@Blotty
Your latest
objections do not arise from new linguistic data or fresh patristic research
but from reiterating the same mis-readings of Scripture and the Fathers that
the Church has answered since the fourth century. They can be met only by
returning, once more, to the primary texts—Hebrew, Greek, and Latin—and to the
consistent theological logic that binds them. This reply therefore traces, step
by step, why the terms “firstborn,” “begotten,” and “created” remain
irreducibly distinct in the biblical witness, why Justin and the other
pre-Nicenes never taught a creature-Christ, and why the NT’s reticence to frame
the Trinity in scholastic propositions is no evidence against the doctrine but
precisely the soil in which it germinated.
The
semantic range of πρῶτότοκος is not intrinsically “partitive.” When Psalm 89
(88 LXX) calls David “firstborn, higher than the kings of the earth,” the
intuition is not that he is merely the chronological eldest within a royal
breeding-line but that he has been exalted to a rank none of his peers possesses.
That David remains one king among kings is irrelevant to Colossians 1:15
because Paul’s context is categorically different. Immediately after naming
Christ “firstborn of all creation” he explains why: “for in him were created
all things … whether thrones or dominions or rulers.” An artisan cannot belong
to the set of artefacts whose existence is owing to his own agency; the causal
clause excludes partitivity. Grammarians catalogue this genitive not as
partitive but as one of subordination or relation: creation is the sphere over
which, not within which, the Son exercises primacy. If Paul had meant
“first-created,” πρωτόκτιστος lay ready to hand (it appears in Philo and
later Greek); he deliberately chose a word whose biblical freight is heirship
and supremacy (Ex 4:22; Ps 89:27; Jer 31:9), a usage the Cappadocians would
later exploit to dismantle Eunomius’ thesis.
The Arian
claim is that every “firstborn” (πρωτότοκος) is, by necessity, a member
of the group from which they are “firstborn,” as in Psalm 89:27, where David,
called the “firstborn,” is still a king among kings. This, however, rests on a
conflation of the genitive construction’s contextual use and its inherent
meaning. While in familial contexts, “firstborn of” can indicate group
membership, in biblical idiom it is also a well-attested title of supremacy and
unique status. In Psalm 89:27, David is designated “firstborn, the highest of
the kings of the earth”—not to stress that he is one king among others, but
that he possesses preeminence and authority over all other kings. This
metaphorical extension of “firstborn” is a familiar biblical trope, denoting
status, privilege, and inheritance, not simply order of birth or inclusion in a
class. In Exodus 4:22, Israel is called God’s “firstborn son,” a title of
privilege among nations, not the first in temporal or natural order. The usage
in Colossians 1:15 follows precisely this logic: Christ is “firstborn of all creation”
not as one creature among many, but as the preeminent Lord and source of
creation itself, as confirmed by the immediate context—“for by him all things
were created... all things were created through him and for him. He is before
all things, and in him all things hold together” (Col 1:16-17). To make
“firstborn” a marker of Christ’s createdness is to wrench the term from its
context and to ignore the consistent NT witness that Christ is the Creator, not
a creature.
Appeals to
“firstborn of death” (Job 18:13) or “firstborn of the poor” (Is 14:30) do not
help the Arian case. Both phrases are prophetic hyperboles. “Firstborn of
death” personifies the most virulent disease; “firstborn of the poor” denotes
the extremity of destitution. The expression signals intensity, not membership:
Job’s disease is not itself one dying son among many; it is death’s most potent
offspring. Likewise, Christ’s title in Colossians marks him as creation’s
principle and lord, not its most senior denizen.
Your insistence
that all “firstborn” language entails partitivity ignores the difference
between a partitive genitive (membership) and a genitive of subordination or
superiority (rulership). The grammatical point, well attested in advanced Greek
grammars (cf. D.B. Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics), is that
the construction πρῶτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως does not, in this context, function as a partitive
but rather as a genitive of subordination: Christ stands over creation as its
Lord. The same logic applies to the use of “firstborn” in LXX idioms such as
“firstborn of death” or “firstborn of the poor”: these are poetic metaphors for
that which is most prominent or supreme among its category (the “firstborn of
death” is the most deadly, not simply the first to die). The analogy actually
supports the Trinitarian reading, not the Arian one, by emphasizing the concept
of preeminence rather than mere inclusion.
Modern
lexical semantics rejects the idea that any single word, isolated from
its syntactic and pragmatic environment, “carries” a permanently fixed relation
such as partitivity. Meanings are not static parcels lodged inside lexemes;
they are networks of potential which a speaker activates in context. Consequently,
the claim that πρωτότοκος is an “inherently partitive word” whose semantics compel
inclusion in whatever genitive follows is methodologically indefensible and
exegetically hazardous.
The
semantic core of πρωτότοκος is straightforward: it denotes the child who holds
“firstborn” status. That notion of priority can be deployed in multiple
conceptual frames—temporal sequence (“first to be born”), legal privilege
(“heir”), or symbolic supremacy (“highest”). Nothing in the lexeme itself
encodes the further proposition “and therefore belongs to the class expressed
by the genitive.” Whether such a relation is inferred in any given clause
depends on how speaker and audience construe the wider situation.
Linguistically, “firstborn of X” is a composite construction: the noun signals
status; the genitive specifies the domain over which that status is exercised.
To treat the domain as an obligatory set-membership marker ignores the
polyfunctionality of Greek genitives (possessive, subjective, objective,
relational, subordination, comparison, et cetera) and collapses syntax,
semantics, and pragmatics into a single mechanical rule.
The
LXX data routinely cited to prove intrinsic partitivity are in fact
heterogeneous. In narratives that list literal siblings (e.g., Genesis 25:13),
the genitive is certainly partitive because the discourse itself evokes a
family set and places the firstborn within it. Yet the very same lexeme appears
in non-partitive settings. Psalm 88(89):27, “I will make him firstborn, the
highest of the kings of the earth,” employs a comparative (heightened)
genitive: David is “of” the kings only in the sense that his royalty is
exercised over them. No Israelite reader would infer that David must share
generic ontological identity with every pagan monarch in order to bear that
title; the turn of phrase marks elevation, not inclusion. The same
non-partitive force dominates Jeremiah 38(31):9, Micah 6:7, and especially
Exodus 4:22, “Israel is my firstborn son,” where the nation is singled out
from, not merged into, the total set of peoples.
NT writers exploit precisely this superlative nuance. Colossians 1:16-17
unfolds the meaning of πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως by glossing it with three
causal clauses: “because in him all things were created,” “because he is before
all things,” and “because all things subsist in him.” Every clause structurally
excludes the Son from the category of created entities: he is the agent, the
antecedent, and the sustainer of τὰ πάντα. If πρωτότοκος were partitive by lexical
necessity, the author’s elaboration would be incoherent, for it would force
Christ simultaneously to belong to and to precede the same ontological set. The
epistle avoids that contradiction precisely by using the genitive in a
subordination (or relational) sense: he is the pre-eminent heir who stands over
creation.
Early Christian exegesis recognizes this polyvalence. Athanasius argues that
the Father could have called the Son πρωτόκτιστος had Paul wished to mark
creaturehood, but instead chose πρωτότοκος to proclaim dignity and heirship.
Basil of Caesarea, in Contra Eunomium II, explicitly distinguishes
between partitive and comparative genitives, locating Colossians 1:15 in the
latter category. Their argument does not impose alien philosophy upon the text;
it formalizes the pragmatic inference that the syntax and context already
suggest.
The burden of proof lies with those who posit an intrinsic partitive
feature. Demonstrating recurring set-membership readings in narrative contexts
does not establish that the lexeme itself encodes that relation; it merely
shows how often authors happened to use the construction in a literal family
frame. A genuine intrinsic feature would manifest across all contexts,
including metaphorical, regal, and cosmological ones—yet the non-partitive
examples cited above show otherwise. Without independent diagnostic
tests—minimal-pair contrasts or native speaker judgements—no purely lexical,
invariant “partitive value” can be verified.
In sum, πρῶτότοκος does not contain a built-in
grammatical switch that forces every following genitive into a partitive mold.
Greek genitive relations are determined by the conceptual structure of the
clause, not by secret semantic properties of individual nouns. Colossians 1:15
therefore remains free to articulate, as its context in vv. 16-17 declares, the
supremacy of the eternally begotten Son over the whole created order—a reading
fully consistent with Trinitarian confession and with sound linguistic method
alike.
The next
argument, concerning Justin Martyr’s use of “begotten” (γεννητός), is equally
misconstrued. While it is true that early Christian writers sometimes used
“begotten” language in ways that reflect the flexible metaphysics of their day,
it is anachronistic to read this as an assertion that Christ was brought into
existence in time. In Dialogue with Trypho 61, Justin explicitly affirms
that the Logos is “begotten of the Father before all created things” and “prior
to all ages.” The phrase “before every aeon” (πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων) is a technical term in early
Christian literature for eternal pre-existence, not simply priority within a
sequence of temporal epochs. The overwhelming patristic consensus, from Justin
through Athanasius to the Cappadocians, is that the Son’s generation is
supra-temporal, transcending all created time, and that the Father has never
existed without the Son.
Justin
Martyr’s vocabulary is pressed into Arian service only by wrenching it from
Justin’s own argument. When he calls the Logos “a second God” and “begotten
before all creatures,” he is not ascribing a temporal birthday to the Son but
contrasting eternal generation with the finite coming-to-be of the cosmos.
Trypho demands how Christians worship one born in recent times; Justin replies
that the Logos existed “πρὸ γενέσεως τῶν ὅλων” (“before the genesis of all things,” Dial. 61). The verb γεννάω
certainly can denote a creature’s entry into time, but Justin precisely distinguishes the
Son’s begetting precisely by locating it outside all temporal measure; he even
invokes Proverbs 8:25 to show that “He brought me forth before the mountains
were established,” a line whose force depends on Wisdom’s priority to any
physical event. Origen goes further: the Father “is always Father, the Son
always Son” (§ Princ. I.2.13), for the act of generation is eternal, proceeding
from the divine will that itself is timeless. Talk of “before every aeon” is
therefore unidirectional—backward, not forward—because the aeons themselves
mark the boundaries of creaturely history. Nothing in Origen suggests the Son ever
did not exist.
The attempt
to relativize this by asking “which direction did he mean?” with reference to
“eternity working two ways” is simply a rhetorical evasion. The context in
Justin and the Fathers makes it clear: “before all ages” means before time
itself, which is the very definition of eternity in the Christian theological
tradition. As the Fourth Lateran Council would later summarize: “the Father
begets, the Son is begotten, the Holy Spirit proceeds—none is before or after,
greater or less than the other, but all three are coeternal and coequal.”
The claim
that if Scripture wanted to call the Son “first-created” (πρωτόκτιστος), it
could have done so, but instead chooses “firstborn” (πρωτότοκος), is dismissed
by the Arian argument as special pleading, suggesting that if the biblical writers
intended the Trinitarian doctrine they would have used unambiguous language for
“God” and the “Trinity.” This line of argument betrays a misunderstanding of
the development of biblical theology and the nature of divine revelation. The
term “firstborn” was chosen precisely for its rich theological resonance: it
denotes not only priority but also heirship, supremacy, and unique relationship
to the Father (cf. Hebrews 1:2–3). The NT does, in fact, call Christ God
explicitly in multiple places (John 1:1; John 20:28; Romans 9:5; Titus 2:13;
Hebrews 1:8–10), and as the only-begotten God (μονογενὴς θεός, John 1:18). The doctrine of
the Trinity emerges not from a single proof text but from the total scriptural
witness, read in light of the rule of faith and the Church’s liturgical and
confessional life (cf. Matthew 28:19, 2 Corinthians 13:14).
Your
rhetorical question—“If the apostles wished to say the Son is God, why not say
so plainly?”—ignores that they do so repeatedly. John opens his Gospel with
“the Word was God”; Thomas confesses “my Lord and my God” (Jn 20:28); Paul
acclaims Christ as “the God who is over all” (Rom 9:5) and looks for “the
appearing of our great God and Saviour, Jesus Christ” (Tit 2:13); Peter greets
the faithful from “our God and Saviour Jesus Christ” (2 Pet 1:1). What
Scripture does not supply is a metaphysical treatise—nor could it, for the
canon arose in the milieu of Second Temple monotheism where theological
compression, not systematic exposition, was the idiom. The Church’s conciliar
language is the fruit of contemplating that compressed witness, not a betrayal
of it.
The
objection that if the NT authors had wished to define three persons in one God
they would have done so as explicitly as Paul describes the “members” of the
body is a category error. Trinitarian dogma is the product of scriptural
synthesis and theological reflection, not the mere collation of isolated
proof-texts. The NT abounds in “triadic” formulas that link the Father, Son,
and Holy Spirit in shared divine prerogatives (see Matthew 28:19; 2 Corinthians
13:14; Ephesians 4:4-6). The gradual unfolding of doctrinal clarity in the
post-apostolic period is the normal pattern of Christian revelation and
theological maturation.
Your jibe that “original scrolls still exist” cuts the other way. No extant
Hebrew manuscript of Proverbs 8 renders קָנָה as “he created me”; every one
supports “acquired/possessed.” It was the Alexandrian translators who ventured ἔκτισεν, and it was precisely that
lone rendering—already suspect to the Jewish revisers Aquila, Symmachus, and
Theodotion—that the Fathers re-interpreted in light of the whole canon: κτίζει
can mean to ordain or establish (Ps 50:12 LXX), so the verse announces Wisdom’s
installation as archetype of the cosmos, whereas verse 25 (“he begets me”)
unveils her eternal derivation. Two verbs, two dimensions: economic mission and
ontological origin.
The appeal
to Psalm 51:10—“Create in me a clean heart, O God” (Hebrew בְּרָא־לִי לֵב טָהוֹר)—to bolster the claim that κτίζω in
Proverbs 8:22 “must” denote the production of a being who previously did not
exist is philologically and theologically misplaced. In the Psalter verse the
verb bārāʾ does not speak of ontological origination out of nothing, still less of
the manufacture of a new “substance.” David already possesses a heart; his
petition is for its moral renewal. Throughout the Hebrew Bible bārāʾ can signify transformative
re-creation within an existing entity (cf. Isaiah 57:19; 65:18). When the
Septuagint renders Psalm 51:10 with κτίσον, it therefore mirrors that
idiom of renewal, not the absolute beginning posited in Genesis 1:1.
Consequently one cannot extrapolate from Psalm 51 to Proverbs 8 a semantic rule
that κτίζω invariably means bringing a concrete object into first
existence.
Patristic
exegesis underscores the same point. Athanasius, commenting on Psalm 51, reads
the verse as an invocation of sanctifying grace rather than material
origination; his focus is the Holy Spirit’s cleansing action in the believer’s
interior life. Augustine concurs in Enarrationes in Psalmos 50,
explaining that the psalmist seeks “a heart refashioned by charity,” a moral
re-creation continuous with, yet elevated above, the heart he already has.
Neither Father treats the verb as proof that God must at that moment be
producing a novel, hitherto non-existent substance. In short, Psalm 51:10
witnesses to divine renovation, not to creaturely genesis.
The
relevance for Christology is decisive. The semantic elasticity of bārāʾ/κτίζω demonstrates that creation
language cannot, by itself, settle ontological status. To infer from Proverbs
8:22—where ἔκτισεν translates קָנָה (“acquired/appointed”)—that Wisdom is a creature because Psalm 51:10
uses a cognate verb for moral renewal is a non sequitur. The writer of Proverbs
selected a verb capable of multiple nuances, and the Fathers consistently
interpreted it as an economic designation: the Son is “established” or
“appointed” as the archetypal Wisdom through whom the cosmos is ordered, not
manufactured as a member of the cosmos. The immediate sequel, “before the
mountains He γεννᾷ me” (v. 25 LXX), already distinguishes generation from creation;
patristic theology merely makes that distinction explicit.
Barnes’
nineteenth-century comment that only God can bring about such an interior
cleansing is perfectly congenial to Trinitarian doctrine: the Son and the
Spirit, being consubstantial with the Father, share the singular divine power
to re-create. Nothing in his gloss authorizes the leap from moral renewal in
the redeemed to ontological origin of the Redeemer. Psalm 51 affirms divine
agency in sanctification; it says nothing about the temporal genesis or
creaturehood of the Logos.
Therefore,
the invocation of Psalm 51:10 neither proves that κτίζω is semantically
restricted to the creation of previously non-existent beings nor supports the
Arian contention that the Son belongs to the order of creatures. Proper lexical
analysis, the broader canonical context, and the unanimous witness of the early
Church converge to show that “create” in that psalm describes God’s
transformative grace, while the Son, eternally begotten and consubstantial with
the Father, stands on the Creator’s side of the Creator–creature divide.
The Arian polemic
depends throughout on the notion that the lack of explicit, technical,
philosophical terminology in the NT somehow constitutes evidence against the
Trinitarian reading. This is historically and methodologically baseless. All
classical Christian doctrine arises from the Church’s careful contemplation of
the entirety of revelation: the unity of God, the divinity of Christ, the
personal distinction of Father, Son, and Spirit, and the narrative of salvation
history. The “homoousios” of Nicaea and the “begotten, not made” formula were
not novelties but clarifications—terms coined to rule out heretical interpretations
like Arianism and to safeguard the mystery revealed in Scripture.
The
distinction between “begotten” and “made” therefore stands on texts older than
Nicea and logic deeper than conciliar decree. Every creature is made ex nihilo;
only the Son is begotten ex Deo. To merge the verbs is to collapse Creator and
creation, to unwrite John 1:3, and to leave the Church without a Redeemer who
is truly God yet truly from God. That is why the bishops of 325, guarding “the
faith once delivered,” confessed nothing novel when they cried “γεννηθέντα, οὐ ποιηθέντα.” They simply gave
dogmatic voice to what Scripture already requires and what Justin, Origen,
Athanasius, and the whole catholic tradition had always—however variously
phrased—believed: the Father is never without his Word, nor was there ever a
time when the Son was not.
In
conclusion, every aspect of the Arian critique—regarding “firstborn,” the
meaning of “begotten,” the biblical witness to Christ’s divinity, and the
development of Trinitarian doctrine—fails under the weight of scriptural
exegesis, linguistic evidence, and historical theology. The context of
Colossians 1, the meaning of πρωτότοκος, and the witness of Justin and the
early Fathers all converge on the reality that the Son is not part of creation
but stands eternally as its source, Lord, and inheritor. The “firstborn of all
creation” is the one through whom all things were made, and without whom
nothing was made that has been made (John 1:3). He is eternally begotten, not
made, consubstantial with the Father—the confession of the universal Church
from the beginning. Any other reading fragments the scriptural logic and
empties the apostolic gospel of its heart: that in Christ, the fullness of
deity dwells bodily (Col 2:9), and that our redemption rests on the uncreated,
eternal Son’s work and person.