Pubsinger's right - we are arguing about BEFORE...
http://www.siue.edu/~evailat/ml12.html
Eternity
1. Traditionally, eternity has been understood in two ways:
1. Eternity1: sempiternity, i.e., existing at each time. For example, perhaps energy/mass is eternal in this way.
2. NOTE: Detensers deny that tomorrow's sea battle or meta-facts about it (e.g., the fact that tomorrow there will be a sea-battle) are sempiternal. Eternity2: eternity proper, i.e., totally independent of time because a thing eternal in this sense is not in time, doesn't exemplify temporal items, and doesn't involve temporal items. For example, Augustine thought of God in this way; probably Plato thought of Forms and their relations this way.
NOTE: Meta-facts involve temporal items (i.e. facts or events); hence, they are not eternal2.
To these two traditional notions, one might add a third:
Eternity3: a thing eternal in this sense is not in time, but it depends on time because it involves temporal items. For example, meta-facts, including the fact that the whole B-series is the way it is, are eternal3.
2. Some reasons for holding that God is properly eternal (eternal2):
* if time has a beginning, then God cannot be in time, otherwise God would have a limited existence.
* if God were in time, then we would not be free because God would foresee our actions.
* if God were in time, then God could, at least in principle, change.
3. Boethius: “eternity is possession all at once of unlimited life”. Hard to make out what Boethius had in mind.
4. Possible accounts of eternity:
1. First definition: Eternity as a non-temporal, non-successive, partless duration. Hence:
* God not in time
* no succession in God (divine simplicity)
* Problem: how can duration be non-successive? all worldly events simultaneously present to God
Problem: since simultaneity transitive, some world-events both simultaneous and non-simultaneous.
Second definition: Eternity as tenseless successive duration, while time is tensed. Hence:
2.
* no past, present and future for God. In this sense God’s life “all at once”.
* succession in divine duration.
* non-simultaneous parts in divine duration
* God not in time, because time is tensed
Problem: Dates apply to God; but some dates simultaneous with, say, past events. Hence tenses apply to God.
Third definition: Eternity as a present (tensed) instant outsidet ime (nunc stans), while time is tensed. Hence:
3.
* no successive parts in eternity because instants are partless.
* eternity unlimited because no instant before or after
* eternity is a permanent present, nunc stans (tensed)
Problem: “remaining present” entails presence through some instants. So, how can an instant have any permanence?
1. Fourth definition: Eternity as a tenseless instant outside time and time is tenseless. Hence:
* no successive parts in eternity
* eternity unlimited because no instant before or after
* eternity not a present instant (nunc stans).
* all moments in tenseless time exist equally for God.
5. Objections to view that God is outside time, and hence has no temporal relation to the world.
* If God creates X at time t1 and Y at time t2, then God changes. But if God changes, then God is in time.
* Reply: God timelessly creates X at t1 and Y at t2. Hence, God doesn’t change. God has extrinsic denominations. Hence God changes; hence God is in time.
* Reply: extrinsic denominations not real changes. If God isn't in time, then God doesn't know what time it is now. Hence, God is not omniscient, which cannot be.
NOTE: this objection presupposes a tensed view of time.