@Blotty
Regarding dia in Romans 11:36, your claim that it refers to "source" rather than "channel" misunderstands the distinction between the prepositions ex (from) and dia (through). Paul uses ex for the Father as the ultimate source ("from Him") and dia for the Son as the means or agent ("through Him"). This distinction highlights relational roles within the Godhead rather than ontological subordination. Dia consistently denotes agency rather than origination in the Pauline corpus when applied to Christ (e.g., John 1:3, Colossians 1:16, Hebrews 1:2). Your interpretation conflates these relational nuances, undermining the Trinitarian understanding of shared divine essence and distinct personal roles.
The claim that in Romans 11:36, dia refers to God as the source rather than as a channel misunderstands the preposition's semantic range and the specific context of this passage. In Romans 11:36, Paul uses three prepositional phrases: "from Him" (ex autou), "through Him" (dia autou), and "to Him" (eis auton). These prepositions highlight distinct aspects of God's relationship to creation: ex autou indicates that God is the ultimate source, dia autou emphasizes His active agency or means, and eis auton denotes the goal or purpose. The use of dia in this context does not imply inferiority but underscores the unity of the Godhead in creation. In Johannine theology, dia similarly reflects Christ’s active role in creation as the divine Word, not a subordinate instrument, but one who fully participates in the work of creation as God.
Your question about a "passive instrument" reveals a misunderstanding of the term and the argument. A passive instrument would imply something used by another without agency or self-determination, akin to a tool wielded by a craftsman. However, John 1:3 explicitly negates this interpretation by stating that "all things were made through Him, and without Him was not anything made that was made." This clause establishes the Logos as the necessary and active agent of creation. The Logos is not passive but integral to the creative process, as indicated by the phrase "without Him" (choris autou), which excludes any possibility of creation occurring apart from Him. This absolute negation leaves no room for the Logos to be a mere instrument or created being.
The idea that "absolute negation" was idiomatic in the biblical era lacks textual evidence in this context. While hyperbolic or idiomatic language exists in Scripture, the construction in John 1:3 is precise and unambiguous. The use of choris autou—combined with the double negation in the Greek text ("without Him was not... anything that was made")—intensifies the exclusivity of the Logos's role in creation. This language rules out the notion that the Logos is part of creation or a secondary agent.
Your assertion that Christ could be both "created" and "uncreated," drawing on Philo's concept of the Logos, reflects a misunderstanding of both Philo's philosophy and John's theology. Philo's Logos is a philosophical abstraction, a mediator between the divine and the material, whereas John's Logos is a person—Jesus Christ—who is fully divine and eternal. John’s description of the Logos as "with God" (pros ton Theon) and "was God" (theos ēn ho logos) affirms the Logos's full divinity and eternal existence. Unlike Eve, who was derived from Adam and is ontologically subordinate to him, the Logos is of the same divine essence as the Father, as clarified by the Nicene Creed's term homoousios ("of the same substance"). The analogy you propose is therefore incompatible with Johannine and Nicene theology. Philo's Logos concept is philosophical speculation, while John's Logos is firmly grounded in Jewish monotheism and the revelation of Christ as fully divine. The Logos is not created "from God's substance" in the manner you describe; such a view parallels Arianism, which was condemned as heretical by the early Church. The Nicene Creed clarifies that the Son is "begotten, not made, consubstantial with the Father." The analogy of Eve being formed from Adam misunderstands the distinction between human derivation and divine begetting. The Son's "begetting" is eternal, not a temporal or contingent event, emphasizing His equality and consubstantiality with the Father.
Your claim that creation is attributed solely to the Father reflects a selective reading of the Church Fathers. While the Father is often described as the "source" of creation (ex ou), the Son is consistently portrayed as the agent (dia hou), and the Spirit as the perfecting force. This Trinitarian framework is evident in Scripture (e.g., John 1:3, Col. 1:16-17, Heb. 1:2, 1 Cor. 8:6) and upheld by patristic theology. For instance, Irenaeus, in Against Heresies (Book 4, Chapter 20), refers to the Son and Spirit as the "two hands of God" in creation. This imagery underscores the collaborative and unified work of the Trinity in creation, without suggesting any ontological hierarchy.
Regarding Daniel Wallace and A.T. Robertson, your citations do not contradict my argument but rather reinforce it. Both scholars affirm that dia in John 1:3 and Colossians 1:16 emphasizes the Logos’s role as the divine agent in creation. Wallace, in Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics, explains that dia can indicate agency without implying inferiority, particularly when the context involves divine action. Similarly, Robertson acknowledges that the Son functions as the "intermediate agent" in creation, which is consistent with Trinitarian theology. Your attempt to use these scholars to suggest subordination misrepresents their positions, as neither Wallace nor Robertson denies the Logos’s full divinity or eternal nature. So your citation of Daniel Wallace and A.T. Robertson supports my argument, not yours. Wallace explicitly identifies dia as indicative of agency in John 1:3 and Colossians 1:16, emphasizing the Son's role in creation without implying inferiority. Robertson similarly recognizes the Logos as the active, sustaining agent in creation. Your selective interpretation of their works misrepresents their conclusions, which consistently affirm the high Christology of these texts.
The appeal to the intermediate agency of the Logos as a basis for subordination is a category error. In Trinitarian theology, "agency" reflects the relational distinctions within the Godhead, not an ontological hierarchy. The Father, Son, and Spirit act inseparably in all divine works, including creation. The Son’s role as the agent of creation (dia hou) does not imply subordination but highlights the relational economy of the Trinity, where the Father is the source, the Son the agent, and the Spirit the perfecter.
Your interpretation of the Logos as "created from God’s substance" contradicts the biblical and theological witness. The Nicene Creed explicitly rejects the idea that the Son is "made" (poiētos), affirming instead that He is "begotten, not made" (gennētos, ou poiētos). This distinction underscores that the Son is eternally generated from the Father, sharing the same divine essence, rather than being a creation. The analogy of Eve's derivation from Adam fails to capture the eternal and consubstantial relationship between the Father and the Son, which is foundational to Trinitarian theology.
On your point that the Church Fathers attribute creation solely to the Father, this is inaccurate. While the Fathers emphasize the Father's role as the source of creation, they also affirm the Son's active participation as Creator. For example, Irenaeus states in Against Heresies (Book 2, Chapter 30): "The Father, indeed, is above all, and He is the Head of Christ; but the Word is through all things and is Himself the head of the Church." This statement aligns with Hebrews 1:2 and Colossians 1:16, where the Son is described as the agent of creation. The relational distinctions in these descriptions reflect the economic Trinity, not subordination.
Regarding BeDuhn, his acknowledgment of theos as qualitative does not negate Christ's divinity. While BeDuhn prefers "divine" as a translation, he recognizes that this aligns with the Logos's divine nature as described in John 1:1. The qualitative use of theos emphasizes the Logos's full participation in the divine essence, not a lesser or created status. Your claim that I selectively omitted information is unsubstantiated; BeDuhn’s linguistic analysis supports the traditional understanding of John 1:1 as affirming the Logos's divine nature, even if he does not personally endorse Trinitarian theology.
BeDuhn acknowledges that theos can denote a category or class, but he does not reduce the Logos to being merely "a god" in the sense of polytheism or henotheism. Instead, his preference for the term "divine" reflects the qualitative nature of theos in John 1:1c, aligning with the broader Johannine context that emphasizes the Word's intrinsic divinity. This interpretation does not equate to an endorsement of the JWs’ theological stance, as BeDuhn himself critiques their translation's theological bias elsewhere.
Regarding the claim that theos as a "count noun" undermines its qualitative force, this argument misunderstands Greek syntax and semantics. While theos can function as a count noun, its role in John 1:1c aligns with qualitative usage. As noted by Harner and other scholars, the anarthrous predicate noun preceding the verb often emphasizes the nature or essence of the subject. In this case, it attributes divinity to the Word, consistent with the Gospel's prologue and broader theological framework. The qualitative interpretation of theos here does not necessitate subordination or categorical division but underscores the Word's shared essence with God. Check these:
- Revisiting the Colwell Construction in Light of Mass / Count Nouns Don Hartley
- Theos is a Count Noun: "God" or "a god" in John 1:1c Robert Hommel
The criticism that the neuter hen in John 10:30 does not indicate unity of essence due to the Incarnation is also misplaced. Theological nuances of Christ's dual nature (divine and human) do not negate His ontological unity with the Father. The use of hen emphasizes unity of will and essence, not mere functional agreement. This is corroborated by the immediate context, where Jesus’ claim leads to accusations of blasphemy, indicating that His audience understood Him to assert divine identity, not merely cooperative action.
On the claim that God as "spirit" (John 4:24) precludes Jesus’ shared essence during His earthly ministry, this reflects a misunderstanding of Trinitarian theology. The Incarnation does not diminish or alter Christ's divine essence; rather, it affirms the hypostatic union, where Christ is fully God and fully man. Describing God as "spirit" emphasizes His immaterial and eternal nature, which Jesus shares as the Logos.
The appeal to theos as a "count noun" fails to refute its qualitative application in John 1:1c. The argument presupposes a rigid linguistic framework that dismisses established grammatical insights. Scholars like Wallace and Harner demonstrate that theos in this context functions to attribute the essence of divinity to the Word without implying numerical separation or inferiority. The argument that theos must always be definite or indefinite overlooks the nuanced qualitative category evident in Koine Greek.
The critique conflates BeDuhn’s linguistic analysis with theological conclusions he does not make. His acknowledgment of the grammatical possibility of “a god” does not mean he endorses it as the most accurate or contextually appropriate rendering. BeDuhn’s focus on qualitative nuance supports a reading that recognizes the Word’s divinity in harmony with monotheistic Jewish theology. Mischaracterizing his position as aligning with JW theology misrepresents his work and the broader academic consensus.
Your assertion that ego eimi in John 8:58 simply indicates existence before Abraham but not eternal existence fails to account for the linguistic and contextual factors. The phrase ego eimi (I am) is not merely a statement of past existence but a present-tense declaration of ongoing being. This present tense, coupled with the temporal clause prin Abraam genesthai (“before Abraham came to be”), creates a contrast that goes beyond the simple claim of existence at a specific point in time. The use of the present tense where a past tense (e.g., ēmēn, “I was”) might be expected indicates a timeless, ongoing existence. This is consistent with how John presents Jesus in the Prologue (John 1:1), where the Logos is described as eternally pre-existent and divine.
Your suggestion that eternal existence could have been conveyed another way ignores the flexibility of Greek grammar. The structure of ego eimi uniquely emphasizes existence in a way that transcends time, which is precisely what John intended to communicate. It aligns with the Prologue's declaration that “the Word was with God, and the Word was God” and reflects a deliberate theological choice to present Jesus as the eternal Logos.
The dismissal of the connection between ego eimi in John 8:58 and the divine name in Exodus 3:14 is unfounded. While it is true that the LXX renders Exodus 3:14 as ego eimi ho on (“I am the Being”), the theological resonance between the two passages cannot be ignored. The use of ego eimi in John 8:58, without the qualification of ho on, emphasizes the immediacy and simplicity of Jesus’ claim to divinity. The reaction of the Jews—attempting to stone Him—confirms that they understood this as a blasphemous assertion of deity, paralleling God’s self-revelation to Moses. The assertion that ego eimi in John 8:58 carries the same resonance as ho on in Exodus 3:14 is supported by the broader Johannine context. The use of ego eimi in John consistently affirms Jesus’ divine identity, as seen in statements like “I am the way, the truth, and the life” (John 14:6) and “I am the resurrection and the life” (John 11:25). These declarations align with the divine self-revelation in Exodus and reflect Jesus’ unique role in salvation history.
The argument that ho on is emphasized in Exodus 3:14 rather than ego eimi overlooks the broader significance of God’s self-identification. While the phrase ho on (“the Being”) is present, ego eimi remains integral to the passage’s theology as it introduces God’s eternal and self-sufficient existence. The absence of ho on in John 8:58 does not diminish the theological connection but reflects John’s focus on Jesus’ appropriation of the divine name. The Gospel of John consistently portrays Jesus as embodying the divine identity, as seen in His other “I am” statements (e.g., John 6:35, John 14:6).
The claim that the Jews’ reaction was merely “perceived blasphemy” does not weaken the argument. Throughout the Gospel of John, the Jewish leaders accuse Jesus of blasphemy specifically because He claims equality with God (John 5:18; 10:30-33). The stoning attempt in John 8:59 is consistent with their understanding that Jesus was asserting divinity, whether or not they accepted the claim.
Your argument regarding the question “Who are you?” (John 8:25) as evidence that the Jews did not initially understand ego eimi as a divine claim overlooks the developing narrative. The question reflects their confusion and resistance to Jesus’ identity, not a denial of His claims. By the time of John 8:58-59, their reaction indicates that they did understand the theological weight of His words, even if they rejected the claim.
The idea that ego eimi could have been expressed differently to imply eternality misunderstands the nuance of Greek grammar. Using a past-tense verb like ēmēn (“I was”) would imply that Jesus’ existence before Abraham was finite or had ceased, which contradicts the intended meaning. The choice of the present tense conveys a continuous and timeless existence, aligning with the divine self-identification in Exodus 3:14.
Your argument that “Son of God” implies equality with God but not divinity in Jewish thought oversimplifies the theological context. While it is true that Son of God could be used for righteous individuals or the Davidic king, Jesus’ usage consistently goes beyond this. In John 5:18, the Jews understand His claim as making Himself “equal with God,” which they consider blasphemy. This equality is not merely functional but ontological, as evidenced by Jesus’ further claims of unity with the Father (John 10:30) and His acceptance of divine worship (John 20:28).
Your dismissal of the predicate-less ego eimi in John 8:58 as an echo of Exodus 3:14 ignores both the linguistic and theological context. The Septuagint's rendering of Exodus 3:14 as ego eimi ho on ("I am the Being") establishes a connection between ego eimi and divine self-identification. In John 8:58, Jesus deliberately uses ego eimi in a way that transcends temporal constraints, asserting eternal existence. The Jews' reaction—attempting to stone Him—demonstrates their understanding of His claim to deity, consistent with the Gospel's high Christology. The suggestion of an implied predicate in ego eimi based on the NIV translation does not apply to John 8:58. While ego eimi can have an implied predicate in some contexts (e.g., John 6:20, “It is I”), its predicate-less usage in John 8:58 is unique and intentional. It conveys existence rather than identification, reinforcing its theological significance.
Your argument that the Jews' initial question, "Who are you?" (John 8:25), undermines the divine claim of ego eimi in John 8:58 is flawed. The question reflects their ongoing misunderstanding and resistance to Jesus' identity, a recurring theme in John's Gospel. By the time of John 8:58, the context and phrasing of Jesus' statement clearly provoke the Jews to accuse Him of blasphemy, confirming their recognition of His divine claim. The claim that the Jewish reaction in John 8:59 could be explained solely by Jesus’ claim to have seen Abraham is inadequate. While the statement that Jesus existed before Abraham would be provocative, it would not necessarily provoke an accusation of blasphemy and an immediate attempt to stone Him. The context and reaction suggest that the Jews understood Jesus’ words as a claim to divine identity.
On John 5:18, your assertion that the Jews accused Jesus only of equality with God, not being God, misreads the text. Equality with God in this context implies sharing divine prerogatives, which the Jews understood as a claim to deity. Similarly, your claim that the Son's authority to forgive sins (Mark 2:10) was merely given to Him ignores the broader theological context of His divine identity. The authority to forgive sins is a prerogative of God alone (Isaiah 43:25), and Jesus exercises it by His own inherent authority.
Your argument that Jesus’ authority to forgive sins was merely given to Him (e.g., Mark 2:10) misunderstands the theological implications. While Jesus acts in accordance with the Father’s will, His authority to forgive sins reflects His divine identity. The scribes’ reaction in Mark 2:7 (“Who can forgive sins but God alone?”) confirms that they understood this act as a claim to divine prerogative. The argument that the Jews only accused Jesus of claiming equality with God but not of being God misrepresents the text. In John 10:33, the Jews explicitly accuse Jesus of “making [Himself] God,” demonstrating that they understood His claim to be ontological, not merely functional. The distinction you propose between equality and identity does not hold in the context of the Jewish leaders’ accusations.
Your critique of Revelation's use of "Alpha and Omega" fails to account for the consistent application of this title to Christ (Revelation 1:8, 21:6, 22:13), affirming His divine status. While the title also applies to the Father, this reflects the shared divine identity of the Father and the Son, consistent with Trinitarian theology.
Trinitarian theology, as you rightly pointed out, is derived from the cumulative and interconnected evidence of Scripture, not isolated passages. This approach respects the nature of biblical revelation, where truths about God are revealed progressively and holistically across the entirety of Scripture. In contrast, JW theology is built on such one-liner prooftexts and punchlines, and it is entirely fair to point out that this does not actually work.
The reason Trinitarians ask JWs for explicit passages—such as evidence that Jesus is Michael the Archangel—is because the JW position hinges on claims of explicit textual evidence. For example, they assert that Jesus is explicitly Michael, or that God’s name "Jehovah" must appear in the NT, and so the burden of proof naturally falls on them to provide direct support for those assertions.
By contrast, Trinitarian theology doesn’t rest on one isolated verse but on the whole counsel of Scripture. For example:
- John 1:1 describes the divine nature of the Logos, who "was God."
- Philippians 2:6 speaks of Christ’s equality with God.
- Matthew 28:19 demonstrates the unity and shared authority of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
These passages, taken together with others like John 20:28 (where Thomas calls Jesus "My Lord and My God") and Colossians 1:15–20 (describing Christ as the Creator of all things), form a cohesive picture that supports the Trinity.
When JWs or other non-Trinitarians challenge the Trinity, they often focus on denying its cumulative basis, insisting instead on isolated, explicit texts that they feel undermine it. Yet, when challenged on their own teachings (e.g., that Jesus is Michael), they cannot provide cumulative evidence—let alone explicit texts—to substantiate their position.
Thus, the request for explicit passages is not a double standard; it’s a logical response to specific claims. Trinitarian doctrine has never claimed to rest on a single verse but on the consistent and harmonious testimony of Scripture as a whole. I would encourage you to apply the same standard of cumulative evidence to your own theology and ask whether it aligns with the breadth of biblical revelation.