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406
Is Jesus the Creator?
by Sea Breeze in
1. watchtower
2. bible
that's what the word says.

.

colossians 1:16. for by him all things were created, both in the heavens and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or authorities—all things have been created through him and for him..
aqwsed12345

@Blotty
The JWs and the NWT mean precisely by their rendering of John 1:1c that it means "a god" in the very sense of Psalm 82 and Exodus 7:1, so according to their interpretation John 1:1c explicitly denies the identity of the quiddity between the Father and the Son, while Hart merely states that Scripture does not yet clearly assert it here in his opinion. Hart’s rejection of “a divine being” inherently applies to the broader category of interpretations that diminish the Logos’ divinity, including the rendering “a god.” This is clear from Hart’s explicit statement that theios could have been used if John’s intent was merely to convey something akin to “a god” or “a divine being.” Hart states:
“If that were all the evangelist were saying, he could have used the perfectly serviceable Greek word theios.”
This critique applies to both “a divine being” and “a god,” as both reduce the Logos to a derivative or subordinate divine entity. Hart’s point is that the absence of theios and the choice of theos indicates something more profound—namely, the Logos’ participation in the divine essence, not a mere association or subordination. What Hart acknowledges is simply a theoretic grammatical possibility due to the anarthrous predicate construction in Greek, but he explicitly rejects it as a theologically and contextually valid interpretation in John 1:1c. He critiques such renderings as failing to capture John’s theological framework, particularly the continuity of divinity between the Logos and God the Father. Hart states:
“The text clearly means to assert some kind of continuity of divinity between God the Father and the Logos, not merely some sort of association between ‘God proper’ and ‘a divine being.’”
This “continuity of divinity” rules out the idea of the Logos as “a god” in the sense of a separate or lesser deity. While Hart discusses grammatical possibilities, his theological conclusions decisively reject interpretations like “a god” or “a divine being.”
While Hart may not use the term “qualitative” explicitly, his arguments align precisely with the concept of qualitative predication as understood in Greek grammar and theology. Hart emphasizes that John 1:1c expresses the nature or essence of the Logos as divine, rather than identifying the Logos as a distinct or subordinate deity. This aligns with the qualitative interpretation widely supported by biblical scholars, such as Daniel Wallace and Harner. Hart’s explanation reflects this qualitative understanding:
“The text clearly means to assert some kind of continuity of divinity between God the Father and the Logos.”
The absence of the definite article before θεός (theos) in John 1:1c is grammatically significant and reflects the qualitative nature of the predicate, a principle supported by linguistic analysis (e.g., Colwell’s Rule). Hart’s theological reasoning directly corresponds to this grammatical observation, even if he does not use the technical term “qualitative.”
Monotheism means that there is one God and no other deity (in the ontological sense), as stated in the first half of the Muslim Shahada. All other beings, creatures, are infinitely distant from the Creator, and there are no other beings outside of the one God for whom the word "god" can be used in the proper sense. The reference to Canaan and Israel in Antiquity is irrelevant to the specific discussion of Hart’s interpretation of John 1:1. The term “henotheism” applies to ancient Near Eastern contexts, where multiple gods might be acknowledged while one deity is considered supreme. However, John’s Gospel is rooted in Second Temple Jewish monotheism, which affirms the uniqueness of Yahweh. Attempts to apply “henotheism” to John’s theology or Hart’s interpretation misunderstand the distinctiveness of Johannine monotheism and the theological intent of the prologue. Hart affirms that John’s Gospel integrates the Logos into the divine identity, consistent with Jewish monotheism, rather than adopting a polytheistic or henotheistic framework. It is not surprising that in order to be an Arian, one must also revert to the henotheism of the First Temple era.
While it is true that Johannine monotheism includes the Logos within the divine identity, Hart—and the majority of biblical scholars—recognize that John’s Gospel remains firmly rooted in Jewish monotheism. Hart emphasizes the Logos’ continuity of divinity with the Father, not a polytheistic framework. He explicitly rejects any reading of John 1:1c that would suggest a henotheistic interpretation (i.e., a hierarchy of gods). Hart critiques interpretations that reduce the Logos to “a divine being” or “a god” precisely because they conflict with John’s monotheistic theology:
“The text clearly means to assert some kind of continuity of divinity between God the Father and the Logos.”
The academic consensus does not support the idea that John’s monotheism is henotheistic or polytheistic. Instead, it affirms a Christological monotheism, where the Logos participates in the one divine essence. Hart acknowledges that early Christians debated the interpretation of John 20:28, but this historical observation does not negate the significance of Thomas addressing Jesus as ὁ θεός (ho theos). Hart states that John 20:28 represents the culmination of the Gospel’s theological trajectory:
“The withholding of the full revelation of Christ as ho theos, God in the fullest sense, until Thomas confesses him as such in the light of Easter, must be seen as an intentional authorial tactic.”
While some early Christians debated whether Jesus’ divine designation was conferred post-resurrection or was eternal, Hart’s own position aligns with the Nicene understanding: the Logos is fully divine and eternally so. This is consistent with Hart’s broader affirmation of the Logos’ continuity of divinity with the Father. Hart does not need to explicitly name the New World Translation to reject its theological premise. By affirming the Logos’ continuity of divinity with the Father and rejecting interpretations like “a divine being,” Hart implicitly critiques any rendering, including the NWT’s “a god,” that introduces a subordinate or separate deity. Hart explicitly states:
“The text clearly means to assert some kind of continuity of divinity between God the Father and the Logos, not merely some sort of association between ‘God proper’ and ‘a divine being.’”
The NWT’s “a god” rendering undermines this continuity and conflicts with John’s monotheistic theology. Hart’s rejection of “a divine being” applies equally to “a god,” as both fail to capture the Logos’ full participation in divine essence. Hart’s discussion of θεός (theos) as applied to beings other than God (e.g., angels) reflects a general linguistic observation about Greek usage, not an endorsement of polytheism. Notice that in the Greek biblical texts, no one is ever referred to as “theos,” even in John 10:34, just because it is a translation. In John’s Gospel, the Logos is not described as a “god” in the sense of an angelic or derivative being but as fully participating in the divine essence. Hart explicitly distinguishes the Logos from any subordinate or created entity:
Angels or beings described as “gods” in other contexts (e.g., Psalm 82:6) from the First Temple era are not ontologically equivalent to the Logos in John’s theology. Hart’s recognition of the term’s broader usage does not imply that the Logos is merely one among many “gods.”Hart acknowledges the diversity of pre-Nicene theological views, but this does not equate to affirming Arianism as “apostolic faith.” Hart’s discussion situates Arianism within the historical development of doctrine but does not endorse its conclusions. He explicitly affirms the Nicene understanding of the Logos’ full divinity and its continuity with the Father. Hart does not reject Trinitarian theology; he affirms the Logos' continuity with the Father and participates in the divine essence, as evidenced in his commentary on John 1:1c. Hart’s scholarship reflects his commitment to theological nuance, and he openly critiques readings that reduce the Logos to "a god" or a derivative divine agency. Hart states:
“The text clearly means to assert some kind of continuity of divinity between God the Father and the Logos.”
This is consistent with Nicene theology, not Arianism. This demonstrates that Hart’s scholarship is evidence-based and grounded in a nuanced understanding of Johannine theology, and that Hart’s scholarship does not support interpretations that fragment Johannine monotheism or diminish the Logos’ divine essence. While his translation avoids Nicene terminology, his conclusions align with the substance of Nicene doctrine, particularly in rejecting interpretations like that the Logos is merely "a god" in the very sense of Psalm 82 or Exodus 7:1 like the JWs assert. Hart’s nuanced discussion of early Christian theology includes a recognition of pre-Nicene diversity. However, he does not endorse every interpretation as equally valid or coherent. Hart explicitly critiques readings like “a god” that fail to account for the Logos’ continuity of divinity with God the Father.
You misrepresent Hart’s arguments by conflating grammatical possibilities with theological endorsement and misinterpreting Hart’s broader theological commitments. Hart explicitly rejects interpretations like “a god” that diminish the Logos’ divinity or continuity with the Father. His nuanced translation and commentary affirm the Logos’ full participation in the divine essence, consistent with traditional Nicene theology. The New World Translation’s “a god” rendering fails to account for John’s theological intent, and Hart’s rejection of similar interpretations is clear throughout his work.
I have not claimed to be the sole authority on theology or interpretation. My arguments are grounded in a careful analysis of David Bentley Hart’s writings, broader biblical scholarship, and historical theology. What I aim to do is accurately present Hart’s position based on his own words, avoiding misrepresentation or bias. Furthermore, expertise in any field requires a rigorous understanding of sources and the ability to interpret them in context. Dismissing an argument as "biased" without addressing its content does not undermine the evidence presented. Hart’s own scholarship supports the idea of the Logos’ divine continuity with God the Father, a position consistent with traditional Christian theology, even if his interpretive method is unconventional.
Bias is not demonstrated by simply holding a theological position; it is demonstrated by the selective use or distortion of evidence. My arguments engage directly with Hart’s writings and the broader scholarly context, demonstrating how his views on John 1:1c align with traditional theological principles, even if expressed differently. Accusing someone of bias without addressing the specific points they raise does not constitute a valid rebuttal. I have consistently provided evidence from Hart’s works to support my interpretation, while your claim relies on assumptions rather than engagement with Hart’s text.
No argument has been made here that Trinitarian theology is "infallible." The discussion is centered on accurately interpreting Hart’s views and assessing their theological implications. Hart himself acknowledges the complexities of Trinitarian development and how early Christians grappled with articulating the relationship between the Logos and God the Father. However, Hart ultimately affirms the Logos’ divine continuity with the Father, a central tenet of Nicene Trinitarianism.

@peacefulpete
It is true that logos carries a rich metaphysical significance in Hellenistic thought, particularly as employed by philosophers like Philo. However, the claim that “Word cannot possibly convey” its meaning is overstated. The Johannine use of logos builds upon its philosophical and religious connotations but transforms it to articulate a distinctively Christian theology of the Logos as fully divine and incarnate. Philo’s logos represents a mediating principle, a secondary divinity subordinate to God. John’s Logos, by contrast, is not merely a mediator but God Himself (theos), fully participating in the divine essence while distinct from the Father. John 1:1 explicitly states, “καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος” (and the Word was God), affirming the Logos’ divine nature. While John’s Gospel reflects awareness of Hellenistic and Jewish thought, its primary framework remains Jewish monotheism. The Logos is not a "secondary divinity" as in Philo but is fully God, as later affirmed by Nicene theology. This is evident in John’s progression from the divine nature of the Logos in 1:1 to the climactic confession of Jesus as ho theos (God) in 20:28.Hart himself recognizes this distinction, noting that while the term logos had various meanings in late antiquity, John’s prologue redefines it within a Christian theological framework. The Johannine Logos is not merely a derivative or subordinate being but is fully divine.
While it is true that late antiquity emphasized God’s transcendence, the Johannine prologue explicitly challenges the idea that God cannot engage directly with creation. The central message of John 1:14 is the Incarnation: “The Word became flesh and dwelt among us.” This is a radical departure from Philo’s Logos or any intermediary figure in pagan or Jewish thought.John’s Gospel affirms that the Logos is not merely a distant principle or a “reduced” form of God but God Himself, who enters the world in a concrete and personal way. This undermines the claim that John’s Logos reflects the common late antique assumption of divine remoteness.
While some early Christians and Jewish thinkers identified the Logos with the divine presence in theophanies, John’s Gospel goes beyond this interpretation. The Logos in John is not merely the agent of theophanies but the incarnate God who reveals the Father directly. John 1:18 declares:
“No one has ever seen God; the only God, who is at the Father’s side, he has made him known.”
This verse establishes that the Logos, as the only begotten God (monogenēs theos), uniquely reveals the Father, surpassing the role of theophanic mediation. Hart affirms this point by noting the Logos’ ultimate identification with ho theos in John 20:28.
"Second power theology," as explored in Second Temple Judaism, refers to concepts of God’s Word, Wisdom, or Name as expressions of His power, but these were not necessarily hypostatized as separate beings. Arianism, however, explicitly posited the Logos as a created being, ontologically distinct and subordinate to God. John’s Gospel explicitly rejects the Arian framework by affirming the Logos as divine (theos), not a creature. In John 1:3, the evangelist asserts that “all things were made through him, and without him was not any thing made that was made.” This excludes the Logos from the category of created beings, placing Him firmly within the divine identity.
The Johannine prologue transcends temporal or historical limitations by situating the Logos’ existence “in the beginning” (en archē), a phrase deliberately echoing Genesis 1:1. This affirms the Logos’ eternal nature and preexistence, a point incompatible with both Arianism and second power theology, which often imply temporal origination. Hart’s commentary on John 1:1 aligns with this reading, emphasizing the Logos’ eternal relationship with the Father and continuity of divinity.
While Hart’s writing reflects a contemplative approach to theology, labeling him merely as a "Christian Mystic" risks oversimplification. Hart engages deeply with patristic and scholastic theology, affirming the central tenets of Nicene Christianity, including the Logos’ full divinity. For example, Hart critiques interpretations of John 1:1c like “a divine being” for failing to capture the continuity of divinity between the Father and the Logos. Mysticism and orthodoxy are not mutually exclusive. Hart’s attraction to Eastern Orthodox theology reflects its emphasis on mystery and apophaticism but does not entail a rejection of Nicene Christology.
406
Is Jesus the Creator?
by Sea Breeze in
1. watchtower
2. bible
that's what the word says.

.

colossians 1:16. for by him all things were created, both in the heavens and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or authorities—all things have been created through him and for him..
aqwsed12345
You both forget that David Bentley Hart is an Eastern Orthodox, and he explicitly writes that he does not question the truth of Nicene-Constantinopolitan theology, nor does he imply with his translation solution that John 1:1c denies the identity of the quiddity of the Father and the Son, he only claims that he uses a typological distinction to indicate that in his view the full deity of the Son had not yet been fully revealed at that time. The NWT's rendering ("a god") is understood to be an explicit and definitive denial of the identity of quiddity. Hart does acknowledge the grammatical possibility of translating καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος as “a god,” but he does not advocate for it as theologically or contextually accurate. His discussion of this possibility is descriptive, reflecting the Greek syntax, but he explicitly critiques interpretations like the NWT for missing John's theological intent. Hart explicitly states:

“Some other scholars have chosen to render the inarticular form of theos as ‘a divine being,’ but this seems wrong to me on two counts: first, if that were all the evangelist were saying, he could have used the perfectly serviceable Greek word theios; and, second, the text clearly means to assert some kind of continuity of divinity between God the Father and the Logos, not merely some sort of association between ‘God proper’ and ‘a divine being.’”

Thus, while he concedes that "a god" is a grammatical possibility, Hart rejects this rendering because it fails to capture the Logos’ participation in divine essence and its unity with the Father. The phrase “clearly means to assert some kind of continuity of divinity” decisively rules out a translation that reduces the Logos to a subordinate or derivative deity. Hart's statement that θεός (without the article) "could be used of any divine being" is just a general linguistic observation about Greek usage, not an endorsement of such a meaning in John 1:1c. Hart explicitly confines his remarks about the Logos' divinity to John's theological framework, where:
1. The Logos’ divinity is qualitative—expressing its nature rather than identifying it as a separate deity or lesser divine being.
2. John does not describe the Logos as "a god" in the sense of a distinct or subordinate entity but affirms its continuity of divinity with God the Father.
Hart underscores this in his commentary:

“The text clearly means to assert some kind of continuity of divinity between God the Father and the Logos, not merely some sort of association between ‘God proper’ and ‘a divine being.’”

This rules out any interpretation that reduces the Logos to a derivative divinity. The quote from Atheist Delusions—“could justly be translated as: ‘In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with God, and the Logos was a god’”—is not an advocacy but an acknowledgment of grammatical possibilities. Hart's own rendering in his translation of the New Testament is "the Logos was god" (lowercase), not "a god." This reflects his view that the Logos' divinity is qualitative and avoids the theological problems of subordination implied by “a god.” Hart himself critiques "a god" (in an Arian-JW-NWT sense) as a misleading translation:

“If that were all the evangelist were saying, he could have used the perfectly serviceable Greek word theios.”

The inclusion of “a god” as a possible rendering in Hart’s descriptive analysis does not equal endorsement. His nuanced approach to lowercase "god" underscores the Logos’ divine essence without conflating it with God the Father (ho theos), but it explicitly rejects interpretations like the NWT’s henotheistic implications. While Hart does not adopt the traditional rendering word-for-word, he does affirm its theological substance. Hart's rendering, "the Logos was god," aligns with the qualitative interpretation of θεός found in traditional Trinitarian theology. The lowercase "god" reflects the Logos' divine nature without equating the Logos to God the Father in a way that might suggest modalism. Importantly, Hart recognizes the climactic revelation of Jesus as ὁ θεός (ho theos) in John 20:28:

“The withholding of the full revelation of Christ as ho theos, God in the fullest sense, until Thomas confesses him as such in the light of Easter, must be seen as an intentional authorial tactic.”

This reinforces the traditional theological reading: the Logos is fully divine and revealed as such in the resurrection. While Hart does not explicitly name the New World Translation, but he rejects its premise by affirming that:
1. The absence of the article before θεός in John 1:1c signals qualitative predication, not indefiniteness.
2. John 1:1c asserts continuity of divinity between the Logos and God the Father, ruling out interpretations that treat the Logos as a separate or subordinate deity.
Hart states:

“The text clearly means to assert some kind of continuity of divinity between God the Father and the Logos.”

This continuity is incompatible with the Jehovah's Witnesses' henotheistic interpretation, which introduces a lesser deity (anathema to John’s monotheism). Additionally, Hart critiques translations that fail to grasp the qualitative use of θεός:

“Some other scholars have chosen to render the inarticular form of theos as ‘a divine being,’ but this seems wrong to me… The text clearly means to assert some kind of continuity of divinity between God the Father and the Logos.”

This is a clear rejection of the theological framework behind the NWT’s "a god."
Hart situates the Arian controversy within the broader historical and theological development of early Christianity but does not endorse Arian theology. His acknowledgment of pre-Nicene diversity does not equate to affirming Arianism as “apostolic faith.” Instead, Hart recognizes the Council of Nicaea as a doctrinal clarification, refining the Church’s understanding of the Logos' relationship to the Father. Hart’s theological commitments remain Nicene, as evidenced by his rejection of subordinate or derivative interpretations of the Logos. He explicitly affirms the Logos’ continuity of divinity with the Father and its full revelation as ὁ θεός (ho theos) in John 20:28.
406
Is Jesus the Creator?
by Sea Breeze in
1. watchtower
2. bible
that's what the word says.

.

colossians 1:16. for by him all things were created, both in the heavens and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or authorities—all things have been created through him and for him..
aqwsed12345
@slimboyfat
David Bentley Hart translates John 1:1 this way:
“In the origin there was the Logos, and the Logos was present to God, and the Logos was god.”
with this footnote:
Or “god was the Logos,” going entirely by word order. In general, however, when two nominatives are placed in apposition and only one of them lacks an article, that inarticular noun is taken for the predicate and the articular for the subject. Still, there are many contrary examples in extant texts, word order is not entirely unimportant even in an inflected tongue like Greek, and the wording here seems intentionally elliptical, so as to avoid speaking of the Logos in a way that, in late antique usage, was reserved properly for the Father. To understand my translation of the first eighteen verses of the Gospel, the reader should refer to “A Note on the Prologue of John’s Gospel” in my postscript to this volume. Here in the Gospel’s prologue, as well as in the closing verses of chapter twenty below, I adopt the typographical convention of the capital G followed by small capitals to indicate where the Greek speaks of ὁ θεός (ho theos), which clearly means God in the fullest and most unequivocal sense, whereas I confine myself entirely to lowercase letters to indicate where the Greek speaks only of θεός (theos) without the article; but, to make the matter more confusing, I have indicated three uses of the word without article (vv. 6, 12, and 13), all concerning the relation between the divine and the created, in all small capitals, to indicate that it is not clear in these instances whether the distinction in forms is still operative, and whether the inarticular form of the noun is being used simply of God as related to creatures through his Logos. And then, in v. 18, I assume the first use of the inarticular form of theos still refers to God in the fullest sense, God the Father, though again the clause in question concerns the relation of creatures to the divine. As for the phrase translated in v. 1 as “present to God” (πρὸς τὸν θεόν, pros ton theon), it might be read any number of ways. Technically, the preposition when attached to an accusative would mean “toward” or “at,” and so might be read here as saying that the Logos was “facing” God, which would suggest at least a pictorial continuity with a tradition of seeing the Logos or “secondary god” as the heavenly high priest, turned toward the unknowable Father and leading the worship of God by all rational creatures. It also might be taken as meaning “pertaining to” or “in attendance upon” the Father.
A Note on the Prologue of John’s Gospel
An Exemplary Case of the Untranslatable
There may perhaps be no passage in the New Testament more resistant to simple translation into another tongue than the first eighteen verses—the prologue—of the Gospel of John. Whether it was written by the same author as most of the rest of the text (and there is cause for some doubt on that score), it very elegantly proposes a theology of the person of Christ that seems to subtend the entire book, and that perhaps reaches its most perfect expression in its twentieth chapter. But it also, intentionally in all likelihood, leaves certain aspects of that theology open to question, almost as if inviting the reader to venture deeper into the text to find the proper answers. Yet many of these fruitful ambiguities are simply invisible anywhere except in the Greek of the original, and even there are discernible in only the most elusive and tantalizing ways. Take, for example, the standard rendering of just the first three verses. In Greek, they read, 1Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος· 2οὗτος ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν θεόν· 3πάντα δι᾽ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἓν ὃ γέγονεν· (1En archēi ēn ho logos, kai ho logos ēn pros ton theon, kai theos ēn ho logos; 2houtos ēn en archēi pros ton theon; 3panta di’ avtou egeneto, kai chōris avtou egeneto oude hen ho gegonen.) I am aware of no respectable English translation in which these verses do not appear in more or less the same form they are given in the King James Version: “1In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. 2The same was in the beginning with God. 3All things were made by him; and without him was not any thing made that was made.” Read thus, the Gospel begins with an enigmatic name for Christ, asserts that he was “with God” in the beginning, and then unambiguously goes on to identify him both as “God” and as the creator of all things. Apart from that curiously bland and impenetrable designation “the Word,” the whole passage looks like a fairly straightforward statement of Trinitarian dogma (or at least two-thirds of it), of the Nicene-Constantinopolitan variety. The average reader would never guess that, in the fourth century, those same verses were employed by all parties in the Trinitarian debates in support of very disparate positions, or that Arians and Eunomians and other opponents of the Nicene settlement interpreted them as evidence against the coequality of God the Father and the divine Son. The truth is that, in Greek, and in the context of late antique Hellenistic metaphysics, the language of the Gospel’s prologue is nowhere near so lucid and unequivocal as the translations make it seem. For one thing, the term logos really had, by the time the Gospel was written, acquired a metaphysical significance that “Word” cannot possibly convey; and in places like Alexandria it had acquired a very particular religious significance as well.
For the Hellenistic Jewish philosopher Philo, for instance, it referred to a kind of “secondary divinity,” a mediating principle standing between God the Most High and creation. In late antiquity it was assumed widely, in pagan, Jewish, and Christian circles, that God in his full transcendence did not come into direct contact with the world of limited and mutable things, and so had expressed himself in a subordinate and economically “reduced” form “through whom” (δι᾽ αὐτοῦ [di’ avtou]) he created and governed the world. It was this Logos that many Jews and Christians believed to be the subject of all the divine theophanies of Hebrew scripture. Many of the early Christian apologists thought of God’s Logos as having been generated just prior to creation, in order to act as God’s artisan of, and archregent in, the created order. Moreover, the Greek of John’s prologue may reflect what was, at the time of its composition, a standard semantic distinction between the articular and inarticular (or arthrous and anarthrous) forms of the word theos: the former, ὁ θεός (ho theos) (as in πρὸς τὸν θεόν [pros ton theon], where the accusative form of article and noun follow the preposition), was generally used to refer to God in the fullest and most proper sense: God Most High, the transcendent One; the latter, however, θεός (theos) (as in καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος [kai theos ēn ho logos]), could be used of any divine being, however finite: a god or a derivative divine agency, say, or even a divinized mortal. And so early theologians differed greatly in their interpretation of that very small but very significantly absent monosyllable. Now it may be that the article is omitted in the latter case simply because the word theos functions as a predicate there, and typically in Greek the predicate would need no article. Yet this rule tends not to hold when the predication is one of personal identity; moreover, the syntax is ambiguous as regards which substantive should be regarded as the subject and which the predicate; though Greek is an inflected language, and hence more syntactically malleable than modern Western tongues, the order of words is not a matter of complete indifference; and one might even translate καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος as “and [this] god was the Logos.” But the issue becomes at once both clearer and more inadjudicable at verse 18, where again the designation of the Son is theos without the article, and there the word is unquestionably the subject of the sentence. Mind you, in the first chapter of John there are also other instances of the inarticular form where it is not clear whether the reference is the Father, the Son, or somehow both at once in an intentionally indeterminate way (as though, perhaps, the distinction of articular from inarticular forms is necessary in regard to the inner divine life, but not when speaking of the relation of the divine to the created realm).
But, in all subsequent verses and chapters, God in his full transcendence is always ho theos; and the crucial importance of the difference between this and the inarticular theos is especially evident at 10:34–36. Most important of all, this distinction imbues the conclusion of the twentieth chapter with a remarkable theological significance, for it is there that Christ, now risen from the dead, is explicitly addressed as ho theos (by the apostle Thomas). Even this startling profession, admittedly, left considerable room for argument in the early centuries as to whether the fully divine designation was something conferred upon Christ only after the resurrection, and then perhaps only honorifically, or whether instead it was an eternal truth about Christ that had been made manifest by the resurrection.
Anyway, my point is not that there is anything amiss in the theology of Nicaea, or anything that the original Greek text calls into question, but only that standard translations make it impossible for readers who know neither Greek nor the history of late antique metaphysics and theology to understand either what the original text says or what it does not say. Not that there is any perfectly satisfactory way of representing the text’s obscurities in English, since we do not distinguish between articular and inarticular forms in the same way; rather, we have to rely on orthography and typography, using the difference between an uppercase or lowercase g to indicate the distinction between God and [a] god. This, hesitantly, is how I deal with the distinction in my translation of the Gospel’s prologue, and I believe one must employ some such device: it seems to me that the withholding of the full revelation of Christ as ho theos, God in the fullest sense, until Thomas confesses him as such in the light of Easter, must be seen as an intentional authorial tactic. Some other scholars have chosen to render the inarticular form of theos as “a divine being,” but this seems wrong to me on two counts: first, if that were all the evangelist were saying, he could have used the perfectly serviceable Greek word theios; and, second, the text clearly means to assert some kind of continuity of divinity between God the Father and the Logos, not merely some sort of association between “God proper” and “a divine being.” Here, I take it, one may regard chapter twenty as providing the ultimate interpretation of chapter one, and allow one’s translation to reflect that.
Hart makes clear in his footnotes and commentary that his use of the lowercase "god" used as a "typographical convention" and reflects a nuanced distinctions in Greek grammar and theological intention, not a rejection of the Logos’ divinity or affirmation of Arian theology. He explains, that the absence of the article before "θεός" (theos) in John 1:1c can signal a qualitative predicate nominative, emphasizing the Logos' divine nature or quality, rather than equating the Logos with God the Father. Hart explicitly rejects rendering it as "a god," criticizing such interpretations for lacking coherence with John's theological framework:
Hart makes a deliberate typographical and interpretive distinction in his translation:
- Capitalized "God" (ὁ θεός) refers to God in the fullest, most transcendent sense—God the Father.
- Lowercase "god" (θεός), as used in John 1:1c, reflects the absence of the article, suggesting the Logos' divine nature rather than identifying it univocally with the Father.
Hart further elaborates on this distinction in his commentary:
“...the Greek of John’s prologue may reflect what was, at the time of its composition, a standard semantic distinction between the articular and inarticular (or arthrous and anarthrous) forms of the word theos: the former, ὁ θεός (ho theos)... was generally used to refer to God in the fullest and most proper sense: God Most High, the transcendent One; the latter, however, θεός (theos)... could be used of any divine being, however finite: a god or a derivative divine agency, say, or even a divinized mortal.”
Hart does not imply that the Logos is merely "a god" or a derivative divine agency. Instead, he emphasizes that the qualitative use of "θεός" signals the Logos' participation in the divine essence while maintaining a distinction from "God" as the Father. This is crucial: Hart’s choice of lowercase "god" serves to honor the Greek syntax and theologically rich ambiguity of John's prologue, not to diminish the Logos' divinity.
“Some other scholars have chosen to render the inarticular form of theos as ‘a divine being,’ but this seems wrong to me on two counts: first, if that were all the evangelist were saying, he could have used the perfectly serviceable Greek word theios; and, second, the text clearly means to assert some kind of continuity of divinity between God the Father and the Logos, not merely some sort of association between ‘God proper’ and ‘a divine being.’”
Thus, while Hart's translation avoids flattening the subtleties of the Greek into a Nicene formulation, it also avoids reducing the Logos to a created or subordinate "god" as in Arianism or the New World Translation. Hart outright refutes interpretations like the New World Translation's "a god", arguing that such renderings fail to account for John's theological intentionality and the prologue's overarching narrative. He explicitly states:
“The text clearly means to assert some kind of continuity of divinity between God the Father and the Logos, not merely some sort of association between ‘God proper’ and ‘a divine being.’”
Moreover, Hart identifies the climactic revelation of Christ's divine identity in John 20:28, where Thomas confesses Jesus as "ὁ θεός" (ho theos):
“[It] seems to me that the withholding of the full revelation of Christ as ho theos, God in the fullest sense, until Thomas confesses him as such in the light of Easter, must be seen as an intentional authorial tactic.”
This demonstrates that John's Gospel presents a progressive revelation of the Logos' divinity, culminating in the affirmation of Christ as fully and unequivocally God (ὁ θεός), in line with Nicene theology. Hart acknowledges that John’s prologue does not offer a systematic Trinitarian theology but instead uses metaphysical and linguistic subtlety to describe the Logos' relationship to God. His translation and commentary aim to preserve this subtlety without sacrificing theological coherence:
- The Logos is "god" (θεός) in John 1:1c because it possesses divine nature.
- The Logos is not "a god," as this would contradict John’s theological continuity between the Logos and the Father.
- The Logos is not identical to "God" (ὁ θεός), as the prologue explicitly distinguishes between the Logos and the Father (pros ton theon, "present to God").
Hart’s rendering aligns with the qualitative interpretation of "θεός" as articulated by many scholars (e.g., Harner’s study on predicate nominatives) and is consistent with traditional Trinitarian readings of John 1:1, even if his terminology is unconventional. Hart does not use the exact wording "the Word was God" but defends the theological substance of that translation. He explicitly rejects subordinationist readings like "a god" and affirms the Logos' continuity of divinity with God the Father. His rendering, "the Logos was god," underscores the Logos' divine nature while preserving the Greek text's linguistic nuance. Hart’s commentary confirms this. The Logos is described as possessing divine nature, not as a subordinate or separate being. The theological trajectory of John’s Gospel culminates in the recognition of the Logos as ὁ θεός (ho theos) in John 20:28, solidifying the Logos' status as fully and unequivocally God. This reinforces that Hart’s rendering is fundamentally aligned with Nicene theology, despite his stylistic departure from traditional translations.
In the discussion cited above (and similar discussions Hart has engaged in), he emphasizes the grammatical complexity of John 1:1c (“καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος”). Hart acknowledges that Greek grammar opens the possibility of rendering this phrase in ways other than “the Word was God,” but this does not imply an endorsement of Arianism or Jehovah's Witness-style theology. Rather, Hart highlights the philosophical and theological depth of the Greek text and its contextual meaning within early Christian thought.
The phrase “καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος” lacks the definite article before theos, and the predicate precedes the subject. This construction suggests a qualitative aspect of the Word (logos) being divine or possessing the essential nature of God. It is not a simple equivalence between “the Word” (ho logos) and “God” (ho theos), nor does it imply subordination or separateness. As Hart himself notes: “If we go by word order, we fail to notice that the anarthrous form of theos stands to the arthrous form of ho logos as predicate to subject. […] John’s prologue does not give us a co-equal Son. John 20 does.” He does not endorese the notion that the Word is presented as “a god” in a separate, subordinate sense, clarifying that John’s Gospel is concerned with the unity of the Logos with God’s essence.
Hart does not endorse the New World Translation’s “a god”, because they fail to recognize the theological context and nuance. While the grammar allows for flexibility, the broader Johannine context makes clear that the Logos shares the essence of God, not merely some divine attribute or a lower-tier deity. This is consistent with the Orthodox Trinitarian understanding of the homoousios doctrine (the Word being of the same substance as the Father), a point Hart has elaborated on in his theological works, such as That All Shall Be Saved and The Experience of God.
The New World Translation’s rendering of John 1:1c as “the Word was a god” arises from a theological bias, not the natural reading of the Greek text. The absence of the definite article before theos does not imply indefiniteness (“a god”). Rather, it indicates a qualitative use, affirming the divine nature of the Logos. As biblical scholar Daniel Wallace and others have noted, John 1:1c fits a “Colwell’s Rule” construction, where an anarthrous predicate noun preceding a verb (as in “θεὸς ἦν”) is typically qualitative, not indefinite. Hart concurs with this general linguistic observation, emphasizing that the Logos is qualitatively divine without identifying the Word as God the Father (ho theos in 1:1b).
The prologue as a whole (John 1:1–18) emphasizes the Logos’s role in creation, life, and light, all attributes of God alone in the Jewish monotheistic framework. John 1:3 asserts that “all things were made through him,” ruling out any Arian subordinationism that would treat the Word as a created being. Hart draws attention to the continuity of this theological vision with early Christian metaphysics: the Logos, as the rational principle of creation, is not “a god” in the sense of a separate, inferior deity but is God’s self-expression in eternal communion. The Jehovah’s Witness rendering is specifically problematic because it introduces henotheistic flavor incompatible with John’s monotheistic theology. Hart rejects such interpretations as alien to the Gospel’s intent.
Hart’s nuanced discussion about the Arian controversy and Nicaea does not, as your argument suggests, amount to an endorsement of Arian theology as "the apostolic faith," nor does it dismiss the Nicene Creed as mere innovation without theological grounding. Rather, Hart situates the Arian controversy within the broader historical and doctrinal development of early Christianity, emphasizing that theological articulations, including Nicene formulations, emerged from a dynamic and contested tradition.
When Hart states that Arius was “an extreme expression of what was regarded by many [not by everyone, not even generally] as the orthodoxy of centuries,” he is not asserting that Arius’ theology constituted the original apostolic teaching. Instead, Hart is highlighting the diversity of early Christian thought and the historical reality that various theological perspectives coexisted prior to the Council of Nicaea. This does not amount to a claim that Arius’ views more accurately reflected apostolic faith. Rather, Hart’s commentary illuminates the theological fluidity of the pre-Nicene period, where key terms and concepts (such as homoousios) had not yet been formally defined.
Hart’s acknowledgment that the Nicene party introduced "new theological grammar," including the term homoousios, does not equate to dismissing the Nicene position as illegitimate or inauthentic. The introduction of new terminology (not new theological content!) was a response to a theological need: to safeguard the Church’s understanding of Christ’s full divinity against interpretations that undermined it. Hart recognizes this as part of the natural development of doctrine. His commentary reflects the historical reality that councils like Nicaea did not merely codify existing consensus but also clarified and formalized contested doctrines.
The assertion that Hart sees Nicaea as the innovation and Arius as the preserver of tradition is an oversimplification of his analysis. While Hart acknowledges that Arius’ views drew on certain pre-Nicene theological currents, he also situates Arianism as part of the broader theological spectrum that early Christians debated. Hart is not claiming that Arius perfectly embodies apostolic teaching or that Nicaea is a wholesale departure from it. Instead, he observes that the articulation of Trinitarian orthodoxy at Nicaea represented a refinement and resolution of theological disputes that had long been simmering.
Hart is pointing out that figures like Eusebius had to adapt their theological frameworks in response to the Nicene settlement, reflecting the evolving nature of doctrinal understanding. This does not imply that Hart rejects the Nicene formulation as a valid expression of Christian faith; rather, it underscores his recognition that theological clarity often arises through historical and doctrinal development. Hart simply explores the diversity of early Christian thought without endorsing Arianism as the definitive interpretation of the apostolic faith. Hart’s own theological commitments remain firmly rooted in the Nicene tradition, even as he critiques certain ways in which that tradition is sometimes presented or understood.
406
Is Jesus the Creator?
by Sea Breeze in
1. watchtower
2. bible
that's what the word says.

.

colossians 1:16. for by him all things were created, both in the heavens and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or authorities—all things have been created through him and for him..
aqwsed12345

@slimboyfat
Your claim that Hanson’s assessment undermines a Trinitarian reading of pre-Nicene theology is misleading. Hanson acknowledges that pre-Nicene theology employed subordinationist language, but this was not synonymous with Arianism. The subordination found in figures like Origen or Justin Martyr pertains to relational roles within the Godhead rather than ontological inequality. Hanson himself explicitly rejects the notion that Origen's theology laid the groundwork for Arianism, as Origen affirmed the co-eternity and divine nature of the Son. Your attempt to equate Origen's subordinationism with that of Arius misinterprets Origen's work and ignores the distinction between relational and ontological subordination.
You argue that Origen described Christ as a "secondary god" and "a creation," suggesting that his views are incompatible with Trinitarian orthodoxy. However, this is a partial and selective representation of Origen's theology. While Origen occasionally used terms like ktisma ("creature") or genetos ("generated"), these terms must be understood within his broader theological framework. Origen explicitly rejected the idea that the Son was created ex nihilo (out of nothing), which is a hallmark of Arianism. Instead, he taught that the Son was eternally generated from the Father, sharing the Father's divine essence. Origen's use of "creature" reflects his attempt to describe the Son as the first expression of God’s creative activity, but always within the divine life itself, not as part of creation. This position is fundamentally different from Arius’ claim that the Son was created and thus ontologically distinct from the Father.
Indeed, Origen called the Son "κτίσμα", and "produced" (γενητός), however, it is undeniable that when Origen calls the Son κτίσμα, he always has in mind a certain expression of Wisdom in the LXX: "The Lord ἐκτισέ me (instead of ἐκτήσατο) as the beginning of His ways." Origen explains the meaning of this text in the following way:

"Since in this hypostasis of Wisdom (already) all the potential and representation of future creation was contained, and by the power of foreknowledge everything was predetermined and arranged – both what exists in the proper sense, and what pertains to the former as belonging to it: therefore, for the sake of these creatures, which were as it were outlined and prefigured in Wisdom itself, she calls herself created at the beginning of God's ways through Solomon, because she contains and prefigures in herself the beginnings, forms, or types of all creation."

Thus, the plan of the universe, preordained in its entirety and details in Wisdom, the world, potentially and ideally existing in Her, – this is the aspect by which the Son is called a "κτίσμα." Clearly, such a basis as the naming of the Son κτίσμα is insufficient to say that Origen acknowledges the Son as a creature in the sense that this word acquired after the Arian controversies. But even weaker is the basis that Origen calls the Son γενητός and other similar expressions. The word γενητός means, strictly speaking, "having its being from another," and the use of its root γίνομαι by Origen proves that it not only did not stand in opposition to the word γεννητός, but even was not distinguished from the latter. Thus, calling the Son κτίσμα, Origen pointed out, in general, the origin of the Son from the Father, by no means intending to express the idea of the created nature of His nature by this name of the Son, but using this expression because it is found in Holy Scripture. The expression κτίσμα or κτίζω is used, as is known, in the Bible in application to the hypostatic Wisdom (Prov. 8:22), and there is no doubt that Origen borrowed it from there. As for the meaning of this expression, it is determined by the Hebrew text, in which it does not mean "creation", as it stands in the translation of the 70 (ἒκτισε), but "acquisition" ( קָגָגִי ) acquired me, in the Vulgate - possedit me, in Aquila - ἐκτῖσατο μὲ). Church writers used this expression in both senses. Long before the appearance of the Arian heresy, many of them used the said expression in the first sense, for example, Athenagoras, Tertullian, Cyprian, Clement of Alexandria, Irenaeus and others. In the second sense this expression is used by Basil the Great (C. Eun. 2), Gregory of Nyssa (G. Eun. 1), Jerome (Hom. in IsaJam 26, 13), and others. However, in both cases, the Church Fathers by no means wanted to say that the Son is the creation of the Father, as the Arians later asserted. If some, not wishing to depart from the literal understanding of the biblical text, used the said expression (κτίσμα, κτίζω in the sense of creation, then they had in mind the human nature of the of the Son. Others, finally, used this word to denote the generation of the Son from the Father. In this case, it is noteworthy that this meaning is given to this expression in the language of the Bible; thus, when it is said of Eve that she "acquired a man" (Cain), the expression is used: ἐκτισάμην ἄνθρωπον. From all that has been said, it is evident that the words κτίζω and κτίσμα were not used in the same way by all in ancient times, and that none of the most ancient fathers of the church used them in the sense which the Arians subsequently gave them. It is impossible, therefore, not to call the following remark of Henry of Valesius just: “the ancient theologians, and especially those who wrote before the Council of Nicaea, under the word κτίζειν non solum creationem intelexerunt, quae ex nihilo fit, sed omnem generaliter productionem tam quae ab aeterno esset, tam illum quae in tempore.”. True, such use of κτίσμα and κτίζω in patristic literature cannot serve as decisive proof that Origen could not have used the above expressions in the Arian sense, but in any case, patristic literature provides very strong grounds for the assumption that he could not have used these expressions in the Arian sense. As to whether he really gave them a different meaning than the Arians, we can be convinced of this from his works. Thus, in one place he says the following: “In the expression: in the beginning was the Word, by the Word is meant the Son, who is called in the beginning precisely because He is in the Father.” In this case, the expression κτίζω, used in Holy Scripture about the Son, is explained by Origen in the sense of the general origin of the Son from the Father, or the procession to creation, but of the same origin, that He - the Son proceeds or proceeds to creation from the Father, in Whom He was as in His beginning. Thus, the expression “created” is understood by Origen as an expression used in Holy Scripture to denote the uncreated nature of the Son, by virtue of which He remains consubstantial with the Father. In another place, Origen discusses the bestowal of existence on Wisdom and the creation of the whole world through Her in the following way.
“As life was in the Word, so the Word was in the beginning. Consider whether we cannot say: in the beginning was the Word understand in such a sense that everything happened according to Wisdom and according to the images consisting of the totality of the ideas contained in it. For I think that just as a house or a ship is built according to the architect’s plans (τύπους), according to the images and foundations (τύπους καὶ λόγους) that the artist has, which constitute the beginning of the house or ship, so everything came to be in accordance with the foundations of things that were to be, foundations that God had foreseen beforehand in Wisdom ( κατὰ τοὶς ἐν τῆ σοφία προτρανωθέντας ύπὸ Θεοῦ , τπων ἐσομένων For He created everything (ἐποίησε) in Wisdom (Ps. 48:13, 21) and it must be said that He created, so to speak, living Wisdom, and granted to it from the types existing in it (ὰπὸ τῶν αὐτῆ τύπων) the granting of being, formation and forms to beings and matter. I wonder, then, whether it cannot also be said that the beginning of things existing is the Son of God, Who says: I am the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last (Rev. 22:13)".
Thus, from the point of view of Origen, the Son is the "living Wisdom", containing in Himself the ideas and prototypes of all things, created by God, but created precisely in the sense of Wisdom alone, as the prototype of the world - the prototype in which He created everything. Obviously, the creation of everything in Wisdom and the creation of Wisdom itself are not the same thing, from the point of view of Origen. It is also remarkable that, speaking further about Wisdom, Origen uses the expression "created" with the addition of "so to speak", - speaking of those forms and ideas that were in Wisdom, he uses the word ἐποίησε. The former, apparently, has a general meaning, similar to that which is given in the above-cited place (John 1:17), while the second means something in the proper sense created, finite.
Your assertion that later Trinitarians declared Origen a heretic due to his incompatibility with their theology is historically inaccurate. Only the Second Council of Constantinople in 553 AD dealt with the Origenist crises, but never condomned his Chistology. The controversies surrounding Origen in the fourth and fifth centuries were complex and often politically motivated, centering on issues like his views on universal salvation (apokatastasis) rather than his Trinitarian theology. As Ilaria Ramelli demonstrates in Origen’s Anti-Subordinationism and its Heritage in the Nicene and Cappadocian Line, Origen’s theology significantly influenced anti-Arian figures like Athanasius and the Cappadocians. Far from being a precursor to Arianism, Origen provided the exegetical and theological tools that later theologians used to refute Arian subordinationism and articulate the doctrine of the Trinity.
You claim that Origen’s works were suppressed or rewritten by later Trinitarians to conform to Nicene orthodoxy. While it is true that Rufinus' translations sometimes softened Origen's language, this does not amount to a wholesale distortion of his theology. Key aspects of Origen's anti-subordinationist thought are preserved in Greek fragments and independent witnesses, such as Gregory of Nyssa, who extensively relied on Origen's arguments in his polemics against Arianism. For example, Gregory’s In Illud: Tunc et Ipse Filius closely follows Origen’s interpretation of 1 Corinthians 15:28, rejecting any notion of the Son’s inferiority to the Father. This demonstrates that Origen’s theology was not only compatible with Nicene orthodoxy but foundational to its development.
The claim that there was no universal understanding of Christ’s divinity before the 4th century is an oversimplification. While it is true that theological language and concepts were refined over time, the essential belief in Christ’s divinity was present from the earliest days of Christianity. The 4th-century debates were not about whether Jesus was divine but about how His divinity related to the Father and the Holy Spirit. Arius introduced a radical subordinationist view, claiming that "there was a time when the Son was not," directly contradicting earlier teachings about Christ’s eternal nature (e.g., John 8:58, Colossians 1:15-17). Contrary to your portrayal of Arianism as a significant and widespread tradition, it was quickly recognized as heretical by a majority of the Church. The Council of Nicaea (325 AD) did not invent the Trinity but reaffirmed the Church’s belief in the co-equality and co-eternity of the Son with the Father. The Council of Nicaea was composed of bishops from across the Christian world, many of whom suffered persecution under earlier Roman emperors. These leaders were deeply committed to defending orthodoxy based on Scripture and apostolic tradition, not imperial politics. Constantine sought unity for political reasons but did not dictate theological content. He deferred to the bishops on matters of doctrine. Constantine sought unity within the Church for the stability of the empire. While his theological expertise was limited, his summoning of the Council of Nicaea was not an attempt to impose doctrine but to facilitate a resolution among bishops. The council decisively rejected Arianism and affirmed the Son's consubstantiality (homoousios) with the Father. This was not a political imposition but the collective decision of the Church’s leadership, guided by Scripture and tradition.
The term homoousios (“of the same substance”) was a point of contention, but its rejection by some bishops before Nicaea does not mean they opposed the concept it conveyed. Many Eastern bishops hesitated to use the term because it had been associated with heretical teachings in prior controversies, not because they denied the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son. Constantine's support for homoousios is also misrepresented. While JWs often suggest that Constantine imposed the term, historical evidence indicates that theologians like Hosius of Cordoba and Alexander of Alexandria championed its inclusion, with Constantine likely relying on their guidance. The adoption of homoousios reflects theological precision rather than imperial overreach. While homoousios had philosophical origins, its use at Nicaea was deeply rooted in biblical and theological reflection. The early Church often employed philosophical terminology to clarify doctrinal truths without compromising biblical fidelity. The Council of Antioch’s earlier rejection of the term was contextual and did not preclude its legitimate use in opposing Arianism. Moreover, the biblical basis for the term is evident in passages like John 10:30 (“I and the Father are one”) and Hebrews 1:3 (“[The Son is] the radiance of God’s glory and the exact representation of his being”). Homoousios encapsulates these scriptural truths, affirming that the Son shares the same divine essence as the Father.
The Nicene Creed formalized language already in use and defended long-standing beliefs against Arian innovation. While early theologians used varying terminologies, there was broad agreement on the divinity of Christ and His unity with the Father. Differences often arose from cultural and linguistic contexts rather than fundamental disagreements. Arians sought to align their teachings with a perceived earlier tradition, but this does not mean their Christology was uncontroversial. The Church rejected Arianism precisely because it was seen as a departure from the apostolic faith, not its preservation. The Nicene Creed was not a theological innovation but a clarification of what the Church already believed, formulated in response to the confusion Arius' teachings created. Arius and his supporters may have selectively quoted earlier Church Fathers, such as Justin Martyr, Origen, and Tertullian, but this does not mean these Fathers shared Arian views. The claim that early Church Fathers supported Arian Christology is a misrepresentation, as they consistently affirmed the divinity of Christ within a Trinitarian framework, even if their terminology was not as developed as it became in later centuries. Jerome’s remark that "the whole world groaned to find itself Arian" reflects the political pressures that political favour temporarily empowered Arianism, not its theological validity. Arius’ teaching that "there was a time when the Son was not" was a clear departure from the Church's traditional understanding of Christ’s eternal preexistence. The Nicene Council condemned this as a heretical innovation. The Nicene Creed did not invent new theology but articulated the apostolic faith in precise terms to counter Arian misinterpretations. Development in terminology (e.g., homoousios) does not imply doctrinal invention but greater clarity. The Nicene Creed formalized what the Church had always believed, ensuring doctrinal consistency and fidelity to Scripture. The ecumenical councils did not "create" the Trinity but clarified and defended the Church's belief in response to controversies. The theological debates, far from being mere power struggles, involved deep scriptural exegesis and reflected the Church’s commitment to fidelity to the apostolic witness.
Finally, your discussion of John 1:1 and Hart’s acknowledgment of alternative renderings like “a god” fails to grasp Hart’s point. Hart highlights the linguistic and cultural challenges of translating ancient texts but affirms that the grammatical and theological context of John 1:1 supports the traditional rendering, “the Word was God.” This aligns with the overwhelming consensus of biblical scholarship, which recognizes that the lack of a definite article before theos in Greek emphasizes the Word’s qualitative identity with God, not its separateness or inferiority.
406
Is Jesus the Creator?
by Sea Breeze in
1. watchtower
2. bible
that's what the word says.

.

colossians 1:16. for by him all things were created, both in the heavens and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or authorities—all things have been created through him and for him..
aqwsed12345
@Blotty
You argue that I am "overruling a dictionary," but this reflects a misunderstanding of how dictionaries and lexicons function. Dictionaries provide definitions based on common usage, but they do not determine meaning in specific contexts, particularly in specialized fields like biblical Greek. Lexicons and dictionaries, including the one you cited, are tools that assist in understanding the range of possible meanings for a word. However, their entries must be applied with contextual and grammatical precision. The definition you referenced—"of one who is the author of the action as well as its instrument, or of the efficient cause"—supports my argument, not yours. It acknowledges that dia can indicate (active) agency (or instrument) as well as cause (efficient cause). The distinction between these uses depends entirely on the context, which I addressed in my earlier response. Ignoring this nuance while appealing to a general definition does not strengthen your case.
You also question my credibility versus that of a dictionary or lexicon. Credibility in this context is not about authority but about the ability to engage with the linguistic and contextual data accurately. Theological motivations are irrelevant if the argument is grounded in proper exegesis and scholarly methodology. Rather than dismissing my points based on assumptions about motive, it would be more constructive to engage with the substance of the argument. Ironically, your own appeal to the authority of dictionaries without engaging the broader exegetical context undermines your criticism of theological bias.
Regarding your claims about Wallace and A.T. Robertson, you misunderstand their points. Wallace does not argue that Christ is not the Creator; rather, he explains the relational distinctions within the Godhead. When he notes that dia with the genitive indicates agency, he is highlighting the instrumental role of the Son in creation as distinct from the Father's role as the ultimate source (ek ou). This is consistent with Trinitarian theology, which maintains that all three persons of the Trinity are involved in creation but with distinct relational roles. Similarly, A.T. Robertson’s comment that the Son is the "intermediate agent" aligns with this view. Being an intermediate agent does not diminish Christ’s deity or role as Creator; it simply reflects the Trinitarian economy of roles in divine action. Your argument that these scholars "contradict" me overlooks this nuance and conflates the relational distinctions within the Trinity with ontological subordination, which neither Wallace nor Robertson supports.
Your dismissal of my point about "passive instruments" as irrelevant is misplaced. The distinction between a passive and active instrument is critical to understanding the Logos's role in creation. A passive instrument is merely a tool that acts at the behest of an external agent, while an active participant is inherently involved and integral to the action. Christ, as the Logos, is not depicted in Scripture as a passive instrument but as an active and divine agent through whom all things were created (John 1:3, Colossians 1:16). Your acknowledgment that Christ is "involved in creation" aligns with this understanding, even if you attempt to minimize its theological implications.
You accuse me of misunderstanding your rhetorical devices and idioms, but this is a distraction from the substantive issues. Resorting to rhetorical flourishes, ad hominem attacks, or irrelevant comparisons does not address the argument. If you have substantive critiques of my points, they should focus on the linguistic, grammatical, or theological evidence, not on my perceived inability to grasp idioms or rhetoric.
Your hyperbolic statement about Christ returning and denying the Trinity is not a meaningful argument but an emotional appeal. If we are to discuss the Trinity or Christ's deity, the discussion must be grounded in the biblical text, historical context, and theological tradition. Speculative scenarios or personal assumptions about my intentions do not contribute to the debate.
Hart’s acknowledgment that Arius was considered “orthodox” before the Council of Nicaea does not mean that Arius represented the apostolic tradition or the dominant theological consensus of early Christianity. To say that Arius was within the bounds of orthodoxy before Nicaea simply reflects the fact that theological language and definitions were still being developed and that there had not yet been a formalized creedal condemnation of Arianism. This does not mean that Arius’ views faithfully reflected the teachings of the apostles or that his Christology was consistent with the broader trajectory of early Christian worship and theology. Hart’s comment highlights the historical reality that theological disputes often take time to reach formal resolution, not that Arius’ subordinationist Christology was the authentic view of the early Church.
You cite Jerome’s statement about Origen’s writings containing references to Christ as a created being as evidence that this view was “traditional.” However, this misses a crucial point: Origen’s theology was highly speculative and complex, and his writings contain apparent tensions and contradictions. While Origen occasionally described Christ in terms that could be interpreted as subordinating Him to the Father, he also affirmed the eternal generation of the Son and rejected the idea that Christ was created in the sense that creatures are created. Origen’s influence on later Arian thought does not mean that Arianism represents Origen’s theology in its entirety, nor does it make Arianism reflective of the broader Christian tradition. Church Fathers like Athanasius vigorously critiqued Arianism precisely because it deviated from what they saw as the apostolic and biblical teaching about Christ’s eternal deity. Origen’s theology was highly complex and multifaceted, and while his writings influenced later theological thought, including elements that Arians appropriated, his views are not equivalent to those of Arianism. Origen affirmed the eternal generation of the Son, which sets his theology apart from Arianism. For Origen, the Son is co-eternal with the Father, sharing in the divine nature. He described the Son as a “ktisma,” but this was not in the sense of being part of creation; rather, it referred to the Son as the first expression of God’s creative act within the divine life itself. Key points in Origen’s theology include his use of the term “epinoiai” (aspects of the Logos' function), his understanding of the Son as eternally generated from the Father, and his attempts to avoid anthropomorphism by explaining the relationship between the Father and the Son in metaphysical terms. While Origen described the Son as “subordinate” to the Father, this was a subordination within the Godhead, emphasizing relational distinctions rather than ontological inequality. Origen also rejected the idea that the Son was derived from non-existence (ex nihilo), a hallmark of Arian theology. I quote Hanson:
We can note also that both Origen and Arius described the Son as a ‘creature’ (ktisma). But here we encounter a difficulty. It is indeed pretty clear, in spite of the efforts of Rufinus in his translation of the Peri Archon to disguise the fact, and of those of Jerome to exaggerate it, that Origen did in the Peri Archon describe the Son both as ‘having come into existence’ (γενητός) and as a ‘creature’ (κτίσμα), at a period when nobody distinguished ‘having come into existence’ (γενητός) from ‘begotten’ (γεννητός).22 For Origen ποιεῖν (to make) was an appropriate word to apply to the production of everything invisible and spiritual, whereas πλάσσειν (to mould) was the correct term to use for the creation of whatever is visible and material.23 The Son could therefore be described as ‘made’ in this sense. But at the same time he declares his belief in the eternity of the Son as a distinct entity from the Father, even in the Peri Archon,24 and frequently elsewhere in his works. For Origen the Logos/Wisdom is coeternal with God, and he only calls him a creature because in him God had formed the ideas of future creation and of all creatures.25 This is a very different concept from Arius’ doctrine of a Son who is created at a certain point, though apparently before time, who did once not exist, who is the highest of the creatures but still part of creation rather than within the Godhead.
22 At Peri Archon 1.2.2 (Crouzel and Simonetti Traité I, 112, 114) Rufinus’ long paraphrase probably disguises the fact that Origen applied the word κτίζειν to the Logos; so Simonetti Studi, 23 (Lorentz, Arius Iud. 69 however defends Rufinus’ integrity here); and at Peri Archon IV.4.1 (28) (402) the Greek preserved by Justinian is probably correct in representing Origen as applying ktisma to the Son; so Simonetti Studi 23, 24; see note on this in Crouzel and Simonetti (Traité IV.9, 242–246). For Origen’s use of γενητός see Crouzel and Simonetti Traité I Introd., n2–n3.
23 So Origen explains Comm. on John XX.22. 24I.2.10 (132, 138); IV.4.1 (28) (402); cf. Gregory Thaumaturgus, whose Expositio (Hahn Bibliothek der Symbole 253–255) clearly declares the eternity of the Son, but who (according to Basil, Epistle 210.5) could, elsewhere, call the Son κτίσμα and ποίημα.
25 This is clearly enough expressed in Peri Archon 1.2.2 (112, 114) and in Comm. on John, frag. 1; see Lorentz op. cit. 69.
Your reference to John 1:1 and Hart’s comment about the phrase “a god” being a possible rendering is taken out of context. Hart’s point in such discussions is not to affirm Arianism but to highlight the challenges of translating ancient texts and the complexities of early Christian theological language. The overwhelming weight of scholarship, however, recognizes that the grammatical and theological context of John 1:1 supports the traditional rendering, “the Word was God,” as a statement of the Word’s full divinity. To argue that Hart’s acknowledgment of a possible alternative rendering somehow endorses an Arian interpretation is to misrepresent the purpose of his remarks.
Your accusation that I have not watched the video is unfounded and irrelevant. Engaging with the content of Hart’s arguments, as well as the broader historical and theological context, does not require slavish repetition of every statement made in a video. The crux of the discussion is not whether Hart acknowledges diversity in early Christology—this is uncontroversial and well-documented—but whether Hart endorses the view that Arianism represents the authentic apostolic tradition. He does not. Instead, Hart critiques the oversimplification of early Christological development and the tendency to view doctrinal articulation as purely linear or static.
The reference to Eusebius’ supposed “change” before and after Nicaea is another misinterpretation. Hart’s observation about Eusebius reflects the fact that the Arian controversy forced theologians to clarify their positions and align with the Nicene Creed’s precise terminology. This does not imply that Eusebius fundamentally changed his belief about Christ’s deity. Though his language may have lacked the precision that the Council of Nicaea later required, Eusebius stopped short of fully embracing Arianism. He rejected the idea that the Son came from non-existence and affirmed that the Son is unique. His theology represents an intermediary position between Origen’s eternal generation and Arius’s stark separation of the Son from the Father. The “change” in Eusebius’ writings after Nicaea reflects his acceptance of the Creed’s language, not a wholesale revision of his theology.
Finally, your inflammatory tone and ad hominem attacks undermine your credibility and the strength of your argument. Accusing me of being a “fraud” or dismissing my comments as “trash” does not engage with the substance of the discussion. Hart’s work, like any scholarly contribution, invites interpretation, critique, and dialogue. Resorting to personal attacks instead of engaging with the theological and historical issues at hand does nothing to advance understanding or resolve disagreement.
406
Is Jesus the Creator?
by Sea Breeze in
1. watchtower
2. bible
that's what the word says.

.

colossians 1:16. for by him all things were created, both in the heavens and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or authorities—all things have been created through him and for him..
aqwsed12345

@slimboyfat
Hart’s acknowledgment that Arius was part of a broader theological tradition and not a fringe figure does not mean that Hart sees Arianism as faithfully preserving the apostolic teaching. Instead, his comments highlight the diversity of early Christian thought and the complex theological landscape that culminated in the Council of Nicaea. To conflate Hart's nuanced observations with an endorsement of Arianism as the "traditional view" is to oversimplify his position and ignore the broader context of his argument.
Hart’s point about homoousios being a "new grammar" or a "new word" does not imply that Nicene theology itself was a departure from apostolic faith. Rather, it reflects the reality that theological precision often requires new terminology to address contemporary challenges and heresies. The term homoousios was introduced to clarify and safeguard the Church's understanding of Christ’s divine nature, not to invent it. Hart’s commentary on this development acknowledges the historical reality that Arian views had some roots in earlier theological trends, but it does not follow that he sees Arius as more representative of apostolic tradition. Instead, Hart recognizes that the Council of Nicaea articulated and defended what the Church had long believed about Christ’s divinity, even if the specific term homoousios was new.
Your appeal to scholars like Paula Fredriksen, E.P. Sanders, Geza Vermes, and Adela Yarbro Collins does not substantiate the claim that Arianism represented the traditional view. These scholars, while valuable contributors to the study of early Christianity, often approach the subject from a historical-critical perspective that may emphasize diversity in early Christological thought. However, highlighting theological diversity does not equate to validating Arianism as the dominant or original understanding of Christ. Historical theology, including the work of scholars like Larry Hurtado and Richard Bauckham, demonstrates that worship of Jesus as divine was present from the earliest stages of Christianity, making Arianism's subordinationist view a deviation rather than a continuation of apostolic faith.
Furthermore, the claim that Hart sees Nicaea as an "innovation" ignores the distinction between theological articulation and theological invention. The Nicene Creed did not introduce new beliefs but clarified the Church’s existing faith in response to Arianism’s challenge. The Church had always confessed Christ’s divinity, as evidenced by pre-Nicene writings like those of Ignatius of Antioch, Justin Martyr, and Irenaeus. These authors affirmed the eternal and divine nature of Christ, demonstrating that Nicene theology was not a departure but a formalization of long-held beliefs.
It is also important to note that Hart’s broader theological and philosophical work consistently affirms the centrality of Nicene theology to Christian orthodoxy. While he recognizes the historical complexity of the Arian controversy, he does not suggest that Arianism better reflects the apostolic faith. Instead, he critiques overly simplistic narratives about the development of Christian doctrine, emphasizing the importance of understanding historical context without undermining the theological validity of Nicene conclusions.
In conclusion, the assertion that Hart unequivocally sees Arius as representing the traditional view and Nicaea as an innovation misrepresents his position. Hart’s comments on theological diversity and the historical development of doctrine do not equate to an endorsement of Arianism or a rejection of Nicene theology. His acknowledgment of the complexity of early Christological debates underscores the need for nuanced understanding, not the wholesale dismissal of Nicene orthodoxy. The Nicene Creed, far from being an innovation, articulated and defended the Church’s apostolic faith against the distortions of Arianism.
If you are really interested in the history of Arianism, and don't just want to read the summary opinions of subversive liberal theologians and second-hand authors who throw in bold claims only to confirm your existing theological preconceptions, and to collect yummy punchlines to flaunt to those filthy "apostates," I suggest you read some more nuanced work, like this one:
Hanson - The search for the Christian doctrine of God : the Arian controversy, 318-381

@Blotty
First, dia does not intrinsically mean "source"; its meaning depends on the grammatical construction and context. When dia is used with the genitive case (as in John 1:3, Colossians 1:16, and Hebrews 1:2), it typically denotes active agency—the means or instrument by which an action is accomplished. This is distinct from the concept of "source," which is more commonly indicated by prepositions like ek ("from") or apo ("out of"). For example, Romans 11:36 uses ek autou ("from Him") to describe God as the source, followed by dia autou ("through Him") to describe the means or agency, and eis auton ("to Him") to indicate the purpose or goal. These prepositions highlight distinct aspects of God's relationship to creation, and dia in this context emphasizes active agency rather than origin or source.
In Hebrews 2:10, dia is again used with the genitive ("through whom all things exist"), referring to God's role as the one through whom creation and redemption are accomplished. While dia with the genitive can sometimes imply a close relationship between the agent and the origin of the action, it does not equate to the concept of "source" in the sense of ultimate causation. Instead, it highlights the instrumental or mediatory role in the act described. This distinction is vital to understanding passages like John 1:3 and Colossians 1:16, where Christ is presented as the divine agent of creation, not as a subordinate or separate source.
Your assertion that I have "acknowledged" dia can mean "source" misunderstands my argument. In cases where dia refers to active agency, it does not imply that the agent is the ultimate source or origin of the action. In Trinitarian theology, the Father is often described as the ultimate source (ek ou), while the Son is the agent (dia hou), and the Spirit is the perfecting force. This relational economy within the Trinity reflects distinct roles in divine action without implying ontological subordination or inequality. Therefore, acknowledging that dia can describe agency does not contradict my earlier points; rather, it reinforces the proper understanding of Christ's role in creation as the active and integral divine agent. You should read about Perichoresis.
The claim that I have inconsistently argued that dia "only means channel" is a strawman. My argument has been that dia with the genitive in these contexts emphasizes agency, not that it "only means channel" in every usage. The phrase "channel of an act" you invoke is not a dismissal of Christ’s role but an accurate description of how dia functions to highlight relational distinctions within the Godhead. To conflate this with denying Christ's divinity or agency is a misrepresentation of both my argument and the broader theological framework.
Your concession that dia in Hebrews 2:10 can describe the "channel" of creation aligns with my argument rather than refuting it. Christ, as the Logos, is the divine agent through whom all things exist, and this is entirely consistent with the language of Scripture and the theology of the early Church. The Logos is not a passive conduit or subordinate instrument but an active and integral participant in creation, fully divine and inseparable from the Father in essence and action. This distinction between agency and source does not diminish Christ’s role but affirms His unique position within the Trinitarian framework.
Finally, your appeal to "basic English grammar" as a rhetorical flourish does not address the substantive issues at hand. Greek prepositions like dia do not operate identically to English prepositions, and their meanings are shaped by grammatical case and context. Dismissing the nuanced theological implications of dia in favor of oversimplified or incorrect analogies betrays a lack of understanding of both Greek grammar and the biblical texts in question. If your critique is based on a superficial reading of the text without engaging the linguistic and theological nuances, it fails to undermine the consistency of my argument or the traditional understanding of Christ’s role as Creator.
406
Is Jesus the Creator?
by Sea Breeze in
1. watchtower
2. bible
that's what the word says.

.

colossians 1:16. for by him all things were created, both in the heavens and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or authorities—all things have been created through him and for him..
aqwsed12345

@slimboyfat
Hart’s acknowledgment that Arius was not a "strange, curious anomaly", "was regarded by many as" etc., and that his views were rooted in earlier theological currents does not equate to explicitly claiming that Arius "more faithfully represented the apostolic faith." Hart’s analysis focuses on the complexity of early Christian theological diversity, not on affirming the superiority or fidelity of Arian theology to apostolic teaching. There is a critical distinction between recognizing Arius as part of a broader theological tradition and suggesting that his views were closer to the apostolic faith than those of the Nicene "party."
Hart's comment about the Nicene party proposing "a new grammar" and introducing terms like homoousios reflects the historical fact that theological language developed over time to address specific controversies. However, Hart does not suggest that this development constitutes a departure from apostolic teaching. Rather, the adoption of homoousios was a necessary response to Arianism, which sought to redefine Christ’s relationship to the Father in a way that contradicted the apostolic understanding of His full divinity. The use of precise terminology like homoousios was not a creation of new doctrine but an articulation of the belief already embedded in the worship, prayers, and confessions of the early Church. To argue that a theological term is not in the Bible is as pathetic, primitive, and foolish an exegesis as the Amish logic that since cars are not mentioned in the Bible, only horse-drawn carriages can be used.
To interpret Hart’s comments as a wholesale endorsement of Arius is to ignore the broader thrust of his argument, which is concerned with the historical and theological dynamics of the early Church. Hart’s acknowledgment of Arianism’s historical roots does not negate the fact that he recognizes the Nicene Creed as a defense of the Church’s understanding of Christ’s divine nature against a theological innovation. Arianism’s claim that the Son was not begotted, but a created being ("there was a time when he was not") represented a deviation from the apostolic teaching that Jesus was eternal, divine, and of the same essence as the Father. This is precisely why Arianism was rejected by the broader Christian community and condemned as heretical at Nicaea.
Moreover, the argument that homoousios was "not in scripture" does not diminish its theological validity. Hart himself, in other writings and discussions, acknowledges that theological development is an inherent part of the Church’s life as it seeks to clarify and defend the truths revealed in Scripture. The Nicene party did not invent Christ’s divinity; they articulated it in precise terms to safeguard the apostolic faith against misinterpretations like Arianism. The fact that homoousios was a "new word" does not mean it introduced a new concept. The term encapsulated the biblical witness to Jesus’ divine nature, as seen in passages like John 1:1, Philippians 2:6-11, and Colossians 1:15-20.
Additionally, Hart’s observation that some bishops and priests adhered to what they believed was an "older view" does not imply that this view was correct or representative of the apostolic faith. Early Christian theology was marked by a diversity of thought, but not all theological currents were equally faithful to the apostolic witness. The early Church, through councils like Nicaea, discerned and defended the truth of Christ’s divinity against deviations like Arianism. The persistence of Arian and semi-Arian views after Nicaea reflects the complexity of theological disputes in the fourth century, not the validity of Arianism as a more authentic representation of the apostolic faith.
Hart’s acknowledgment of this historical complexity does not amount to a repudiation of Nicene theology or an explicitt endorsement of Arianism as the "orthodoxy of centuries." The claim that the Nicene "party" introduced a "new grammar" does not undermine the fact that this grammar faithfully expressed the substance of apostolic teaching. Hart’s discussion highlights the need for historical and theological nuance, not the wholesale rejection of Nicene orthodoxy in favor of Arianism.
406
Is Jesus the Creator?
by Sea Breeze in
1. watchtower
2. bible
that's what the word says.

.

colossians 1:16. for by him all things were created, both in the heavens and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or authorities—all things have been created through him and for him..
aqwsed12345
@Blotty
Regarding dia in Romans 11:36, your claim that it refers to "source" rather than "channel" misunderstands the distinction between the prepositions ex (from) and dia (through). Paul uses ex for the Father as the ultimate source ("from Him") and dia for the Son as the means or agent ("through Him"). This distinction highlights relational roles within the Godhead rather than ontological subordination. Dia consistently denotes agency rather than origination in the Pauline corpus when applied to Christ (e.g., John 1:3, Colossians 1:16, Hebrews 1:2). Your interpretation conflates these relational nuances, undermining the Trinitarian understanding of shared divine essence and distinct personal roles.
The claim that in Romans 11:36, dia refers to God as the source rather than as a channel misunderstands the preposition's semantic range and the specific context of this passage. In Romans 11:36, Paul uses three prepositional phrases: "from Him" (ex autou), "through Him" (dia autou), and "to Him" (eis auton). These prepositions highlight distinct aspects of God's relationship to creation: ex autou indicates that God is the ultimate source, dia autou emphasizes His active agency or means, and eis auton denotes the goal or purpose. The use of dia in this context does not imply inferiority but underscores the unity of the Godhead in creation. In Johannine theology, dia similarly reflects Christ’s active role in creation as the divine Word, not a subordinate instrument, but one who fully participates in the work of creation as God.
Your question about a "passive instrument" reveals a misunderstanding of the term and the argument. A passive instrument would imply something used by another without agency or self-determination, akin to a tool wielded by a craftsman. However, John 1:3 explicitly negates this interpretation by stating that "all things were made through Him, and without Him was not anything made that was made." This clause establishes the Logos as the necessary and active agent of creation. The Logos is not passive but integral to the creative process, as indicated by the phrase "without Him" (choris autou), which excludes any possibility of creation occurring apart from Him. This absolute negation leaves no room for the Logos to be a mere instrument or created being.
The idea that "absolute negation" was idiomatic in the biblical era lacks textual evidence in this context. While hyperbolic or idiomatic language exists in Scripture, the construction in John 1:3 is precise and unambiguous. The use of choris autou—combined with the double negation in the Greek text ("without Him was not... anything that was made")—intensifies the exclusivity of the Logos's role in creation. This language rules out the notion that the Logos is part of creation or a secondary agent.
Your assertion that Christ could be both "created" and "uncreated," drawing on Philo's concept of the Logos, reflects a misunderstanding of both Philo's philosophy and John's theology. Philo's Logos is a philosophical abstraction, a mediator between the divine and the material, whereas John's Logos is a person—Jesus Christ—who is fully divine and eternal. John’s description of the Logos as "with God" (pros ton Theon) and "was God" (theos ēn ho logos) affirms the Logos's full divinity and eternal existence. Unlike Eve, who was derived from Adam and is ontologically subordinate to him, the Logos is of the same divine essence as the Father, as clarified by the Nicene Creed's term homoousios ("of the same substance"). The analogy you propose is therefore incompatible with Johannine and Nicene theology. Philo's Logos concept is philosophical speculation, while John's Logos is firmly grounded in Jewish monotheism and the revelation of Christ as fully divine. The Logos is not created "from God's substance" in the manner you describe; such a view parallels Arianism, which was condemned as heretical by the early Church. The Nicene Creed clarifies that the Son is "begotten, not made, consubstantial with the Father." The analogy of Eve being formed from Adam misunderstands the distinction between human derivation and divine begetting. The Son's "begetting" is eternal, not a temporal or contingent event, emphasizing His equality and consubstantiality with the Father.
Your claim that creation is attributed solely to the Father reflects a selective reading of the Church Fathers. While the Father is often described as the "source" of creation (ex ou), the Son is consistently portrayed as the agent (dia hou), and the Spirit as the perfecting force. This Trinitarian framework is evident in Scripture (e.g., John 1:3, Col. 1:16-17, Heb. 1:2, 1 Cor. 8:6) and upheld by patristic theology. For instance, Irenaeus, in Against Heresies (Book 4, Chapter 20), refers to the Son and Spirit as the "two hands of God" in creation. This imagery underscores the collaborative and unified work of the Trinity in creation, without suggesting any ontological hierarchy.
Regarding Daniel Wallace and A.T. Robertson, your citations do not contradict my argument but rather reinforce it. Both scholars affirm that dia in John 1:3 and Colossians 1:16 emphasizes the Logos’s role as the divine agent in creation. Wallace, in Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics, explains that dia can indicate agency without implying inferiority, particularly when the context involves divine action. Similarly, Robertson acknowledges that the Son functions as the "intermediate agent" in creation, which is consistent with Trinitarian theology. Your attempt to use these scholars to suggest subordination misrepresents their positions, as neither Wallace nor Robertson denies the Logos’s full divinity or eternal nature. So your citation of Daniel Wallace and A.T. Robertson supports my argument, not yours. Wallace explicitly identifies dia as indicative of agency in John 1:3 and Colossians 1:16, emphasizing the Son's role in creation without implying inferiority. Robertson similarly recognizes the Logos as the active, sustaining agent in creation. Your selective interpretation of their works misrepresents their conclusions, which consistently affirm the high Christology of these texts.
The appeal to the intermediate agency of the Logos as a basis for subordination is a category error. In Trinitarian theology, "agency" reflects the relational distinctions within the Godhead, not an ontological hierarchy. The Father, Son, and Spirit act inseparably in all divine works, including creation. The Son’s role as the agent of creation (dia hou) does not imply subordination but highlights the relational economy of the Trinity, where the Father is the source, the Son the agent, and the Spirit the perfecter.
Your interpretation of the Logos as "created from God’s substance" contradicts the biblical and theological witness. The Nicene Creed explicitly rejects the idea that the Son is "made" (poiētos), affirming instead that He is "begotten, not made" (gennētos, ou poiētos). This distinction underscores that the Son is eternally generated from the Father, sharing the same divine essence, rather than being a creation. The analogy of Eve's derivation from Adam fails to capture the eternal and consubstantial relationship between the Father and the Son, which is foundational to Trinitarian theology.
On your point that the Church Fathers attribute creation solely to the Father, this is inaccurate. While the Fathers emphasize the Father's role as the source of creation, they also affirm the Son's active participation as Creator. For example, Irenaeus states in Against Heresies (Book 2, Chapter 30): "The Father, indeed, is above all, and He is the Head of Christ; but the Word is through all things and is Himself the head of the Church." This statement aligns with Hebrews 1:2 and Colossians 1:16, where the Son is described as the agent of creation. The relational distinctions in these descriptions reflect the economic Trinity, not subordination.
Regarding BeDuhn, his acknowledgment of theos as qualitative does not negate Christ's divinity. While BeDuhn prefers "divine" as a translation, he recognizes that this aligns with the Logos's divine nature as described in John 1:1. The qualitative use of theos emphasizes the Logos's full participation in the divine essence, not a lesser or created status. Your claim that I selectively omitted information is unsubstantiated; BeDuhn’s linguistic analysis supports the traditional understanding of John 1:1 as affirming the Logos's divine nature, even if he does not personally endorse Trinitarian theology.
BeDuhn acknowledges that theos can denote a category or class, but he does not reduce the Logos to being merely "a god" in the sense of polytheism or henotheism. Instead, his preference for the term "divine" reflects the qualitative nature of theos in John 1:1c, aligning with the broader Johannine context that emphasizes the Word's intrinsic divinity. This interpretation does not equate to an endorsement of the JWs’ theological stance, as BeDuhn himself critiques their translation's theological bias elsewhere.
Regarding the claim that theos as a "count noun" undermines its qualitative force, this argument misunderstands Greek syntax and semantics. While theos can function as a count noun, its role in John 1:1c aligns with qualitative usage. As noted by Harner and other scholars, the anarthrous predicate noun preceding the verb often emphasizes the nature or essence of the subject. In this case, it attributes divinity to the Word, consistent with the Gospel's prologue and broader theological framework. The qualitative interpretation of theos here does not necessitate subordination or categorical division but underscores the Word's shared essence with God. Check these:
- Revisiting the Colwell Construction in Light of Mass / Count Nouns Don Hartley
- Theos is a Count Noun: "God" or "a god" in John 1:1c Robert Hommel
The criticism that the neuter hen in John 10:30 does not indicate unity of essence due to the Incarnation is also misplaced. Theological nuances of Christ's dual nature (divine and human) do not negate His ontological unity with the Father. The use of hen emphasizes unity of will and essence, not mere functional agreement. This is corroborated by the immediate context, where Jesus’ claim leads to accusations of blasphemy, indicating that His audience understood Him to assert divine identity, not merely cooperative action.
On the claim that God as "spirit" (John 4:24) precludes Jesus’ shared essence during His earthly ministry, this reflects a misunderstanding of Trinitarian theology. The Incarnation does not diminish or alter Christ's divine essence; rather, it affirms the hypostatic union, where Christ is fully God and fully man. Describing God as "spirit" emphasizes His immaterial and eternal nature, which Jesus shares as the Logos.
The appeal to theos as a "count noun" fails to refute its qualitative application in John 1:1c. The argument presupposes a rigid linguistic framework that dismisses established grammatical insights. Scholars like Wallace and Harner demonstrate that theos in this context functions to attribute the essence of divinity to the Word without implying numerical separation or inferiority. The argument that theos must always be definite or indefinite overlooks the nuanced qualitative category evident in Koine Greek.
The critique conflates BeDuhn’s linguistic analysis with theological conclusions he does not make. His acknowledgment of the grammatical possibility of “a god” does not mean he endorses it as the most accurate or contextually appropriate rendering. BeDuhn’s focus on qualitative nuance supports a reading that recognizes the Word’s divinity in harmony with monotheistic Jewish theology. Mischaracterizing his position as aligning with JW theology misrepresents his work and the broader academic consensus.
Your assertion that ego eimi in John 8:58 simply indicates existence before Abraham but not eternal existence fails to account for the linguistic and contextual factors. The phrase ego eimi (I am) is not merely a statement of past existence but a present-tense declaration of ongoing being. This present tense, coupled with the temporal clause prin Abraam genesthai (“before Abraham came to be”), creates a contrast that goes beyond the simple claim of existence at a specific point in time. The use of the present tense where a past tense (e.g., ēmēn, “I was”) might be expected indicates a timeless, ongoing existence. This is consistent with how John presents Jesus in the Prologue (John 1:1), where the Logos is described as eternally pre-existent and divine.
Your suggestion that eternal existence could have been conveyed another way ignores the flexibility of Greek grammar. The structure of ego eimi uniquely emphasizes existence in a way that transcends time, which is precisely what John intended to communicate. It aligns with the Prologue's declaration that “the Word was with God, and the Word was God” and reflects a deliberate theological choice to present Jesus as the eternal Logos.
The dismissal of the connection between ego eimi in John 8:58 and the divine name in Exodus 3:14 is unfounded. While it is true that the LXX renders Exodus 3:14 as ego eimi ho on (“I am the Being”), the theological resonance between the two passages cannot be ignored. The use of ego eimi in John 8:58, without the qualification of ho on, emphasizes the immediacy and simplicity of Jesus’ claim to divinity. The reaction of the Jews—attempting to stone Him—confirms that they understood this as a blasphemous assertion of deity, paralleling God’s self-revelation to Moses. The assertion that ego eimi in John 8:58 carries the same resonance as ho on in Exodus 3:14 is supported by the broader Johannine context. The use of ego eimi in John consistently affirms Jesus’ divine identity, as seen in statements like “I am the way, the truth, and the life” (John 14:6) and “I am the resurrection and the life” (John 11:25). These declarations align with the divine self-revelation in Exodus and reflect Jesus’ unique role in salvation history.
The argument that ho on is emphasized in Exodus 3:14 rather than ego eimi overlooks the broader significance of God’s self-identification. While the phrase ho on (“the Being”) is present, ego eimi remains integral to the passage’s theology as it introduces God’s eternal and self-sufficient existence. The absence of ho on in John 8:58 does not diminish the theological connection but reflects John’s focus on Jesus’ appropriation of the divine name. The Gospel of John consistently portrays Jesus as embodying the divine identity, as seen in His other “I am” statements (e.g., John 6:35, John 14:6).
The claim that the Jews’ reaction was merely “perceived blasphemy” does not weaken the argument. Throughout the Gospel of John, the Jewish leaders accuse Jesus of blasphemy specifically because He claims equality with God (John 5:18; 10:30-33). The stoning attempt in John 8:59 is consistent with their understanding that Jesus was asserting divinity, whether or not they accepted the claim.
Your argument regarding the question “Who are you?” (John 8:25) as evidence that the Jews did not initially understand ego eimi as a divine claim overlooks the developing narrative. The question reflects their confusion and resistance to Jesus’ identity, not a denial of His claims. By the time of John 8:58-59, their reaction indicates that they did understand the theological weight of His words, even if they rejected the claim.
The idea that ego eimi could have been expressed differently to imply eternality misunderstands the nuance of Greek grammar. Using a past-tense verb like ēmēn (“I was”) would imply that Jesus’ existence before Abraham was finite or had ceased, which contradicts the intended meaning. The choice of the present tense conveys a continuous and timeless existence, aligning with the divine self-identification in Exodus 3:14.
Your argument that “Son of God” implies equality with God but not divinity in Jewish thought oversimplifies the theological context. While it is true that Son of God could be used for righteous individuals or the Davidic king, Jesus’ usage consistently goes beyond this. In John 5:18, the Jews understand His claim as making Himself “equal with God,” which they consider blasphemy. This equality is not merely functional but ontological, as evidenced by Jesus’ further claims of unity with the Father (John 10:30) and His acceptance of divine worship (John 20:28).
Your dismissal of the predicate-less ego eimi in John 8:58 as an echo of Exodus 3:14 ignores both the linguistic and theological context. The Septuagint's rendering of Exodus 3:14 as ego eimi ho on ("I am the Being") establishes a connection between ego eimi and divine self-identification. In John 8:58, Jesus deliberately uses ego eimi in a way that transcends temporal constraints, asserting eternal existence. The Jews' reaction—attempting to stone Him—demonstrates their understanding of His claim to deity, consistent with the Gospel's high Christology. The suggestion of an implied predicate in ego eimi based on the NIV translation does not apply to John 8:58. While ego eimi can have an implied predicate in some contexts (e.g., John 6:20, “It is I”), its predicate-less usage in John 8:58 is unique and intentional. It conveys existence rather than identification, reinforcing its theological significance.
Your argument that the Jews' initial question, "Who are you?" (John 8:25), undermines the divine claim of ego eimi in John 8:58 is flawed. The question reflects their ongoing misunderstanding and resistance to Jesus' identity, a recurring theme in John's Gospel. By the time of John 8:58, the context and phrasing of Jesus' statement clearly provoke the Jews to accuse Him of blasphemy, confirming their recognition of His divine claim. The claim that the Jewish reaction in John 8:59 could be explained solely by Jesus’ claim to have seen Abraham is inadequate. While the statement that Jesus existed before Abraham would be provocative, it would not necessarily provoke an accusation of blasphemy and an immediate attempt to stone Him. The context and reaction suggest that the Jews understood Jesus’ words as a claim to divine identity.
On John 5:18, your assertion that the Jews accused Jesus only of equality with God, not being God, misreads the text. Equality with God in this context implies sharing divine prerogatives, which the Jews understood as a claim to deity. Similarly, your claim that the Son's authority to forgive sins (Mark 2:10) was merely given to Him ignores the broader theological context of His divine identity. The authority to forgive sins is a prerogative of God alone (Isaiah 43:25), and Jesus exercises it by His own inherent authority.
Your argument that Jesus’ authority to forgive sins was merely given to Him (e.g., Mark 2:10) misunderstands the theological implications. While Jesus acts in accordance with the Father’s will, His authority to forgive sins reflects His divine identity. The scribes’ reaction in Mark 2:7 (“Who can forgive sins but God alone?”) confirms that they understood this act as a claim to divine prerogative. The argument that the Jews only accused Jesus of claiming equality with God but not of being God misrepresents the text. In John 10:33, the Jews explicitly accuse Jesus of “making [Himself] God,” demonstrating that they understood His claim to be ontological, not merely functional. The distinction you propose between equality and identity does not hold in the context of the Jewish leaders’ accusations.
Your critique of Revelation's use of "Alpha and Omega" fails to account for the consistent application of this title to Christ (Revelation 1:8, 21:6, 22:13), affirming His divine status. While the title also applies to the Father, this reflects the shared divine identity of the Father and the Son, consistent with Trinitarian theology.
Trinitarian theology, as you rightly pointed out, is derived from the cumulative and interconnected evidence of Scripture, not isolated passages. This approach respects the nature of biblical revelation, where truths about God are revealed progressively and holistically across the entirety of Scripture. In contrast, JW theology is built on such one-liner prooftexts and punchlines, and it is entirely fair to point out that this does not actually work.
The reason Trinitarians ask JWs for explicit passages—such as evidence that Jesus is Michael the Archangel—is because the JW position hinges on claims of explicit textual evidence. For example, they assert that Jesus is explicitly Michael, or that God’s name "Jehovah" must appear in the NT, and so the burden of proof naturally falls on them to provide direct support for those assertions.
By contrast, Trinitarian theology doesn’t rest on one isolated verse but on the whole counsel of Scripture. For example:
- John 1:1 describes the divine nature of the Logos, who "was God."
- Philippians 2:6 speaks of Christ’s equality with God.
- Matthew 28:19 demonstrates the unity and shared authority of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
These passages, taken together with others like John 20:28 (where Thomas calls Jesus "My Lord and My God") and Colossians 1:15–20 (describing Christ as the Creator of all things), form a cohesive picture that supports the Trinity.
When JWs or other non-Trinitarians challenge the Trinity, they often focus on denying its cumulative basis, insisting instead on isolated, explicit texts that they feel undermine it. Yet, when challenged on their own teachings (e.g., that Jesus is Michael), they cannot provide cumulative evidence—let alone explicit texts—to substantiate their position.
Thus, the request for explicit passages is not a double standard; it’s a logical response to specific claims. Trinitarian doctrine has never claimed to rest on a single verse but on the consistent and harmonious testimony of Scripture as a whole. I would encourage you to apply the same standard of cumulative evidence to your own theology and ask whether it aligns with the breadth of biblical revelation.
406
Is Jesus the Creator?
by Sea Breeze in
1. watchtower
2. bible
that's what the word says.

.

colossians 1:16. for by him all things were created, both in the heavens and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or authorities—all things have been created through him and for him..
aqwsed12345

@Blotty
Regarding the Wikipedia issue, your critique misrepresents my position. I did not claim you accused me of relying on Wikipedia; I addressed your dismissal of its validity. Your own "blanket policy" acknowledges its utility if corroborated by reliable sources, which undermines the general rejection you initially implied.
The claim that "without Him was not anything made" (John 1:3) doesn't exclude the possibility of the Logos being a created entity misunderstands the passage's construction. The statement categorically excludes anything made without the Logos. This would include the Logos if He were created, creating a logical impossibility.
The Greek phrase choris autou ("without Him") is an absolute negation, leaving no room for exceptions. This grammatical structure ensures that the Logos was not merely a passive tool but an essential, active agent in creation. The text explicitly places the Logos in a position of indispensable creative authority, refuting any notion of passivity.
You challenge the claim that dia (through) does not imply inferiority or dependence and demand an exception. In Greek, dia often denotes agency, indicating the means by which an action is accomplished. Its use does not inherently imply subordination or inferiority. For instance, in Romans 11:36, Paul writes, "For from Him and through [dia] Him and to Him are all things." Here, dia is used for God’s agency in creation, clearly not implying inferiority. Similarly, in John 1:3 and Colossians 1:16, dia highlights the Son’s role as the divine agent in creation, functioning within the unity of the Godhead. It emphasizes the relational distinction between the Father as the source and the Son as the agent without suggesting ontological subordination. Dia ("through") often indicates active agency without implying inferiority. For example, Hebrews 1:2 describes the Son as the one "through whom" God made the universe, affirming His divine role without subordination. If you demand citations, the works of Daniel Wallace or A.T. Robertson on Greek prepositions provide ample evidence.
You assert that the Trinity as a whole is the Creator and accuse me of misleading language by distinguishing the roles of Father, Son, and Spirit. However, Trinitarian theology does not deny that the entire Godhead acts in creation. Instead, it affirms that each divine person participates in creation according to their unique roles: the Father as the source, the Son as the agent, and the Spirit as the sustainer. This relational distinction does not imply inequality but reflects the harmonious operation of the one divine essence. While early writers like Tertullian or Origen may not have used later Nicene terminology, their writings affirm the Son’s divine agency in creation. For example, Tertullian states in Against Praxeas: "The Father created the world through His Word," acknowledging the Son’s active role as Creator. The development of Trinitarian language over time does not negate this foundational truth but clarifies it.
You claim that I misrepresented your position on Isaiah 44:24, suggesting you never said it excludes the Son. However, the implication of your argument—that creation is attributed solely to the Father—contradicts the NT’s consistent application of OT creation texts to the Son. Hebrews 1:10 applies Psalm 102:25-27 to the Son, directly attributing Yahweh’s creative work to Him. The unity of Father and Son in creation is a fundamental aspect of Trinitarian theology, underscoring the Son’s full participation in the divine identity. If you agree that the Son participates in creation, then you align with the Trinitarian understanding that creation is the work of the one God involving all three persons.
Calling something "a god" in metaphorical terms (e.g., Psalm 82 or 2 Corinthians 4:4) itself does not equate to polytheism or henotheism. These passages use "god" as a metaphor to describe authority or divine representation, not divinity in the ontological sense. In John 1:1, however, the term theos qualitatively describes the Logos as possessing the divine essence, which aligns with Jewish monotheism and the broader context of John's Gospel. This is a theological and linguistic distinction. The metaphorical use of "gods" in contexts like Psalm 82 or 2 Corinthians 4:4 does not equate to polytheism or henotheism because it does not involve ontological divinity. In Psalm 82 human judges are called "gods" (elohim) because they act as representatives of God’s authority, not because they are divine beings. Jesus uses this argument in John 10:34-36 to demonstrate the appropriateness of His claim to divine sonship. In 2 Corinthians 4:4 Satan is referred to as "the god of this age" metaphorically, denoting his temporary authority in a fallen world, not literal deity. By contrast, John 1:1c uses "theos" qualitatively to affirm the Logos' divine nature, not metaphorically. The Word is not likened to a godly figure or representative but is described as sharing fully in the divine essence. The NWT's rendering of "a god" imposes an interpretation that introduces a polytheistic nuance foreign to the Johannine text.
If you equate "a god" with "a divine person," you misunderstand the theological implications. The phrase "a god" introduces ambiguity and suggests separateness or subordination, which is inconsistent with John’s monotheistic framework. The qualitative reading of "theos" in John 1:1c does not present the Word as "a divine person" among many but as possessing the full essence of divinity. BeDuhn has clarified his stance in his works. While he prefers "divine" as a translation, his use of the term does not align with the Trinitarian understanding of Christ's full divinity. However, his critique of traditional translations like the NWT does not amount to an endorsement of their theological implications. His linguistic analysis must be distinguished from theological conclusions. BeDuhn’s "divine" emphasizes the qualitative nature of the Logos without explicitly endorsing the Arian interpretation of "a god." His preference for "divine" reflects the Logos' nature as distinct but does not reject Trinitarian possibilities, as he has acknowledged that his translation leaves room for multiple interpretations.
Your critique of applying modern meanings to "divine" ignores how BeDuhn’s preference for "divine" reflects the qualitative nature of theos in John 1:1c. BeDuhn does not endorse a polytheistic/henotheistic interpretation; rather, he acknowledges the qualitative aspect of the Logos’ divinity. Your claim that you could email him to clarify underscores the need for rigorous analysis over speculation. If you choose to contact BeDuhn, it would be prudent to frame your questions carefully, distinguishing between his linguistic analysis and his personal theological views. However, his prior work already suggests that his preferred translation, "divine," is open to interpretation and does not necessarily support Jehovah’s Witness theology. Even if BeDuhn is non-Trinitarian, this does not invalidate Trinitarian scholarship or early Christian interpretations affirming Christ's full divinity.
Your insistence on focusing solely on linguistics while disregarding theological context is problematic. Greek grammar operates within the framework of meaning, which includes theological nuances in texts like John 1:1 and John 8:58. Stripping these texts of their theological context results in incomplete interpretations. Your personal theological preferences are noted, but this debate is not about personal preferences; it is about textual, historical, and linguistic analysis. The discussion hinges on what the original Greek text and early Christian interpretations indicate, not on whether you personally accept Trinitarian theology.
The term "worship" as applied to Christ in the New Testament (e.g., Matthew 28:17; Hebrews 1:6) reflects the veneration due only to God. In Greek, the word proskyneō (worship) can indicate varying levels of reverence, but when directed toward Christ, it is consistently within a divine framework, affirming His full deity. Modern definitions of "worship" align with this understanding, emphasizing supreme reverence, which is inconsistent with Jehovah’s Witness theology that restricts worship to the Father.
John 10:30’s statement, "I and the Father are one," uses the neuter hen to express unity in essence, not merely cooperative action. The reaction of the Jews—attempting to stone Jesus for blasphemy—indicates they understood this as a claim to divinity, not just moral unity. The broader context of John 10 supports this interpretation.
On Revelation 22:13, you misconstrue my argument. The angel quoting "Alpha and Omega" does not attribute this title to itself but conveys the words of Christ, as seen in the consistent use of the title for God or Jesus in Revelation (1:8, 21:6, 22:13).
Your dismissal of the connection between John 8:58’s ego eimi and Exodus 3:14 reflects a misunderstanding. The Septuagint’s rendering of Exodus 3:14 as ego eimi ho on ("I am the Being") underscores God’s eternal self-existence. While the phrase "I am" in John 8:58 doesn’t replicate the exact wording, its predicate-less structure conveys eternal existence. The Jewish reaction—attempting to stone Jesus—indicates they understood His claim as divine.
On John 8:58, translating ego eimi as "I have been" diminishes the statement's theological significance. Jesus’ use of ego eimi without a predicate conveys a timeless existence, aligning with the Prologue’s declaration of His eternal nature. The broader context of John’s Gospel consistently affirms Jesus’ divinity, making the claim of eternal existence fitting.
The predicate-less ego eimi is a deliberate echo of the divine name revealed in Exodus 3:14, where God declares, "I AM WHO I AM" (Ehyeh Asher Ehyeh). The Septuagint renders this as ego eimi ho on ("I am the Being"), linking ego eimi to God’s self-identification. In John 8:58, Jesus’ use of ego eimi contrasts with the temporal clause "before Abraham was" (prin Abraam genesthai), emphasizing His eternal existence. The reaction of the Jews—attempting to stone Him—confirms their understanding of this as a claim to deity, not merely preexistence. Your assertion that ego eimi could have been expressed differently to indicate eternality ignores the theological weight of Jesus’ words and the broader Johannine context, where His divine identity is a recurring theme (e.g., John 1:1, John 20:28).
You claim that the Jews’ question, "Who are you?" (John 8:25), undermines the significance of ego eimi. However, this question does not diminish Jesus’ declaration but reflects their ongoing confusion and rejection of His claims. Throughout John’s Gospel, the Jews repeatedly misunderstand or resist Jesus’ assertions of His identity (e.g., John 6:41-42, John 10:24-26). Their response highlights their unwillingness to accept the implications of His words, not a lack of clarity on Jesus’ part.
You also argue that the Septuagint’s emphasis on "the Being" (ho on) in Exodus 3:14 undermines the connection between ego eimi and the divine name. However, the distinction is not as stark as you suggest. The phrase ego eimi in John 8:58 carries the same theological resonance as ho on, as both expressions emphasize God’s eternal, self-existent nature. The absence of ho on in John 8:58 does not weaken the connection to Exodus 3:14 but reflects John’s theological focus on Jesus’ personal appropriation of the divine name.
Your dismissal of ego eimi as a declaration of deity because it does not explicitly state eternal existence overlooks the cumulative evidence of John’s Gospel. The Prologue (John 1:1-3) establishes the Logos as eternal and divine, and Jesus’ "I am" statements throughout the Gospel consistently affirm His divine identity (e.g., John 6:35, John 10:11, John 14:6). The use of ego eimi in John 8:58 is a climactic affirmation of this identity, grounded in the broader narrative of the Gospel.
You challenge my interpretation of John 5:18, claiming that equality with God and being God are separate concepts in Jewish thought. While it is true that claiming equality with God does not necessarily equate to claiming to be God, the context of John’s Gospel shows that Jesus’ claims went beyond equality. In John 10:30, Jesus declares, "I and the Father are one," prompting the Jews to accuse Him of blasphemy for "making Himself God" (John 10:33). This reaction confirms that Jesus’ statements were understood as assertions of deity, not merely equality.
Your assertion that a prophet once forgave sins like Jesus overlooks the unique authority with which Jesus forgave sins. In Mark 2:5-12, Jesus forgives the paralytic’s sins and justifies His authority by healing him, stating, "The Son of Man has authority on earth to forgive sins." Unlike OT prophets, who acted as intermediaries delivering God’s message, Jesus forgave sins by His own authority, a prerogative reserved for God alone. This distinction underscores His divine identity and authority.
Your claim that "Son of God" implies equality but not divinity in Jewish thought is incomplete. In John 5:18, the Jews accuse Jesus of "making Himself equal with God," showing that this title was understood as a divine claim. Additionally, forgiving sins (Mark 2:5-12) and accepting worship (John 20:28) are divine prerogatives, not merely actions of a prophet.
Finally, your claim of double standards regarding explicit passages misunderstands the nature of biblical revelation. Trinitarian doctrine emerges from the cumulative evidence of Scripture, not isolated proof texts. When asking for explicit passages from Jehovah’s Witnesses, the request addresses their specific claims, such as Jesus being Michael the Archangel, which lacks clear biblical support. In contrast, the deity of Christ is supported by the interconnected itness of Scripture.
167
How did JWs arrive at a clearer understanding of what the Bible teaches than other Christian denominations?
by slimboyfat in
1. watchtower
2. beliefs
for jws who believe that jehovah had a hand in reviving the truth in the nineteenth century this is enough explanation for how jws managed to achieve a closer approximation to early christian beliefs and practices than other groups.

but is there an explanation for this phenomenon that doesn’t rely on supernatural intervention?

new testament scholar james dunn explains the difficulty of interpreting the biblical texts in this way:.
aqwsed12345

Bart Ehrman’s perspective on the formation of the New Testament canon reflects a common historical-critical approach but requires careful response from a Catholic viewpoint to address misconceptions and inaccuracies. The Catholic understanding of how the New Testament canon was formed is rooted in both historical evidence and theological principles, and it differs significantly from Ehrman’s portrayal. The claim that the New Testament canon was formed solely through centuries of debate among church leaders without any definitive resolution until the Council of Trent (16th century) oversimplifies and misrepresents historical reality. While the canonization process was indeed gradual, the Catholic Church recognizes that the Holy Spirit guided the Church in discerning the canon. Lists of authoritative texts, such as those by St. Athanasius in his Festal Letter (AD 367) or the Synods of Hippo (AD 393) and Carthage (AD 397), show that by the late 4th century, a clear consensus had emerged on the 27 books of the New Testament. These local councils were not isolated but reflected the broader agreement within the universal Church. They affirmed rather than invented the canon. This understanding is consistent with the Church’s teaching authority, which was established by Christ himself (e.g., Matthew 16:18-19) and exercised through Apostolic succession.
Ehrman’s characterization of the canonization process as a "popularity contest" among literate elites neglects the theological foundation of the Church’s decisions. The canon was not determined by human preference but by the recognition of divine inspiration and Apostolic origin. Books like the Gospels and Paul’s letters were accepted not because they were merely popular but because they were understood to bear witness to the true teachings of Christ and the Apostles. The Church rejected texts such as the Gospel of Thomas or the Shepherd of Hermas not arbitrarily but because they either lacked Apostolic authorship or contained teachings incompatible with orthodox Christianity.
Ehrman’s suggestion that Christianity’s exclusivity and insistence on a single truth led to the formation of the canon is accurate to an extent but misses the essential point. The Church’s commitment to one truth stems from Christ’s own claims (e.g., John 14:6) and the Apostolic mission to safeguard and proclaim this truth (e.g., 1 Timothy 3:15). The development of the canon was a natural outgrowth of this mission, ensuring that the faithful would have a reliable record of God’s revelation. The Church’s insistence on preserving orthodoxy was not a form of authoritarianism but a means of protecting the faithful from heresies that could distort the Gospel message.
Finally, the notion that the Council of Trent "invented" the canon in response to the Protestant Reformation is a common misconception. In reality, Trent reaffirmed the canon that had been consistently recognized by the Church for over a millennium. This reaffirmation was necessary to counter the reformers' rejection of certain books, such as the deuterocanonical texts, which had been included in the Septuagint and used by early Christians. The deuterocanonical books were accepted by the Church because they were part of the Scriptures that Jesus and the Apostles used, as evidenced by numerous quotations and allusions in the New Testament.
The Catholic Church understands the canonization of the New Testament as a process guided by the Holy Spirit, rooted in the Church’s Apostolic authority, and confirmed through the discernment of early councils and theologians. Ehrman’s portrayal may resonate with a secular academic audience, but it overlooks the theological and ecclesial dimensions that are essential to understanding how and why the canon was formed. The Catholic Church did not arbitrarily decide the canon but faithfully discerned and safeguarded the books that truly convey God’s revelation to humanity.