i think when people leave the organization, they lump it all together- jehovah- religion, organization, etc.
i am not doubtful there is a god, but just doubtful that he used the wts to be his one & only means.
just wanted to say that.
I would have to agree with Alan on this one that your formulas are gross simplifications of a more complex issue.
What about the aspect if there is a God/Creator, does he give a damn? Is it a god as described in scripture? Who's scriptures? It can't really be boiled down to does he exist or not. All your results were formulated on a Christian bias (judgement vs damnation).
Interesting argumentation nonetheless. I look forward to reading more of your posts.
Kismet
i lifted this from the "other" board.. you say we will never know the answer?
i have the answer.
my sister, who met, and liked farkel, was so turned off by ***(the fighting and the picture of one poster's penis) she is going back to the hall.
shhhhhhhh Prisca don't you know they aren't allowed to talk about this place over there...or so they keep claiming. (funny how 2 moderators of that forum got involved in the thread you quoted...) but it is a good thing '(ForumDirector) Norm is quick to remove such topics.'
Despite all their hand waving and statements to the contrary, they are equally fixated with this place and some of the participants here, as some participants here are about them. So all their (Kent's board people) put downs and self righteous posturing falls pretty flat when they are doing the very things they condemn.
I believe there is a word fo that..... hmmmm
There are people at both places equally guilty of continuing battles including those pretending to be peacemakers here who are mere puppets of the more antagonistic. So why not just admit, we are all guilty of it and move on. No need to prove who is more guilty..kinda becomes a moot point.
So rather than wasting energy fighting, how about some commentary on the articles in the Blood section about mature minors and blood transfusions. A slightly more important topic IMO than which exJW is worse pond scum then the rest of us pond scum. LOL
Kismet - who thinks his colour of pond scum is far nicer than anyone else's LOL
Edited by - Kismet on 11 July 2002 18:21:49
canadian law has strongly affirmed the right to only receive medical treatment after providing "informed consent.".
informed consent in making treatment decisions.
however, both provincial legislation (36) and courts have recognized that some minors may in fact be capable of making their own medical decisions.
Pistoff:
I am the last person you need to worry about ferreting you out. I have had it done to me and wouldn't wish that on anyone.
Regarding the lawyers, how does it make you feel that your contributions went to putting a couple of dining room waiters and kitchen personnel through law school. The legal Department in Canada is made up of mostly bethelites put through law school. Even David Gnam was sponsored by the Society as was Andre Carbonneau in Montreal.
Now THAT gets me pissed off!!
Kismet
countries, states and provinces all have different rules as far as when someone legally becomes an adult.
is it when they turn 16, 18, or 21?
should age be used at all to make such a determination?
Countries, States and Provinces all have different rules as far as when someone legally becomes an adult. Is it when they turn 16, 18, or 21? Should age be used at all to make such a determination? For those teens that are not yet legally viewed as adults, the catchall expression "Mature Minor" is used. On what do authorities base their judgement of maturity especially in regards choice of medical treatment?
The American Academy of Pediatrics Task Force grants informed consent based on the patient's age, disease, severity, prognosis, risks, proposed benefits, level of intelligence, reasoning, emotional state, and cultural perspective.1 In addition, studies have shown that teens can make informed choices just as well as adults with regard to issues such as diabetes, epilepsy, and depression.2
A clear and concise statutory definition of ``mature minor'' could help all understand what is required to be determined a mature minor.
In Canada (under Common Law) in particular B.C., they have a description of the "mature minor". A child who is under the age of majority (e.g. nineteen), can be described as a mature minor, if they have sufficient intelligence to understand the nature and consequences and the reasonably foreseeable benefits and risks of a health care service or treatment. While some courts have found children as young as eight as being mature minors, this finding depends on the individual characteristics of the particular child and the nature of the health care decision they are facing. However and at the risk of over-generalizing, a mature minor is commonly understood to be a child who is 13 years of age or older and of average intelligence. But the essential feature of "mature" is the child's capacity to understand and make the particular health care decision that is before them. So it is a flexible concept.
The Seattle & King County Public Health Department provides excellent instructions on determining the maturity of a minor 3 .
Mature minor
Guidelines for an individual to be considered a mature minor include: age, living apart from parents or guardian, maturity, intelligence, economic independence, experience and marital status.
Therefore under common law, a minor was presumed to acquire the capacity to consent when she had the ability of the average person to understand and weigh the risks and benefits of a proposed course of action.
Alabama provides a concrete definition of a mature minor as, "[a]ny minor, who is age 14 or older, or has graduated from high school, or is married, or having been married is divorced or is pregnant may give effective consent to any legally authorized medical, dental, health or mental health services, and the consent of no other person shall be necessary."
Walter Wadlington in his Minors and Health Care: The Age of Consent, [Osgood Hall L.J. 115, (1973) ] elucidated upon cases in which the ``mature minor'' doctrine had been applied, and found it to have the following commonalities: (1) treatment was undertaken for the benefit of the minor, as opposed to a third party; (2) the minor was near the age of majority, or at least 15 years of age, and was deemed to have sufficient mental capacity to fully understand the nature and importance of the proposed medical procedures; and (3) the medical procedures could be described by a court as not ``major'' or ``serious.''
To reflect minors' progressing reasoning abilities through various developmental stages, capacity is often determined by a so-called ``Rule of Sevens.'' Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 745 (Tenn. 1987). The Rule of Sevens provides that under the age of seven, a child has no capacity; between the ages of seven and fourteen, there exists a rebuttable presumption that the minor has no capacity; and between the ages of fourteen and twenty-one, there exists a rebuttable presumption that the individual has capacity.
Without belabouring the point further, it is my position that a mature minor is one that is capable of understanding and objectively looking at options, risks benefits of a proposed treatment and being able to make a decision accordingly.
This principle should only be superseded when it becomes apparent that a minor is under undue influence of parents or other influential adults in the minors life.
In situations involving minors refusing treatment on religious grounds, the Courts should interview the minor to determine if alternatives have been clearly and objectively reviewed or if the child has been strictly indoctrinated into a myopic point of view. Should such be determined, the State should, in the best interests of the child, intervene so that said minor may grow to an age whereby reasonable decisions can be made hopefully without the undue influence of a high control religion.
In the case of minor Jehovahs Witnesses who (or whose parents) refuses life saving medical treatment, the presence of Church leaders and specifically HLC members should be prohibited from being part of medical discussions with families and any attempts to invade the doctor patient confidentiality on the part of said members should be barred from future visitations and names turned over for interference of the medical profession.
Any attempt by the local congregation or Branch Office of Jehovahs Witnesses to interfere with personal medical choice of minor children, including provision of lawyers should be sanctioned harshly by the courts
The fact that a minor or an adult has turned over decision making to agents of the Church should give indication to the court that Jehovahs Witness minors are in fact being unduly influenced and are not to be considered mature minors.
1 Christin Hanisco, Acknowledging the Hypocrisy: Granting Minors the Right to Choose, 16 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 899 (summer 2000).
...2 Shoshanna Ehrlich, Minors as Medical Decision Makers, 7 Mich. J. Gender & L. 65 at 71-72 (2000).
3 http://www.metrokc.gov/health/famplan/matureminor.htm
Kismet
canadian law has strongly affirmed the right to only receive medical treatment after providing "informed consent.".
informed consent in making treatment decisions.
however, both provincial legislation (36) and courts have recognized that some minors may in fact be capable of making their own medical decisions.
Scully:
Regarding the JW motives, I believe you are pretty damned close to their thinking.
My heart goes out to Lawrence. If the Canada Branch wasn't bloodguilty before, they certainly are now.
I just hope the SCC refuses the application. Lawrence doesn't need this dragged out any further.
Kismet
canadian law has strongly affirmed the right to only receive medical treatment after providing "informed consent.".
informed consent in making treatment decisions.
however, both provincial legislation (36) and courts have recognized that some minors may in fact be capable of making their own medical decisions.
LOL@Waiting. I just quoted the whole thing just to prove that there are people out there more long winded than me! lol
The gist of the articles is that if a minor is capable of making decisions for themselves it should be respected. The discussion of what constitutes a mature minor is still be developed and is being reviewed on a case to case basis.
That being said however, a parent's rights shall not interfere with the future rights of their minor children to make a personal choice later on in life once they are mature. So if a parent makes a medicial decision for their minor child that is not in the best interests of the child (negatively affecting their future) the State can and should intervene on behalf of the child.
The parent's rights of freedom of religion shall not supercede the rights of a child to live.
So in the case of "Mia" the original trial judge after declaring Mia a minor not capable of making medical decisions on her own, did NOT err and thus should not be overturned. The Supreme Court of Canada has already ruled on the issue of mature minors and thus (hopefully) should reject the mother's and the Watchtower's (one in the same) application for Appeal.
For those research oriented, some of the references provided are excellent reads!
Kismet
(editted for typos)
Edited by - Kismet on 10 July 2002 14:39:21
canadian law has strongly affirmed the right to only receive medical treatment after providing "informed consent.".
informed consent in making treatment decisions.
however, both provincial legislation (36) and courts have recognized that some minors may in fact be capable of making their own medical decisions.
These are two articles on from AIDS Law newsletter and the other from the Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser University in British Columbia.
They provide an great commentary on the legal issues regarding minors and medical treatment. It adds credence to the position that the SCC should refuse the application for leave to appeal on the part of the 16 year old Calgary girl. The Supreme Court of Canada has already ruled on this issue and there is no factual or legal change or fault in law that requires the Supreme Court to review their previous decisions.
The links to the original articles:
http://www.aidslaw.ca/Maincontent/otherdocs/Newsletter/FallWin99/children.htm
http://www.educ.sfu.ca/cels/past_art26.html
Canadian Law on Minors and Medical Treatment (22)
Canadian law has strongly affirmed the right to only receive medical treatment after providing "informed consent." |
Informed Consent in Making Treatment Decisions
Canadian law has strongly affirmed the right to only receive medical treatment after providing "informed consent," as affirmed in two leading 1980 decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. (23) The health-care worker who treats someone without consent may be civilly and criminally liable, and may also be subject to professional discipline.
As courts have ruled in subsequent cases, a person's right to give informed consent to medical treatment necessarily includes the right to refuse such treatment, even if that treatment would likely save their life. (24) Canadian courts have strongly stated this conclusion:
The right of a person to control his or her own body is a concept that has long been recognized at common law. The tort of battery has traditionally protected the interest in bodily security from unwanted physical interference.... No special exceptions are made for medical care, other than in emergency situations, and the general rules governing actions for battery are applicable to the doctor-patient relationship. Thus, as a matter of common law, a medical intervention in which a doctor touches the body of a patient would constitute a battery if the patient did not consent to the intervention. Patients have the decisive role in the medical decision-making process. Their right of self-determination is recognized and protected by law. (25)
The fact that serious risks or consequences may result from a refusal of medical treatment does not vitiate the right of medical self-determination. The doctrine of informed consent ensures the freedom of individuals to make choices about their medical care. It is the patient, not the doctor, who ultimately must decide if treatment - any treatment - is to be administered. (26)
It should not be forgotten that every patient has a right to bodily integrity. This encompasses the right to determine what medical procedures will be accepted and the extent to which they will be accepted. Everyone has the right to decide what is to be done with one's own body. This includes the right to be free from medical treatment to which the individual does not consent. (27)
Not only is the right to grant or refuse consent to medical treatment established in Canadian common law; it has also been considered to be constitutionally protected, as the Ontario Court of Appeal indicated in Fleming. (28)
The common law also recognizes, however, that in emergency situations where immediate treatment is required and the consent of the patient (or their substitute decision-maker) cannot be obtained, treatment may be given without consent. (29) In some jurisdictions, provincial legislation also specifically sets out further definition of "emergency" circumstances in which treatment without consent may be permitted. However, in line with the doctrine of informed consent, the Ontario Court of Appeal has ruled that treatment cannot be given if the patient (or their substitute decision-maker) is competent and refuses treatment, even in an emergency situation. (30)
The doctrine of informed consent applies equally to adults and to minors. However, two difficult questions arise with respect to making decisions regarding minors' medical treatment: Who is entitled to consent to, or refuse, treament? And on what basis are such decisions to be made?
Who Makes Medical Decisions for Minors?
As a general rule, parents are recognized as those with a legal right to make medical decisions on behalf of their children not capable of making these decisions for themselves. This is recognized both in the common law (31) and in provincial statutes that deal with consent to health care and substitute decision-making (unless a court has expressly appointed someone else under the provisions of such a statute). (32)
Parents also have legal obligations to ensure that their minor children receive required medical care; failing to do so may result in both civil liability for negligence and criminal liability for the offence of "failing to provide the necessaries of life." (33) In every jurisdiction, legislation also provides that child protection authorities may seek custody of a child in need of protection as a result of parental conduct or may seek a more limited authority, such as the authority to make medical treatment decisions on behalf of the child in place of the parent(s). Finally, courts have an inherent parens patriae jurisdiction to safeguard the well-being of "persons who are not able to take care of themselves." (34) Canadian courts have upheld such legislative or judicial interference with "parental rights" as being constitutionally permissible (see discussion below). (35)
However, both provincial legislation (36) and courts have recognized that some minors may in fact be capable of making their own medical decisions. In keeping with the respect for personal autonomy, the common law doctrine of the "mature minor" holds that a minor can legally consent or refuse a given medical treatment if they can understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of the procedure and their decision. (37) In the case of a mature minor, parental consent is not required, nor can the parent's refusal of a given treatment (legally) override the mature minor's decision. Nor, in the case of a mature minor, can any other person, such as child protection authorities or the court, supersede the minor's treatment decisions: "at common law a mature minor is 'able to take care of themselves' and may make decisions about medical treatment. In such a case, there is no room for a court to exercise its parens patriae jurisdiction." (38) In several of these cases, the mature minor's decision has been respected where their refusal of treatment was based on religious beliefs, such as teenage Jehovah's Witnesses refusing blood transfusions. (39) In another case, the minor refusing a transfusion on religious grounds was deemed to be incapable of making this decision. (40)
The "Best Interests of the Child"
In those cases where a minor is not "mature" enough to be capable of making their own medical decisions, it is the substitute decision-maker (such as a parent) who may give or refuse consent to any proposed treatment. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court of Canada has clearly stated that such decisions must be based solely on the "best interests" of the child. (41) But in some cases, there is strong disagreement between health professionals and the decision-maker as to the appropriate treatment and what constitute the child's "best interests." As Gilmour points out in her review of the case law: "Difficulties arise not with the basic decision-making principle, which directs that the decision shall be made in the child's best interests, but rather, in determining whose understanding of 'best interests' shall prevail and the content to give that standard." (42)
In 1995, in RB v Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, (43) the Supreme Court of Canada considered the question of whether Jehovah's Witness parents could refuse to permit their infant to receive needed blood transfusions. On short notice, the lower court had granted temporary wardship of the infant to child protection authorities; surgery (involving a transfusion) was performed; the court then terminated the wardship and returned the infant to her parents. The parents appealed these court decisions, arguing that their Charter rights to freedom of religion (s 2(a)) and to liberty (including parents' rights to choose medical treatment for their children) (s 7) had been infringed.
The Supreme Court recognized that parents' interest in caring for a child is an interest of "fundamental importance" and is protected by the right to liberty under section 7 of the Charter, but that this is not an "unconstrained freedom" and the state may intervene to protect a child if necessary. In this case, the Court found that while the parents' liberty had been infringed by overriding their right to refuse medical treatment for their child, this had been done "in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice," which included the protection of a child's right to life and to health.
The Court also accepted that the right of parents to raise their children according to their religious beliefs (including choosing or refusing medical treatments) is a fundamental aspect of freedom of religion, and that their Charter rights in this respect had been infringed. However, the Court concluded that this infringement was justified (under s 1 of the Charter): protecting children is a sufficiently important objective to warrant interfering with parents' rights; the process set out by the legislation in question was carefully crafted to ensure this infringement of parents' rights only where necessary to protect the child's health, and provided procedural protections for parents who wished to contest the attempt by child protection authorities to supersede parental authority over medical decisions.
While there have been other cases in which courts have considered the question of parental refusal to medically recommended treatment based on religious belief, (44) in other cases there is no such dimension to the disagreement over the appropriate treatment. (45) And, as Gilmour points out, in some cases there is not always a clear indication as to the "right" treatment:
Where the benefits of treatment are not so obvious or unequivocal as they are with relatively simple procedures such as blood transfusions, or where the risks are significant, then decision-making becomes immeasurably more difficult both for the child's parents and for courts. Which reasons put forward by which families should be accepted and which rejected? And how to decide? Cases to date have emphasized one aspect of the determination - the medical assessment of the benefits and burdens of treatment and non-treatment, and medical practice. (46)
What the Supreme Court's decision in RB, and court decisions in other cases, confirm is that decisions about restricting parental control over their children's medical treatment are essentially questions to be decided on the basis of the facts of a particular case, as well as public policy considerations. As LaForest J wrote for the plurality in RB:
State interference in order to balance the rights of parents and children will arise only in exceptional cases. In fact, we must accept that parents can, at times, make decisions contrary to their children's wishes - and rights - as long as they do not exceed the threshold dictated by public policy, in its broad conception. (47)
In the RB case, Gilmour summarizes the Court's reasoning as follows:
In another case, a court upheld a parent's refusal of chemotherapy for her child despite doctors' recommendations and an application by the hospital for court authorization to treat the child. In Couture-Jacquet, the Qubec Court of Appeal based this decision on the small chance of success of the treatment, as well as the significant physical damage and suffering it would cause. (49)Quoted footnotes: 22. For an excellent discussion of minors and medical treatment in Canadian law, see J Gilmour. Minors. In: J Downie, T Caulfied (eds). Canadian Health Law and Policy. Markham: Butterworths Canada Ltd, 1999, at 179-216. 23. Hopp v Lepp, [1980] 2 SCR 192; Reibl v Hughes, [1980] 2 SCR 880. 24. For example, see: Rodriguez v BC (AG), [1993] 3 SCR 519; Nancy B v Htel Dieu de Qubec (1992), 86 DLR (4 th ) 385 (Que SC); Walker (Litigation Guardian of) v Region 2 Hospital Corp (1994), 116 DLR (4 th ) 476, [1994] NBJ No 242 (QL) (NBCA); Re K(LD) (1985), 48 RFL (2d) 164 (Ont Prov Ct). 25. Malette v Shulman (1990), 37 OAC 281 (CA) at 285. 26. Fleming v Reid, (1991) 82 DLR (4 th ) 298 (CA) at 309-310. 27. Ciarlariello v Schacter, [1993] 2 SCR 119, cited in Walker, supra, note 24. 28. Fleming, supra, note 26 at 312-313. 29. Walker, supra, note 24; Malette, supra, note 25; Marshall v Curry, [1933] 3 DLR 260 (NSTD). 30. Malette, supra, note 25. 31. RB v Children's Aid Society of Metropoliton Toronto, [1995] 1 SCR 315. 32. Eg, Health Care Consent Act, 1996, SO 1996, c 2 (Sch A), s 20. 33. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 215. 34. Beson v Director of Child Welfare (Nfld), [1982] 2 SCR 716; E v Eve, [1986] 2 SCR 388; Fleming, supra, note 26 at 315-316; Walker, supra, note 24 at QL para 29; Ney v Canada (AG) (1993), 79 BCLR (2d) 47 (SC); Kennett Estate v Manitoba (AG) (1998), 129 Man R (2d) 244 (CA). 35. RB v Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, supra, note 31; Alberta (Director of Child Welfare) v Harrison, infra, note 44. 36. Eg, Medical Consent of Minors Act, SNB 1976, c M-6.1. 37. Walker, supra, note 23; Johnston v Wellesley Hospital (1970), 17 DLR (3d) 139 (HC); Ney, supra, note 33; Re AY (1993), 111 Nfld & PEIR 91; C(JS) v Wren, [1987] 2 WWR 669 (Alta CA); Re K(LD), supra, note 23. 38. Walker, supra, note 24 at QL para 26. 39. Walker, supra, note 24; Re AY, supra, note 37; Re K(LD), supra, note 24. 40. H(T) v Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto (1996), 138 DLR (4 th ) 144 (Ont Gen Div). 41. E v Eve, supra, note 34. 42. Gilmour, supra , note 22 at 200. 43. RB, supra, note 31; 78 OAC 1. 44. Alberta (Director of Child Welfare) v Harrison, [1996] AJ No 501 (Alta QB). 45. Re Superintendent of Family & Child Service and Dawson (1983), 145 DLR (3d) 610 (BCSC); New Brunswick (Minister of Health & Community Services) (1990), 70 DLR (4 th ) 568 (NBQB); Re Goyette: Centre des Services Sociaux du Montral, [1983] C 429 (Que SC); Children's Aid Society of Peel (Region) v B(C), unreported, 9 February 1988, Karswick PCJ, (988), ACWS (3d) 425 (Ont Prov Ct), cited in Gilmour, supra, note 22 at 199; Saskatchewan (Minister of Social Services) v P(F) (1990), 69 DLR (4 th ) 134 (Sask Prov Ct). 46. Gilmour, supra, note 22 at 201. 47. RB, supra, note 31 at 373. 48. Gilmour, supra, note 22 at 198. 49. Couture-Jacquet v Montreal Children's Hospital (1986), 28 DLR (4 th ) 22 (Que CA). *********************************************Second article from the Simon Fraser Faculty of Education site: The Law ConnectionEven with the dangers of transmitting infection now identified in the blood supply system, blood transfusions are a standard form of medical therapy, enjoy wide public acceptance, are not particularly invasive, do not generally cause major side effects, and are often necessary to preserve health and even life. Given its standard nature, the small degree of physical risk associated with a transfusion and the major risks anticipated from refusing it, and given strong medical opinion supporting the need for transfusion and wide societal acceptance of it as a form of treatment, the Court was not prepared to countenance the parental refusal. The life and physical health of the child clearly prevailed in the determination of the child's best interests. (48)
when questioning the rate of sucides among jw's & how the #'s compare to the general population , i believe these things are of worthy to note:.
the "high wire act".
the whole demeanor of the rank& file jw is bred from a impossibly awkward & fabricated persona.
Nancee:
Amazing is correct in his statements. The fact that you don't want to agree with him doesn't make his comments wrong.
No where on the link you provided does it say that bergman's paper was published by anyone other than himself. Who was this alleged board of peers that you claim reviewed the paper? If it was published in such a prestigious journal as you purport one would think that Mr. Bergman would provide his adoring public with a citation to said journal.
So far I have only seen you and Jerry Bergman himself claim he is highly respected.
Are you his wife or lover or something? I just don't understand your almost godlike worship of the man.
Kismet
bill,.
what' happened on the 28th?
no meeting with the elders yet?
Just a minor clarification.
Amazing's research is currently unsubstantiated and based on speculation. It may very well turn out to be true but we shouldn't be running off at the mouth about it quite yet.
Amazing commented in a post that it is more the overtures taken by the NCC towardds the JW's and Mormans rather than the other way around. Tho one has to wonder why they would initiate those moves without some positive sign from the WTBTS that they would be receptive to it.
Kismet
this is a sincere question.
do you worry about offending active witnesses?
I for one do care since these places were designed, amongst other reasons, to be a place where they can learn the truth about the 'truth' and intentionally insulting them or conducting ourselves in such a manner that would chase them away defeats that purpose.
I am curious as to which person is writing this question tho? Is this the Uncle or Milky? If Milky you have a lot of nerve asking this question considering how you insulted and treated one of the kindest hearted person I have ever known. You drove her off H20 both as a member and as a participant. You got banned from H20 for your insulting behaviour and now repeat it here.
So do you care if you offend anyone whether JW or not?
If this is the alleged Uncle, please encourage your nephew to seek professioanl help.
Kismet
