischaracterizes these writers, who operated within a monotheistic framework that included the Son within the divine identity, not as a separate deity. Clement’s reference to “men becoming God” (Stromata 7.10) and Athanasius’ echo of this in On the Incarnation 54 (“He became man so that we might become God”) are soteriological, not ontological, statements about deification through participation in Christ, not an endorsement of Arian creaturely status. Lozano’s work (pp. 10–16) underscores this by tracing how proskuneō in the NT elevates Jesus beyond mere homage, aligning with patristic affirmations of his deity rather than a henotheistic dilution.

    Appeal to Augustine’s latreía/proskýnēsis distinction is likewise misplaced. Augustine does reserve latreía for the sacrifice owed to God alone (City of God 10), yet Revelation applies that verb to the unified “throne of God and of the Lamb”: “His servants shall λατρεύσουσιν ατ (22:3). Lozano rightly notes that the singular pronoun embraces both Father and Son within a single sovereignty and a single cultic service, contradicting attempts to confine latreía to the Father alone. Conversely, proskynēsis can indeed be illegitimately offered to idols or men (Dan 3; Matt 4:9-10); its very prohibition shows that in certain contexts it denotes the kind of honor that competes with God. The NT writers harness that semantic range to theological ends: every creature that mistakenly receives it rebukes the gesture, whereas Jesus consistently approves it. Greeven’s verdict still stands: “When the NT uses προσκυνεν, the object is always something—truly or supposedly—divine”.

    The suggestion that biblical and patristic authors were “henotheists” misconstrues Second-Temple and early-Christian monotheism. Jewish monotheism distinguishes God from every created power by two exclusive prerogatives: sole sovereignty over all things and sole worthiness to receive cultic worship. The NT repeatedly extends both prerogatives to Christ (e.g., Col 1:15-20; Rev 5:13-14; Heb 1:2-3, 8-12). Precisely because the writers are committed monotheists, they must explain rather than negate their own devotional practice; their explanation is Christ’s inclusion within the unique divine identity. The Fathers follow suit: Justin, Origen, and even the highly philosophical Clement never speak of independent deities but of one God who is Father, Son and Spirit.

    Ray Lozano’s exhaustive study closes by noting that every canonical author who depicts Jesus as the recipient of προσκυνέω does so in a way that uniquely associates him with the God of Israel and “presents him as a divine figure included with God as a legitimate recipient of the kind of worship … reserved for God alone”. The patristic writers simply continued that reading of Scripture. The Arian alternative can be maintained only by excising texts, redefining lexica in a circular fashion, and overlooking the unbroken liturgical witness of the church catholic. It therefore fails the tests of linguistic, literary and historical coherence, leaving the Nicene confession intact: to worship the Son is to worship the Father in the unity of the Spirit, for the one throne of God is shared by the Lamb.

    Finally, the semantic distinction between proskuneō (general reverence) and latreuō (divine worship) as a bulwark against Christ’s worship is untenable. While latreuō is tied to temple service and never directly applied to Jesus in the Gospels, Revelation 22:3—“His servants will latreuō Him”—uses a singular pronoun for both God and the Lamb, indicating shared divine worship in the eschatological temple. Lozano (pp. 196–232) emphasizes that Revelation’s throne-room scenes equate proskuneō to Jesus with cultic worship, not mere obeisance, as seen in its rejection by angels and its universal scope (Rev 5:14). The Watch Tower’s rendering of proskuneō as “obeisance” for Christ but “worship” elsewhere lacks lexical support; standard lexica (BDAG, LSJ) and NT usage (e.g., Matt 28:17; Heb 1:6) confirm its cultic force when context demands, as it does with Jesus.

    In conclusion, the Arian position misreads John 4:24 by isolating it from its Christocentric context, misrepresents early Christian writers as henotheists despite their monotheistic commitments, and misapplies Psalm 45:6 and 1 Chronicles 29:20 by ignoring their NT reinterpretation and narrative distinctions. The elasticity of worship under the Mosaic Law is irrelevant to the new covenant’s revelation of Christ as divine. The NT, as Lozano’s study affirms, presents Jesus as the proper object of proskuneō and, implicitly, latreuō, not as a secondary figure but as co-equal with the Father in the divine identity. Trinitarian theology does not fracture monotheism but fulfills it, recognizing that to worship the Son is to worship the one God—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—in the fullness of his self-revelation. The Arian critique, rooted in selective exegesis and historical revisionism, cannot displace this canonical and theological coherence.

  • Earnest
    Earnest
    Blotty : Clement comments on "men becoming God" (?) - I would think Clement would mean "a god"

    Yep. Clement writes in Exhortation to the Greeks, Chapter 1 " the Word of [the] God became man, that you may learn from man how man may become God" (ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος, ἵνα δὴ καὶ σὺ παρὰ ἀνθρώπου μάθῃς, πῇ ποτε ἄρα ἄνθρωπος γένηται θεός.)

    Note that "man may become God" is anarthrous, so, more accurately, "man may become a god". Whenever the early Church Fathers refer to Jesus as God, it is always worthwhile to check whether the language they use means "a god" or "the God".

    I see aqwsed12345 has already identified the Clement passage as Stromata 7.10. Frankly, I cannot find the wording there but it does seem I have the wrong text. Nevertheless, the principle of distinguishing between θεός and ὁ θεός remains true.

  • aqwsed12345
    aqwsed12345
    @Earnest

    The use of the anarthrous θες in both the NT and patristic Greek does not automatically mean “a god” in the sense of a lesser, separate deity. Greek grammar employs the anarthrous form for a variety of reasons: to express qualitative predicates, to indicate essence, or for purely syntactic or stylistic purposes. In the context of early Christian theology, and especially in soteriological statements (about salvation and deification), the anarthrous θες almost always carries a qualitative force, not an indefinite or polytheistic sense. As leading grammarians and patristic scholars have repeatedly pointed out, the distinction between “the God” and “god” in these contexts is one of person (the Father versus the Son, or the Creator versus the creature) and nature (divine qualities or participation in divinity), not a division of ontological rank or the existence of multiple gods in the proper sense.

    The doctrine of theosis—the transformative participation in the divine life by grace—is utterly different from the pagan or henotheistic idea of multiple gods. In Christian tradition, the Church Fathers consistently maintain the ontological distinction between the Creator and the creature. When Clement says, “the Word of God became man so that you may learn from man how man may become God” (να νθρωπος γένηται θεός), this is always understood within the framework of grace: man is deified not by nature or essence, but by participation, through adoption and union with Christ. Gregory of Nyssa, Athanasius, Maximus the Confessor, and Augustine all stress that “becoming god” means sharing in the divine life through union with Christ, not becoming another, independent or rival god.

    Moreover, as Catholic and Orthodox theology both clarify, deification (theosis) is never a literal identity with God’s essence. The Church Fathers use vivid metaphors (such as iron heated in fire, or the sharing of light), but always with the explicit qualification that humanity remains created and distinct from the uncreated essence of God. Athanasius’ famous dictum, “God became man that man might become god,” is always situated in this context of grace and participation, never polytheism or pantheism. As Augustine says, “we are made gods by participation, not by nature.”

    When Clement and other Church Fathers use the anarthrous θες in the context of “becoming god,” it does not refer to humans becoming “a god” in the sense of a second deity; rather, it refers to participation in divine life, becoming “godlike” or “divinized” by grace. The analogy is always participatory, not substantial. This is in sharp contrast to the use of θες in reference to the Word in John 1:1c, where the qualitative sense asserts that the Logos possesses fully and inherently the very nature of God, not merely a share in divine attributes by adoption or grace.

    Additionally, the idea that biblical or patristic writers were “henotheists” is refuted by their emphatic monotheism, rooted in the Hebrew Scriptures and fully affirmed in the Christian creeds. They repeatedly insist that there is only one true God, and all talk of “becoming god” or “gods” (e.g., Ps 82:6, Jn 10:34) is interpreted within the context of metaphor, adoption, or participation—never as a multiplication of independent deities.

    Therefore, to suggest that the Church Fathers’ use of the anarthrous θες supports an Arian or Watchtower reading of John 1:1c as “a god,” or as evidence of henotheism, is to misunderstand both the grammatical function of the anarthrous predicate and the theological content of Christian theosis. The distinction between the definite and anarthrous θες in patristic texts never provides grounds for the existence of “multiple gods” or a subordinate class of divine beings. It expresses either the unique, fully divine status of the Son (as in John 1:1c, qualitatively: “the Word was fully God”), or the analogical, participatory sense in which creatures are elevated by grace (i.e., “becoming god” by sharing in the divine life, not by nature).

    The consensus of patristic scholarship, and the entire trajectory of Christian dogma, is that the anarthrous θες in these passages does not teach polytheism, henotheism, or ontological equivalence or similitude with the Creator. Rather, it teaches either the fullness of divinity in Christ or the elevation of the human by grace, always within the strict boundaries of monotheistic faith and the unbridgeable gap between Creator and creature. Any attempt to make these passages support the NWT’s “a god” rendering is both grammatically and theologically unsustainable.

  • no-zombie
    no-zombie

    The term 'worship' can mean different things to different people, as does the scope or degree of 'worship' someone or thing receives. That being said, despite the Governing Body's recent decision to include Jesus more into convention programs, historically he seems to have received very little attention ... which shouldn't be the case, when you consider Witnesses to be a Christian faith.

    But is you are asking me for a opinion ... I'd say no to worship, yes to more appreciation. Just as the Bible subscribes.

  • slimboyfat
    slimboyfat

    Theos without the article may not automatically mean “a god” rather than “the God”, but when the authors explicitly make that distinction themselves, as Philo, Justin Matryr, and Origen do, then it’s fair to accept they mean what they say when the make a distinction between the God and a second subordinate god. This video has a good explanation in relation to Justin Martyr by Bible scholar Dan McClellan.

    https://youtu.be/7JbqiSpkBL4?si=-2vtceQTuV6A9nPm

  • aqwsed12345
    aqwsed12345
    @slimboyfat

    Your response seeks to drive a wedge between Justin Martyr’s second-century Logos theology and Nicene Trinitarianism by positing that Justin distinguishes between “the God” (ho theos, the Father) and “a god” (theos, the Logos/Son) in a way that constitutes real ontological subordination—a second, lesser deity. This reading is asserted to be based on explicit linguistic and philosophical distinctions in Justin’s text, allegedly corroborated by the scholarly consensus and the supposed absence of Nicene metaphysics in Justin’s era. Such a reconstruction, however, misreads both the language and the intent of Justin’s thought, as well as the actual nature of theological development in early Christianity.

    First, the insistence that the absence of the article before theos (θεός) in Greek signals ontological inferiority or a “lesser god” status—whether in the New Testament or in Justin’s writings—rests on a fundamental grammatical fallacy. As repeatedly demonstrated in contemporary Greek grammar and patristic scholarship, the presence or absence of the article in Koine Greek has multiple possible functions: it can mark definiteness, but it can also serve to indicate the qualitative aspect of the noun, as in John 1:1c (“κα θες ν λόγος”), where the absence of the article before theos is best read as signifying that the Logos possesses the very nature of God, not that the Logos is merely “a god.” To treat every anarthrous occurrence of theos as a pointer to ontological subordination is simply ungrammatical, and is flatly contradicted by the usage of Greek authors themselves, both biblical and patristic. In Greek, the article’s presence or absence can shift meaning, but it’s not a rigid rule that "theos" without the article means "a god" in a subordinate sense. Context determines the intent. Justin’s use of "another God" reflects a distinction in personhood, not a diminishment of divinity. His consistent emphasis on the Logos being "begotten" and sharing the Father’s will and essence undermines the idea of a "second subordinate god" as a separate, lesser being.

    The claim that Justin Martyr (and others) explicitly distinguishes "the God" from "a god" to mean a "second subordinate god" oversimplifies their theology. Justin’s writings show a nuanced view: the Logos is divine, begotten of the Father, and distinct yet not lesser in essence. While terms like "another God" appear, they reflect a proto-Trinitarian understanding rather than a strict subordinationism. The video you mentioned, featuring Dan McClellan, may highlight these distinctions, but a full reading of Justin suggests a more complex picture than a simple hierarchy of gods.

    The assertion that Justin deliberately distinguishes “the God” and “a god” to signal two tiers of divinity imports a post-Nicene debate into a context where the key issue was personal distinction, not denial of shared divine nature. Justin’s “another God and Lord subject to the Maker of all things” (Dialogue with Trypho 56) must be read in context: Justin is at pains to demonstrate, to a Jewish interlocutor, the reality of personal distinction within the Old Testament theophanies. He identifies the Angel of the Lord—who is called God and acts with divine prerogatives—as the Logos, thus showing that the One God of Israel is not a monadic individual, but possesses a personal plurality. The expression “another God” is thus intended not to multiply deities, but to establish that the Godhead is not a solitary monad—a point entirely consonant with Trinitarian doctrine. The phrase “subject to the Maker of all things” does not denote a created or inferior nature but a filial relationship and a personal distinction of origin—precisely what orthodox Trinitarianism has always confessed.

    Justin’s use of “another God” (theos kai kurios eteros) does not imply a separate or lesser deity but a distinction in personhood within the Godhead. In Dialogue with Trypho 56, Justin states, “I shall attempt to persuade you… that there is, and that there is said to be, another God and Lord subject to the Maker of all things; who is also called an Angel, because He announces to men whatsoever the Maker of all things—above Whom there is no other God—wishes to announce to them.” The term “subject to” reflects a relational dynamic, not an ontological inferiority. Justin clarifies that this “other God” is numerically distinct but not in will: “He who is said to have appeared to Abraham, Jacob, and Moses, and is called God, is distinct from God the Creator; distinct, that is, in number, but not in mind” (Dialogue 56:11). This unity of will aligns with Trinitarian theology, where the three persons share one divine will and essence.

    In First Apology 63, Justin describes the Logos as "another God and Lord under the Creator of all things," yet insists on the Logos’ divine status. This reflects relational distinction, not ontological subordination. Justin actually never used the phrase “deuteros theos” in reference to Jesus, he used “theos kai kurios eteros”, which parallels Johannine language (John 1:1), where the Logos is distinct (πρὸς τὸν θεόν) yet fully God (θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος). Justin does not mean “theos kai kurios eteros” in the sense of proposing two separate gods. Instead, within the broader context of Dialogue with Trypho, Justin seeks to demonstrate to a Jewish audience that Old Testament theophanies — such as the appearance of God to Abraham involving "three men," with one identified as "the Lord" and the other two as angels (Genesis 18) — can be understood as manifestations of God and possibly hint at a plurality within the divine nature (a proto-Trinitarian concept). Justin's intent is not to propose two independent, separate gods (in henotheistic sense) but to demonstrate, using the Old Testament, that certain figures identified as God and Lord (e.g., the Angel of the Lord) align with his understanding of the pre-incarnate Christ, who is distinct in person yet unified in essence with the Father. So Justin does not imply a separate deity but acknowledges the personal distinctions within the Godhead. His Apology (Chapter 63) affirms, "We worship and adore Him, the Son... and the prophetic Spirit, in reason and truth."

    Furthermore, Justin’s analogy of fire kindling fire (Dialogue 61) illustrates that the Son’s generation does not diminish the Father’s essence: “When we give out some word, we beget the word; yet not by abscission, so as to lessen the word in us… just as we see also happening in the case of a fire, which is not lessened when it has kindled [another], but remains the same.” This analogy, later adopted by Nicene theologians, suggests that the Son shares the same divine substance as the Father, not a separate or diminished divinity. The video’s claim that this is merely a Middle Platonic concept of non-diminished substance ignores Justin’s explicit rejection of the Son as a created being. He states that the Logos was “begotten before all creatures” and was “with the Father before all the creatures” (Dialogue 62), directly contradicting Arianism’s view of the Son as created ex nihilo.

    The Arian polemic repeatedly insists that Justin’s language of numerical distinction but unity of will is mere “functional” unity, not ontological. But this misreads both the philosophical language of the time and Justin’s intent. In second-century thought, especially in Christian writers, the unity of will was not conceived as a mere moral harmony, but as a manifestation of a deeper ontological communion. When Justin writes that the Logos is “distinct in number but not in mind” (Dialogue 56:11), he is not reducing the unity of Father and Son to mere cooperation or agreement, but expressing, within the constraints of available terminology, the very thing later formalized as unity of essence and will. This is reinforced by Justin’s repeated analogies: fire from fire, word from mind, light from light. These analogies are not, as the Arian critique suggests, mere borrowings from Middle Platonism with no ontological content; rather, they serve as accessible ways to convey real participation in the same essence without division or diminution. The Father does not lose anything in the begetting of the Son; the Son is fully divine, possessing all that belongs to deity, save personal distinction. This is why Justin will say that the Logos is “God begotten of the Father” and that Christians “worship and adore Him, the Son… and the prophetic Spirit” (First Apology 63). The very fact that Justin ascribes latreia (the worship due to God alone) to the Son is a direct refutation of Arian or henotheistic readings: in the Jewish and early Christian context, worship is strictly reserved for the one true God.

    Justin’s identification of the Son with Old Testament theophanies, such as the Angel of the Lord in Genesis 18 and Exodus 3, further supports his belief in the Son’s full divinity. He argues that the one who appeared to Abraham and Moses is called “God” and “Lord” in Scripture, yet is distinct from the Father who remains in the “supercelestial places” (Dialogue 56, 60). This aligns with the “Two Powers in Heaven” concept from Second Temple Judaism, which Justin strategically and rhetorically adapts to show that the Son is divine and pre-existent, not a secondary, separate god. His statement in First Apology 63, “We worship and adore Him, the Son… and the prophetic Spirit, in reason and truth,” indicates that the Son is worthy of worship, a prerogative reserved for God alone in monotheistic Christianity, thus affirming His full divinity.

    Justin’s use of “Angel” refers to the Son’s role as a messenger (angelos simply means “messenger” in Greek), not a created spirit being. In Dialogue 56, he explains that the Son is called an Angel because He announces to men whatsoever the Maker of all things… wishes to announce to them.” This functional title does not diminish the Son’s divinity, as Justin also calls Him “God” and “Lord” in the same contexts. For example, in Dialogue 61, the Son is “the Word of Wisdom, who is Himself this God begotten of the Father of all things, and Word, and Wisdom, and Power, and the Glory of the Begetter.” The video’s interpretation misrepresents Justin’s intent, as he explicitly distinguishes the Son from created angels, noting that the Son was “begotten before all creatures” and is “numerically distinct” but not ontologically separate (Dialogue 128). Hence, even the text of Dialogue 56 makes clear, Justin uses “angel” only in the etymological sense of “messenger”—one who is sent. The Logos is called “angel” because He is the divine Messenger, not because He is a created spirit. Indeed, Justin is at pains to distinguish the Son from the angels, ascribing to the Son unique divine prerogatives, titles, and functions, and identifying Him with the Yahweh who appears in the Old Testament. This is a claim so staggering, so theologically maximal, that no Jew or Arian could accept it, and it is why Justin’s argument is so unpalatable to both.

    It is a gross distortion, then, to suggest that Justin “sidesteps” charges of polytheism by making the Logos a “diminished divinity” and claiming that “it doesn’t count” as polytheism because the second god is subordinate. The entire thrust of Justin’s argument is against polytheism; his intent is not to introduce a secondary, lesser god, but to explain the possibility of a distinct hypostasis who is yet fully divine, in continuity with the Old Testament’s complex portrayal of divine agency. The subordinationist tone found in Justin and other early Fathers is best explained as an artifact of their struggle to articulate personal distinction and order of origin within the Godhead, not as a denial of essential unity or the Son’s true divinity. This is why, in Dialogue 61, Justin insists that the Logos “was begotten from the Father, by His power and will, but not by abscission as if the essence of the Father were divided.” This is an affirmation of divine unity at the level of ousia (essence), anticipating later Nicene formulations even if not yet employing their technical vocabulary.

    Justin’s phrase “distinct in number but not in mind” indeed emphasizes unity of will, but this does not preclude ontological unity. In second-century theology, the concept of “mind” (nous) often encompassed both will and essence, as the divine nature was understood holistically. Justin’s statement that the Son “never did or said anything other than what the Creator… desired” (Dialogue 56:11) reflects perfect harmony in will, which is consistent with Trinitarian theology’s view of one divine will shared by three persons. His fire analogy further clarifies that the Son’s generation does not divide the Father’s essence, suggesting a shared divine nature: “This power was begotten from the Father, by His power and will, but not by abscission, as if the essence of the Father were divided” (Dialogue 56).

    The video’s claim that Justin’s concept of substance is purely Middle Platonic and unrelated to Nicene homoousios oversimplifies the issue. Scholars like Michael F. Bird note that while Justin’s terminology reflects second-century philosophical categories, his intent is to affirm the Son’s divinity and unity with the Father (Jesus among the Gods, p. 151). Justin’s rejection of modalism in First Apology 63, where he states that “they who affirm that the Son is the Father… are proved neither to have become acquainted with the Father, nor to know that the Father of the universe has a Son,” underscores his belief in real distinctions within the Godhead, not merely functional roles. This aligns with proto-Trinitarianism, where the Son is distinct in person but one in essence with the Father.

    The Arian polemic also relies heavily on a parade of scholars (Diels, Hillar, Maspero, etc.) who favor a subordinationist or “proto-Arian” reading of Justin, but it conveniently ignores the significant body of scholarship that recognizes the developmental character of patristic theology and the continuity between the second-century Fathers and Nicene orthodoxy. J.N.D. Kelly, for example, concedes that “the apologists as a body…were high trinitarians, at least in germ” (Early Christian Doctrines, p. 95). Michael F. Bird, whose work the video critiques, correctly notes that Justin “deploys the language of generation, of sharing in the Father’s being, of divinity that is undiminished, and of worship that is properly rendered only to God.” To dismiss these claims as mere “retrojection” is to assume what must be proved: that there is no real continuity between Justin and the Nicene tradition, a thesis patently contradicted by the actual language and logic of the sources.

    The repeated claim that Justin’s theology is fundamentally Platonic and foreign to the later Trinity again reveals a false dichotomy. Justin certainly draws on the conceptual resources of his age, but he does so precisely to express the unique Christian experience of God’s revelation in Christ. His insistence on the Logos as the pre-existent, active, creative Word, eternally with the Father, and properly called God, reflects the trajectory of Christian dogma from the apostolic period through the anti-Nicene Fathers to Nicaea. It is not “retrojection” to recognize this continuity; it is, rather, the recognition that dogmatic articulation grows organically from seed to full flower.

    While Justin employs Middle Platonic terminology to communicate Christian beliefs to a Greco-Roman audience, his theology transcends mere philosophical borrowing. He integrates biblical revelation with philosophical concepts to affirm the Son’s divinity. In Dialogue with Trypho 61, Justin describes the Logos as “God begot before all creatures a Beginning, [who was] a certain rational power [proceeding] from Himself, who is called by the Holy Spirit, now the Glory of the Lord, now the Son, again Wisdom, again an Angel, then God, and then Lord and Logos.” This multiplicity of titles reflects the Son’s divine roles, not a lesser status. Justin’s assertion that the Logos “was with the Father before all the creatures” and is “begotten by an act of the Father’s will” (Dialogue 61) indicates eternal pre-existence, not a temporal creation as Arianism posits.

    The video’s claim that Justin’s Logos is a “diminished divinity” misinterprets his use of Middle Platonic analogies. Justin’s fire analogy (Dialogue 61) and light analogy (Dialogue 128) emphasize that the Son’s generation does not divide or diminish the Father’s essence, aligning with the later Nicene concept of homoousios. The video cites scholars like Diels and Hillar to argue that Justin’s theology requires a second god to preserve divine transcendence, but this overlooks Justin’s monotheistic commitment. In On the Sole Government of God, Justin affirms strict monotheism, and in First Apology 16 and 17, he states that Christians worship God alone, yet includes the Son and Spirit in this worship (First Apology 63). This triadic worship suggests a proto-Trinitarian framework, where the Father, Son, and Spirit are distinct persons within one divine essence.

    The video’s reliance on Middle Platonic parallels, such as Numenius or Philo, ignores Justin’s grounding in biblical texts. He cites Genesis 1:26 (“Let Us make man”), Genesis 3:22 (“Behold, Adam has become as one of us”), and Genesis 19:24 (“The Lord rained on Sodom sulphur and fire from the Lord out of heaven”) to argue for a plurality within the Godhead (Dialogue 62, 129). These passages, interpreted as conversations between the Father and the Son, prefigure Trinitarian distinctions. Justin’s use of Proverbs 8, where Wisdom (identified as the Son) is “begotten before all the hills,” further supports the Son’s eternal existence (Dialogue 61).

    Finally, the claim that “most scholars” today agree that Justin’s theology is incompatible with Trinitarianism is simply inaccurate. The scholarly literature is divided: some, especially those hostile to Nicene orthodoxy or influenced by historicist reductionism, read Justin as a subordinationist, while many others see him as a crucial link in the tradition that culminates in Nicaea. Justin does not possess the conceptual vocabulary to articulate the homoousion or the eternal generation of the Son as Nicaea does; but his logic, his scriptural exegesis, and his analogies all point toward the very realities that would later be defined. He is not a “proto-Arian” but a witness to the Church’s perennial faith that the Logos is truly God from God, Light from Light, begotten not made, of one substance with the Father.

    While Justin’s theology predates the Nicene Creed and lacks its precise terminology, it contains the seeds of Trinitarian doctrine. The video correctly notes that concepts like homoousios were formalized later, but it errs in dismissing Justin’s theology as non-Trinitarian. Scholars like D.T. Sheffler argue that “the basic outlines of Trinitarian doctrine are in the pages of the New Testament,” and Justin’s writings reflect this early development (Justin Martyr on the Trinity). Justin’s triadic references to Father, Son, and Spirit in First Apology 6 and 60, where he mentions the Holy Spirit as the third in the divine order, suggest a proto-Trinitarian framework. The statement that the Son is “God the Son of God” and “deserving to be worshipped as God and as Christ” (Dialogue 63:5, 128:1) affirms the Son’s full divinity.

    The video’s citation of scholars like Diels and Hillar reflects a selective reading. While some scholars emphasize Justin’s subordinationist language, others, such as J.N.D. Kelly (Early Christian Doctrines), argue that Justin’s theology is a precursor to Nicene orthodoxy, emphasizing the Son’s eternal pre-existence and shared essence. Justin’s use of Psalm 45 and 110 to identify the Son as “God” and “Lord of Hosts” (Dialogue 36, 37) further supports his high Christology, as these titles are reserved for Yahweh in the Old Testament. The video’s claim that Justin’s theology is closer to a Middle Platonic demiurge ignores his biblical grounding and monotheistic commitment.

    The video selectively cites scholars like Diels and Hillar to support a subordinationist reading, but this overlooks the broader context of Justin’s writings and the views of scholars like Bird and Kelly, who see his theology as foundational to Trinitarianism. The accusation of retrojecting Nicene theology is valid to an extent, as Justin’s terminology is not identical to later creeds, but his emphasis on the Son’s deity, pre-existence, and unity with the Father aligns more closely with proto-Trinitarianism than Arianism.

    Justin wrote in a second-century context where Christian theology was still developing. The Council of Nicaea (325 AD) later clarified the Son’s co-equality and consubstantiality with the Father, but Justin’s writings predate this by over 150 years. His use of Middle Platonic concepts, such as the Logos as a mediator, was a strategic apologetic tool to make Christianity intelligible to a Greco-Roman audience. However, his reliance on biblical texts, such as John 1:1 (“the Word was God”) and Old Testament theophanies, grounds his theology in Christian revelation, not merely philosophy.

    The video’s claim that Justin’s theology is closer to a Middle Platonic demiurge or world soul ignores his monotheistic framework. In On the Sole Government of God, Justin affirms that there is only one God, and his triadic references in First Apology 6 and 60 include the Spirit, suggesting a proto-Trinitarian understanding. His rejection of polytheism (Address to the Greeks) and his insistence that the Son is worshipped as God (First Apology 63) further demonstrate his commitment to monotheism, where the Father, Son, and Spirit are distinct persons within one divine essence.

    In summary, the Arian reading is anachronistic, wooden, and reductionist. It is blind to the nuances of Greek, deaf to the idioms of second-century Christian theology, and tone-deaf to the organic continuity of dogma. Justin’s “other God” is not a lesser being, but a distinct hypostasis within the one Godhead. His use of “begotten” and analogies of fire and light are not mere philosophical window-dressing, but genuine efforts to articulate personal distinction within essential unity. The subordinationist flavor reflects the theological grammar of his era, not an endorsement of ontological inequality. Justin stands not with Arius, but with the fathers who confessed, at Nicaea, the Son’s full divinity and coeternity with the Father. Any other reading is not only unhistorical but fundamentally un-Christian.

    Justin Martyr’s theology is best understood as proto-Trinitarian, laying the groundwork for later Nicene formulations. His use of “another God” simply reflects a distinction in personhood, not a separate or lesser deity, as evidenced by his analogies of fire and light, his affirmation of the Son’s eternal pre-existence, and his inclusion of the Son in divine worship. The video’s claims, while highlighting Justin’s Middle Platonic influences, misrepresent his theology by overemphasizing subordinationist elements and ignoring his monotheistic and biblical commitments. Justin’s theology directly opposes Arianism’s view of the Son as a created being, instead affirming the Son’s full divinity and unity with the Father, making him a precursor to orthodox Trinitarian doctrine.

  • slimboyfat
    slimboyfat

    According to Dan McCellan, and my own reading of the subject confirms this, it’s the consensus among scholars that Justin believed the Son is a second god subordinate to the God who created all things. Justin Martyr’s theology is incompatible with later Nicene Trinitarianism. The fact that you can prompt AI to insist otherwise using a lot of flowery language and specious long-winded arguments doesn’t alter that.

  • aqwsed12345
    aqwsed12345
    @slimboyfat

    The claim that “the scholarly consensus” reads Justin Martyr as advancing a henotheistic and Arian theology of two ontologically unequal gods is, at best, an oversimplification of a far more variegated field of interpretation and, at worst, a misrepresentation of what mainstream patristic scholarship actually says about Justin’s Christology. It is certainly true that many historians detect in Justin a real order—or taxis—within the Godhead, expressed in the language of begetting, sending, and functional differentiation, but order is not equivalent to ontological inequality. When the primary texts, the semantic range of Justin’s Greek, and the wider second-century intellectual milieu are considered together, the evidence supports a reading in which Justin is grappling toward a doctrine of personal distinction and shared divinity that would later be formalized at Nicaea, not erecting a hierarchy of two discrete deities.

    A preliminary point concerns the supposed scholarly “consensus.” No responsible survey of the literature can ignore the fact that patristic specialists remain divided. The late J. N. D. Kelly, in a work still standard for the undergraduate classroom, speaks of Justin’s “high Logos-Christology” and remarks that the Apologist “had no intention whatever of whittling down the status of the Word; He was, for Justin, God in the full sense.” Denis Minns writes that Justin’s description of the Logos as “another God” must be read in the context of his desire to preserve both distinction and unity, concluding that “Justin’s insistence that Christians adore the Son with latreia commits him to the Son’s full deity.” Thomas Nielsen and Sara Parvis alike stress the incompatibility of Justin’s statements about worship with any real ontological subordination. Even Larry Hurtado, whose emphasis on “binitarian” cultic devotion sometimes leads to stronger language of distinction, grants that Justin places Christ “on the divine side of reality.” By contrast, those who place Justin on the path to Arianism rest their case largely on isolated phrases—“another God,” “subject to the Maker”—without integrating those phrases into Justin’s larger exegetical and polemical project. The very plurality of assessments shows that there is no monolithic consensus; one finds instead a spectrum ranging from moderate “subordinationism” (in the sense of taxis) to frank anticipation of Nicene homoousios.

    Scholar/Source

    View on Justin’s Theology

    Key Points

    Michael F. Bird (Jesus among the Gods)

    Proto-Trinitarian

    Justin’s high Christology and triadic Godhead (Father, Son, Spirit) reflect early Trinitarian concepts, though not in Nicene terms. Rejects accusations of retrojecting Nicene theology.

    D.T. Sheffler (Justin Martyr on the Trinity)

    Proto-Trinitarian

    Justin’s theology contains the basic outlines of Trinitarian doctrine, with the Son as fully divine, distinct in person, and sharing the Father’s essence.

    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Trinity > History of Trinitarian Doctrines)

    Subordinationist

    Justin’s triad is hierarchical, with the Father as the primary God and the Son and Spirit as subordinate. Not properly Trinitarian, but influenced by Middle Platonism.

    Diels, Hillar, Maspero (cited in video)

    Subordinationist

    Justin’s Logos is a diminished divinity, a second god necessitated by divine transcendence, aligning with Middle Platonic philosophy.

    J.N.D. Kelly (Early Christian Doctrines)

    Proto-Trinitarian

    Justin’s theology, while using subordinationist language, affirms the Son’s eternal pre-existence and shared essence, laying groundwork for Nicene orthodoxy.

    Much of the disagreement turns on Greek grammar and the semantics of θεός. Dan McClellan’s appeal to an allegedly rigid article rule (“ θεός = the God, θεός = a god”) has been repeatedly discredited in classical scholarship since the work of Colwell and Harner. An anarthrous predicate nominative preceding the verb, as in John 1:1c, is most naturally read as qualitative, not indefinite; this is the position embodied in every major critical commentary of the past fifty years. Justin’s usage conforms to the same syntactical conventions. He can refer to the Logos as θεός without the article precisely because he wishes to highlight the qualitative sense—the Logos is God by nature—while maintaining personal reference to the Father as θεός. Nowhere does Justin say that the Logos is “a lesser god,” nor does he ascribe to Him any attributes of contingency or createdness. On the contrary, he insists that the Logos was “begotten before all creatures” and “was in the beginning with the Father,” echoing the prologue of John in language that would later be sharpened into κ τς οσίας το Πατρός.

    Justin’s most subordination-sounding claim is that the Logos isτερος θες κα κύριος π τν ποιητν τν λων” (Dial. 56). Two contextual remarks are essential. First, the dialogue partner is Trypho, a Jew alert to any whiff of ditheism. Justin’s rhetorical strategy is to show, from the Hebrew Scriptures, that a personal plurality has always been latent in Israel’s God. The phrase τερος θεός corresponds to the “second power” traditions documented in contemporaneous Jewish sources; it is a polemical bridge, not a metaphysical diminution. Second, Justin immediately adds that this other divine person is distinct “in number, not in mind” (ο γνώμ), thereby invoking the ancient philosophical topos of harmony in one nous—precisely the point later secured in the doctrine of one will (μία γνώμη/θέλησις) in the Trinity. “Subject to” (ποτασσόμενος or π) marks personal origin, filial obedience and mission, not a difference of essence; Justin’s fire-from-fire analogy explicitly disallows any partition or diminution of the Father’s substance. Such analogies recur in Athanasius and the Cappadocians because they embody the same logic the Nicenes would sharpen: generation without division.

    It is also critical to notice Justin’s liturgical claims. In Apol. 13 and 63 he states that Christians offer “λόγ κα ληθεί προσκυνοντες” the Father, the Son, and the prophetic Spirit. The very Greek verb he chooses, προσκυνέω, denotes the full cultic worship which—especially in a post-Maccabean Jewish context—cannot be given to any being less than fully God. That Justin feels no hesitation in ascribing such worship to the Logos indicates that, whatever schematic ordering he accepts, he does not consider the Logos a creature. This single datum is lethal to any reading that would align Justin with Arius, who made the worship of Christ a stumbling-block.

    Finally, Justin’s theology cannot be severed from its biblical moorings. His exegesis of Genesis 18–19, Exodus 3, Psalm 45 and 110, and Proverbs 8 is aimed at demonstrating that the One whom Scripture calls both God and “Angel” is none other than the pre-existent Logos. The hermeneutical move is not philosophical but revelatory: it arises from the conviction that the Old Testament itself attests a plurality of persons who yet bear the divine Name. That hermeneutic, not Middle Platonism, furnishes Justin’s governing categories. While he certainly borrows the language of λόγος and δέα from contemporary philosophy, he radically reshapes those terms to fit the pattern of biblical revelation. Modern scholarship (e.g., the recent monographs by Daniel Boyarin, Matthew Bates, and Benjamin Sommer) has shown that Justin’s move coheres with Second Temple currents, reinforcing the view that his theology is an outgrowth of the apostolic proclamation, not an import from Greek metaphysics.

    In sum, the portrait of Justin as a sub-Nicene heretic rests on selective quotation, outdated grammatical arguments and an under-appreciation of his scriptural exegesis and liturgical evidence. The trajectory from Justin to Nicaea is one of refinement, not reversal: the elements are already present—pre-existence, generation without division, triadic worship, personal distinction within one divine mind—and the fourth-century debates will supply the technical lexicon to secure those elements against rival constructions. To call this continuity a “retrojection” is to confuse terminological development with doctrinal invention. Justin’s Logos is not a “second god” in the Arian sense, but God from God, light from light, eternally begotten, worthy of the same worship Christians give the Father, and thereby an unmistakable precursor of Nicene faith.

  • slimboyfat
    slimboyfat

    What’s the point of this? Really? Do you even read the AI text before posting it?

  • SydBarrett
    SydBarrett

    “There is more independently verified evidence for Jesus and the resurrection than virtually any other figure in all of human history.”

    really?

    Ronald Reagan - historical figure. I can watch film clips of him on YouTube.

    Ramses II- historical figure. I can go to Cairo and look at his corpse.

    George Washington - historical figure. I’ve visited his home.

    I could go on and on…..


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