@Blotty
Regarding the Wikipedia issue, your critique misrepresents my position. I did not claim you accused me of relying on Wikipedia; I addressed your dismissal of its validity. Your own "blanket policy" acknowledges its utility if corroborated by reliable sources, which undermines the general rejection you initially implied.
The claim that "without Him was not anything made" (John 1:3) doesn't exclude the possibility of the Logos being a created entity misunderstands the passage's construction. The statement categorically excludes anything made without the Logos. This would include the Logos if He were created, creating a logical impossibility.
The Greek phrase choris autou ("without Him") is an absolute negation, leaving no room for exceptions. This grammatical structure ensures that the Logos was not merely a passive tool but an essential, active agent in creation. The text explicitly places the Logos in a position of indispensable creative authority, refuting any notion of passivity.
You challenge the claim that dia (through) does not imply inferiority or dependence and demand an exception. In Greek, dia often denotes agency, indicating the means by which an action is accomplished. Its use does not inherently imply subordination or inferiority. For instance, in Romans 11:36, Paul writes, "For from Him and through [dia] Him and to Him are all things." Here, dia is used for God’s agency in creation, clearly not implying inferiority. Similarly, in John 1:3 and Colossians 1:16, dia highlights the Son’s role as the divine agent in creation, functioning within the unity of the Godhead. It emphasizes the relational distinction between the Father as the source and the Son as the agent without suggesting ontological subordination. Dia ("through") often indicates active agency without implying inferiority. For example, Hebrews 1:2 describes the Son as the one "through whom" God made the universe, affirming His divine role without subordination. If you demand citations, the works of Daniel Wallace or A.T. Robertson on Greek prepositions provide ample evidence.
You assert that the Trinity as a whole is the Creator and accuse me of misleading language by distinguishing the roles of Father, Son, and Spirit. However, Trinitarian theology does not deny that the entire Godhead acts in creation. Instead, it affirms that each divine person participates in creation according to their unique roles: the Father as the source, the Son as the agent, and the Spirit as the sustainer. This relational distinction does not imply inequality but reflects the harmonious operation of the one divine essence. While early writers like Tertullian or Origen may not have used later Nicene terminology, their writings affirm the Son’s divine agency in creation. For example, Tertullian states in Against Praxeas: "The Father created the world through His Word," acknowledging the Son’s active role as Creator. The development of Trinitarian language over time does not negate this foundational truth but clarifies it.
You claim that I misrepresented your position on Isaiah 44:24, suggesting you never said it excludes the Son. However, the implication of your argument—that creation is attributed solely to the Father—contradicts the NT’s consistent application of OT creation texts to the Son. Hebrews 1:10 applies Psalm 102:25-27 to the Son, directly attributing Yahweh’s creative work to Him. The unity of Father and Son in creation is a fundamental aspect of Trinitarian theology, underscoring the Son’s full participation in the divine identity. If you agree that the Son participates in creation, then you align with the Trinitarian understanding that creation is the work of the one God involving all three persons.
Calling something "a god" in metaphorical terms (e.g., Psalm 82 or 2 Corinthians 4:4) itself does not equate to polytheism or henotheism. These passages use "god" as a metaphor to describe authority or divine representation, not divinity in the ontological sense. In John 1:1, however, the term theos qualitatively describes the Logos as possessing the divine essence, which aligns with Jewish monotheism and the broader context of John's Gospel. This is a theological and linguistic distinction. The metaphorical use of "gods" in contexts like Psalm 82 or 2 Corinthians 4:4 does not equate to polytheism or henotheism because it does not involve ontological divinity. In Psalm 82 human judges are called "gods" (elohim) because they act as representatives of God’s authority, not because they are divine beings. Jesus uses this argument in John 10:34-36 to demonstrate the appropriateness of His claim to divine sonship. In 2 Corinthians 4:4 Satan is referred to as "the god of this age" metaphorically, denoting his temporary authority in a fallen world, not literal deity. By contrast, John 1:1c uses "theos" qualitatively to affirm the Logos' divine nature, not metaphorically. The Word is not likened to a godly figure or representative but is described as sharing fully in the divine essence. The NWT's rendering of "a god" imposes an interpretation that introduces a polytheistic nuance foreign to the Johannine text.
If you equate "a god" with "a divine person," you misunderstand the theological implications. The phrase "a god" introduces ambiguity and suggests separateness or subordination, which is inconsistent with John’s monotheistic framework. The qualitative reading of "theos" in John 1:1c does not present the Word as "a divine person" among many but as possessing the full essence of divinity. BeDuhn has clarified his stance in his works. While he prefers "divine" as a translation, his use of the term does not align with the Trinitarian understanding of Christ's full divinity. However, his critique of traditional translations like the NWT does not amount to an endorsement of their theological implications. His linguistic analysis must be distinguished from theological conclusions. BeDuhn’s "divine" emphasizes the qualitative nature of the Logos without explicitly endorsing the Arian interpretation of "a god." His preference for "divine" reflects the Logos' nature as distinct but does not reject Trinitarian possibilities, as he has acknowledged that his translation leaves room for multiple interpretations.
Your critique of applying modern meanings to "divine" ignores how BeDuhn’s preference for "divine" reflects the qualitative nature of theos in John 1:1c. BeDuhn does not endorse a polytheistic/henotheistic interpretation; rather, he acknowledges the qualitative aspect of the Logos’ divinity. Your claim that you could email him to clarify underscores the need for rigorous analysis over speculation. If you choose to contact BeDuhn, it would be prudent to frame your questions carefully, distinguishing between his linguistic analysis and his personal theological views. However, his prior work already suggests that his preferred translation, "divine," is open to interpretation and does not necessarily support Jehovah’s Witness theology. Even if BeDuhn is non-Trinitarian, this does not invalidate Trinitarian scholarship or early Christian interpretations affirming Christ's full divinity.
Your insistence on focusing solely on linguistics while disregarding theological context is problematic. Greek grammar operates within the framework of meaning, which includes theological nuances in texts like John 1:1 and John 8:58. Stripping these texts of their theological context results in incomplete interpretations. Your personal theological preferences are noted, but this debate is not about personal preferences; it is about textual, historical, and linguistic analysis. The discussion hinges on what the original Greek text and early Christian interpretations indicate, not on whether you personally accept Trinitarian theology.
The term "worship" as applied to Christ in the New Testament (e.g., Matthew 28:17; Hebrews 1:6) reflects the veneration due only to God. In Greek, the word proskyneō (worship) can indicate varying levels of reverence, but when directed toward Christ, it is consistently within a divine framework, affirming His full deity. Modern definitions of "worship" align with this understanding, emphasizing supreme reverence, which is inconsistent with Jehovah’s Witness theology that restricts worship to the Father.
John 10:30’s statement, "I and the Father are one," uses the neuter hen to express unity in essence, not merely cooperative action. The reaction of the Jews—attempting to stone Jesus for blasphemy—indicates they understood this as a claim to divinity, not just moral unity. The broader context of John 10 supports this interpretation.
On Revelation 22:13, you misconstrue my argument. The angel quoting "Alpha and Omega" does not attribute this title to itself but conveys the words of Christ, as seen in the consistent use of the title for God or Jesus in Revelation (1:8, 21:6, 22:13).
Your dismissal of the connection between John 8:58’s ego eimi and Exodus 3:14 reflects a misunderstanding. The Septuagint’s rendering of Exodus 3:14 as ego eimi ho on ("I am the Being") underscores God’s eternal self-existence. While the phrase "I am" in John 8:58 doesn’t replicate the exact wording, its predicate-less structure conveys eternal existence. The Jewish reaction—attempting to stone Jesus—indicates they understood His claim as divine.
On John 8:58, translating ego eimi as "I have been" diminishes the statement's theological significance. Jesus’ use of ego eimi without a predicate conveys a timeless existence, aligning with the Prologue’s declaration of His eternal nature. The broader context of John’s Gospel consistently affirms Jesus’ divinity, making the claim of eternal existence fitting.
The predicate-less ego eimi is a deliberate echo of the divine name revealed in Exodus 3:14, where God declares, "I AM WHO I AM" (Ehyeh Asher Ehyeh). The Septuagint renders this as ego eimi ho on ("I am the Being"), linking ego eimi to God’s self-identification. In John 8:58, Jesus’ use of ego eimi contrasts with the temporal clause "before Abraham was" (prin Abraam genesthai), emphasizing His eternal existence. The reaction of the Jews—attempting to stone Him—confirms their understanding of this as a claim to deity, not merely preexistence. Your assertion that ego eimi could have been expressed differently to indicate eternality ignores the theological weight of Jesus’ words and the broader Johannine context, where His divine identity is a recurring theme (e.g., John 1:1, John 20:28).
You claim that the Jews’ question, "Who are you?" (John 8:25), undermines the significance of ego eimi. However, this question does not diminish Jesus’ declaration but reflects their ongoing confusion and rejection of His claims. Throughout John’s Gospel, the Jews repeatedly misunderstand or resist Jesus’ assertions of His identity (e.g., John 6:41-42, John 10:24-26). Their response highlights their unwillingness to accept the implications of His words, not a lack of clarity on Jesus’ part.
You also argue that the Septuagint’s emphasis on "the Being" (ho on) in Exodus 3:14 undermines the connection between ego eimi and the divine name. However, the distinction is not as stark as you suggest. The phrase ego eimi in John 8:58 carries the same theological resonance as ho on, as both expressions emphasize God’s eternal, self-existent nature. The absence of ho on in John 8:58 does not weaken the connection to Exodus 3:14 but reflects John’s theological focus on Jesus’ personal appropriation of the divine name.
Your dismissal of ego eimi as a declaration of deity because it does not explicitly state eternal existence overlooks the cumulative evidence of John’s Gospel. The Prologue (John 1:1-3) establishes the Logos as eternal and divine, and Jesus’ "I am" statements throughout the Gospel consistently affirm His divine identity (e.g., John 6:35, John 10:11, John 14:6). The use of ego eimi in John 8:58 is a climactic affirmation of this identity, grounded in the broader narrative of the Gospel.
You challenge my interpretation of John 5:18, claiming that equality with God and being God are separate concepts in Jewish thought. While it is true that claiming equality with God does not necessarily equate to claiming to be God, the context of John’s Gospel shows that Jesus’ claims went beyond equality. In John 10:30, Jesus declares, "I and the Father are one," prompting the Jews to accuse Him of blasphemy for "making Himself God" (John 10:33). This reaction confirms that Jesus’ statements were understood as assertions of deity, not merely equality.
Your assertion that a prophet once forgave sins like Jesus overlooks the unique authority with which Jesus forgave sins. In Mark 2:5-12, Jesus forgives the paralytic’s sins and justifies His authority by healing him, stating, "The Son of Man has authority on earth to forgive sins." Unlike OT prophets, who acted as intermediaries delivering God’s message, Jesus forgave sins by His own authority, a prerogative reserved for God alone. This distinction underscores His divine identity and authority.
Your claim that "Son of God" implies equality but not divinity in Jewish thought is incomplete. In John 5:18, the Jews accuse Jesus of "making Himself equal with God," showing that this title was understood as a divine claim. Additionally, forgiving sins (Mark 2:5-12) and accepting worship (John 20:28) are divine prerogatives, not merely actions of a prophet.
Finally, your claim of double standards regarding explicit passages misunderstands the nature of biblical revelation. Trinitarian doctrine emerges from the cumulative evidence of Scripture, not isolated proof texts. When asking for explicit passages from Jehovah’s Witnesses, the request addresses their specific claims, such as Jesus being Michael the Archangel, which lacks clear biblical support. In contrast, the deity of Christ is supported by the interconnected itness of Scripture.