@Wonderment
Your
response insists that the existence of a broad range of non-traditional English
translations of John 1:1c—many from Catholic and Protestant sources—discredits
the argument for scholarly consensus behind the mainstream rendering. However,
this claim misconstrues the very nature of scholarly consensus in biblical
studies. The mere presence of alternative translations does not invalidate the
overwhelming alignment of major critical scholars and standard reference works
with the qualitative interpretation, nor does it demonstrate equivalence
between mainstream academic translation and the often idiosyncratic choices of
marginal or paraphrastic versions. To measure consensus by mere quantity or
denominational label is methodologically unsound: scholarship is not advanced
by counting versions, but by analyzing the linguistic, literary, and
theological arguments undergirding translation choices. The mainstream
rendering persists because it most faithfully reflects the grammatical,
contextual, and theological data.
he core
issue of this debate revolves around the interpretation of the Greek text of John
1:1c and what it implies about the relationship between the Father and the Son.
Specifically, the question is whether this verse:
- Asserts an identity of quiddity (essential nature) between the
Father and the Son,
- Neither asserts nor denies such an identity, or
- Explicitly negates it.
To answer
this, we must first examine whether the theological framework of the Gospel of
John—and the NT as a whole—allows for the concept of a “lesser god” or reflects
a form of monolatristic henotheism (the worship of one god while
acknowledging the existence of others). The NT, including John’s Gospel,
emerges from the context of Second Temple Judaism, a period marked by a strong
commitment to monotheism. This is rooted in the Hebrew Scriptures, particularly
in texts like Isaiah 43:10-11 and 44:6, where God declares, “Before me no
god was formed, nor shall there be any after me,” and “I am the first
and I am the last; besides me there is no god.” These anti-henotheistic
statements reject the idea of multiple gods or lesser divine beings sharing
God’s nature or status.
In this
light, John 1:1c must be understood. The absence of the definite article before
θεός has led some, like Arian apologists, to argue that the Logos
(the Son) is a “lesser god” rather than fully divine in the same sense as the
Father. However, the broader theological framework of the NT does not support
this. There is no evidence of monolatristic henotheism—where multiple gods are
acknowledged but only one is worshiped—in this framework.
Arian apologists often cite Exodus 7:1 (“See,
I have made you like God [elohim] to Pharaoh”) and Psalm 82:6 (“I said,
‘You are gods’”) to argue that the Bible permits the concept of lesser divine
beings. However, these OT texts, written centuries earlier in Hebrew, do not
align with the theological context of the Second Temple period, when the
apostles lived and wrote. In Exodus 7:1 Moses is appointed as God’s
representative, not a literal lesser deity. The term elohim is used
functionally, not ontologically. Psalm 82 likely refers to human judges or
heavenly beings (e.g., angels) under God’s authority, not independent gods. The
Septuagint, the Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible widely used in the
apostolic era, reflects this shift. For instance, in Psalm 8:5 (8:6 in the
LXX), elohim (“gods” or “heavenly beings”) is translated as aggeloi
(“angels”), a choice echoed in Hebrews 2:7. This shows a deliberate move
away from language that could suggest henotheism or multiple gods.
By the time
of the NT, such terminology had been “purged” or reinterpreted to align with
strict monotheism. The apostles, operating in this milieu, show no precedent
for reviving a henotheistic understanding of divine beings.
The Greek
text of John 1:1c asserts an identity of quiddity between the Father and the
Son, affirming that the Word shares the same divine essence as God. The
theological framework of John and the NT rejects the notion of a “lesser god”
or monolatristic henotheism. While Arian apologists point to earlier texts like
Exodus 7:1 and Psalm 82, these do not reflect the Second Temple context, where
such ideas were reinterpreted or abandoned, as seen in the LXX and apostolic
writings. There is no evidence from the apostolic era to support a henotheistic
reading. Instead, John 1:1c stands as a clear declaration of the Son’s full
divinity.
The core
issue lies in the anarthrous use of θεός in John 1:1c, which lacks the
definite article ὁ ho, unlike τὸν θεόν in
John 1:1b. You claim that my reliance on scholars like Daniel Wallace is
misplaced, arguing that grammarians and translators diverge, with Wallace's
work allegedly biased by theology, as admitted in his preface. However, this
mischaracterizes Wallace's Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics, which is an
empirical study of Koine Greek syntax, not a theological treatise. Wallace
concludes that pre-verbal anarthrous predicate nominatives, such as θεός
here, are primarily qualitative, indicating the nature or essence of the
subject, based on extensive analysis of NT and Septuagint data. His preface
acknowledges scholarly disagreement, but this does not undermine his finding
that such constructions are overwhelmingly qualitative, especially in
theological contexts like John 1:1c.
Your
argument conflates the qualitative and indefinite readings of anarthrous
predicate nouns, asserting that there is significant overlap and that this
undercuts the distinction insisted on by Wallace, Harner, and Dixon. Yet this
is a fundamental misunderstanding of their analysis. The central question is
not whether some overlap exists in certain constructions (which all grammarians
recognize), but which sense is required in the specific context of John 1:1c.
The studies you reference are not trinitarian polemics, but careful
examinations of Greek syntax across the NT and contemporaneous literature. Both
Harner and Dixon, after exhaustive statistical studies, demonstrate that
pre-copulative, anarthrous predicate nominatives are overwhelmingly qualitative
in Johannine and broader Koine usage, especially in creedal or ontological
statements. Wallace’s categories explicitly note that while indefiniteness is
sometimes possible, in John 1:1c the qualitative sense is contextually and
grammatically demanded by the literary context and by the structure of the
Prologue. The diagram you allude to in Wallace (p. 269) is not an admission
that the indefinite and qualitative readings are interchangeable, but a mapping
of their possible intersections in Greek grammar, with context always remaining
decisive.
Your
assertion that Trinitarians evade the indefinite sense for theological reasons,
appealing to Colwell, Dixon, and Harner, ignores the linguistic rigor of these
studies. Colwell's Rule states that definite predicate nominatives preceding
the verb often lack the article, suggesting θεός can be definite or
qualitative, not necessarily indefinite. Harner's study analyzed over 250
examples and found that the qualitative sense predominates, particularly in
pre-verbal positions, with the indefinite sense rare and contextually excluded.
Dixon's dissertation similarly supports this, noting that English translations
may use an indefinite article for readability, but the Greek conveys essence.
These conclusions are not theological fiat but empirical observations, accepted
across confessional lines, including by non-Trinitarian linguists.
Your claim
that Wallace, Dixon, and Colwell are biased from the start, conducting studies
to counter non-traditional readings, is unsubstantiated. Their work is
peer-reviewed and grounded in syntactic patterns, not theological agendas.
Wallace's diagrams show overlap between qualitative and indefinite senses in
some contexts, but he explicitly states that in John 1:1c, the qualitative
force is primary, given the context of the prologue distinguishing the Logos
from “the God” (John 1:1b) while affirming its divine role (John 1:3-4).
This overlap does not imply equivalence; rather, it acknowledges that English
translation may require “a” for idiom, but the Greek remains
qualitative.
You cite
the NWT's 1984 Appendix, listing anarthrous predicate nouns (e.g., Mark 6:49, “a
spirit”; John 4:19, “a prophet”) where translators use an indefinite
article, suggesting this supports “a god” in John 1:1c. However, this
conflates translation choices with grammatical function and ignores contextual
distinctions. In Mark 6:49, φάντασμα conveys a qualitative nature (“having
the nature of a spirit”), not an indefinite class; John 4:19's προφήτης
emphasizes Jesus's prophetic essence, with “a” added in English for
readability, not because the Greek is indefinite. These examples differ from
John 1:1c, where θεός is not a category noun but a term for the unique
divine nature, introduced in a creedal prologue asserting the Logos's role as
Creator (John 1:3) and intimate relation with “the God” (John 1:1b). The
NWT's list illustrates translation variability, but it does not establish that
an indefinite sense is grammatically or contextually appropriate for John 1:1c,
where the qualitative interpretation—“the Word was fully God in nature”—aligns
with the prologue's monotheistic framework.
You
challenge me to verify these occurrences using the Zondervan Greek-English
Concordance, citing Acts 28:4 (“By all means murderer is the man this”) as an
example where translators render it as “This man must be a murderer”
(NIV), suggesting an indefinite-qualitative sense. However, this comparison is
flawed. In Acts 28:4, the noun “murderer” (ἀνθρωποκτόνος) describes a category, and the
context (the islanders' inference based on a snakebite) supports an indefinite
reading (“a murderer among others”). In contrast, John 1:1c is a metaphysical
statement about the Logos's essence, not a descriptive category, set within a
prologue exalting its divine status. The NIV's “a murderer” reflects
English idiom, not a rejection of qualitative force, and does not parallel John
1:1c, where the context demands a qualitative θεός.
Hence, the
examples you cite are not analogous to the use of θεός in John 1:1c. The
use of the indefinite article there is natural and expected in English, given
the idiom and the type of noun involved. By contrast, θεός in John 1:1c
is a monadic, abstract noun situated in an ontological, not
classificatory, assertion about the Word’s nature, immediately after the Word
has been distinguished from the Father by the articular usage in 1:1b. Thus,
the analogy fails: translating θεός ἦν ὁ λόγος as “the Word was a god” introduces an
unwarranted category distinction, suggesting the existence of multiple gods, a
meaning John’s monotheistic context does not allow.
Your claim
that translators often render pre-verbal anarthrous predicates with an
indefinite article, contradicting Wallace and Dixon's rules, is overstated.
Both scholars note that the indefinite sense is the least popular, but you
dismiss this as a “Trinitarian play.” This ignores that translation practices
reflect target-language needs, not a repudiation of Greek grammar. For
instance, in John 4:19, Wallace describes the sense as “indefinite-qualitative,”
meaning the Greek is qualitative, with “a” added in English for clarity,
not because it is indefinite. Dixon admits English may require “a” for
qualitative nouns, but this does not mean the Greek is indefinite; it reflects
translation idiom, as seen in French translations like Segond (“Je vois que
tu es prophète”) versus Darby (“Je vois que tu es un prophète”).
You argue
that “the Word was God” wrongly identifies the Word with God, failing to
distinguish between the articular θεός (John 1:1b, “the God”)
and the anarthrous θεός (John 1:1c), citing verse 2 to argue for a distinction
between the invisible God and the Word. However, this misunderstands the Greek.
The anarthrous θεός in 1:1c is qualitative, emphasizing shared essence,
not identity of person. John 1:2 (“He was in the beginning with God”) reinforces
this, maintaining the distinction in personhood (“with [the] God”) while
affirming shared full divinity (“was God”).
Hence, the
absence of the article with θεός in 1:1c is precisely what signals qualitative
predication: the Word is everything that God is by nature, but remains distinct
in person from “the God” (ὁ θεός) whom he is with. This is the point of the
syntactic construction. The traditional translation “the Word was God”
is, in English idiom, the most effective way of conveying this qualitative
identity—though not identity of person—without introducing the misleading
implication of a lesser, subordinate, or additional deity. Alternative
translations like “the Word was divine” or “what God was, the Word
was” have been adopted by some, not to suggest a lesser being, but to
clarify the qualitative force. None of these renderings support the indefinite,
category-member sense that the NWT projects.
Barclay,
whom you cite, himself states: “John does not say that the Word was the
God (ho theos); to have said that would have been to identify the Word
with God. He says that the Word was theos—without the article—which
means that the Word was, as we would say, of the very same character and
quality and essence and being as God.” This is precisely the qualitative force
articulated by Wallace, Harner, and the vast majority of critical scholars: not
that the Word is “a secondary, lesser god,” but that the Word shares fully in the nature
of God. The very distinction between the articular and anarthrous θεός
in John 1:1 is not obliterated by the traditional translation; rather, it is
the result of careful exegetical and grammatical analysis, as found in every
major critical commentary.
The
assertion that English “the Word was God” is ambiguous or misleading is
not supported by mainstream English usage, in which “God” functions both
as a proper noun and as a title denoting divine nature. The context, especially
when interpreted alongside the rest of the Prologue (John 1:3, 1:18, etc.),
makes it clear that the Word is not identical with the Father in person but is
fully and truly God in essence. The translation “the Word was God”
reflects this distinction as well as the language allows, and any further
clarification belongs in commentary, not in a distortion of the translation
itself.
You also
claim that the NWT’s rendering is more faithful because it reflects the
anarthrous nature of the Greek noun. But as demonstrated by every major Greek
grammar, including those by non-Trinitarians and even secular scholars,
anarthrous predicate nouns in this syntactic position are typically
qualitative, not indefinite. The mere absence of the article does not imply
indefiniteness; it is the context, especially in ontological and theological
statements, that is determinative.
Your
invocation of a global plurality of English translations, some of which differ
from the traditional rendering, does nothing to advance your argument. The
overwhelming weight of scholarly authority—BDAG, Wallace, Harner, Dixon,
Porter, Robertson, and every standard lexicon and grammar—aligns with the
qualitative interpretation. The proliferation of alternative translations often
arises from confessional bias or from a desire to clarify the qualitative sense
for lay readers, not from grammatical necessity. Indeed, translations that opt
for “divine” or “what God was, the Word was” do so out of concern
for clarity, not because they accept the indefinite “a god.” Your examples,
like the 1808 Improved Version (“and the Word was a god”) or Moffatt's
1924 translation (“the Logos was divine”), reflect minority views, often
driven by theological agendas, not grammatical necessity. William Barclay
clarifies that Jesus is of the same essence as God but distinct, supporting the
qualitative interpretation.
Finally,
the very logic of your position leads to a form of henotheism or monolatry, in
which more than one being can properly be called “god.” This is utterly foreign
to the context of John’s Second-Temple Jewish monotheism, in which the Shema
(Deut 6:4) remains the fundamental confession. The Prologue of John, from 1:1
to 1:18, affirms that the Word is not a creature, not a member of a class of
gods, but the very source of all that exists (John 1:3), the light and life of
men, the one who reveals the Father. Such predication cannot be made of a
subordinate, lesser deity. It is the qualitative force that alone does justice
to the context, the syntax, and the theology of the Gospel.
In summary,
your arguments—that my appeal to Wallace is misplaced, that qualitative and
indefinite senses overlap, and that non-traditional translations undermine the
traditional rendering—are refuted by the grammatical evidence, scholarly
consensus, and theological context. Wallace, Harner, and Dixon support a
qualitative θεός in John 1:1c, aligned with the monotheistic framework
of John. The NWT's “a god” relies on a misreading of syntax and
translation practice, while the Coptic and variant translations cited fail to
overturn the consensus. Theology informs interpretation, but here it aligns
with, rather than distorts, the linguistic data, affirming “the Word was God”
as the most accurate rendering.
Your
argument fails on grammatical, contextual, and theological grounds. The
consensus of critical scholarship, based on exhaustive studies of Greek grammar
and NT usage, is that John 1:1c is best rendered with a qualitative sense—“the
Word was God,” or, if further clarity is desired, “the Word was fully
divine.” The indefinite “a god” is not supported by the syntactic
construction, the context of the Prologue, the usage in the rest of the Gospel,
or the monotheistic setting of the NT. The qualitative force affirms the unique
and eternal deity of the Word, maintaining distinction of persons without
division of essence. Any rendering that suggests otherwise is linguistically,
historically, and theologically mistaken.
