MadApostate

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Posts by MadApostate

• 
  21

  JURY AWARDS $1,210,000 TO JW FOR DISCRIMINATION

  by MadApostate in

  1. watchtower
  2. scandals

  is this guy fred hall, nytelecom, or one of ldh's or essie's relatives?.

  [nyjw] sued his former employer, [defendant], alleging employment discrimination in violation of title vii of the civil rights act of 1964, 42 u. s. c. 2000e.

  proceeding pro se, [nyjw] argued his case to a jury beginning january 12, 199[8].

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  MadApostate

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• 
  10

  JW CONVICTED/JAILED FOR STALKING ANOTHER JW FAMILY

  by MadApostate in

  1. watchtower
  2. scandals

  for the district of massachusetts.

  " this conduct forms count i of the indictment issued against nedd in this case ("interstate threats" in violation of 18 u.s.c.

  875(c) - interstate threats .

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  MadApostate

  This is long, but well worth the read time, plus amusing and enlightening!!!
• 
  19

  JW ELDERS APPLY/RECEIVE CLERGY TAX EXEMPTION

  by MadApostate in

  1. watchtower
  2. scandals

  opinions of counsel.

  volume 10 - opinions of counsel sbrps no.

  these opinions are subject to revision and editing changes prior to publication.

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  MadApostate

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• 
  21

  JURY AWARDS $1,210,000 TO JW FOR DISCRIMINATION

  by MadApostate in

  1. watchtower
  2. scandals

  is this guy fred hall, nytelecom, or one of ldh's or essie's relatives?.

  [nyjw] sued his former employer, [defendant], alleging employment discrimination in violation of title vii of the civil rights act of 1964, 42 u. s. c. 2000e.

  proceeding pro se, [nyjw] argued his case to a jury beginning january 12, 199[8].

  1. 
  2. 
  3. 
• 

  MadApostate

  I posted this for obvious reasons (that is, obvious to anyone other than LDH).

  However, I've edited the original post to blue highlight parts such as:

  1. NYJW was allowed to act as his own attorney, and present his own case to the jury.

  2. NYJW used his "JW-ness" as part of his "offense", or else this appellate judge would not have known about such.

  3. The case "boiled-down" to the NYJW's word against the word of the employer and the other employees, AND the Jury chose to believe NYJW.
• 
  10

  JW CONVICTED/JAILED FOR STALKING ANOTHER JW FAMILY

  by MadApostate in

  1. watchtower
  2. scandals

  for the district of massachusetts.

  " this conduct forms count i of the indictment issued against nedd in this case ("interstate threats" in violation of 18 u.s.c.

  875(c) - interstate threats .

  1. 
  2. 
  3. 
• 

  MadApostate

  Is this Fred Hall, NYTelecom, or one of LDH's or Essie's relatives?

  --------------------------------------------

  United States Court of Appeals
  For the First Circuit
  No. 00-2569
  UNITED STATES,
  
  Appellee,
  
  v.
  
  PETER A. NEDD,
  
  Defendant, Appellant.
  
  APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
  
  FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
  
  [Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]
  
  Before
  
  Torruella, Circuit Judge,
  Campbell and Bownes, Senior Circuit Judges.

  Owen S. Walker, Federal Public Defender, for appellant.

  John T. McNeil, Assistant U.S. Attorney, with whom Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief for appellee.

  September 4, 2001

  CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge. Peter Nedd appeals from his sentence of thirty-three months imprisonment imposed after pleading nolo contendere to four counts of transmitting threatening communications in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) and pleading guilty to one count of interstate violation of a restraining order in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(1). He argues that the district court erred in its application of the grouping rules of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, in particular, U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 ("Groups of Closely Related Counts"), by grouping the five-count indictment into three groups instead of into one group.(1) We affirm, although on an interpretation of the grouping rules different from that of the district court.

  I. BACKGROUND

  The facts underlying this appeal are not in dispute. We take the facts and sentencing details from the Presentence Report (PSR) and the transcript of proceedings below. United States v. Lindia, 82 F.3d 1154, 1158 (1st Cir. 1996).

  Defendant's Personal History

  Defendant Peter Nedd is a thirty-eight year old man with a history of mental illness such as manic depression and schizophrenia, both of which were diagnosed in 1989 when he was living in Boston and hospitalized for a brief time.

  While a resident of Boston, Nedd attended the Kingdom Hall of Jehovah Witnesses in Cambridge. There he met the Carpenter family, Richard and Andrea Carpenter and their daughter Chantelle. Nedd became obsessed with Chantelle, desiring her romantic affection. Nedd would call the Carpenters' house repeatedly requesting to see Chantelle and would send Chantelle gifts. His attention was unreciprocated. Richard Carpenter became especially concerned with Nedd's behavior when, in 1996, Nedd falsely claimed that Richard Carpenter had given Chantelle permission to marry Nedd. At the time, Chantelle was a teenager and Nedd in his early thirties.
  Although Nedd moved to New York in 1996, his obsession with Chantelle did not end. He continued to call the Carpenters' home and to send letters and gifts to Chantelle. The Carpenters felt harassed by Nedd's repeated communications. They stopped answering their phone and began to record all of his telephone messages with their answering machine.
  The Carpenters describe Nedd's messages left on the their answering machine in the fall of 1998 as changing in tone from romantic obsession to threatening violence. Those messages demanded that Richard Carpenter allow Chantelle to marry Nedd or that Chantelle return all the gifts Nedd had sent her. The Carpenters did not return Nedd's calls.
  In May 1999, Nedd came from New York to Boston to see Chantelle. When Richard and Andrea Carpenter learned that Nedd was in Boston, they sent Chantelle into hiding and obtained a temporary restraining order against Nedd. That restraining order was made permanent on June 3, 1999 and prohibits Nedd from, among other things, threatening either Richard or Chantelle Carpenter.

  Criminal Conduct for the Instant Case

  Although Nedd returned to New York without further calls or attempted visits to the Carpenters' home, during the summer of 1999, he persisted in harassing the Carpenters as before.(2) Then, on October 14, 1999, Nedd called the Carpenters from New York and left what would be the first of four recorded violent messages on their home telephone answering machine that form the bulk of the present charges. On that day he left the following message on the Carpenters' answering machine:

  "Hey Richard Carpenter, did you get that letter I sent your fucking daughter, . . . if I see you and you come near me I will break your fucking jaw. If you have a fucking gun, I will shove that shit up your fucking hole and blow your fucking brains out . . . ." This conduct forms Count I of the indictment issued against Nedd in this case ("Interstate Threats" in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)).

  On October 18, 1999, Nedd again called the Carpenters, this time saying that he was on his way to Boston. After arriving in Boston, he made several calls to the Carpenters and tried to visit them at their home, to no avail. This behavior violated the permanent restraining order and is the conduct that forms Count VI of the indictment ("Interstate Violation of a Restraining Order" in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(1)).

  On November 30, 1999, Nedd left another message from New York on the Carpenters' answering machine that said, in relevant part:

  "Hey Richard, if I don't get my fucking shit back that I gave your daughter . . . with a fucking note that says I am sorry I hurt your feelings . . ., I will fucking kill you, and her, and your fucking wife [slams the phone down]." This conduct forms Count II of the indictment ("Interstate Threats," 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)).

  On December 4, 1999, Nedd left the following message that forms Count III of the indictment ("Interstate Threats," 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)):

  "Hey Richard Carpenter, guess what? . . . I'm going to kill you and I am going to beat the shit out of you and if I see your fucking daughter I'll beat the shit out of her and fuck her up the ass like a fucking dog . . . ."

  On December 6, 1999, Nedd left the last of the four messages described in the indictment. This one forms Count IV ("Interstate Threats," 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)). It said:

  "Hey Richard Carpenter . . . I'm going to fucking kill you . . . I'm coming to Boston, Richard, and this time you won't see me. And when you come to your fucking house I will break your fucking head open. I'll kill your wife and your fucking daughter if you do not send all my personal things back . . . ."

  C. Charges and Plea

  On April 26, 2000, Nedd was charged with four counts of interstate threats in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (Counts I-IV) and one count of interstate violation of a restraining order in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(1)(Count VI). On July 13, 2000, the district court accepted Nedd's plea of nolo contendere to Counts I-IV and accepted Nedd's plea of guilty to Count VI. The charges to which he pleaded read as follows:

  COUNT ONE: 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) - Interstate Threats
  . . .
  On or about October 14, 1999, at Boston, in the District of Massachusetts,

  PETER A. NEDD

  defendant herein, knowingly and willfully transmitted in interstate commerce a communication containing a threat to injure the person of another, to wit: a telephone call originating outside the Commonwealth of Massachusetts placed to a telephone in Boston, Massachusetts which threatened to break the jaw and to blow the brains out of Richard Carpenter.
  All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 875(c).

  COUNT TWO: 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) -
  Interstate Threats
  . . .

  On or about November 30, 1999, at Boston, in the District of Massachusetts,

  PETER A. NEDD

  defendant herein, knowingly and willfully transmitted in interstate commerce a communication containing a threat to injure the person of another, to wit: a telephone call originating outside the Commonwealth of Massachusetts placed to a telephone in Boston, Massachusetts which threatened to kill Richard Carpenter, Andrea Carpenter, and Chantelle Carpenter.
  All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 875(c).

  COUNT THREE: 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) - Interstate Threats
  . . .
  On or about December 4, 1999, at Boston, in the District of Massachusetts,

  PETER A. NEDD

  defendant herein, knowingly and willfully transmitted in interstate commerce a communication containing a threat to injure the person of another, to wit: a telephone call originating outside the Commonwealth of Massachusetts placed to a telephone in Boston, Massachusetts which threatened to kill Richard Carpenter, and to beat and to forcibly sodomize Chantelle Carpenter.
  All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 875(c).

  COUNT FOUR: 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) - Interstate Threats
  . . .
  On or about December 6, 1999, at Boston, in the District of Massachusetts,

  PETER A. NEDD

  defendant herein, knowingly and willfully transmitted in interstate commerce a communication containing a threat to injure the person of another, to wit: a telephone call originating in New York State placed to a telephone in Boston, Massachusetts which threatened to kill Richard Carpenter, Andrea Carpenter, and Chantelle Carpenter.
  All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 875(c).
  . . .

  COUNT SIX: 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(1) - Interstate Violation of a Protective Order
  . . .
  On or about October 18, 1999, at Boston, in the District of Massachusetts,

  PETER A. NEDD

  defendant herein, traveled across the State line of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts with the intent to engage in conduct that violated that portion of the protection order issued by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Superior Court that involved protection of Richard Carpenter and Chantelle Carpenter against repeated harassment, and the defendant subsequently engaged in repeated harassment in violation of that protective order by repeatedly telephoning the residence of Richard and Chantelle Carpenter on or about October 18 and 19, 1999, and by attempting to visit them at their residence on or about October 18, 1999.

  All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2262(a)(1).

  On November 29, 2000, the district court sentenced Nedd to thirty-three months incarceration and three years of supervised release, imposing a number of special conditions including that the defendant continue to take his anti-psychotic medication and that he have no contact with the Carpenters.

  The Sentencing Determination Made Below

  At the sentencing hearing in the district court, the court discussed with the parties the most appropriate method under the Sentencing Guidelines for grouping the five counts of the indictment. See generally U.S.S.G., Ch. 3, Pt. D, introductory cmt. (entitled "Multiple Counts", one purpose of which is to "determin[e] a single offense level that encompasses all the counts of which the defendant is convicted"). Probation recommended grouping the five counts according to victim, positing three groups, one for each of the three members of the Carpenter family.(3) The government advocated probation's position with proffers of victim impact statements from each of the Carpenters. Nedd's counsel objected to this method, arguing that grouping by victim was not permitted under the Sentencing Guidelines as such a method split a count among several groups, putting one count into more than one group, see infra note 3, and therefore had the potential to create more groups than counts and would thwart the purposes of grouping, which is to lessen the amount of sentencing determinations and to "prevent multiple punishment for substantially identical offense conduct." Id. It was and remains the defendant's position that all five counts should form one group. According to the defendant, all five counts involve substantially the same harm within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 (stating that "[a]ll counts involving substantially the same harm shall be grouped together into a single Group"). This would result in a sentence of eighteen to twenty-four months, as opposed to the twenty-seven to thirty-three month range for the three victim-defined groups advocated by the government.

  The district court sentenced Nedd to thirty-three months in prison, the high-end of the government's proposed guideline range. In so doing, the district court settled on three groups for the five counts of the indictment, accepting probation's and the government's position that grouping the counts of the indictment into three groups by victim, each a member of the Carpenter family, was the correct application of the Sentencing Guidelines. Nedd has appealed from this sentencing determination.
• 
  21

  JURY AWARDS $1,210,000 TO JW FOR DISCRIMINATION

  by MadApostate in

  1. watchtower
  2. scandals

  is this guy fred hall, nytelecom, or one of ldh's or essie's relatives?.

  [nyjw] sued his former employer, [defendant], alleging employment discrimination in violation of title vii of the civil rights act of 1964, 42 u. s. c. 2000e.

  proceeding pro se, [nyjw] argued his case to a jury beginning january 12, 199[8].

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  3. 
• 

  MadApostate

  Is this guy Fred Hall, NYTelecom, or one of LDH's or Essie's relatives?

  ------------------------------------------------------

  [NYJW] sued his former employer, [Defendant], alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e. Proceeding pro se, [NYJW] argued his case to a jury beginning January 12, 199[8].

  On January 15, 1998 the jury returned a verdict awarding [NYJW] $210,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000,000 in punitive damages. Presently before the Court are plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to conform to the proof at trial and [Defendant's] application to reduce the award to $300,000 under the applicable statutory scheme. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's motion is denied, and defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

  BACKGROUND

  [NYJW] was fired from the [Defendant] on March 11, 1995. [NYJW], who is black, alleges that he was treated differently than were white employees during his employment and that he was fired and then not re-hired because of his race.

  Plaintiff brought the instant action under Title VII and represented himself during pretrial motions and at trial.

  From the evidence adduced at trial, the jury could have found that [Defendant] denied [NYJW] prompt access to medical care after he was injured in the workplace, delaying his eventual trip to the hospital by a number of hours. The jury could further have concluded that [Defendant's] actions in this regard were either motivated by plaintiff's race or by stereotypes about the behavior of persons of plaintiff's race.

  The parties further disputed the events leading up to [NYJW's] termination. While [Defendant] alleged that [NYJW] was fired because he posed a threat to his co-workers, the jury could reasonably have found that the only "source" from which [Defendant] could derive a potential threat is stereotypes about the dangers posed by large black men. While [NYJW] is, indeed, a physically large individual, no evidence was adduced to suggest that he has ever assaulted, threatened, or in any way imperiled anyone. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that [NYJW], a Jehovah's Witness minister, has devoted his adult life to activities designed to foster peace in the community.The jury could further have credited [NYJW's] account that on the date of his termination his immediate supervisor called him a "nigger," despite the supervisor's testimony that he never uses, or used, such epithets. Finally, the jury could reasonably have found that racist cartoons left in [NYJW's] locker at work were left there by [Defendant's] employees. After two days of trial and two days of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict in favor of [NYJW]. Its verdict form stated that plaintiff was entitled to $210,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000,000 in punitive damages. The jury was instructed that compensatory damages, on the facts of the case as adduced by the evidence, included past pain and suffering and past economic loss.

  After trial, [Defendant] moved to reduce the verdict to $300,000, pursuant to the limitations on damages set forth in 42
  U. S. C. § 1981a. In response, plaintiff retained counsel and moved to amend his complaint to state claims under 42 U. S. C. 5 1981 and the New York Human Rights Law, N. Y. Exec. L. S: 296,
  and to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

  ...
  ...
  ...

  Under this precedent, then, the $300,000 cap in the present case must include both compensatory and punitive damages.

  As the jury was instructed, however, compensatory damages includes backpay. Under 5 1981a, backpay is separate from the cap and plaintiff is entitled to have any demonstrated backpay recovery excluded from the $300,000 cap. The evidence, however, does not establish plaintiff's hourly wage. No evidence was
  introduced regarding effort by [NYJW] to secure other employment nor regarding failure on his part to secure other employment. No evidence was introduced regarding any raises, for cost of living
  or for promotion, that [NYJW] would have received had he remained at [Defendant]. Under this precedent, then, the $300,000 cap in the present case must include both compensatory and punitive damages.

  As the jury was instructed, however, compensatory damages includes backpay. Under 5 1981a, backpay is separate from the cap and plaintiff is entitled to have any demonstrated backpay recovery excluded from the $300,000 cap. The evidence, however, does not establish plaintiff's hourly wage. No evidence was
  introduced regarding effort by [NYJW] to secure other employment nor regarding failure on his part to secure other employment. No evidence was introduced regarding any raises, for cost of living
  or for promotion, that [NYJW] would have received had he remained at [Defendant] until the time of trial. Thus, although the
  statute would have allowed [NYJW] to recover demonstrated backpay in addition to the $300,000 imposed by the cap, in the absence of any relevant evidence the amount of his backpay is indeterminate
  and therefore speculative. [NYJW's] total recovery from the jury's verdict is therefore $300,000. Plaintiff is also entitled to recover attorney's fees.

  ...

  Plaintiff having prevailed, he is entitled to be recompensed for the fees incurred by his counsel in defending against [Defendant's] attempt to reduce the judgment, and for the fees incurred in preparing the motion to amend the complaint.

  Accordingly, plaintiff is directed to settle a judgment on notice encompassing an award of $300,000 and a reasonable
  attorneys fee, documenting the fee arrangement and the hours
  spent by his counsel.

  The Clerk of the Court is directed to furnish a filed copy of the within to all parties, to the magistrate judge, and
  to chambers.

  SO ORDERED.

  Dated : Brooklyn, New York May 20, 1998
• 
  5

  Why is the WTBTS incorporated?

  by hungry4life in

  1. jw
  2. friends

  i was talking to my friend again and i shared the http://circuitleasing.com page with her (she says she ordered a keychain).

  she was pretty disgusted by the blatant commercialism and wanted to know who owns the company?

  she also mentioned the fact that the wtbts is incorporated and since neither of us is very business savvy i was wondering if any of you knows what that means.

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  MadApostate

  H4L:

  I haven't read the earlier posts to which you refer re "your friend", but for someone who has been around since 7/01, you should have read all the earlier posts re CircuitLeasing sufficient to know that there is NO SCANDAL, and you shoud be ashamed of yourself if you have mislead a friend into believing that such exists.
• 
  3

  JWs NoPart of World ExceptIn Congressional Hearing

  by MadApostate in

  1. watchtower
  2. scandals

  charles canady [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.. .

  ms. wigfall.

  mr. scott.

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  MadApostate

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• 
  19

  JW ELDERS APPLY/RECEIVE CLERGY TAX EXEMPTION

  by MadApostate in

  1. watchtower
  2. scandals

  opinions of counsel.

  volume 10 - opinions of counsel sbrps no.

  these opinions are subject to revision and editing changes prior to publication.

  1. 
  2. 
  3. 
• 

  MadApostate

  .
• 
  3

  JWs NoPart of World ExceptIn Congressional Hearing

  by MadApostate in

  1. watchtower
  2. scandals

  charles canady [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.. .

  ms. wigfall.

  mr. scott.

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  MadApostate

  PROTECTING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AFTER BOERNE V. FLORES (PART II)

  HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
  COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

  HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
  ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
  SECOND SESSION

  FEBRUARY 26, 1998

  COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

  HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman
  F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., Wisconsin
  BILL McCOLLUM, Florida
  GEORGE W. GEKAS, Pennsylvania
  HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
  LAMAR SMITH, Texas
  STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico
  ELTON GALLEGLY, California
  CHARLES T. CANADY, Florida
  BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
  BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia
  STEPHEN E. BUYER, Indiana
  ED BRYANT, Tennessee
  STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
  BOB BARR, Georgia
  WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee
  ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
  EDWARD A. PEASE, Indiana
  CHRIS CANNON, Utah
  JAMES E. ROGAN, California
  LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
  JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
  BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
  CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
  HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
  RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
  JERROLD NADLER, New York
  ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
  MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
  ZOE LOFGREN, California
  SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
  MAXINE WATERS, California
  MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
  WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
  ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
  STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
  THOMAS E. MOONEY, Chief of
  Staff-General Counsel
  JULIAN EPSTEIN, Minority Staff Director

  Subcommittee on the Constitution
  CHARLES T. CANADY, Florida, Chairman
  HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
  BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
  ED BRYANT, Tennessee
  WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee
  BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia
  BOB BARR, Georgia
  ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
  ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
  MAXINE WATERS, California
  JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
  JERROLD NADLER, New York
  MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
  KERI FOLMAR, Chief Counsel
  JOHN H. LADD, Counsel
  ROBERT J. CORRY, Counsel
  CATHLEEN CLEAVER, Counsel

  C O N T E N T S

  HEARING DATE
  
  February 26, 1998

  OPENING STATEMENT
  
  Canady, Hon. Charles T., a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on the Constitution

  WITNESSES
  
  Brooks, Donald W., Reverend, Diocese of Tulsa, Oklahoma
  
  Brown, Suzanne, Brookline, New Hampshire
  
  Hamlin, Richard, Reverend and Pastor, Evangelical Reformed Church, Tacoma, Washington
  
  Mesiti, Jacob, Brookline, New Hampshire
  
  Robb, Richard, Ypsilanti, Michigan
  
  Rubin, Chaim, Rabbi, Congregation Etz Chaim in Los Angeles, California
  
  Smith, Evelyn, Chico, California
  
  Steel, Richard, Reverend and Pastor, Cedar Bayou Baptist Church, Baytown, Texas
  
  Wigfall, Zari, Van Nuys, California
  
  Wilson, III, Patrick, Reverend, on behalf of the Trinity Baptist Church of Richmond, Virginia, and the Richmond Affiliate of the Congress of Black Churches, Inc.
  
  Wimberly, Jr., John, Reverend, Western Presbyterian Church, Washington, DC.

  LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
  
  Brooks, Donald W., Reverend, Diocese of Tulsa, Oklahoma: Prepared statement
  
  Robb, Richard, Ypsilanti, Michigan: Prepared statement
  
  Rubin, Chaim, Rabbi, Congregation Etz Chaim in Los Angeles, California: Prepared statement
  
  Smith, Evelyn, Chico, California: Prepared statement
  
  Steel, Richard, Reverend and Pastor, Cedar Bayou Baptist Church, Baytown, Texas: Prepared statement
  
  Wilson, III, Patrick, Reverend, on behalf of the Trinity Baptist Church of Richmond, Virginia, and the Richmond Affiliate of the Congress of Black Churches, Inc.: Prepared statement
  
  Wimberly, Jr., John, Reverend, Western Presbyterian Church, Washington, DC.: Prepared statement

  APPENDIX
  
  Material submitted for the record

  PROTECTING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AFTER BOERNE V. FLORES
  (Part II)
  THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1998
  House of Representatives,
  Subcommittee on the Constitution,
  Committee on the Judiciary,
  Washington, DC.
  
  The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in Room 2226, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Charles Canady [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
  
  Present: Representatives Henry J. Hyde, Charles T. Canady, Bob Inglis, Ed Bryant, Asa Hutchinson, Robert C. Scott, and Jerrold Nadler.
  
  Staff present: Keri Folmer, Chief Counsel; John Ladd, Counsel; Brett Shogren, Research Assistant; Michael Connolly, Staff Assistant; and Brian Woolfolk, Minority Staff.
  
  OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN CANADY
  
  Mr. CANADY [presiding]. The subcommittee will be in order. This morning the subcommittee on the Constitution convenes to hear the real-life stories of individuals who have had their free exercise of religion substantially burdened by governmental action. These individuals have traveled to our nation's capital today from a variety of different regions of the country, and they come to us from a variety of different religious faiths.
  
  In 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, or RFRA, which required government to give a compelling reason for laws which substantially burden religious exercise. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court last June in Boerne v. Flores held that RFRA was not a valid exercise of Congress' power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
  
  The freedom to practice one's religion is a fundamental right and yet the Boerne decision has left men and women of faith, like those who have traveled to Washington to tell us their stories today, without adequate protection against laws that interfere with their religious practice.
  
  We, in Congress, should work to restore protection of these men and women. America was founded upon the notion that Government should not interfere with the religious practices of its citizens. Constitutional protection for the free exercise of religion is at the core of the American experiment in democracy. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and I look forward to working successfully in this Congress to preserve our first freedom, the freedom to practice one's religion without government interference. I'm very hopeful that we will be able to develop a consensus among members of the subcommittee and the full committee on this important subject, and move forward with legislation to address the issue. Mr. Scott.

  ...
  ...

  On our first panel today, the first to testify this morning will be Ms. Zari Wigfall. Ms. Wigfall is a college student from Van Nuys, California. Then we will hear from Reverent Richard Hamlin. Reverent Hamlin, pastor of the Evangelical Reformed Church comes to us from Tacoma, Washington. Next will be Reverend Patrick J. Wilson, III. Reverend Wilson serves as Minister of Community Development with the Congress of Black Churches, Incorporated, in Richmond, Virginia. Finally on our first panel, we will hear from Reverend John Wimberly, Jr. Reverend Wimberly is pastor of the Western Presbyterian Church here in Washington, DC.
  
  Again, we thank you all for being here with us this morning. I would ask that each of you summarize your testimony in 10 minutes or less, and without objection, your written statements will be made a part of the permanent record of this hearing. Again, thank you for being with us. Ms. Wigfall.

  STATEMENT OF ZARI WIGFALL, VAN NUYS, CALIFORNIA
  
  Ms. WIGFALL. During the Spring of 1994, I was a college student at Sacramento City College, and I had a 4.0 grade average, and I was interviewed to be a peer counselor assistant. The job required that I take new students on tours of the college campus so that they could become more familiar with the campus.
  
  When I went to fill out and sign the paperwork—that was necessary for my employment—included was an oath of allegiance. While I don't want to show any disrespect to the United States, I follow the Bible's command to be neutral when it comes to political issues, and not to engage in or fight against any human being. Because of this, I feel it's important that I bear faith and true allegiance to God and His word, the Bible. If I didn't do this, I would be in conflict with my principles, and my conscience.
  
  To back up the reason why I feel this way, in the Bible at Luke Chapter 4 and Verse 8, Jesus himself said it is written, it is Jehovah your God you must worship, and it is to Him alone you must render sacred service. So as one of Jehovah's witnesses, I could not give that sacred service to anybody else, only to God. Also, in Matthew, Chapter 26 and Verse 52, Jesus also said that those who take the sword will perish by the sword. And for that reason, I wouldn't want to put myself in any position where I would have to kill another human being. Because of these reasons, I was unable to sign the oath. And the swearing of true faith and allegiance to the United States or to any other human government against all enemies foreign and domestic, is something that does go against my religion's principles and also my conscience.
  
  But this doesn't mean that I'm disrespectful to the Government or to the United States. Instead, I try as much as I can to be helpful to the community, and even to be an asset to the community.
  
  I told Mr. Downs, who was the person that interviewed me that this was the case and I couldn't sign the oath for these reasons. At the time he said that it wouldn't be a problem, so I went ahead and turned in the rest of the paperwork and started working. The job was great for me because I was able to take college students on tours of the campus. I was also able to fit this job in with my school schedule, work it around my school schedule, and this provided me with an income to support my college education.
  
  But after I worked this job for a week, Mr. Downs met me and informed me that I no longer had the job. And the reason why was because the dean had gotten my paperwork, and had said that because I wouldn't sign the oath, then I couldn't have the job. So, I tried to make the oath in harmony with my religions beliefs. And I asked if I could amend the oath so that I could sign it and turn it in. But the dean said that I couldn't. Even though Mr. Downs who had interviewed me was just as surprised and frustrated that this was an issue and that they would actually take my job away, there was nothing that he could do about it, so he had to find another student who was just as qualified as I had been for the job, and I no longer had a job.
  
  The other thing that happened to me was later in the fall of 1994. My stage makeup teacher, Judy Radue, asked me if I would like to be a theater house manager for her play for children's theater ''Beauty and the Beast,'' and it ran for five consecutive weeks. So I agreed to do that, and as things went, there was paperwork I also had to fill out for the position. When I went through the paperwork, as I was filling it out, there was the oath of allegiance again. So I explained to the secretary in the theater office that I couldn't sign this oath of allegiance, and she said that the dean had said that if someone didn't want to sign the oath of allegiance then they didn't want to work for the school.
  
  So because of that I was, once again, denied a job that I was well-qualified for. And again, my teacher was really surprised that this was an issue and she was even kind of upset and frustrated, but there was nothing she could do, so she had to give my position to some other student who was just as qualified as I had been.
  
  And I guess for me the thing that's also kind of frustrating is the fact that being in the United States, just didn't think that this would be an issue because, I mean, in history books I read that there were times when citizens didn't really have rights, when there was no Constitution, and when the law didn't work for people of certain ethnic groups. But living today in the 1990's, we do have the Constitution, citizens are entitled to certain rights, and also minorities, including religious minorities, are given certain guarantees. And I just didn't think that this would be such an issue, and that because of my religious beliefs I would have two jobs taken away from me.
  
  And I guess that sums up what I have to say.
  
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  Mr. SCOTT. Ms. Wigfall, you know when we take an oath in court and many other places, they have an alternative, you must solemnly swear or affirm. Were you given an alternative that was not religious in the oath that was offered to you?
  
  Ms. WIGFALL. No, I was never given an alternative.
  
  Mr. SCOTT. Are you getting the mic?
  
  Ms. WIGFALL. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, actually I took it to court and the judge did rule in my favor because of that. But now that it is thrown out, I'm back to square one.
  
  Mr. SCOTT. Who authorized—where did this oath come from, was this something just at the college or something that was administered statewide to everyone that wants a state job?
  
  Ms. WIGFALL. This is in all state and Federal positions.
  
  Mr. SCOTT. All state and Federal? Was your position a state or Federal position?
  
  Ms. WIGFALL. A state position, through the college.
  
  Mr. SCOTT. If the alternative, were you given the opportunity to affirm rather than to swear, and leave out the reference to Almighty God, would that have caused a problem?
  
  
  Ms. WIGFALL. If I had been able to amend it or given an alternative that I could sign where I didn't have to pledge allegiance to the United States or also that I wouldn't have to put myself in a position to kill another human being, then I wouldn't have had a problem with it.

  
  
  Mr. SCOTT. Reverend Hamlin, there's a privilege that attorneys have in terms of what they can be forced to say about what their client said. That privilege is not the attorney's privilege, it's the client's privilege. I understand your state law has a privilege that the penitent could have invoked. Did he invoke his privilege?
  
  Mr. HAMLIN. He did, and it was ruled by this particular judge that it did not apply. And the reason he felt that it did not apply in this case is he said the penitent needs to demonstrate a compellingness to confess or to speak with clergy, and I struggled with that ruling for obvious reasons. How does one prove that? How does one demonstrate that? And that was our question. Nevertheless, it was thrown out for that reason and then that's when they pursued me.
  
  Mr. SCOTT. So your suggestion is that the penitent should have the privilege. Are you suggesting that the minister should also have a privilege?
  
  Mr. HAMLIN. Yes, I do.
  
  Mr. SCOTT. If the penitent can invoke the privilege, why could he not, what would be the problem with him waiving the privilege and he would like to have what he said revealed?
  
  Mr. HAMLIN. And I think those particular issues need to be thought through very carefully. The Ninth Circuit, for instance, that I made mention of, in that particular case, the penitent wanted the testimony from the clergy. The clergy person there did not. Yet the Ninth Circuit judge ruled in favor of the clergy person, that it is also the clergy's right to retain information. So I believe that it cannot be coerced out of me, it should be a matter deferred to clergy in these kind of issues, whether or not that information is given or not.
  
  Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
  
  Chairman HYDE. Thank you. Mr. Hutchinson.
  
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to say, first, that I appreciate the convictions of each of our witnesses today. Society needs to see convictions, people standing on their beliefs, and you all demonstrate that, and I congratulate you for that, and I hope that all the young people in our nation can see this example. Secondly, this is a very important hearing as it deals with the issues of religious freedom which are critical to our society, to our constitutional government. It's something very important to our way of life; very precious to me. But it also deals with the relationship between Congress and the courts, that's the second reason it's so important. We have a fidelity to the Constitution here in Congress just as the court does, and there's a struggle between the two as to what the constitution means. So it's very, very important, what's happening. I congratulate Chairman Canady for holding this hearing, and thank you for your participation.
  
  
  Now, if I understood right, three of you, anyway, had your issue resolved in court successfully, but Reverend Hamlin, yours is still pending. Is that correct?
  
  Mr. HAMLIN. Correct.
  
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. And Reverend Wilson, yours has not been resolved at all.
  
  Mr. WILSON. No, it is not at all resolved.
  
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Okay, so we have two that have been resolved favorably in court. Now, Ms. Wigfall, yours was resolved favorably but at what cost?
  
  Ms. WIGFALL. Well, now that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is no longer around, I'm actually back to where I started.
  
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. When you won your case, did you have your job available to you?
  
  Ms. WIGFALL. Actually, at that point, I probably could have had it, if I needed to, but by the time it was resolved, I traveled through several semesters at school. So actually I don't even go to the same college anymore.

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  . http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju57221.000/hju57221_0.htm