Patio
It's my understanding that the US put up and supported Hussein until he disobeyed the US and invaded Kuwait.
Actually, hussein asked for permission first ...
APRIL GLASPIE TRANSCRIPT
Saddam-Glaspie meeting
Transcript of Meeting Between Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie. - July 25, 1990 (Eight days before the August 2, 1990 Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait)
July 25, 1990 - Presidential Palace - Baghdad
U.S. Ambassador Glaspie - I have direct instructions from President Bush to improve our relations with Iraq. We have considerable sympathy for your quest for higher oil prices, the immediate cause of your confrontation with Kuwait. (pause) As you know, I lived here for years and admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. We know you need funds. We understand that, and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. (pause) We can see that you have deployed massive numbers of troops in the south. Normally that would be none of our business, but when this happens in the context of your threat s against Kuwait, then it would be reasonable for us to be concerned. For this reason, I have received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship - not confrontation - regarding your intentions: Why are your troops massed so very close to Kuwait's borders?
Saddam Hussein - As you know, for years now I have made every effort to reach a settlement on our dispute with Kuwait. There is to be a meeting in two days; I am prepared to give negotiations only this one more brief chance. (pause) When we (the Iraqis) meet (with the Kuwaitis) and we see there is hope, then nothing will happen. But if we are unable to find a solution, then it will be natural that Iraq will not accept death.
U.S. Ambassador Glaspie - What solutions would be acceptable?
Saddam Hussein - If we could keep the whole of the Shatt al Arab - our strategic goal in our war with Iran - we will make concessions (to the Kuwaitis). But, if we are forced to choose between keeping half of the Shatt and the whole of Iraq (i.e., in Saddam’s view, including Kuwait ) then we will give up all of the Shatt to defend our claims on Kuwait to keep the whole of Iraq in the shape we wish it to be. (pause) What is the United States' opinion on this?
U.S. Ambassador Glaspie - We have no opinion on your Arab - Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait. Secretary (of State James) Baker has directed me to emphasize the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960's, that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America. (Saddam smiles)
On August 2, 1990 four days later, Saddam's massed troops invade and occupy Kuwait. _____
Baghdad, September 2, 1990, U.S. Embassy
One month later, British journalists obtain the the above tape and transcript of the Saddam - Glaspie meeting of July 29, 1990. Astounded, they confront Ms. Glaspie as she leaves the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.
Journalist 1 - Are the transcripts (holding them up) correct, Madam Ambassador?(Ambassador Glaspie does not respond)
Journalist 2 - You knew Saddam was going to invade (Kuwait ) but you didn't warn him not to. You didn't tell him America would defend Kuwait. You told him the opposite - that America was not associated with Kuwait.
Journalist 1 - You encouraged this aggression - his invasion. What were you thinking?
U.S. Ambassador Glaspie - Obviously, I didn't think, and nobody else did, that the Iraqis were going to take all of Kuwait.
- Journalist 1 - You thought he was just going to take some of it? But, how could you? Saddam told you that, if negotiations failed , he would give up his Iran (Shatt al Arab waterway) goal for the Whole of Iraq, in the shape we wish it to be. You know that includes Kuwait, which the Iraqis have always viewed as an historic part of their country!
- Journalist 1 - American green-lighted the invasion. At a minimum, you admit signaling Saddam that some aggression was okay - that the U.S. would not oppose a grab of the al-Rumeilah oil field, the disputed border strip and the Gulf Islands (including Bubiyan) - the territories claimed by Iraq?
- (Ambassador Glaspie says nothing as a limousine door closed behind her and the car drives off.)
Former US Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie, meeting with Saddam Hussein, July 25th 1990. US State Department transcripts have been published in James Ridgeway's ‘The March to War’ Four Walls and Eight Windows, New York 1991 (page 28). Also in Pierre Salinger and Eric Laurent's ‘Secret Dossier - The Hidden Agenda Behind the Gulf War’ Penguin, Harmondworth 1991, and ‘The Gulf War Reader’, Times Books, Random House, New York 1991, editors Michael Sifry and Christopher Cert.
On 20th September 1990, seven weeks after the invasion of Kuwait, Glaspie was interviewed by the New York Times, during which she remarked:
"I didn't think, and nobody else did, that the Iraqis were going to take ALL of Kuwait." -----------
Further, at first bush I was not planning on any reaction. Here is the transcript from national public radio, of news analist daniel schorr explaining the change:
DANIEL SCHORR:
At dinner last Saturday at that Aspen ranch of Henry Catto, former ambassador to Britain, he recalled the daylong meeting of President Bush Sr. and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in his house on August 3rd, 1990, the day after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
JACKI LYDEN, host:
NPR News analyst Daniel Schorr.
SCHORR: The president had said before leaving Washington that, `We're not discussing intervention. I am not contemplating such action.' Thatcher told him, `George, this is no time to go wobbly.' At the ensuing joint press conference, Bush, his spine stiffened, said he was considering steps to end the naked aggression, and thus he started down the road to war.
Today, Bush Jr. agonizes about how not to be perceived as going wobbly if he does not soon make good on his many suggestions, a forceful action to bring down the regime of Saddam Hussein. Bush has so far not presented convincing evidence of an imminent threat nor proof of Iraqi support for the al-Qaeda terrorists. That makes it difficult to assemble decisive congressional, public and international support without which military action is somewhere between difficult and unfeasible.
So now with Secretary of State Colin Powell for the first time openly acknowledging a split in the official family, the president seems to be embarked on an effort to back off his limb of pre-emption. He is soliciting the advice of Congress, the American people and the international community. After his meeting this morning with congressional leaders, he stressed a wish for open dialogue about our future and how to deal with it. He said that in his speech to the United Nations on September 12th, he will talk about ways of making sure that Saddam Hussein, who has been stiffing the world, can be made to fulfill his obligations. No mention of armed action or even regime change, which, in any event, would not survive a veto in the Security Council.
His retreat, if that's what it is, will have to be carefully orchestrated if it is not to cause him political damage. He could embrace the Powell idea of revived weapons inspection as a first step without giving up the idea of military action as an eventual recourse. The question is how to carry this off without being labeled by the hawks as `wobbly.' This is Daniel Schorr.
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