France & Germany Take the Same Stance

by MrMoe 103 Replies latest jw friends

  • Realist
    Realist

    yeru,

    if you can'T see the difference between hating US politics and hating the USA than i can't do anything about it.

    i trust neither the word of hussein nor bush's word. they are both liars and they both only do what is best for them. no morals on both sides.

    bush has not presented any actual facts to the world community...repeating he has facts doesn't make it true. he says his government is informed about actual locations where weapons are hidden (lakes houses etc.) if this is true why doesn'T he give that info to the UN inspectors? i don't believe in any of his facts as long as he doesn't give neutral observers the opportunity to prove or disprove what he says.

    you still have to show that hussein is any worse than many of the dictators the US supports/ed (including hussein himself!). the US goverment is using double standards like no one else. one day he is worth to be supported...than when he doesn't comply with US interests anymore he is turned into the reincarnation of the devil himself and has to be removed.

    about the resolutions against israel...it was the US and only the US in many cases that prevented sanctions against israel. israel is save since the US has the right to veto any UN resolution.

    Those terretories wouldn't be "occupied" had the Palestinians not used them to attack Israel from. Israel who was gauranteed existence by the UN you so favor.

    it was a bullshit idea to found israel on already inhabited land. the whole conflict is as old as the zionist movement. no one can blame the arabs for trying to defend their land.

    i can guarantee you that the iraqis won't apprechiate the liberation! i told you already what i think the outcome of this war will be...the US will give a flying shit about the iraqis once they have the oil. we will see whose prediction is right.

    The guy is evil, when we take him out, we'll find a lot of his weapons of mass destruction, and that still won't be enough for the America haters.

    that remains to be seen.

    and by the way....i don'T find it more troublesome that hussein has WMD than lets say israel or the US....simply because he is no position to use them anyway.

    Perry,

    what exactly are your ARGUMENTS?

    and when did i side step? i aswered your post. i think hussein should be removes just like any unscrupulous goverment in the world.

    Edited by - realist on 24 January 2003 8:37:21

  • Perry
    Perry
    To all moral relativists,

    Maybe you guys could simply write to the state department and ask them to reason with Saddam over a nice warm cappacino? As disturbing as it might be for you to contemplate that there are patholigical narcissists in the world, it might be useful for you guys to actually look inside the mind of a mass murderer here: http://www.buzzle.com/editorials/10-20-2002-28543.asp?viewPage=22

    Likewise it might be shocking to realize what the experts say regarding the liklihood of anything you have espoused having a peaceful outcome here:

    http://www.aijac.org.au/review/2002/2712/essay2712.html

    If logic is too difficult, then simply look at the pretty pictures below.

    Cheers.

    Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs

    Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.

    Baghdad hides large portions of Iraq's WMD efforts. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information.

    Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.

    • Iraq's growing ability to sell oil illicitly increases Baghdad's capabilities to finance WMD programs; annual earnings in cash and goods have more than quadrupled.

    • Iraq largely has rebuilt missile and biological weapons facilities damaged during Operation Desert Fox and has expanded its chemical and biological infrastructure under the cover of civilian production.

    • Baghdad has exceeded UN range limits of 150 km with its ballistic missiles and is working with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which allow for a more lethal means to deliver biological and, less likely, chemical warfare agents.

    • Although Saddam probably does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent on acquiring them.

    How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon depends on when it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material.

  • If Baghdad acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material from abroad, it could make a nuclear weapon within a year.

  • Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon until the last half of the decade.

    • Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain proscribed high-strength aluminum tubes are of significant concern. All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons and that these tubes could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program. Most intelligence specialists assess this to be the intended use, but some believe that these tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs.

    • Based on tubes of the size Iraq is trying to acquire, a few tens of thousands of centrifuges would be capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a couple of weapons per year.

    Baghdad has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX. Its capability was reduced during the UNSCOM inspections and is probably more limited now than it was at the time of the Gulf war, although VX production and agent storage life probably have been improved.

    • Saddam probably has stocked a few hundred metric tons of CW agents.

    • The Iraqis have experience in manufacturing CW bombs, artillery rockets, and projectiles, and probably possess CW bulk fills for SRBM warheads, including for a limited number of covertly stored, extended-range Scuds.

    All key aspectsR&D, production, and weaponizationof Iraq's offensive BW program are active and most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf war.

    • Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives, including potentially against the US Homeland.

    • Baghdad has established a large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capability, which includes mobile facilities; these facilities can evade detection, are highly survivable, and can exceed the production rates Iraq had prior to the Gulf war.

    Iraq maintains a small missile force and several development programs, including for a UAV that most analysts believe probably is intended to deliver biological warfare agents.

    • Gaps in Iraqi accounting to UNSCOM suggest that Saddam retains a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant SRBMs with ranges of 650 to 900 km.

    • Iraq is deploying its new al-Samoud and Ababil-100 SRBMs, which are capable of flying beyond the UN-authorized 150-km range limit.

    • Baghdad's UAVsespecially if used for delivery of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agentscould threaten Iraq's neighbors, US forces in the Persian Gulf, and the United States if brought close to, or into, the US Homeland.

    • Iraq is developing medium-range ballistic missile capabilities, largely through foreign assistance in building specialized facilities.

    Discussion

    Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs

    In April 1991, the UN Security Council enacted Resolution 687 requiring Iraq to declare, destroy, or render harmless its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal and production infrastructure under UN or International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervision. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 also demanded that Iraq forgo the future development or acquisition of WMD.

    Baghdad's determination to hold onto a sizeable remnant of its WMD arsenal, agents, equipment, and expertise has led to years of dissembling and obstruction of UN inspections. Elite Iraqi security services orchestrated an extensive concealment and deception campaign to hide incriminating documents and material that precluded resolution of key issues pertaining to its WMD programs.

    • Iraqi obstructions prompted the Security Council to pass several subsequent resolutions demanding that Baghdad comply with its obligations to cooperate with the inspection process and to provide United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and IAEA officials immediate and unrestricted access to any site they wished to inspect.

    • Although outwardly maintaining the facade of cooperation, Iraqi officials frequently denied or substantially delayed access to facilities, personnel, and documents in an effort to conceal critical information about Iraq's WMD programs.

    Successive Iraqi declarations on Baghdad's pre-Gulf war WMD programs gradually became more accurate between 1991 and 1998, but only because of sustained pressure from UN sanctions, Coalition military force, and vigorous and robust inspections facilitated by information from cooperative countries. Nevertheless, Iraq never has fully accounted for major gaps and inconsistencies in its declarations and has provided no credible proof that it has completely destroyed its weapons stockpiles and production infrastructure.

    • UNSCOM inspection activities and Coalition military strikes destroyed most of its prohibited ballistic missiles and some Gulf war-era chemical and biological munitions, but Iraq still has a small force of extended-range Scud-variant missiles, chemical precursors, biological seed stock, and thousands of munitions suitable for chemical and biological agents.

    • Iraq has preserved and in some cases enhanced the infrastructure and expertise necessary for WMD production and has used that capability to maintain a stockpile of WMD and to increase its size and sophistication in some areas.
    UN Security Council Resolutions and Provisions for Inspections and Monitoring: Theory and Practice

    Resolution Requirement

    Reality

    Res. 687 (3 April 1991) Requires Iraq to declare, destroy, remove, or render harmless under UN or IAEA supervision and not to use, develop, construct, or acquire all chemical and biological weapons, all ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 150 km, and all nuclear weapons-usable material, including related material, equipment, and facilities. The resolution also formed the Special Commission and authorized the IAEA to carry out immediate on-site inspections of WMD-related facilities based on Iraq's declarations and UNSCOM's designation of any additional locations.

    Baghdad refused to declare all parts of each WMD program, submitted several declarations as part of its aggressive efforts to deny and deceive inspectors, and ensured that certain elements of the program would remain concealed. The prohibition against developing delivery platforms with ranges greater than 150 km allowed Baghdad to research and develop shorter-range systems with applications for longer-range systems and did not affect Iraqi efforts to convert full-size aircraft into unmanned aerial vehicles as potential WMD delivery systems with ranges far beyond 150 km.

    Res. 707 (15 August 1991) Requires Iraq to allow UN and IAEA inspectors immediate and unrestricted access to any site they wish to inspect. Demands Iraq provide full, final, and complete disclosure of all aspects of its WMD programs; cease immediately any attempt to conceal, move, or destroy WMD-related material or equipment; allow UNSCOM and IAEA teams to use fixed-wing and helicopter flights throughout Iraq; and respond fully, completely, and promptly to any Special Commission questions or requests.

    Baghdad in 1996 negotiated with UNSCOM Executive Chairman Ekeus modalities that it used to delay inspections, to restrict to four the number of inspectors allowed into any site Baghdad declared as "sensitive," and to prohibit them altogether from sites regarded as sovereign. These modalities gave Iraq leverage over individual inspections. Iraq eventually allowed larger numbers of inspectors into such sites but only after lengthy negotiations at each site.

    Res. 715 (11 October 1991) Requires Iraq to submit to UNSCOM and IAEA long-term monitoring of Iraqi WMD programs; approved detailed plans called for in UNSCRs 687 and 707 for long-term monitoring.

    Iraq generally accommodated UN monitors at declared sites but occasionally obstructed access and manipulated monitoring cameras. UNSCOM and IAEA monitoring of Iraq's WMD programs does not have a specified end date under current UN resolutions.

    Res. 1051 (27 March 1996) Established the Iraqi export/import monitoring system, requiring UN members to provide IAEA and UNSCOM with information on materials exported to Iraq that may be applicable to WMD production, and requiring Iraq to report imports of all dual-use items.

    Iraq is negotiating contracts for procuringoutside of UN controlsdual-use items with WMD applications. The UN lacks the staff needed to conduct thorough inspections of goods at Iraq's borders and to monitor imports inside Iraq.

    Res. 1060 (12 June 1996) and Resolutions 1115, 1134, 1137, 1154, 1194, and 1205. Demands that Iraq cooperate with UNSCOM and allow inspection teams immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to facilities for inspection and access to Iraqi officials for interviews. UNSCR 1137 condemns Baghdad's refusal to allow entry to Iraq to UNSCOM officials on the grounds of their nationality and its threats to the safety of UN reconnaissance aircraft.

    Baghdad consistently sought to impede and limit UNSCOM's mission in Iraq by blocking access to numerous facilities throughout the inspection process, often sanitizing sites before the arrival of inspectors and routinely attempting to deny inspectors access to requested sites and individuals. At times, Baghdad would promise compliance to avoid consequences, only to renege later.

    Res. 1154 (2 March 1998) Demands that Iraq comply with UNSCOM and IAEA inspections and endorses the Secretary General's memorandum of understanding with Iraq, providing for "severest consequences" if Iraq fails to comply.

    Res. 1194 (9 September 1998) Condemns Iraq's decision to suspend cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA.

    Res. 1205 (5 November 1998) Condemns Iraq's decision to cease cooperation with UNSCOM.

    UNSCOM could not exercise its mandate without Iraqi compliance. Baghdad refused to work with UNSCOM and instead negotiated with the Secretary General, whom it believed would be more sympathetic to Iraq's needs.

    Res. 1284 (17 December 1999) Established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), replacing UNSCOM; and demanded that Iraq allow UNMOVIC teams immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all aspects of Iraq's WMD program.

    Iraq repeatedly has rejected the return of UN arms inspectors and claims that it has satisfied all UN resolutions relevant to disarmament. Compared with UNSCOM, 1284 gives the UNMOVIC chairman less authority, gives the Security Council a greater role in defining key disarmament tasks, and requires that inspectors be full-time UN employees.

    Since December 1998, Baghdad has refused to allow UN inspectors into Iraq as required by the Security Council resolutions. Technical monitoring systems installed by the UN at known and suspected WMD and missile facilities in Iraq no longer operate. Baghdad prohibits Security Council-mandated monitoring overflights of Iraqi facilities by UN aircraft and helicopters. Similarly, Iraq has curtailed most IAEA inspections since 1998, allowing the IAEA to visit annually only a very small number of sites to safeguard Iraq's stockpile of uranium oxide.

    In the absence of inspectors, Baghdad's already considerable ability to work on prohibited programs without risk of discovery has increased, and there is substantial evidence that Iraq is reconstituting prohibited programs. Baghdad's vigorous concealment efforts have meant that specific information on many aspects of Iraq's WMD programs is yet to be uncovered. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information.

    • Limited insight into activities since 1998 clearly show that Baghdad has used the absence of UN inspectors to repair and expand dual-use and dedicated missile-development facilities and to increase its ability to produce WMD.
    Nuclear Weapons Program

    More than ten years of sanctions and the loss of much of Iraq's physical nuclear infrastructure under IAEA oversight have not diminished Saddam's interest in acquiring or developing nuclear weapons.

    • Iraq's efforts to procure tens of thousands of proscribed high-strength aluminum tubes are of significant concern. All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons and that these tubes could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program. Most intelligence specialists assess this to be the intended use, but some believe that these tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs.

    Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development program before the Gulf war that focused on building an implosion-type weapon using highly enriched uranium. Baghdad was attempting a variety of uranium enrichment techniques, the most successful of which were the electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) and gas centrifuge programs. After its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq initiated a crash program to divert IAEA-safeguarded, highly enriched uranium from its Soviet and French-supplied reactors,but the onset of hostilities ended this effort. Iraqi declarations and the UNSCOM/IAEA inspection process revealed much of Iraq's nuclear weapons efforts, but Baghdad still has not provided complete information on all aspects of its nuclear weapons program.

    • Iraq has withheld important details relevant to its nuclear program, including procurement logs, technical documents, experimental data, accounting of materials, and foreign assistance.

    • Baghdad also continues to withhold other data about enrichment techniques, foreign procurement, weapons design, and the role of Iraqi security services in concealing its nuclear facilities and activities.

    • In recent years, Baghdad has diverted goods contracted under the Oil-for-Food Program for military purposes and has increased solicitations and dual-use procurementsoutside the Oil-for-Food processsome of which almost certainly are going to prohibited WMD and other weapons programs. Baghdad probably uses some of the money it gains through its illicit oil sales to support its WMD efforts.

    Before its departure from Iraq, the IAEA made significant strides toward dismantling Iraq's nuclear weapons program and unearthing the nature and scope of Iraq's past nuclear activities. In the absence of inspections, however, most analysts assess that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear programunraveling the IAEA's hard-earned accomplishments.

    Iraq retains its cadre of nuclear scientists and technicians, its program documentation, and sufficient dual-use manufacturing capabilities to support a reconstituted nuclear weapons program. Iraqi media have reported numerous meetings between Saddam and nuclear scientists over the past two years, signaling Baghdad's continued interest in reviving a nuclear program.

    Iraq's expanding international trade provides growing access to nuclear-related technology and materials and potential access to foreign nuclear expertise. An increase in dual-use procurement activity in recent years may be supporting a reconstituted nuclear weapons program.

    • The acquisition of sufficient fissile material is Iraq's principal hurdle in developing a nuclear weapon.

    • Iraq is unlikely to produce indigenously enough weapons-grade material for a deliverable nuclear weapon until the last half of this decade. Baghdad could produce a nuclear weapon within a year if it were able to procure weapons-grade fissile material abroad.

    Baghdad may have acquired uranium enrichment capabilities that could shorten substantially the amount of time necessary to make a nuclear weapon.


    Chemical Warfare Program

    Iraq has the ability to produce chemical warfare (CW) agents within its chemical industry, although it probably depends on external sources for some precursors. Baghdad is expanding its infrastructure, under cover of civilian industries, that it could use to advance its CW agent production capability. During the 1980s Saddam had a formidable CW capability that he used against Iranians and against Iraq's Kurdish population. Iraqi forces killed or injured more than 20,000 people in multiple attacks, delivering chemical agents (including mustard agent[1] and the nerve agents sarin and tabun[2]) in aerial bombs, 122mm rockets, and artillery shells against both tactical military targets and segments of Iraq's Kurdish population. Before the 1991 Gulf war, Baghdad had a large stockpile of chemical munitions and a robust indigenous production capacity.

    Documented Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons

    Date

    Area Used

    Type of Agent

    Approximate Casualties

    Target Population

    Aug 1983

    Hajj Umran

    Mustard

    fewer than 100

    Iranians/Kurds

    Oct-Nov 1983

    Panjwin

    Mustard

    3,000

    Iranian/Kurds

    Feb-Mar 1984

    Majnoon Island

    Mustard

    2,500

    Iranians

    Mar 1984

    al-Basrah

    Tabun

    50 to 100

    Iranians

    Mar 1985

    Hawizah Marsh

    Mustard/Tabun

    3,000

    Iranians

    Feb 1986

    al-Faw

    Mustard/Tabun

    8,000 to 10,000

    Iranians

    Dec 1986

    Umm ar Rasas

    Mustard

    thousands

    Iranians

    Apr 1987

    al-Basrah

    Mustard/Tabun

    5,000

    Iranians

    Oct 1987

    Sumar/Mehran

    Mustard/nerve agents

    3,000

    Iranians

    Mar 1988

    Halabjah

    Mustard/nerve agents

    hundreds

    Iranians/Kurds

    Although precise information is lacking, human rights organizations have received plausible accounts from Kurdish villagers of even more Iraqi chemical attacks against civilians in the 1987 to 1988 time framewith some attacks as late as October 1988in areas close to the Iranian and Turkish borders.

    • UNSCOM supervised the destruction of more than 40,000 chemical munitions, nearly 500,000 liters of chemical agents, 1.8 million liters of chemical precursors, and seven different types of delivery systems, including ballistic missile warheads.

    More than 10 years after the Gulf war, gaps in Iraqi accounting and current production capabilities strongly suggest that Iraq maintains a stockpile of chemical agents, probably VX,[3] sarin, cyclosarin,[4] and mustard.

    • Iraq probably has concealed precursors, production equipment, documentation, and other items necessary for continuing its CW effort. Baghdad never supplied adequate evidence to support its claims that it destroyed all of its CW agents and munitions. Thousands of tons of chemical precursors and tens of thousands of unfilled munitions, including Scud-variant missile warheads, remain unaccounted for.

    • UNSCOM discovered a document at Iraqi Air Force headquarters in July 1998 showing that Iraq overstated by at least 6,000 the number of chemical bombs it told the UN it had used during the Iran-Iraq Warbombs that remain are unaccounted for.

    • Iraq has not accounted for 15,000 artillery rockets that in the past were its preferred means for delivering nerve agents, nor has it accounted for about 550 artillery shells filled with mustard agent.

    • Iraq probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents.

    Baghdad continues to rebuild and expand dual-use infrastructure that it could divert quickly to CW production. The best examples are the chlorine and phenol plants at the Fallujah II facility. Both chemicals have legitimate civilian uses but also are raw materials for the synthesis of precursor chemicals used to produce blister and nerve agents. Iraq has three other chlorine plants that have much higher capacity for civilian production; these plants and Iraqi imports are more than sufficient to meet Iraq's civilian needs for water treatment. Of the 15 million kg of chlorine imported under the UN Oil-for-Food Program since 1997, Baghdad used only 10 million kg and has 5 million kg in stock, suggesting that some domestically produced chlorine has been diverted to such proscribed activities as CW agent production.

    • Fallujah II was one of Iraq's principal CW precursor production facilities before the Gulf war. In the last two years the Iraqis have upgraded the facility and brought in new chemical reactor vessels and shipping containers with a large amount of production equipment. They have expanded chlorine output far beyond pre-Gulf war production levelscapabilities that can be diverted quickly to CW production. Iraq is seeking to purchase CW agent precursors and applicable production equipment and is trying to hide the activities of the Fallujah plant.



    Biological Warfare Program

    Iraq has the capability to convert quickly legitimate vaccine and biopesticide plants to biological warfare (BW) production and already may have done so. This capability is particularly troublesome because Iraq has a record of concealing its BW activities and lying about the existence of its offensive BW program.

    After four years of claiming that they had conducted only "small-scale, defensive" research, Iraqi officials finally admitted to inspectors in 1995 to production and weaponization of biological agents. The Iraqis admitted this only after being faced with evidence of their procurement of a large volume of growth media and the defection of Husayn Kamil, former director of Iraq's military industries.



    Iraqi-Acknowledged Open-Air Testing of Biological Weapons

    Location-Date

    Agent

    Munition

    Al Muhammadiyat Mar 1988

    Bacillus subtilis[5]

    250-gauge bomb (cap. 65 liters)

    Al Muhammadiyat Mar 1988

    Botulinum toxin

    250-gauge bomb (cap. 65 liters)

    Al Muhammadiyat Nov 1989

    Bacillus subtilis

    122mm rocket (cap. 8 liters)

    Al Muhammadiyat Nov 1989

    Botulinum toxin

    122mm rocket (cap. 8 liters)

    Al Muhammadiyat Nov 1989

    Aflatoxin

    122mm rocket (cap. 8 liters)

    Khan Bani Saad Aug 1988

    Bacillus subtilis

    aerosol generator Mi-2 helicopter with modified agricultural spray equipment

    Al Muhammadiyat Dec 1989

    Bacillus subtilis

    R-400 bomb (cap. 85 liters)

    Al Muhammadiyat Nov 1989

    Botulinum toxin

    R-400 bomb (cap. 85 liters)

    Al Muhammadiyat Nov 1989

    Aflatoxin

    R-400 bomb (cap. 85 liters)

    Jurf al-Sakr Firing Range Sep 1989

    Ricin

    155mm artillery shell (cap. 3 liters)

    Abu Obeydi Airfield Dec 1990

    Water

    Modified Mirage F1 drop-tank (cap. 2,200 liters)

    Abu Obeydi Airfield Dec 1990

    Water/potassium permanganate

    Modified Mirage F1 drop-tank (cap. 2,200 liters)

    Abu Obeydi Airfield Jan 1991

    Water/glycerine

    Modified Mirage F1 drop-tank (cap. 2,200 liters)

    Abu Obeydi Airfield Jan 1991

    Bacillus subtilis/Glycerine

    Modified Mirage F1 drop-tank (cap. 2,200 liters)

    • Iraq admitted producing thousands of liters of the BW agents anthrax,[6] botulinum toxin, (which paralyzes respiratory muscles and can be fatal within 24 to 36 hours), and aflatoxin, (a potent carcinogen that can attack the liver, killing years after ingestion),and preparing BW-filled Scud-variant missile warheads, aerial bombs, and aircraft spray tanks before the Gulf war.

    Baghdad did not provide persuasive evidence to support its claims that it unilaterally destroyed its BW agents and munitions. Experts from UNSCOM assessed that Baghdad's declarations vastly understated the production of biological agents and estimated that Iraq actually produced two-to-four times the amount of agent that it acknowledged producing, including Bacillus anthracisthe causative agent of anthraxand botulinum toxin.

    The improvement or expansion of a number of nominally "civilian" facilities that were directly associated with biological weapons indicates that key aspects of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and most elements more advanced and larger than before the 1990-1991 Gulf war.

    • The al-Dawrah Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) Vaccine Facility is one of two known Biocontainment Level-3facilities in Iraq with an extensive air handling and filtering system. Iraq admitted that before the Gulf war Al-Dawrah had been a BW agent production facility. UNSCOM attempted to render it useless for BW agent pro-duction in 1996 but left some production equipment in place because UNSCOM could not prove it was connected to previous BW work. In 2001, Iraq announced it would begin renovating the plant without UN approval, ostensibly to produce a vaccine to combat an FMD outbreak. In fact, Iraq easily can import all the foot-and-mouth vaccine it needs through the UN.

    • The Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute is an ideal cover location for BW re-search, testing, production, and storage. UN inspectors discovered documents related to BW research at this facility, some showing that BW cultures, agents, and equipment were stored there during the Gulf war. Of particular concern is the plant's new storage capacity, which greatly exceeds Iraq's needs for legitimate medical storage.

    • The Fallujah III Castor Oil Production Plant is situated on a large complex with an historical connection to Iraq's CW program. Of immediate BW concern is the potential production of ricin toxin.[7] Castor bean pulp, left over from castor oil production, can be used to extract ricin toxin. Iraq admitted to UNSCOM that it manufactured ricin and field-tested it in artillery shells before the Gulf war. Iraq operated this plant for legitimate purposes under UNSCOM scrutiny before 1998 when UN inspectors left the country. Since 1999, Iraq has rebuilt major structures destroyed during Operation Desert Fox. Iraqi officials claim they are making castor oil for brake fluid, but verifying such claims without UN inspections is impossible.

    In addition to questions about activity at known facilities, there are compelling reasons to be concerned about BW activity at other sites and in mobile production units and laboratories. Baghdad has pursued a mobile BW research and production capability to better conceal its program.

    • UNSCOM uncovered a document on Iraqi Military Industrial Commission letterhead indicating that Iraq was interested in developing mobile fermentation units, and an Iraqi scientist admitted to UN inspectors that Iraq was trying to move in the direction of mobile BW production.

    • Iraq has now established large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capabilities based on mobile BW facilities.
    Ballistic Missile Program

    Iraq has developed a ballistic missile capability that exceeds the 150km range limitation established under UNSCR 687. During the 1980s, Iraq purchased 819 Scud B missiles from the USSR. Hundreds of these 300km range missiles were used to attack Iranian cities during the Iran-Iraq War. Beginning in 1987, Iraq converted many of these Soviet Scuds into extended-range variants, some of which were fired at Tehran; some were launched during the Gulf war, and others remained in Iraq's inventory at war's end. Iraq admitted filling at least 75 of its Scud warheads with chemical or biological agents and deployed these weapons for use against Coalition forces and regional opponents, including Israel in 1991.

    Most of the approximately 90 Scud-type missiles Saddam fired at Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain during the Gulf war were al-Husayn variants that the Iraqis modified by lengthening the airframe and increasing fuel capacity, extending the range to 650 km.

    Baghdad was developing other longer-range missiles based on Scud technology, including the 900km al-Abbas. Iraq was designing follow-on multi-stage and clustered medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) concepts with intended ranges up to 3,000 km. Iraq also had a program to develop a two-stage missile, called the Badr-2000, using solid-propellants with an estimated range of 750 to 1,000 km.

    • Iraq never fully accounted for its existing missile programs. Discrepancies in Baghdad's declarations suggest that Iraq retains a small force of extended-range Scud-type missiles and an undetermined number of launchers and warheads. Further, Iraq never explained the disposition of advanced missile components, such as guidance and control systems, that it could not produce on its own and that would be critical to developmental programs.


    Iraq continues to work on UN-authorized short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs)those with a range no greater than 150 kmthat help develop the expertise and infrastructure needed to produce longer-range missile systems. The al-Samoud liquid propellant SRBM and the Ababil-100 solid propellant SRBM, however, are capable of flying beyond the allowed 150km range. Both missiles have been tested aggressively and are in early deployment. Other evidence strongly suggests Iraq is modifying missile testing and production facilities to produce even longer-range missiles.

    • The Al-Rafah-North Liquid Propellant Engine Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) Facility is Iraq's principal site for the static testing of liquid propellant missile engines. Baghdad has been building a new test stand there that is larger than the test stand associated with al-Samoud engine testing and the defunct Scud engine test stand. The only plausible explanation for this test facility is that Iraq intends to test engines for longer-range missiles prohibited under UNSCR 687.



    • The Al-Mutasim Solid Rocket Motor and Test Facility, previously associated with Iraq's Badr-2000 solid-propellant missile program, has been rebuilt and expanded in recent years. The al-Mutasim site supports solid-propellant motor assembly, rework, and testing for the UN-authorized Ababil-100, but the size of certain facilities there, particularly those newly constructed between the assembly rework and static test areas, suggests that Baghdad is preparing to develop systems that are prohibited by the UN.

    • At the Al-Mamoun Solid Rocket Motor Production Plant and RDT&E Facility, the Iraqis, since the December 1998 departure of inspectors, have rebuilt structures damaged during the Gulf war and dismantled by UNSCOM that originally were built to manufacture solid propellant motors for the Badr-2000 program. They also have built a new building and are reconstructing other buildings originally designed to fill large Badr-2000 motor casings with solid propellant.

    • Also at al-Mamoun, the Iraqis have rebuilt two structures used to "mix" solid propellant for the Badr-2000 missile. The new buildingsabout as large as the original onesare ideally suited to house large, UN-prohibited mixers. In fact, the only logical explanation for the size and configuration of these mixing buildings is that Iraq intends to develop longer-range, prohibited missiles.

    Iraq has managed to rebuild and expand its missile development infrastructure under sanctions. Iraqi intermediaries have sought production technology, machine tools, and raw materials in violation of the arms embargo.

    • The Iraqis have completed a new ammonium perchlorate production plant at Mamoun that supports Iraq's solid propellant missile program. Ammonium perchlorate is a common oxidizer used in solid propellant missile motors. Baghdad would not have been able to complete this facility without help from abroad.

    • In August 1995, Iraq was caught trying to acquire sensitive ballistic missile guidance components, including gyroscopes originally used in Russian strategic nuclear SLBMs, demonstrating that Baghdad has been pursuing proscribed, advanced, long-range missile technology for some time. Iraqi officials admitted that, despite international prohibitions, they had received a similar shipment earlier that year.
    Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Program and Other Aircraft

    Iraq is continuing to develop other platforms which most analysts believe probably are intended for delivering biological warfare agents. Immediately before the Gulf war, Baghdad attempted to convert a MiG-21 into an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to carry spray tanks capable of dispensing chemical or biological agents. UNSCOM assessed that the program to develop the spray system was successful, but the conversion of the MiG-21 was not. More recently, Baghdad has attempted to convert some of its L-29 jet trainer aircraft into UAVs that can be fitted with chemical and biological warfare (CBW) spray tanks, most likely a continuation of previous efforts with the MiG-21. Although much less sophisticated than ballistic missiles as a delivery platform, an aircraftmanned or unmannedis the most efficient way to disseminate chemical and biological weapons over a large, distant area.

    • Iraq already has produced modified drop-tanks that can disperse biological or chemical agents effectively. Before the Gulf war, the Iraqis successfully experimented with aircraft-mounted spray tanks capable of releasing up to 2,000 liters of an anthrax simulant over a target area. Iraq also has modified commercial crop sprayers successfully and tested them with an anthrax simulant delivered by helicopters.

    • Baghdad has a history of experimenting with a variety of unmanned platforms. Iraq's use of newer, more capable airframes would increase range and payload, while smaller platforms might be harder to detect and therefore more survivable. This capability represents a serious threat to Iraq's neighbors and to international military forces in the region.

    • Iraq used tactical fighter aircraft and helicopters to deliver chemical agents, loaded in bombs and rockets, during the Iran-Iraq War. Baghdad probably is considering again using manned aircraft as delivery platforms depending on the operational scenario.
    Procurement in Support of WMD Programs

    Iraq has been able to import dual-use, WMD-relevant equipment and material through procurements both within and outside the UN sanctions regime. Baghdad diverts some of the $10 billion worth of goods now entering Iraq every year for humanitarian needs to support the military and WMD programs instead. Iraq's growing ability to sell oil illicitly increases Baghdad's capabilities to finance its WMD programs. Over the last four years Baghdad's earnings from illicit oil sales have more than quadrupled to about $3 billion this year.


    • UN monitors at Iraq's borders do not inspect the cargoworth hundreds of millions of dollarsthat enters Iraq every year outside of the Oil-for-Food Program; some of these goods clearly support Iraq's military and WMD programs. For example, Baghdad imports fiber-optic communication systems outside of UN auspices to support the Iraqi military.

    • Iraq imports goods using planes, trains, trucks, and ships without any type of international inspectionsin violation of UN Security Council resolutions.

    Even within the UN-authorized Oil-for-Food Program, Iraq does not hide that it wants to purchase military and WMD-related goods. For example, Baghdad diverted UN-approved trucks for military purposes and construction equipment to rehabilitate WMD-affiliated facilities, even though these items were approved only to help the civilian population.

    • Iraq has been able to repair modern industrial machine tools that previously supported production of WMD or missile components and has imported additional tools that it may use to reconstitute Baghdad's unconventional weapons arsenal.

    • On several occasions, Iraq has asked to purchase goodssuch as neutron generators and servo valvesthat the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) views as linchpins for prohibited Iraqi programs; alternative, non-dual-use items would serve the civilian purpose purportedly intended for this equipment.

    UNMOVIC began screening contracts pursuant to UNSCR 1284 in December 1999 and since has identified more than 100 contracts containing dual-use items as defined in UNSCR 1051 that can be diverted into WMD programs. UNMOVIC also has requested that suppliers provide technical information on hundreds of other goods because of concerns about potential misuse of dual-use equipment. In many cases, Iraq has requested technology that clearly exceeds requirements for the stated commercial end-use when it easily could substitute items that could not be used for WMD.

    • On some UN contracts, Baghdad claimed that the requested goods are designed to rehabilitate facilitiessuch as the Al Qa'im phosphate plant and Fallujahthat in the past were used to support both industrial and WMD programs.



    [1] Mustard is a blister agent that causes medical casualties by blistering or burning exposed skin, eyes, lungs, and mucus membranes within hours of exposure. It is a persistent agent that can remain a hazard for days.

    [2] Sarin, cyclosarin, and tabun are G-series nerve agents that can act within seconds of absorption through the skin or inhalation. These agents overstimulate muscles or glands with messages transmitted from nerves, causing convulsions and loss of consciousness. Tabun is persistent and can remain a hazard for days. Sarin and cyclosarin are not persistent and pose more of an inhalation hazard than a skin hazard.

    [3] VX is a V-series nerve agent that is similar to but more advanced than G-series nerve agents in that it causes the same medical effects but is more toxic and much more persistent. Thus, it poses a far greater skin hazard than G-series agents. VX could be used for long-term contamination of territory.

    [4] See footnote 5.

    [5] Bacillus subtilis is commonly used as a simulant for B. anthracis.

    [6] An infectious dose of anthrax is about 8,000 spores, or less than one-millionth of a gram in a non immuno-compromised person. Inhalation anthrax historically has been 100 percent fatal within five to seven days, although in recent cases aggressive medical treatment has reduced the fatality rate.

    [7] Ricin can cause multiple organ failure within one or two days after inhalation.
  • pettygrudger
    pettygrudger

    CANADA HAS NOW SIDED WITH FRANCE & GERMANY - CAN SOMEONE EXPLAIN TO ME WHAT THEIR PROBLEM IS WITH THE UNITED STATES?

    Or, maybe some people around here are a little to eager for war, before other efforts have been exhausted aye?

  • Yerusalyim
    Yerusalyim

    Petty, it's been twelve years now, what's YOUR definition of exhausted?

    Perry, Damnit, stop confusing people with facts.

  • amac
    amac

    Sorry, I'm a little too slow to respond to make an exciting debate, but I'll give it a stab.

    Perry wrote:

    That is just utter bullshit. The entire world has agreed that Saddam is in material breach of 16 UN resolutions designed to increase world security. The final resolution (1441) warned IRAQ of the serious consequences of non-compliance.
    Within the next few days, we will get the full story of Iraq's deception. Every day now more information is being declassified and released. The weapons inspectors will deliver their report shortly. And, Bush will address the US next Tuesday night.
    People are disputing the morality of enforcing the UN resolutions, not whether or not the violations are real or not.
    The only illogical conclusiuons here are the ficticous phobias you are regurgitating.

    And how is my statement utter bullshit? Were you ever a JW? How long were you a JW? If so, I imagine you had the same convictions as most and you would have died for your religion because you were so sure it was right, correct? You had lots and lots of scriptures to back it up too! There's no way you could be wrong, right?

    Well now you are no longer a JW. And instead of believing so firmly in your religion that you would die for it, you firmly believe this war should happen and other people should die for it. Sure hope you're not wrong again.

    I firmly understand that Iraq has breached UN resolutions, I don't think that is debatable. I think the seriousness of these breaches is debatable and, of course, the morality of war as a consequence is debatable. But those are debates I am not interested in. I think it can be fairly proven that the UN has reasons to act against Iraq. However, it is the fact that there are OBVIOUS ulterior motives and double standards by the US (who seem to be spearheading this war) makes me want to stay completely clear of supporting it.

    One thing I have learned as a JW is that this world is quite jacked up and there are always going to be win-lose situations.

    By the way, what fictitious phobias am I regurgitating?

    Edited by - amac on 24 January 2003 12:10:25

  • JH
    JH

    CANADA HAS NOW SIDED WITH FRANCE & GERMANY - CAN SOMEONE EXPLAIN TO ME WHAT THEIR PROBLEM IS WITH THE UNITED STATES?

    I think that they rather follow the UN than the US. I didn't listen to recent Canadian news, but this doesn't surprise me at all. Canada is a peace keeping country. BTW thats all it can do.

    911 happened in the US, and that's the difference.

    Canada helped in the gulf war in 1990-91, because the UN said so, not the US.

  • Xander
    Xander

    Quite well said Amac.

    I think we need to remind the warhawks we are debating with a few points:

    • Saddam is a bad person. Yes, we know that. Everyone knows that. That's not being debated, so every time you bring up "But look how AWFUL he is", well, we don't care. We already knew that.
    • Saddam probably has WMD. Yeah, that's kinda likely. The US sold some to him, he didn't use them all, logic dictates he still has them. Every time you post all these pics of Iraqis weapons, well, we don't care. We already knew that.
    • Saddam has violated UN resolutions. Indeed he has! No one is arguing that, either. Every time you list all the UN resolutions he has broken, well, again, we don't care. We already knew THAT, too.

    The problem is, that you all (warhawks) feel that these three facts alone are enough to justify any action the US wants to take, regardless of anything else at all, and by presenting these points OVER and OVER, you are winning an argument.

    These points are not being argued. What IS being argued is what they MEAN, and that is why I keep falling back on the context (IE., the US as a bad judge of character, etc.).

    YOU all have not provided any argument on WHY these three factors mean we MUST GO TO WAR NOW. You just present these 3 'facts' and go "Well, see, we must go to war". I look at the same thing and think "Okay....uhhh....why?"

    Edited by - Xander on 24 January 2003 12:18:3

  • Crazy151drinker
    Crazy151drinker

    Xander, my dove kissing save the world friend:

    This WHOLE thing is SIMPLE. We do not want IRAQ to have WMD. WHY???? Because then the situation will become just like N. Korea. Why dont we do anything about N. Korea??? Because they Have NUKES and we dont want the 11 Million people in Soul to get VAPORIZED. Its that SIMPLE. Get rid of the problem before its to late to do anything about it. You sit here and preach about peace but yet you want some idiot with a RECENT history of BBQ'n his neighbors to have NUKES. What is wrong with you?? How is allowing Saddam to have NUKES in the interest of peace??? You would rather save the lives of 50,000 people now at the expense of MILLIONS later. You have your priorities MIXED up. MILLIONS of N. KOREANS are STARVING and we cant do a DAMN thing about it becuase KIM SUCK DONG has NUKES and yet you want Saddam to have them???

    Lets say that you DONT want Saddam to have them. Then what? YOu dont want us to invade. How about some Sanctions....OOOPS weve already tried that, didnt work. Oh I know, lets send in some inspectors to look for things that Saddam has had 10 YEARS to hide. Yeah, that will work.

    Isolationalist views get more people killed in the Long run than aggressive foriegn policy. Once agian, its called preventative maitenence. Why do WE have to do it?? BECAUSE NOONE ELSE CAN! Do you think FRANCE could invade Iraq??? YEAH RIGHT!!!!! Russia Cant and Doesnt want 2, and neither does China. They could care less. So who is left to do all the dirty work? THE US. You think we want to do all this shit??? Your insane.

  • amac
    amac

    We might as well argue about the trinity while we are at it.

    My closing comment on the topic is, if you are going to support this war, I sure hope you are ready and willing to get off your ass and go help fight it. Because I would hate to think that you (and I don't mean anyone specifically) are supporting a war that is going to send someone else's son off to kill someone else's family so you can keep your freedoms. If you are not in that position to help, then it is my opinion that you should keep your trap shut over expediting the deaths of others.

    Rant over.

  • pettygrudger
    pettygrudger

    U.S. evidence on Iraq questioned

    Assertions about aluminum tubes come under fire

    By Joby Warrick
    THE WASHINGTON POST

    Jan. 24 When President Bush traveled to the United Nations in September to make his case against Iraq, he brought along a rare piece of evidence for what he called Iraqs continued appetite for nuclear bombs. The finding: Iraq had tried to buy thousands of high-strength aluminum tubes, which Bush said were used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon.

    BUSH CITED the aluminum tubes in his speech before the U.N. General Assembly and in documents presented to U.N. leaders. Vice President Cheney and national security adviser Condoleezza Rice both repeated the claim, with Rice describing the tubes as only really suited for nuclear weapons programs.
    It was by far the most prominent, detailed assertion by the White House of recent Iraqi efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. But according to government officials and weapons experts, the claim now appears to be seriously in doubt.


    After weeks of investigation, U.N. weapons inspectors in Iraq are increasingly confident that the aluminum tubes were never meant for enriching uranium, according to officials familiar with the inspection process. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.N.-chartered nuclear watchdog, reported in a Jan. 8 preliminary assessment that the tubes were not directly suitable for uranium enrichment but were consistent with making ordinary artillery rockets a finding that meshed with Iraqs official explanation for the tubes. New evidence supporting that conclusion has been gathered in recent weeks and will be presented to the U.N. Security Council in a report due to be released on Monday, the officials said.

    CLUES FROM THE START
    Moreover, there were clues from the beginning that should have raised doubts about claims that the tubes were part of a secret Iraqi nuclear weapons program, according to U.S. and international experts on uranium enrichment. The quantity and specifications of the tubes narrow, silver cylinders measuring 81 millimeters in diameter and about a meter in length-made them ill-suited to enrich uranium without extensive modification, the experts said.
    But they are a perfect fit for a well-documented 81mm conventional rocket program in place for two decades. Iraq imported the same aluminum tubes for rockets in the 1980s. The new tubes it tried to purchase actually bear an inscription that includes the word rocket, according to one official who examined them.
    It may be technically possible that the tubes could be used to enrich uranium, said one expert familiar with the investigation of Iraqs attempted acquisition. But youd have to believe that Iraq deliberately ordered the wrong stock and intended to spend a great deal of time and money reworking each piece.

    A CREDIBILITY QUESTION
    Advertisement

    As the U.N. inspections continue, some weapons experts said the aluminum tubes saga could undermine the credibility of claims about Iraqs arsenal. To date, the Bush administration has declined to release photos or other specific evidence to bolster its contention that Iraq is actively seeking to acquire new biological, chemical and nuclear arms, and the means to deliver them.
    The U.N. inspections earlier this month turned up 16 empty chemical warheads for short-range, 122mm rockets. But inspectors said that so far they have found no conclusive proof of a new Iraqi effort to acquire weapons of mass destruction in searches of facilities that had been identified as suspicious in U.S. and British intelligence reports. U.N. officials contend that Iraq retains biological and chemical weapons and components it acquired before the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
    If the U.S. government puts out bad information it runs a risk of undermining the good information it possesses, said David Albright, a former IAEA weapons inspector who has investigated Iraqs past nuclear programs extensively. In this case, I fear that the information was put out there for a short-term political goal: to convince people that Saddam Hussein is close to acquiring nuclear weapons.
    The Bush administration, while acknowledging the IAEAs findings on the aluminum tubes, has not retreated from its earlier statements. White House spokesman Ari Fleischer reacted to the IAEAs initial report on Jan. 8 by asserting that the case was still open.

    U.S. CITES OTHER INTELLIGENCE
    But if Iraq does have a centrifuge program, it is well-hidden, and it is important for us to come up with information that will help us find it.
    DAVID ALBRIGHT
    Former weapons inspector with the IAEA It should be noted, Fleischer said, that the attempted acquisition of such tubes is prohibited under the United Nations resolutions in any case. U.N. sanctions restrict Iraqs ability to import dual-use items that potentially could be used for weapons.
    U.S. intelligence officials contend that the evidence, on balance, still points to a secret uranium enrichment program, although there is significant disagreement within the intelligence services. Those supporting the nuclear theory said they were influenced by other intelligence beyond the specifications of the tubes themselves, according to one intelligence official. He did not elaborate.
    IAEA officials said the investigation of the tubes officially remains open. Earlier this week, Iraq agreed to provide inspectors with additional data about its intended use for the tubes.
    The controversy stems from a series of Iraqi attempts to purchase large quantities thousands or tens of thousands of high-strength aluminum tubes over the last two years. Apparently none of the attempts succeeded, although in one instance in 2001 a shipment of more than 60,000 Chinese-made aluminum tubes made it as far as Jordan before it was intercepted, according to officials familiar with Iraqs procurement attempts.
    Since then, the officials said, Iraq has made at least two other attempts to acquire the tubes. The more recent attempts involved private firms located in what was described only as a NATO country. In all, more than 120,000 of the tubes were reportedly sought.
    In each of the attempts, Iraq requested tubes made of an aluminum alloy with precise dimensions and high tolerances for heat and stress. To intelligence analysts, the requests had a ring of familiarity: Iraq had imported aluminum tubes in the 1980s, although with different specifications and much larger diameter, to build gas centrifuges fast-spinning machines used in enriching uranium for nuclear weapons. Through a crash nuclear program launched in 1990, Iraq succeeded in enriching nearly enough uranium for one bomb before its plans were disrupted in 1991 by the start of the Gulf War, according to U.N. weapons inspectors.

    DEBATE WITHIN WHITE HOUSE
    By contrast, the government of British Prime Minister Tony Blair said that there was no definitive intelligence that the tubes were destined for a nuclear program.

    By several accounts, Iraqs recent attempts to buy aluminum tubes sparked a rancorous debate as Bush administration officials, intelligence analysts and government scientists argued over Iraqs intent.
    A number of people argued that the tubes could not possibly be used as artillery rockets because the specifications were so precise. It would be a waste of dollars, said one knowledgeable scientist.
    Ultimately, the conclusion in the intelligence discussion was that Iraq was planning to use the tubes in a nuclear program. This view was favored by CIA analysts. However, there were dissenting arguments by enrichment experts at the Energy Department and officials at the State Department. What ultimately swung the argument in favor of the nuclear theory was the observation that Iraq had attempted to purchase aluminum tubes with such precise specifications that it made other uses seem unlikely, officials said.
    By contrast, in Britain, the government of Prime Minister Tony Blair said in a Sept. 24 white paper that there was no definitive intelligence that the tubes were destined for a nuclear program.
    The tubes were made of an aluminum-zinc alloy known as 7000-series, which is used in a wide range of industrial applications. But the dimensions and technical features, such as metal thickness and surface coatings, made them an unlikely choice for centrifuges, several nuclear experts said. Iraq used a different aluminum alloy in its centrifuges in the 1980s before switching to more advanced metals known as maraging steel and carbon fibers, which are better suited for the task, the experts said.

    NO CENTRIFUGAL EVIDENCE
    Significantly, there is no evidence so far that Iraq sought other materials required for centrifuges, such as motors, metal caps and special magnets, U.S. and international officials said.
    Bushs remarks about the aluminum tubes caused a stir at the IAEAs headquarters in Vienna. Weapons experts at the agency had also been monitoring Iraqs attempts to buy the aluminum but were skeptical of arguments that the tubes had a nuclear purpose, according to one official who spoke on the condition of anonymity. The IAEA spent seven years in the 1990s documenting and ultimately destroying all known vestiges of Iraqs nuclear weapons program, including its gas centrifuges.
    After returning to Iraq when weapons inspections resumed in November, the IAEA made it a priority to sort out the conflicting claims, according to officials familiar with the probe. In December, the agency spent several days poring through files and interviewing people involved in the attempted acquisition of the tubes-including officials at the company that supplied the metal and managers of the Baghdad importing firm that apparently had been set up as a front company to acquire special parts and materials for Iraqs Ministry of Industry. According to informed officials, the IAEA concluded Iraq had indeed been running a secret procurement operation, but the intended beneficiary was not Iraqs Atomic Energy Commission; rather, it was an established army program to replace Iraqs aging arsenal of conventional 81mm rockets, the type used in multiple rocket launchers.

    REPLACEMENTS SOUGHT?
    The explanation made sense for several reasons, they said. In the 1980s, Iraq was known to have obtained a design for 81mm rockets through reverse-engineering of munitions it had previously purchased abroad. During the Iran-Iraq war, Iraqis built tens of thousands of such rockets, using high-strength, 7000-series aluminum tubes it bought from foreign suppliers. U.N. inspectors in the 1990s had allowed Iraq to retain a stockpile of about 160,000 of the 81mm rockets, and an inspection of the stockpile last month confirmed that the rockets still exist, though now corroded after years of exposure in outdoor depots.
    By all appearances, the Iraqis were trying to buy exact replacements for those rockets, said Albright, the former IAEA inspector.
    Albright, now president of the Institute for Science and International Security, a Washington research group, said that even a less sinister explanation for the aluminum tubes did not suggest Iraq is entirely innocent.
    But if Iraq does have a centrifuge program, it is well-hidden, and it is important for us to come up with information that will help us find it, Albright said. This incident discredits that effort at a time when we can least afford it.

  • Share this

    Google+
    Pinterest
    Reddit