Sagan and anyone who care toreply

by jw 111 Replies latest jw friends

  • Narkissos
    Narkissos
    If I were looking for a "scientific" cause this is exactly what I would have to do. However, I only have to do this if I am attempting to prove (scientifically) the cause for phenomenal life.

    This is where I beg to differ. To me the necessity of doing so is required, not only for actual proof, but also for the very act of thinking whatever you experienced as a possible cause for phenomenal life. You must first define that which you experienced as living in a non-metaphorical way, susceptible of being a real (not necessarily scientifically observable) cause for phenomenal life. This imo leads you out of the realm of experience into that of interpretation. In the latter, you can't escape the question: how much does my interpretation of what/whom I have had subjective experience, as a living being, owe to the cultural, literary, metaphorical, anthropomorphical representations of "gods" as living beings? Again, just to think it as such, not to prove it.

    PP,

    the scientifically minded person's love of precision is met with the philosophers love of verbal ambiguity.
    I disagree. While religious or mystical thought may love and perhaps need verbal ambiguity, philosophy is bent on elucidating the ambiguities (that's the big step from mythos to logos). I feel that it is indispensable, if only to differentiate the respective areas of validity and status of each kind of speech. After all, no scientific mind is only a scientific mind, and no mystic is only a mystic, and for this reason I think both need philosophy to know where their favorite kind of thinking ceases to be valid.
  • AuldSoul
    AuldSoul
    Why does your thought exercise loose its value if we appropriately substitute "invisible purple unique to the universe creature" for "bee"? It looses its impact precisely because it more accurately illustrates the matter.

    I understand your dilemma, peacefulpete. If you lack the imagination to first posit that no one had ever been stung by a bee, you cannot possibly follow the thought exercise as I laid it out. The fact that you know bees are real (observed) and you know they sting (either through experience or study/research) does not limit the value of presupposing that you do not know these facts for the purposes of a thought exercise.

    On the other hand, as LittleToe pointed out, such individual experiences as we were discussing are not as rare as singular reports of "invisible purple unique to the universe creature." However, to humor you, I will proceed with your analogy: if an invisible, purple, unique in the universe entity stung 20 people around the earth over the course of two millennia, and they all express the experience to those who did not share it in very similar terms (with inevitable local and temporal metaphorical differences) as their languages permitted, would that be a known entity?

    Let's say thousands upon thousands were stung by this entity over the course of five millennia, and they all express the experience to those who did not share it in very similar terms (with inevitable local and temporal metaphorical differences) as their languages permitted, would that be a known entity?

    In other words, how many people would have to be stung by this entity before its existence could be considered "known"? Or would you have us believe that there is no point at which someone who experiences this entity can state they "know" what they experienced first-hand, simply because the entity was never subjected to laboratory testing?

    Respectfully,
    AuldSoul

  • AuldSoul
    AuldSoul
    This imo leads you out of the realm of experience into that of interpretation.

    In my experience, this is only true of necessity in the act of explaining the experience, it is not of necessity true in order for the one who experienced it to think this entity is alive. I do not interpret my experiences beyond the extent to which I technically interpret all experiences (which leads down a Nihilistic road I categorically reject as fruitless). I remember them. My experiences do not derive from metaphor, although I freely admit metaphor would be required to communicate them to someone else.

    Respectfully,
    AuldSoul

  • LittleToe
    LittleToe

    Didier makes an important point here regarding "interpretation". Experience is removed from a third party by at least three layers of abstraction:

    • Personal interpretation and storage of the first-hand stimulae
    • Re-coding into a communicable context, often by metaphor
    • Personal interpretation and storage of the communication by the third party

    Any of these points can fail.

    It becomes easier to communicate when there is a common syntax, such as science attempts to employ and develop. However, this also evolves. Nor is it adequate to dismiss a proposition merely because it has not yet been accepted by science. Scientific method is merely another useful tool, and as such can inform us of the fact that visible purple bees and unicorns do not exist, and that an invisible variety is statistically unlikely.

  • Narkissos
    Narkissos

    AuldSoul,

    I don't mean to harass you, but I guess that's what I am doing...

    In my experience, this is only true of necessity in the act of explaining the experience, it is not of necessity true in order for the one who experienced it to think this entity is alive.

    I notice you stepped back from proving to explaining.

    How different is thinking from explaining (if only to yourself)?

    In the act of thinking "x" as alive in a non-metaphorical sense (which is patent from your previous definition of "x" as a "non-carbon-based life form") you had to use a preconception of "life" which depended on your language, culture, and education before your experience. That's what I'm trying to question -- not the experience itself, but how it related to this preconception. My mind here cries "metaphor," you assure me it is something else, which I'd like to understand. If you think I can't, never mind.

  • Midget-Sasquatch
    Midget-Sasquatch
    In other words, how many people would have to be stung by this entity before its existence could be considered "known"? Or would you have us believe that there is no point at which someone who experiences this entity can state they "know" what they experienced first-hand, simply because the entity was never subjected to laboratory testing?

    I'm certainly open to the possibility that there are other aspects to reality which science cannot currently measure and analyze. However by way of analogy: How many people need to say they were abducted by aliens and probed (giving very similar accounts) before we can say that the Greys are real? I don't mean to ridicule any mystical experiences with the comparison. To mystics or abductees, these are real "entities". We all construct our realities from the external information being taken in along with significant processing. As has been shown, there are subjective elements to how that information is processed and constructed within our minds. Different factors can affect the resulting construct, with the internal being nearly impossible to distinguish from the external...to those experiencers. added point: Narkissos At first thought, I was going to say that we can and form perceptions of "life" just from experience, without the need for preconceived notions. But on more thought I see your point. I recalled a psychology class where it was mentioned that we, even from very early ages are apparently hardwired to categorize and sort objects as "alive" "inanimate" etc. Assuming an evolutionary development of mind, with interaction to our earthly environment, those categories will in fact dictate or give us preconcieved notions of "life". We'd have to then step into our imaginations and use metaphor to even conceive of "life" (let alone explain it) thats different from that on terrafirma.

    AuldSould Because I do sympathize with your position, I don't think we should once and for all dismiss the possibility of some experiences having a basis in external reality. We could miss out on alot. Until I experience it myself though, and even then, I'd have to wonder if its solely within.

  • AuldSoul
    AuldSoul
    How many people need to say they were abducted by aliens and probed (giving very similar accounts) before we can say that the Greys are real?

    I would say that would depend. Are these accounts actually remembered or "regressed to" under hypnosis? In all but a tiny fraction of instances the latter is true. But, I would say a few million who actually remember would be sufficient. Especially if accounts of such events span several millennia with very little distinction between the related experiences.

    When it comes to the grey men, we are up to about 50 years. Only 1,950 years to go for the two millennia mark, and already we have a smattering whose rememberances were not regressed under hypnosis by hypnotists who make their living offering therapy to survivors of alien abduction.

    Respectfully,
    AuldSoul

  • AuldSoul
    AuldSoul

    Narkissos,

    I don't feel badgered, I am getting a lot out of the discussion.

    ...beyond the extent to which I technically interpret all experiences.

    This caveat against the emptiness of Nihilism seems to me to be directly related to:

    In the act of thinking "x" as alive in a non-metaphorical sense (which is patent from your previous definition of "x" as a "non-carbon-based life form") you had to use a preconception of "life" which depended on your language, culture, and education before your experience. That's what I'm trying to question -- not the experience itself, but how it related to this preconception. My mind here cries "metaphor," you assure me it is something else, which I'd like to understand.

    ...to which, I think, my bee analogy speaks directly. In the sense that you interpret the bee sting as painful as well, but the pain is not metaphorical, it is actual. Your description cannot help but be metaphorical, but the experience itself is not metaphorical and neither is your personal knowledge. You store the experience (as LittleToe brought out). All experiences, all data, all input is interpretted at a basic level to some degree or other. However, if we call all that is interpretted metaphor then nothing is known and nothing is real. Nihilism.

    Personal experience of something is as close to complete knowledge as I can reasonably expect to come. E.g. knowing bee stings occur and that they hurt anecdotally, or from clinical data does not replace having had the experience.

    For all practical purposes of rational thought and discussion, if my concept of what life is matches the perceived nature of what I experience (a concept that is subjectively unique to myself, because "life" cannot be objectively defined by any means of which I am aware), I am not speaking metaphorically to label the nature of what I experience "life", unless all is only metaphor (which leads directly to Nihilism).

    Respectfully,
    AuldSoul

  • Midget-Sasquatch
    Midget-Sasquatch
    When it comes to the grey men, we are up to about 50 years. Only 1,950 years to go for the two millennia mark, and already we have a smattering whose rememberances were not regressed under hypnosis by hypnotists who make their living offering therapy to survivors of alien abduction.

    Their questionnaires can be funny (I was supposedly abducted according to 2 of them ) Although if one of those therapists were a really hot babe instead of Bud Hopkins, I might start having flasbacks and book a session.

    Back to topic:

    All experiences, all data, all input is interpretted at a basic level to some degree or other.

    Which to me at least points to a very light shade of nihilism. Here's what I mean by that. I prefer to hold to their being objective reality and objective truth....but then again the theory of relativity, and whats been learned in the neurosciences, brings out our limitations of ever knowing absolutely. Its our own current deficiency.

    I brought up alien abductions because even though they specifically have only been around for a few decades, the essential experience of being "visited" (often along with all its uncomfortable overtones) is actually a very old phenomenon. They were the wee people from Magonia or the daemons, etc. The large number of people who attested to them would strongly indicate to me that these experiences are triggered by something real. But the changing players would indicate to me that the experience is highly influenced by cultural backgrounds and some preconceived notions. So not all experiences are equally valid in telling us something about the larger reality. But any of them can be starting points for us to engage in a dialectic with reality.

  • Narkissos
    Narkissos

    Nihilism vs. autism?

    Right or wrong, the nihilist bogeyman doesn't scare me too much. I am probably a moral nihilist because I don't hold any longer absolute opinions about what should or shouldn't be done. I might be termed a metaphysical nihilist inasmuch as I don't believe anymore in some invisible realm (whether of gods or ideas) behind, beneath or over the phenomenal world. Otoh I am definitely not a cognitive nihilist because I do believe (yes, believe) that I am somehow part of something real and I wonder at that -- even though I can only partly know it through language (and perhaps partly otherwise, of which, naturally, I cannot speak -- except poetically maybe).

    if we call all that is interpretted metaphor then nothing is known and nothing is real. Nihilism.

    Metaphor is in the interpretation, not in that which is interpreted. Thus far I agree.

    if my concept of what life is matches the perceived nature of what I experience (a concept that is subjectively unique to myself, because "life" cannot be objectively defined by any means of which I am aware)
    Phenomenal "life" is scientifically observed and described. We (collectively of course, I'm no biologist) know how it works -- and afaik it doesn't need any "principle of life" (such as the pre-scientific ruach or pneuma, nephesh or psukhè which incidentally left out vegetal "life"): in a sense the very notion of "life" (as an inner "principle") is lost in biology. If you have your own "subjective concept" of "life" which can cover both your personal "x"-perience and phenomenal life, it is probably at odds with the scientific definition of the latter. Of course there is no such problem if you accept that "x" is metaphorically "alive" (which I think most theologians would concede about the "living God").

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