by Narkissos 42 Replies latest jw friends
morailty should be a person's own set of behavioral values. Not ascribed to others by default. Ethics however are those mores that one expects others to abide by based on fair play, the rule of law, and an attempt to make things as equitable as possible, given any situation. That is the way I see it, but more oft than not individual morality is ascribed to others by default, which leads to the unequitable treatment of others. Just my two cents.
Sincerely,
District Overbeer
Interesting thoughts.
Many posters have highlighted the concept of (lesser) harm at least as a practical/personal "rule" or "principle" to live by. This of course can be related to the "Golden Rule" (about which PP's thread gives thorough background), and more broadly to the governing "value" of compassion, sympathy or empathy which is probably deeper than morality -- rooted in emotion and potentially developing into a comprehensive philosophical or religious self-understanding. This might be the only positive approach available now to humanistic and ecological ethics. Quite attractive, but are we really (or only) that good?
I would have more issues with the_classicist's (classical, as ever) connection of morality with responsibility / accountability, and especially with point # 2 which makes "sufficient reflection" as a component of "mortal sin". I tend to think this traditionally Christian approach has actually produced or favoured much irresponsibility in the form of self-delusion, ignorance of one's desires and motives, and generally a twisted and sneaky approach to life, exemplified by the Pauline alibi ("in fact it is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwells within me," Romans 7:17). To this attitude, I guess, responds Luther's famous formula, pecca fortiter ("sin bravely"). Moreover, hasn't psychoanalysis shattered the whole artifice, with Freud's motto Wo es war soll Ich werden (wherever "it" was, there I must/should be/come/become/stand)?
Funnily enough, moral utilitarianism might be traced back to Paul: "'All things are lawful,' but not all things are beneficial" (1 Corinthians 10:23; cf. 6:12) -- even though the first sentence might not be really his, but the "Christian libertines"' he addresses in Corinth. But of course there is a long history of amoralism starting (at least) with the Greek sophists and running down to Hobbes, Stirner, Nietzsche, the surrealists and situationists.
When reading the posts on this thread I was thinking of John Huston. Almost all of his movies grapple with the problem of morality, from a voluntarist stance close to Thunder's (The Maltese Falcon, Key Largo) to a much more nuanced appraisal of human nature (The Misfits, Reflections in a Golden Eye).
Just rambling. Keep it coming.
Just playing around with a couple of ideas here...
governing "value" of compassion, sympathy or empathy which is probably deeper than morality -- rooted in emotion and potentially developing into a comprehensive philosophical or religious self-understanding
Is empathy really 'deeper' than morality? I think that there are two fundamental evolutionary instincts that underly the moral sense. One is empathy, the instinct to put ourselves in another's place. (For anyone who doubts that this is an instinct, watch how any group of guys react when they see another guy getting hit in the groin.) Our level of empathy often depends on how closely we identify with someone, hence the phenomenon of separate in-group and out-group moralities.
The other is 'fairness', the idea that there is something fundamentally right about an even exchange, to repay good with good and evil with evil. This is just as deeply ingrained a human value as empathy. While I don't believe that this viewpoint is 'right', because it leads to logical paradox and does not tend towards long-term happiness, there is no objective basis for considering it to be any less 'moral' than the empathetic instinct.
point # 2 which makes "sufficient reflection" as a component of "mortal sin". I tend to think this traditionally Christian approach has actually produced or favoured much irresponsibility in the form of self-delusion, ignorance of one's desires and motives
I think that any view that promotes self-alienation is a bad thing. And yet, considering motive is a major part of our moral intuitions. We are prone to be far angrier at something done 'with malice aforethought' than at something done due to mere carelessness.
In purely abstract terms of moral culpability, there is no difference between the two, whether one takes a compassionate or utilitarian approach. From a compassionate approach, a person's feelings--even malice--always have some psychological basis, and hence there is no reason for morally favoring one feeling over another. And from a utilitarian approach, the impact of an action is all that matters, not its motivation.
From a practical, day-to-day standpoint, however, there is good reason to make the distinction. A person who hurts us out of carelessness is far less likely to hurt us again in the future than one who hurts out of malice.
Which I guess brings me back to the question you asked Valis: what is the difference between morality and ethics? This is ultimately a matter of personal preference, but I use 'morality' to refer to the logically coherent philosophy of virtue, whereas I use 'ethics' to refer to precepts that are useful for day-to-day living. Because humans are not rational creatures, there will always be a disconnect between the two.
'All things are lawful,' but not all things are beneficial"
Prolly the wisest message in the bible. That quoted scripture sums it up for me.
A friend asked me one time if there really was no bible god, what would be wrong with screwing everything with 2 leggs? I told him that if your married....it doesn't work. Mates get pissed if you cheat on them.....it's just the way humans are programmed. I asked him if the human enviroment from birth was to breed each other as animals do and there was no moral laws ingrained in us.....would it seem odd to breed one another as do the animals? I still don't know the answer but I'm only gonna breed my wife till I find me a primitive tribe who breeds like rabbits and join the bastards.
Gumby....who's disappointed Nark didn't play with him today.
I accidentally quoted myself and can't fix it.
I would have more issues with the_classicist's (classical, as ever) connection of morality with responsibility / accountability, and especially with point # 2 which makes "sufficient reflection" as a component of "mortal sin". I tend to think this traditionally Christian approach has actually produced or favoured much irresponsibility in the form of self-delusion, ignorance of one's desires and motives, and generally a twisted and sneaky approach to life, exemplified by the Pauline alibi ("in fact it is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwells within me," Romans 7:17). To this attitude, I guess, responds Luther's famous formula, pecca fortiter ("sin bravely"). Moreover, hasn't psychoanalysis shattered the whole artifice, with Freud's motto Wo es war soll Ich werden (wherever "it" was, there I must/should be/come/become/stand)?
Thanks for the compliment! What are we talking about anyways, a subjective or objective morality. Morality is subjective in some sense because it is bound to the human conscience whereas it can also be objective, if you believe in a moral system put in place by a higher being, a God figure if you will (credo in Deum, but I'm trying to be ecumenical).
"Sufficient reflection" means that we must know the thought, word or deed to
be sinful at the time we are guilty of it; and "full consent of the will" means
that we must fully and willfully yield to it.
Classicist... isn't the idea of the 'will' rather problematic? Putting aside anything that is done accidentally or as a matter of reflex, our actions are always the result of 'will', even if they are not fully reflected on.
For example, if you and I were to get into a very heated argument, and I were to hit you, there would still be that instant where I thought to myself, "do I want to do this?" and answered "yes". So is that an act of will?
What about sexual intercourse? Suppose I am sitting next a woman I'm attracted to. On an impulse, I kiss her. She responds, and things progress from there. There's a period of several minutes during which I could think to myself 'this is wrong', and stop before penetration occurs.* And yet, I am probably not spending that time in moral reflection. So is that an act of will?
If unreflected actions are still acts of will, then will is a distinction without value. But if only reflected actions are acts of will, then a person who examines their own motives is putting themselves at greater risk of mortal sin, a counterintuitive and (IMHO) highly undesirable proposition.
* I'm assuming, based on my limited knowledge of Catholic doctrine, that penetration is necessary for adultery to be a mortal sin
I think we must separate will from intellect. Will, I think, is what we want to happen, what we desire to come to be. You know beforehand that striking someone would be wrong, and supposedly you would stop yourself from such an action because of your knowledge that it is wrong and the displeasure you would get in doing something wrong.
You do raise some really good points, I'm not smart enough to answer them though.
Euph,
Is empathy really 'deeper' than morality? I think that there are two fundamental evolutionary instincts that underly the moral sense. One is empathy, the instinct to put ourselves in another's place. (For anyone who doubts that this is an instinct, watch how any group of guys react when they see another guy getting hit in the groin.) Our level of empathy often depends on how closely we identify with someone, hence the phenomenon of separate in-group and out-group moralities.The other is 'fairness', the idea that there is something fundamentally right about an even exchange, to repay good with good and evil with evil. This is just as deeply ingrained a human value as empathy. While I don't believe that this viewpoint is 'right', because it leads to logical paradox and does not tend towards long-term happiness, there is no objective basis for considering it to be any less 'moral' than the empathetic instinct.
I fully agree (btw our metaphors of "deep" and "underlying" are quite compatible btw). This twofold "genealogy" reminds me of Levinas and his "epiphany of the Other's face" as the absolute command stopping violence (the only transcendance to him); but this doesn't make a morality: morality begins when a third person steps in, bringing in the necessity of relative measure and law (in the sense of metros and nomos).
I'm not entirely satisfied by Levinas' definition of the "other" as human. I feel sometimes the object of "empathy" is more "the animal in the other," the biological being rather than the personal character; and that it potentially outsteps the human sphere.
But one thing I do appreciate in him is his emphasis on exteriority and morality as a response to an outward "calling" rather than a voluntary self-construction. I feel there's something pretty dangerous (although perhaps unescapable) in the psychological ideal of "internalising the law" (which always reminds me of Jeremiah 31 -- perhaps the ultimate totalitarian dream). Being able to revolt, lie, cheat, betray (which implies doing it sometimes!) is absolutely essential to what we are and paradoxically gives meaning to our "commitments".
I think that any view that promotes self-alienation is a bad thing. And yet, considering motive is a major part of our moral intuitions. We are prone to be far angrier at something done 'with malice aforethought' than at something done due to mere carelessness.
In purely abstract terms of moral culpability, there is no difference between the two, whether one takes a compassionate or utilitarian approach. From a compassionate approach, a person's feelings--even malice--always have some psychological basis, and hence there is no reason for morally favoring one feeling over another. And from a utilitarian approach, the impact of an action is all that matters, not its motivation.
From a practical, day-to-day standpoint, however, there is good reason to make the distinction. A person who hurts us out of carelessness is far less likely to hurt us again in the future than one who hurts out of malice.
On this I (intuitively) wouldn't agree. I feel all the conscious viciousness in the world has produced much less harm than stupidity, and the latter is endlessly repeating itself. Moreover, viciousness is more creative.
(Reminds me of the famous line in the Third Man: "In Italy for 30 years under the Borgias they had warfare, terror, murder, and bloodshed, but they produced Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, and the Renaissance. In Switzerland they had brotherly love - they had 500 years of democracy and peace, and what did that produce? The cuckoo clock ...")
Rev. Gumby,
I was in your Church yesterday but you didn't see me. OK I didn't comment at the meeting, so maybe I'm getting weak. Perhaps you should send me some of your vestal assistants on their way back from the spa for a shepherding call...
Classicist... I'm sure you're plenty smart enough, but it's very good of you to admit when you don't have an answer at hand. Even though I disagree with Catholicism, I have a lot of respect for its rich intellectual history.
Narkissos,
btw our metaphors of "deep" and "underlying" are quite compatible btw
Quite so. I should have clarified a little more what I meant: that the sense of 'fairness', or equity, whether or not we consider it philosophically moral, is as deep and fundamental a part of the human moral instinct as compassion.
I'm also unfamiliar with the use of metros and nomos in this context; can you elucidate?
feel sometimes the object of "empathy" is more "the animal in the other," the biological being rather than the personal character; and that it potentially outsteps the human sphere.
Do you mean that humans' compassion can reach beyond just other humans, or that compassion is not only a quality of humans?
But one thing I do appreciate in him is his emphasis on exteriority and morality as a response to an outward "calling" rather than a voluntary self-construction.Is that the 'calling' of societally taught morality? Or the social instict that underlies morality, the desire to be seen by others as a moral person? I would agree that morality is to a large degree learned; a Jesus or a Buddha still works within the moral framework of their society. And yet, the ultimate act of morality is to be more moral than the consensus of one's society. Does not this impulse come from within? Or do you believe it is purely the effect of previous conditioning? (To whatever degree that distinction is meaningful.)
I feel there's something pretty dangerous (although perhaps unescapable) in the psychological ideal of "internalising the law" (which always reminds me of Jeremiah 31 -- perhaps the ultimate totalitarian dream). Being able to revolt, lie, cheat, betray (which implies doing it sometimes!) is absolutely essential to what we are and paradoxically gives meaning to our "commitments".
That makes sense from an evolutionary standpoint. We did not evolve to be purely moral beings; morality itself evolved only because of its pragmatic value. To be fully internalize a consistent morality is contrary to human nature.
On this I (intuitively) wouldn't agree. I feel all the conscious viciousness in the world has produced much less harm than stupidity, and the latter is endlessly repeating itself.
That is true, but IMHO only because stupidity is far more common than viciousness. Pound for pound, a person who seeks to cause harm is inherently more dangerous than one who merely does not care if they cause it. I would far rather that my neighborhood be plagued by a gang of murderous muggers than by a psychopathic killer. I could be friends with someone who occasionally lost their temper, but I could not be friends with someone who cold-bloodedly said things they knew would hurt me. It takes an accumulation of unintentional harm to have the same effect as one deliberate thrust.
I certainly have to grant you the point on creativity, however. Then again, war is one of the best mediums of technological progress that man has devised.
I'm also unfamiliar with the use of metros and nomos in this context; can you elucidate?
Duh... metron! (should have re-read). I was referring to the etymological meaning of nomos (which we use to translate "law" but often means "custom, usage") as "allotted share" or "territory" (esp. pasture), implying the central value of metron as one's measure not to be overstepped.
Back to Levinas' philosophy: the demand of the other person's transcendental "face" is potentially infinite, measureless, boundless. Only when a third (or fourth, fifth of course) person steps in the need appears for a fair share, which implies measure. If truth begins with two (Jaspers), ethics begin with three.
Do you mean that humans' compassion can reach beyond just other humans, or that compassion is not only a quality of humans?
I meant the former (although we could certainly find behaviours reminiscent of what we call "compassion" in the animal realm). It's not fortuitous, I feel, that people can be equally or more moved by animal (especially fellow mammals) than human suffering... compassion is related to a biological being and this biological being can be concealed by a social / moral character -- thinking of the role of "clothing" and "uniform" here...
Is that the 'calling' of societally taught morality? Or the social instict that underlies morality, the desire to be seen by others as a moral person? I would agree that morality is to a large degree learned; a Jesus or a Buddha still works within the moral framework of their society. And yet, the ultimate act of morality is to be more moral than the consensus of one's society. Does not this impulse come from within? Or do you believe it is purely the effect of previous conditioning? (To whatever degree that distinction is meaningful.)
I was not thinking of "moral teaching", rather the simple fact that from the very beginning of our life we respond to external stimuli, and build our "selves" so as to fit their structure (in French we use the word "pli" = "fold" to describe both a habit and a character, and this is very meaningful to me). "Within" might be a pretty empty word; in a sense our morality is only skin-deep.
Thanks for the response Euph.
