New Here (page 8)

reniaa says:

am glad I saw this thread now it shows me very clearly what becomes to ex-Jws when they leave Jws and the hatred that is born in them. that they would overlook basic human rights. I'm am also glad not all supported wests stated actions on this thread.

Reniaa: You are so full of *%$#. This thread showed you??? Onlky in your deluded, brainwashed mind. You have said that same comment many times before so this thread didn't show you anything.

Reniaa

Reniaa says:

shamus rudeness is the resort a poor debator.

My reply: I didn;t think shamus was rude...nor is that relevant to this thread. As usual you hijack someone elses thread and project your own inadequacies to others.

Reniaa says:

Purplesofa I had to speak out against the inhumanity of wests actions to keep my conscience clear, the scariest thing on this forums is the very real consequences it may have on peoples actions. if isaac link that he gives west means a baby is taken off it's mother would that guilt be on isaac or us all?

My reply: Inhumainty? How about the wholesale murder your cult is responsible for? I will paste this link again to help keep my conscience clear and perhaps save a child from this dreadful cult.

Here is the link again westcoast:

DIVORCE, BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS, AND
OTHER LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING
CHILDREN OF JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES

BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS:

PARENTAL OBLIGATIONS

PAGE 1 of 2

The law in the United States regarding Jehovah's Witnesses and their refusal to accept blood transfusions is somewhat settled. Most competent adults have the constitutional right to refuse to accept a life-saving blood transfusion, even if such refusal means they will die. What about Jehovah's Witnesses, who are competent adults, but who have minor children to rear? Early on in this "battle", some courts recognized the right of Jehovah's Witness children to be reared by the parents who gave them life and brought them into this world. However, as occurred in other scenarios, more and more courts started allowing Jehovah's Witness Parents to refuse life-saving blood transfusions and die, thus leaving their children to be reared by the surviving parent, or other relatives and friends. This is possibly one segment of this "battle" that some courts may be willing to revisit. Freedom of religious belief is absolute in the United States. Freedom to exercise religious beliefs is not absolute. Are the rights of a Jehovah's Witness Parent really superior to the rights of their children, especially in a scenario where the parent ends up dead and the child prematurely loses a natural parent? Should our courts really give higher priority to a parent's right to free religious expression which results in that parent's death over the right of that parent's child to have the normal parent-child relationship with a living natural parent? The rearing of a child is more than providing financial support for that child. What about all the other factors involved in the natural parent-child relationship? What happens to the children if something happens to the surviving parent? The WatchTower Society prepares Jehovah's Witnesses to always repeat in court that they do not want to die. Why then are Jehovah's Witnesses dying? Because the WatchTower Society told them in 1945 that the Bible forbids blood transfusions. The WatchTower Society initially taught Jehovah's Witnesses that they were obligated to resist the administering of a blood transfusion. Parents were encouraged to kidnap their own children away from hospitals. Jehovah's Witnesses receiving a transfusion were encouraged to physically resist such. However, the WatchTower Society now teaches Jehovah's Witnesses that it is NOT the act of receiving a transfusion that is a sin, but rather it is the consenting to such that is the sin. Therefore, when a transfusion is court-ordered, the recipient does not sin according to the WatchTower Society. Thus, if American courts would simply recognize that most Jehovah's Witnesses are forced to resist only in the courtroom, but not in the emergency room, then many lives could be saved. Jehovah's Witnesses will cooperate in the farce. Simply allow them to protest loud enough and they will be silently satisfied.

******************

ON APPLICATION OF ST. JOSEPH'S HOSPITAL was a 2003 New York court case which runs contrary to every other court case on this webpage. In January 2003, officials at Syracuse's St. Joseph's Hospital sought court intervention when an unidentified local JW father was unconscious and in desperate need of a blood transfusion. The JW father's family refused to consent, but at the emergency hearing, the man's JW Son admitted that his father had stated in the past, that in the case of a life and death situation, that he would consent to a transfusion. Evidently, this JW father was sharp enough to know that the WatchTower is wrong on this issue, and fortunately for him, he had expressed his decision to his family. The judge authorized the transfusion, and the JW recovered.

******************

IN RE MARIA ISABEL DURAN was a 2001 Pennsylvania appellate court decision. Maria Duran was the 34 year old wife of Lionel Duran. Maria Duran was the mother of three children, including two teenagers who lived at home.Maria was a Jehovah's Witness. In the mid 1990s, Maria had a medical condition which necessitated a liver transplant. As a Jehovah's Witness forbidden to accept blood transfusions, Maria contacted the WatchTower Society for doctors and hospitals who would perform a liver transplant without performing blood transfusions. Maria was directed to the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center. In 1997, Maria traveled from her home in New York to Pittsburgh to be evaluated as a candidate for a liver transplant procedure. In February 1998, Maria executed a "Durable Power of Attorney", a standardized form supplied by the WatchTower Society, which at that time was typically distributed at meetings of Jehovah's Witnesses every January/February, and often completed at the Kingdom Hall, so that fellow JWs could "witness" the signature; and for JWs whose family are not JWs, agree to being named "agent". That standardized WatchTower document read:

"I am one of Jehovah's Witnesses. On the basis of my firmly held religious convictions, see Acts 15:28, 29, and on the basis of my desire to avoid the numerous hazards and complications of blood, I absolutely, unequivocally and resolutely refuse homologous blood (another person's blood) and stored autologous blood (my own stored blood) under any and all circumstances, no matter what my medical condition. This means no whole blood, no red cells, no white cells, no platelets, and no blood plasma no matter what the consequences. Even if health-care providers (doctors, nurses, etc.) believe that only blood transfusion therapy will preserve my life or health, I do not want it. Family, relatives or friends may disagree with my religious beliefs and with my wishes expressed herein. However, their disagreement is legally and ethically irrelevant because it is my subjective choice that controls. Any such disagreement should in no way be construed as creating ambiguity or doubt about the strength or substance of my wishes."

In her DPA, Maria Duran appointed Larry M. Johnson, as her health-care agent. Larry Johnson was a Jehovah's Witness Elder, who lived in the Pittsburgh area. Johnson was most likely an area member of the WatchTower Society's "Hospital Laison Committee" (HLC), which monitors the admission of Jehovah's Witnesses into hospitals throughout the United States, and tries to make certain that Jehovah's Witnesses do not agree to accept blood transfusions. Maria Duran moved in with the Johnson family in mid 1999, after the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center informed Maria that she was close to receiving a liver and advised her to move closer to Pittsburgh. On July 19, 1999, Maria underwent her first liver transplant operation. Prior to the operation, Maria provided her doctors with copies of her DPA and reiterated her refusal to accept any blood transfusions. Maria's body rejected the first liver. A second operation was Maria's only chance for survival. Larry Johnson, as Maria's appointed health-care agent, consented to a second liver transplant operation. Maria's body rejected the second liver as well. Maria's own failing liver caused her to slip into a comatose state. Maria's condition rapidly deteriorated and doctors estimated that without a blood transfusion she would die within the next twenty-four hours. Only with a transfusion, doctors projected, would Maria have a chance of survival. On July 27, 1999, in an attempt to save his wife's life, Lionel Duran, orally petitioned the local Court to be appointed Maria's emergency limited guardian for the purpose of consenting to a blood transfusion. The court heard testimony from the treating physician, Dr. Stephen Bowles, Lionel Duran, and Maria's sister, Velma Santiago. A court-appointed attorney represented Maria. Larry Johnson was not given notice of the hearing. The Court granted Lionel Duran's petition. Johnson filed exceptions to the court's order on August 3. Meanwhile, Maria's husband consented to the blood transfusions for Maria. However, Maria died on August 19, 1999. On August 25, before returning home to New York to his three grieving motherless children, Lionel Duran thought that he had taken care of all legalities by withdrawing his guardianship petition and asking the court to dismiss further proceedings. However, the WatchTower Society would not allow the matter to rest with Maria's death. Larry Johnson then filed a memorandum of law requesting that the local court rule on the exceptions he had filed back on August 3 -- despite their technical mootness due to Maria's death. The Court affirmed their prior order. Larry Johnson then filed an appeal. On appeal, Larry Johnson a/k/a WatchTower Society argued that the trial court violated Maria Duran's common law and constitutional rights when it appointed her husband as emergency guardian to consent to a blood transfusion on behalf of Maria in spite of her religious beliefs and prior directives. The appellate court agreed with the WatchTower Society, stating in part:

"Appellant has raised both constitutional and common law challenges to the court's order. We note that courts should avoid deciding issues on constitutional grounds where the issue may be resolved on non-constitutional grounds. ... "The right to refuse medical treatment is deeply rooted in our common law. ... "The right to control the integrity of one's body spawned the doctrine of informed consent. ... This doctrine demands that if the patient is mentally and physically able to consult about his or her condition, the patient's informed consent is a prerequisite to treatment. ... ... "While this right is fundamental to our concept of personal autonomy, it may be outweighed by any one of four state interests: 1) protection of third parties; 2) protection of the ethical integrity of the medical profession; 3) preservation of life; and 4) prevention of suicide. ... "When evaluating the state's interest in protecting third parties, 'the primary focus is on whether the patient has dependents who would be left emotionally and financially bereft were the patient to refuse medical treatment.' Fiori, ... [No further comment here, but see below.] ... ... "The right of a Jehovah's Witness to refuse a blood transfusion was examined previously in Dorone, ... "The instant case is distinguishable from Dorone. Here, Maria clearly indicated her resolute refusal of blood transfusions. Her DPA was unequivocal in its pointed refusal of a blood transfusion under any circumstance. Her[standardized WatchTower prepared]statement that, 'even if health-care providers ... believe that only blood transfusion therapy will preserve my life or health, I do not want it' indicates her resolve to refuse blood under life threatening conditions. ... Maria also clearly indicated that her refusal of blood was an unwavering religious conviction. The fact that Maria presented the hospital staff with copies of her DPA minutes before her operation demonstrates her continued affirmation to abstain from blood. Maria's appointment of Appellant as her personal health care agent was another clear demonstration that her desire to abstain from blood be given a voice when she could not provide one.

"There is also evidence of Maria's desire to refuse blood, independent of her DPA. The Center had performed liver transplants for Jehovah's Witnesses without the transfusion of blood. Maria specifically chose the Center to perform her operation, as it could accommodate her religious beliefs. Maria also discussed her beliefs with her husband and family prior to the liver transplant operation. Finally, she verbalized her refusal of a transfusion to the hospital staff prior to her operation. Under these facts, Maria clearly expressed her desire not to receive blood transfusion therapy. This refusal of medical treatment is protected by Pennsylvania common law. ... "Moreover, after a careful review of the record, there is no evidence to suggest that any state interest in this case was compelling enough to override Maria's refusal of blood. ... There is no evidence that the state's interest in protecting third parties is implicated here.[INCREDIBLE???]The transcript of the hearing to appoint Lionel Duran emergency guardian is devoid of testimony regarding the emotional and financial relationship between Maria and her two teenage children. ... Therefore, we will not manufacture evidence and conjecture in a strained attempt to apply this exception to the instant facts." [Therefore, why create "law" in the meantime?]
... ...

On appeal, Larry Johnson a/k/a WatchTower Society next argued that Lionel Duran should not have been appointed Maria's emergency guardian because Maria had already appointed a health care representative when she executed her DPA. Johnson/WatchTower also contended that Lionel Duran should not have been appointed emergency guardian for the express purpose of consenting to a blood transfusion because his beliefs conflicted with Maria's regarding blood transfusion therapy. The appellate court agreed with the WatchTower Society, stating in part:

"When a patient has executed a DPA and named a personal representative, that choice is given paramount importance. ... "In the instant case, Maria executed a valid DPA contemplating an emergency situation that might require a blood transfusion. After deliberation, Maria recorded her emphatic refusal of blood transfusion therapy under all circumstances. Maria also appointed her own health care agent to ensure that this order was obeyed. ... Therefore, Maria was not in need of a guardian. ... When the very situation contemplated by Maria's DPA arose, the court should have given effect to Maria's unequivocal directions. ... Moreover, no one alleged that Appellant had acted contrary to Maria's wishes or best interest. ... Therefore, the appointment of Lionel Duran as guardian for the express purpose of consenting to a blood transfusion contradicted Maria's clear and unequivocal directions. ... To hold differently would devitalize personal health care directives and devalue the common law right to personal autonomy. Accordingly, we agree with Appellant that the trial court erred when it appointed Lionel Duran as Maria's emergency guardian."

In their final argument of the appeal, Larry Johnson a/k/a WatchTower Society contended that Lionel Duran knew that Larry Johnson was Lionel's wife's duly appointed health care agent. Johnson/WatchTower also contended that Lionel Duran knew Johnson's whereabouts at all times prior Duran's oral motion for appointment as Maria's emergency guardian. Johnson concludes that he should have been notified of the hearing to appoint a new guardian. The appellate court agreed with the WatchTower Society, stating in part:

"... Maria's DPA named Appellant as her personal representative for health care. ... Maria informed the doctors and hospital staff of her DPA and provided copies of this document prior to surgery. She also discussed her DPA with family members before her treatment began. During the course of Maria's treatment, doctors and staff at the Center sought Appellant's consent to a kidney dialysis, a biopsy and the second liver transplant. ... When, however, a blood transfusion in contravention of Maria's DPA was required, no one looked to Appellant for consent, or informed him of a hearing to displace his guardianship. Lionel Duran and the hospital staff knew where to find Appellant in an emergency situation, as they had on the three prior emergency consent situations. Thus, it was reasonable under these circumstances to afford Appellant notice of the hearing in question. ... Accordingly, Appellant was entitled to notice of the hearing.

"It is a difficult thing to decline potentially life-saving treatment for a loved one, rendered mute by her condition, on the basis of her devotion to religious beliefs. Nevertheless, absent evidence of overarching state interests, the patient's clear and unequivocal wishes should generally be respected.

"Based upon the foregoing analysis, we conclude that this appeal is cognizable despite its technical mootness. Additionally, we hold that under the circumstances of this case, Maria's self-determination to refuse blood transfusion therapy is protected by Pennsylvania common law. The trial court abrogated Maria's right when it appointed Lionel Duran as emergency guardian, as the evidence was insufficient to implicate state interests. Finally, we conclude that Appellant, as Maria's named guardian, was entitled to notice of the hearing to appoint an emergency guardian. Thus, we reverse the trial court's order."

****************** In March 2000, residents of Virginia, Maryland, and Washington D.C. watched continuous, often live, news reports about an ongoing manhunt for a police fugitive on the loose. On March 8, 2000, that career criminal, named Joseph Palczynski, attempted to carjack a Jehovah's Witness family on their way to the Kingdom Hall in Joppa, Maryland. Palczynski twice shot Jennifer McDonel, 37, who was driving the family auto. The McDonels managed to drive away until they could stop and allow Thomas McDonel to drive his wife to Franklin Square Hospital. There, Jennifer McDonel died after the couple both refused to consent to a needed blood transfusion. Thomas McDonel expressed regret that he would now be forced to rear their one year-old daughter, Lydia McDonel, on his wages as a janitor. He also regretted that his wife's employer only provided a $25,000.00 life insurance policy. Interestingly, two days later in Virginia, Joseph Palczynski's vehicle run out of gasoline near the home of a Jehovah's Witness Elder named William Louis Terrell. Palczynski first asked for help with his vehicle, and afterwards kidnapped Terrell. Terrell, who afterwards explained to reporters that he had recently read an article in the WatchTower Society's AWAKE! magazine advising kidnap victims to cooperate with their kidnappers, drove Joseph Palczynski back to Maryland while quoting Bible verses (recruiting). Terrell even stopped at three or more stores, and went in alone, and purchased supplies for Palczynski, while he waited outside in the truck. Terrell shopped at a Target, purchased a portable TV at Best Buy, and bought survival supplies at an army surplus store. Once back near his home, Palczynski walked away from Terrell's pickup truck, after Terrell promised Palczynski that he would not report anything to the police. Palczynski went on to kidnap others over the next few days. One later victim questioned why in the world Terrell never telephoned the police from inside one of the stores in which he shopped, nor alerted any store employees. [Because, the AWAKE! magazine article did not tell Terrell that he could do so.] Some people even questioned police as to why Terrell was not charged with aiding and abetting Palczynski. Interestingly, a few months after Palczynski was killed, the AWAKE! magazine carried an article praising Terrell's actions that day. ****************** STAMFORD HOSPITAL v. VEGA was a 1996 Connecticut Supreme Court decision. WatchTower attorney, Donald T. Ridley, represented Nelly Vega during her appeal. A separate Connecticut attorney filed an amicus curiae brief for the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. On August 26, 1994, Nelly E. Vega was admitted as a patient to Stamford Hospital to deliver her first child. That evening, Vega, a Jehovah's Witness, executed a release requesting that no blood or its derivatives be administered to her during her hospitalization, and relieving the hospital and its personnel of liability for any adverse effects that might result from her refusal to permit the use of blood in her treatment. Vega's husband also signed the release. After giving birth to her child, Nelly Vega hemorrhaged and was in need of a blood transfusion to save her life. When Vega and her husband continued to refuse to consent, the Hospital sought a court order to administer the life-saving transfusions. The trial judge granted the Hospital's petition on the grounds of preserving life and protecting the newborn child from "abandonment". After Vega recovered, she and her husband, with the support of the WatchTower Society's Legal Department, appealed. An appellate court dismissed the appeal, but the Connecticut Supreme Court gave ear. The Supreme Court found both the trial and appellate court decisions to be erroneous. The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that a hospital's interest in preserving a patient's life and in protecting the medical profession's ethical integrity were not sufficient to take priority over the common law right of bodily self determination of a Jehovah's Witness to refuse a blood transfusion. Neither could the state justify forcing a parent to accept blood transfusions against religious beliefs in order to prevent orphaning of their children. There was no abandonment on the part of the mother as there was no immediate danger to the baby’s health. Whether Vega's child grew up with one rather than two parents, or, for that matter, with no parent at all was simply not enough to justify disregarding Vega's common law right of bodily self determination. ****************** PERKINS v. LAVIN and AKRON CITY HOSPITAL was a 1994 Ohio appellate court decision. Bonita Perkins gave birth to a baby at Akron City Hospital on September 26, 1991. Perkins was discharged two or three days later. After going home, she began hemorrhaging and was forced to return to the hospital. She specifically informed Hospital's employees that she was not to be provided any blood or blood derivatives and completed and signed a form to that effect:

"I REQUEST THAT NO BLOOD OR BLOOD DERIVATIVES BE ADMINISTERED TO [PERKINS] DURING THIS HOSPITALIZATION, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SUCH TREATMENT MAY BE DEEMED NECESSARY IN THE OPINION OF THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN OR HIS ASSISTANTS TO PRESERVE LIFE OR PROMOTE RECOVERY. I RELEASE THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN, HIS ASSISTANTS, THE HOSPITAL AND ITS PERSONNEL FROM ANY RESPONSIBILITY WHATEVER FOR ANY UNTOWARD RESULTS DUE TO MY REFUSAL TO PERMIT THE USE OF BLOOD OR ITS DERIVATIVES."

It became necessary to perform an emergency dilatation and curettage. Perkins continued to bleed and her condition deteriorated dramatically. Her blood count dropped, necessitating administration of blood products as a life-saving measure. Her husband, who is not a Jehovah's Witness, consented to a blood transfusion, which was administered. Perkins fully recovered. Thereafter, Perkins sued her doctor and the Hospital for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted the two defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Perkin's complaint. Perkins appealed. The Ohio appellate court first ruled that the lower court's dismissal of the assault and battery claim was erroneous, stating in part:

"In granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, the trial court held: 'There must be evidence that [defendant] intended to injure [plaintiff], or committed the act with the belief that such injury is substantially certain to occur. There was no evidence of such intent; in fact, the opposite must be inferred. [Defendant] performed the blood transfusion with the intent to preserve [plaintiff's] life, and not to cause her harm.' "'Battery' includes innocent intentional contact and even intentional contact meant to assist the complainant, if that contact is unauthorized ... "In this case, plaintiff specifically informed defendant that she would consider a blood transfusion offensive contact. Although both parties have noted that plaintiff's husband provided his consent for the transfusion, defendant has not, at least as yet, argued that his consent was sufficient to overcome plaintiff's direction that she was not to receive a transfusion. Plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence to the trial court to establish that there was, at least, a genuine issue whether defendant intentionally invaded her right to be free from offensive contact. Because of plaintiff's recognition that defendant acted to save her life, a jury may find that she is entitled to only nominal damages. Regardless of that, however, the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's assault and battery claim. ...

With regard to Perkins claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, this court affirmed the trial court's summary dismissal, sating in part:

"A plaintiff may state a cause of action against a defendant who intentionally or recklessly engages in extreme and outrageous conduct ...

"Defendant's conduct that plaintiff claimed was an intentional infliction of emotional distress on her was the provision of a blood transfusion that saved her life and provided her an opportunity to raise the baby girl to which she had given birth just days before. Rather than an average member of the community exclaiming that defendant acted outrageously by providing that transfusion, such a person would view it as outrageous if defendant had not provided it. Accordingly, there was no genuine issue of material fact and defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Perkins finally got the jury trial that she wanted so badly, in June 1995. Even though this was a heartland jury, and not a left-coast or right-coast jury, it still took the jurors 90 minutes for their common sense to kick in and tell Perkins that she should go home thankful that she was alive.

******************

In July 1993, a 25 year old Jehovah's Witness, named Carlton Thomas Johnson chose to die rather than accept a blood transfusion. Johnson's decision was supported by his new wife, Tonya Johnson, who was four months pregnant with the couple's first child. Johnson was a recent convert to the Jehovah's Witnesses. While attending a WatchTower Convention in Dallas, Texas, the Shreveport, Louisiana, father-to-be was struck by another automobile while he was changing a flat tire while stopped in the center lane of I-20. Tonya Johnson stated: "He wanted to raise his baby in God's word, to give him things he didn't have growing up, he said. That's why we were at the convention."

Johnson was unconscious on arrival at Dallas' Methodist Medical Center. However, emergency room doctors found the WatchTower Society supplied "NO BLOOD" card in Johnson's wallet. However, the hospital decided to honor the card only after Johnson's wife also refused to consent to blood transfusions, and insisted that Johnson himself still ascribed to the convictions outlined on the card.

****************** IN RE MATTER OF PATRICIA DUBREUIL was a 1993 Florida Supreme Court decision. WatchTower attorney Donald T. Ridley helped represent Patricia Dubreuil in this appeal. William E. Hoey, Tequesta, submitted an amicus curiae brief for the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., the parent corporation of the Jehovah's Witnesses. The American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Florida, Inc. also submitted an amicus curiae brief. On the evening of April 5, 1990, Patricia Dubreuil was admitted to Memorial Hospital in Hollywood, Florida, through its emergency room. Dubreuil was in an "advanced stage" of pregnancy. Dubreuil signed a standard consent form agreeing to the infusion of blood if it were to become necessary. By the early morning hours of April 6, physicians determined that Dubreuil was ready to deliver her child and that a Caesarean section delivery would be appropriate. Dubreuil consented to the Caesarean section, but notwithstanding the routine consent form she had signed, she withheld consent to the transfusion of blood on the basis of her values and religious convictions as a Jehovah's Witness. Michael Dubreuil was subsequently delivered by Caesarean section at approximately 5:30 a.m. on April 6.

Dubreuil experienced a significant loss of blood during deliverybecause of a severe blood condition that prevents her blood from clotting properly. Attending physicians determined that a blood transfusion was required to save her life, but Dubreuil still refused to consent. Because of the extreme medical emergency that existed on the morning of April 6, medical authorities, with police assistance, contacted Luc Dubreuil, Patricia's estranged husband. He had not accompanied Patricia when she went to the hospital hours earlier. When Luc Dubreuil arrived shortly thereafter, he consented to the blood transfusion. Physicians relied upon Luc's written consent and transfused a quantity of blood into Patricia during the morning of April 6.
Luc and Patricia Dubreuil were still married but were separated and living apart when this incident arose. They are the natural parents of the newborn infant, Michael, and three other minor children, Cary, Tina, and Tracy, who at the time, respectively, were twelve, six, and four years old and living with their mother. Luc was not a Jehovah's Witness. Luc's consent was supported by Patricia's two brothers, who were not Jehovah's Witnesses, while Patricia's mother, who is a Jehovah's Witness, backed her daughter's decision.

After the first blood transfusion on April 6, physicians apparently believed that transfusions would continue to be needed. Unsure of its legal obligations and responsibilities under these circumstances, the hospital petitioned the circuit court for an emergency declaratory judgment hearing to determine the hospital's authority or duty to administer blood transfusions to Patricia Dubreuil over her objections. A hearing was conducted at 3:00 PM on April 6. It was attended by counsel representing Patricia and the hospital. No testimony was taken, but during the hearing the hospital's counsel received a telephone call advising that Patricia, who had been unconscious, had just become conscious, appeared lucid, and was able to communicate. When asked at that time whether she would consent to a blood transfusion, Patricia again refused. At 3:30 PM, the trial court announced judgment in favor of the hospital, allowing it to administer blood as physicians deemed necessary. The hospital continued to administer blood, and Patricia survived.
The trial court issued a written order on April 11, 1990 concluding that "there has been no suggestion as to the means or methods of caring for the four minor children of Patricia Dubreuil, if she should die. In the absence of some suggestion or showing as to the availability of proper care and custody of the four minor children, in the event of the death of Patricia Dubreuil, this court believes that the demands of the state (and society) outweigh the wishes of Patricia Dubreuil and that every medical effort should be made to prolong her life so that she can care for her four minor children until their respective majorities."
Patricia's attorneys moved for rehearing, indicating that she continued to object to blood transfusion and that she had an "extended family as well as friends who are willing to assist in the rearing of her minor children in the event of her demise." The Circuit Court denied rehearing on April 12. The Fourth District affirmed by a 2-1 vote.

Patricia sought discretionary review with the Supreme Court of Florida, arguing that the decision below violated her state and federal constitutional rights of privacy, bodily self-determination, and religious freedom. It accepted, stating: "We recognize that the present case is moot given that Patricia received blood and was released from the hospital. However, we accept jurisdiction because the issue is one of great public importance, is capable of repetition, and otherwise might evade review. ... ... For the foregoing reasons, we quash the district court's decision."

The Rights of Privacy and Free Exercise of Religion: "... the Florida Constitution guarantees that "a competent person has the constitutional right to choose or refuse medical treatment, and that right extends to all relevant decisions concerning one's health." ... In cases like this one, the privacy right overlaps with the right to freely exercise one's religion to protect the right of a person to refuse a blood transfusion because of religious convictions. ... ...

"The state has a duty to assure that a person's wishes regarding medical treatment are respected. That obligation serves to protect the rights of the individual from intrusion by the state unless the state has a compelling interest great enough to override this constitutional right. The means to carry out any such compelling state interest must be narrowly tailored in the least intrusive manner possible to safeguard the rights of the individual. "... Among the factors we have identified that could be considered in determining whether to give force to a patient's right to refrain from medical treatment is the protection of innocent third parties ...

"The arguments made in this Court present two basic issues. First, we must determine whether it is appropriate for a hospital to assert the state interests in an attempt to defeat a patient's decision to forgo emergency medical treatment. Second, assuming the state interests were properly presented in this case, we must decide whether Patricia's rejection of a blood transfusion constituted, as the district court found, abandonment of the couple's minor children and amounted to a state interest that was compelling enough to override her constitutional rights of privacy and religious freedom, by the least intrusive means available. Asserting the State Interests: "Patricia argues that Memorial Hospital should not have intervened in her private decision to refuse a blood transfusion. She claims that the "State" has never been a party in this action, has not asserted any interest, and that the hospital has no authority to assume the State's responsibilities. The hospital argues in its brief that as a public health care facility owned and operated by a special taxing district established under Florida law, it acted as a unit of local government and stood in the shoes of the State for the purposes of asserting the state interests. However, at oral argument, the hospital expressed substantial discomfort in assuming the role of the State in such proceedings. Consequently, both parties agreed that a procedure should be established by which the State can properly intervene if there is reason to do so.

"In most prior Florida decisions where state interests were asserted under analogous medical emergency situations, the State Attorney joined as a party at some point in the proceedings. ... ... One noteworthy exception is Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons ... (Fla. 1989), where, as in this case, the state interests were argued by a public health care provider without further intervention of the State. In discussing the need for court proceedings and the requisite burden of proof, we said "it will be necessary for hospitals that wish to contest a patient's refusal of treatment to commence court proceedings and sustain the heavy burden of proof that the state's interest outweighs the patient's constitutional rights." ... We merely assumed, based on the facts in that case, that the health care provider would raise the state interests. Until today, we were not asked to determine whether it is appropriate for a health care provider, as opposed to another party, to assert the state interests in the first instance.

"One noteworthy exception is Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, (Fla. 1989) [A PRIOR CASE INVOLVING ANOTHER JEHOVAH'S WITNESS], where, as in this case, the state interests were argued by a public health care provider without further intervention of the State. In discussing the need for court proceedings and the requisite burden of proof, we said "it will be necessary for hospitals that wish to contest a patient's refusal of treatment to commence court proceedings and sustain the heavy burden of proof that the state's interest outweighs the patient's constitutional rights." ... We merely assumed, based on the facts in that case, that the health care provider would raise the state interests. Until today, we were not asked to determine whether it is appropriate for a health care provider, as opposed to another party, to assert the state interests in the first instance. "We conclude that a health care provider must not be forced into the awkward position of having to argue zealously against the wishes of its own patient, seeking deference to the wishes or interests of nonpatients - in this case Patricia's husband, her brothers, the children, and the State itself. Patients do not lose their right to make decisions affecting their lives simply by entering a health care facility. Despite concededly good intentions, a health care provider's function is to provide medical treatment in accordance with the patient's wishes and best interests, not as a "substitute parent" supervening the wishes of a competent adult. Accordingly, a health care provider must comply with the wishes of a patient to refuse medical treatment unless ordered to do otherwise by a court of competent jurisdiction. A health care provider cannot act on behalf of the State to assert the state interests in these circumstances. This is an appropriate role for the State to play directly, not through the legal artifice of a special taxing district.
... ... "... When a health care provider, acting in good faith, follows the wishes of a competent and informed patient to refuse medical treatment, the health care provider is acting appropriately and cannot be subjected to civil or criminal liability.

"Although this procedure absolves the health care facility of any obligation to go to court, we recognize the need for the State and interested parties to have the opportunity to seek judicial intervention if appropriate. Accordingly, a health care provider wishing to override a patient's decision to refuse medical treatment must immediately provide notice to the State Attorney presiding in the circuit where the controversy arises, and to interested third parties known to the health care provider. The extent to which the State Attorney chooses to engage in a legal action, if any, is discretionary based on the law and facts of each case. This procedure should eliminate needless litigation by health care providers while honoring the patient's wishes and giving other interested parties the right to intervene if there is a good faith reason to do so. ... Protecting Innocent Third Parties: "The state interest raised in this case is the protection of innocent third parties, which the parties and courts in other jurisdictions under similar circumstances have termed the prevention of abandonment of minor children. Until Dubreuil, no other reported Florida appellate decision had found abandonment in this context. The case most closely on point in this Court's jurisprudence is Wons, where abandonment was discussed but not found. "Norma Wons, a 38-year-old woman, had been suffering from dysfunctional uterine bleeding, and physicians said she could die without a blood transfusion. However, she refused based on her religious convictions as a Jehovah's Witness. Norma lived with her husband Henrich and their two minor children, who were twelve and fourteen years of age. Henrich was also a Jehovah's Witness and supported Norma's decision. Henrich worked to support the family, and during Norma's illness the children had been cared for in Henrich's absence by Norma's sixty-two-year-old mother, who was in good health. Testimony established that if Norma were to die, her mother and two brothers, who also were Jehovah's Witnesses, would assist in taking care of the children. The trial court ruled that Norma's refusal would deny the children the intangible right to be reared by two loving parents, and the state interest in protecting the two minor children overrode Norma's right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment. The Third District reversed, finding that there was no showing of an abandonment of the minor children to override Norma's constitutional rights. The district court said that:
'the societal interest in protecting Mrs. Wons' two minor children ... - although a vital and troubling consideration in this case - cannot, in our view, override Mrs. Wons' constitutional right to refuse a blood transfusion under the circumstances of this case. This is so because, simply put, Mrs. Wons' probable, but not certain, demise by refusing the subject blood transfusions will not result in an abandonment of her two minor children. According to the undisputed testimony below, she has a tightly knit family unit, all practicing Jehovah's Witnesses, all of whom fully support her decision to refuse a blood transfusion, all of whom will care for and rear the two minor children in the event she dies. Her husband will, plainly, continue supporting the two children with the aid of her two brothers; her mother, a sixty-two-year-old woman in good health, will also care for the children while her husband is at work. Without dispute, these children will not become wards of the state and will be reared by a loving family. ... .'

"This Court generally approved the district court's rationale and held that the state interest in maintaining a home with two parents for the minor children does not override a patient's constitutional rights of privacy and religion to refuse a potentially lifesaving blood transfusion. ...
"... there was no abandonment proved in that case, so the protection of innocent third parties could not have been a 'compelling interest sufficient to override the competent patient's right to refuse treatment." ... Because there was no abandonment in Wons, we did not decide in that case 'whether evidence of abandonment alone would be sufficient in itself to override the competent patient's constitutional rights.' ... "The trial court in Dubreuilfound abandonment and held it to be an overriding state interest. The court distinguished Wons, noting that Luc no longer lived with Patricia and the children; Luc was not a Jehovah's Witness and consented to the transfusion; and Patricia presented no evidence of how the children would be cared for in the event of her death. "In a split decision, the district court affirmed by reasoning that Wons put the burden on the hospital to prove abandonment, and under the emergency circumstances and limited evidence presented, the hospital carried its burden. The district court focused on the fact that no evidence was presented about Luc, his ability to care for the couple's children, or the ability or willingness of any others to help care for the children in the event of Patricia's death. The court rejected the argument that a presumption against finding abandonment should exist in the absence of firsthand evidence to the contrary, suggesting that if any presumption were to apply, it would be a presumption in favor of finding abandonment given the ages of the children and the preexisting custody conditions.

"The district court concluded that because there was no showing that the children of tender years would be protected in the event of their parent's death, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that 'there was an overriding interest in the state as parens patriae that outbalances the mother's free exercise and privacy right to reject the transfusion.'

"In dissent, Judge Warner observed that Luc, as the natural father, is the children's legal guardian and is responsible for their care as a matter of Florida law ... Judge Warner relied on our decision in Wons to conclude that because the hospital failed to present compelling evidence that abandonment would result from the rejection of medical treatment, no compelling state interest was established to override Patricia's decision. ... "In her argument to this Court, Patricia urges us to eliminate from this line of cases any consideration given to the state interest in protecting innocent third parties from abandonment, claiming that it is inherently unsound and dangerous and cannot be consistently applied. She argues, for example, that it will lead beyond blood transfusions to major medical procedures ranging from Caesarean sections to heart bypass surgery; or it will allow courts to compel a pregnant Catholic woman who is the single parent of a minor child to have an abortion against her religious beliefs if taking the pregnancy to term would endanger the mother's life. She also argues that the rule eventually will go well beyond the protection of minor children, compelling a single adult, who cares for her dependent elderly parent or grandparent, to receive unwanted medical treatment in order to advance the state interest in protecting the elderly dependent.

"Patricia's argument has some merit. Parenthood, in and of itself, does not deprive one of living in accord with one's own beliefs. Society does not, for example, disparage or preclude one from performing an act of bravery resulting in the loss of that person's life simply because that person has parental responsibilities. "Nonetheless, we decline at this time to rule out the possibility that some case not yet before us may present a compelling interest to prevent abandonment. ... Therefore, we think the better course is the one we took in Wons, where we held that 'these cases demand individual attention' and cannot be covered by a blanket rule. ... "Next, Patricia argues that even if the prevention of abandonment may be a valid state interest, there was no proof in this record that an abandonment would have occurred had Patricia died after refusing medical treatment. We agree.

"Both the circuit and district courts failed to properly consider the father of the four children, Luc Dubreuil. Under Florida law, as Judge Warner's dissent correctly observed, a child with two living natural parents has two natural guardians who share equally the responsibilities of parenting. "'If one parent dies, the natural guardianship shall pass to the surviving parent, and the right shall continue even though the surviving parent remarries. If the marriage between the parents is dissolved, the natural guardianship shall belong to the parent to whom the custody of the child is awarded.' ... Thus, Florida law unambiguously presumes that had Patricia died under these circumstances, Luc would have become the sole legal guardian of the couple's four minor children and would have been given full responsibility for their care in the absence of any contravening legal agreement or order. .. "The State could rebut this strong legal presumption only by presenting clear and convincing evidence that Luc would not properly assume responsibility for the children under the circumstances. ... However, there was absolutely no such evidence presented in this case, as the record is silent as to Luc's ability or desire to care for the children. The record shows only that Luc and Patricia were married but separated, their minor children were under Patricia's care, Luc did not accompany his wife to the hospital, he was readily available when called to Patricia's bedside on the morning of April 6, and he was available to 'consent' to an emergency treatment for Patricia. "Likewise, there was no evidence presented as to whether anyone else, including the families of Luc and Patricia, would take responsibility for the children. To the contrary, Patricia said in an affidavit on rehearing that extended family members and friends (Jehovah's Witnesses saying so for purposes of this lawsuit)were willing to assist in raising the children in the event of Patricia's death.

"Moreover, we do not know if Luc or any other interested party was given the opportunity to address these issues. According to the parties' stipulation, neither Luc nor any other family members attended the emergency hearing, and the record contains no evidence that notice of the hearing was provided. ... "We conclude that the district court erred in holding that sufficient evidence was presented to satisfy the heavy burden required to override the patient's constitutional right to refuse medical treatment. The State alone bore that burden, which the hospital, standing in the State's shoes, did not carry.

"Moreover, the district court erred by suggesting that absent firsthand proof, the law should presume abandonment under these circumstances. To the contrary, the law presumes that when one parent is no longer able to care for the couple's children, the other parent will do so. The district court's decision effectively presumed that Luc had abandoned his children when he separated from his wife. That presumption is unacceptable. The
state cannot disparage a person's parental rights nor excuse a person's parental responsibilities based on martial status alone. .. "Likewise, although not intended by the district court, its rationale could be read by some to perpetuate the damaging stereotype that a mother's role is one of caregiver, and the father's role is that of an apathetic, irresponsible, or unfit parent. ... The law has evolved to move away from inappropriate gender-based distinctions. ... We do not want the district court's rationale misinterpreted to reinforce these outdated ideas in a manner that effectively denies a woman her constitutional right to refuse medical treatment as guaranteed by ... the Florida Constitution. Such an interpretation would also undermine the principle of shared parental responsibility, to which this state adheres. ...

******************

NORWOOD HOSPITAL v. MUNOZ was a 1991 Massachusetts Supreme Court court decision. Yolanda Munoz, a thirty-eight year old woman, had a history of stomach ulcers. On April 11, 1989, Munoz vomited blood and collapsed in her home. Ernesto Munoz took his wife to the Norwood Hospital emergency room. Physicians at Norwood Hospital gave Yolanda Munoz medication which stopped the bleeding. Munoz was then admitted to the hospital as an inpatient. During the evening, her hematocrit (the percentage of red blood cells to whole blood) was 17%. A normal hematocrit level for an adult woman is approximately 42%. Ms. Munoz was placed under the care of Dr. Joseph L. Perrotto. It was his medical opinion that the patient had a 50% probability of hemorrhaging again. If Munoz started to bleed, Dr. Perrotto believed that she would in all probability die unless she received a blood transfusion. Ms. Munoz, however, refused to consent to a blood transfusion in the event of a new hemorrhage.

Yolanda and Ernesto Munoz were baptized as Jehovah's Witnesses over sixteen years ago. They are both members of the Jamaica Plain Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses. They attended three religious meetings every week. A principal tenet of the Jehovah's Witnesses religion is a belief, based on interpretations of the Bible, that the act of receiving blood or blood products precluded an individual resurrection and everlasting life after death.

Norwood Hospital had a written policy regarding patients who refuse to consent to the administration of blood or blood products. According to this policy, if the patient arrives at the hospital in need of emergency medical treatment and there is no time to investigate the patient's circumstances or competence to make decisions regarding treatment, the blood transfusion will be performed if necessary to save the patient's life. If the patient, in a nonemergency situation, refuses to consent to a blood transfusion, and the patient is a competent adult, not pregnant, and does not have minor children, the hospital will accede to the patient's refusal. If the patient, in a non- emergency situation, refuses to consent to a blood transfusion, and the patient is a minor, an incompetent adult, pregnant, or a competent adult with minor children, the hospital's policy is to seek judicial determination of the rights and responsibilities of the parties.

Although no longer in an emergency situation once her ulcer stopped bleeding, Yolanda Munoz had a minor son, Ernesto, Jr. Thus, on April 12, the hospital filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment in the Norfolk Division of the Probate and Family Court requesteing that Munoz be required to accept blood transfusions, which her attending physician believed to be reasonably necessary to save her life. On that same day, the judge granted a temporary restraining order authorizing the hospital to "administer transfusions of blood or blood products in the event that Yolanda Munoz hemorrhages to the extent that her life is severely threatened by loss of blood in the opinion of her attending physicians." The court also appointed Mr. Jonathan Brant to serve as guardian ad litem for five year old Ernesto, Jr.

On April 13, the judge held a full evidentiary hearing. Dr. Perrotto stated in an unchallenged affidavit that, if Mrs. Munoz were to begin bleeding again, she would have an excellent chance of recovering if she received a blood transfusion. If she started to bleed, however, and did not receive a blood transfusion, she would probably die. In addition, Dr. Perrotto stated that there was no alternative course of medical treatment capable of saving the patient's life. Ernesto Munoz and James Joslin, Mrs. Munoz's brother-in-law, testified at the hearing in favor of allowing Mrs. Munoz to refuse the blood transfusion. The guardian ad litem's report, which recommended that the hospital's request for a declaratory judgment be denied, was admitted in evidence.

On April 14, the judge granted the declaratory judgment authorizing blood transfusions which were "reasonably necessary to save Yolanda Munoz's life." The judgment also absolved the hospital and its agents from any civil or criminal liability, except for negligence or malpractice, which might arise from a blood transfusion. On May 11, 1989, the judge issued a detailed opinion explaining his reasons for granting the declaratory judgment. The judge found the patient competent; she understood the nature of her illness, and the potential serious consequences of her decision, including the risk of imminent death if her bleeding resumed and blood transfusions were not administered. While recognizing that a competent adult may usually refuse medical treatment, the judge stated that the hospital could administer the blood transfusions because, if they did not and Mrs. Munoz subsequently died, Ernesto, Jr., would be "abandoned."

The judge concluded that the State's interest in protecting the well-being of Ernesto, Jr., outweighed Ms. Munoz's right to refuse the medical treatment. Ernesto Munoz worked sixteen hours a day, Monday through Friday, and seven hours on Saturday driving his own commercial truck. Yolanda Munoz worked at a beauty salon from 9 A.M. to 3 P.M., three days a week. Ernesto, Jr., was enrolled in a day-care center Monday through Friday, from 9 A.M. until 4 P.M. The judge found that Yolanda Munoz was the "principal homemaker and principal caretaker of Ernesto, Jr." The judge also found that, while Ernesto's father, who lived in the home, was available to assist in caring for Ernesto, Jr., his assistance would be inadequate because of his advanced age, his inability to speak English, his unemployment, his lack of a driver's license, and because he had not, in the past, played a significant role in caring for his grandson. In addition, the judge found, that while Sonia and James Joslin, Ernesto's sister and brother-in-law, expressed a willingness to help Ernesto take care of the child in the event that Mrs. Munoz died, the family had not formulated a concrete plan for the care and support of Ernesto, Jr. The judge concluded that Mrs. Munoz's death "would be likely to cause an emotional abandonment of Ernesto, Jr., which would more probably than not be detrimental to his best interests." The judge ruled that "the State, as parens patriae, will not allow a parent to abandon a child, and so it should not allow this most ultimate of voluntary abandonments."

Although Munoz's ulcer did not hemorrhage after the entry of the judgment, and she was released from the hospital without receiving a blood transfusion, she appealed (probably on the urging of the WatchTower's Legal Department). Munoz argued that the trial judge erred because she has a right, as a competent adult, to refuse life-saving medical treatment, and the State's interests do not override that right. The Massachusetts Supreme Court agreed, stating in part:

"... This court has recognized the right of a competent individual to refuse medical treatment. We have declared that individuals have a common law right to determine for themselves whether to allow a physical invasion of their bodies. ... We have stated that 'a person has a strong interest in being free from nonconsensual invasion of his bodily integrity.' ... See Roe v. Wade, ... .

"The right to bodily integrity has been developed further through the doctrine of informed consent, ... Under the doctrine, a physician has the duty to disclose to a competent adult 'sufficient information to enable the patient to make an informed judgment whether to give or withhold consent to a medical or surgical procedure.' ... It is for the individual to decide whether a particular medical treatment is in the individual's best interests. As a result, 'the law protects [a person's] right to make her own decision to accept or reject treatment, whether that decision is wise or unwise.'
"There is no doubt, therefore, that Ms. Munoz has a right to refuse the blood transfusion. Initially, it is for her to decide, after having been informed by the medical personnel of the risks involved in not accepting the blood transfusion, whether to consent to the medical treatment. The fact that the treatment involves life-saving procedures does not undermine Ms. Munoz's rights to bodily integrity and privacy, except to the extent that the right must then be balanced against the State's interests. ...
...
"Numerous courts have recognized the right of a competent individual to refuse medical treatment even if that decision will hasten death. ...
"Ms. Munoz argues that, in addition to her rights to bodily integrity and privacy, she has a right secured by the free exercise clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution to object to the administration of blood or blood products because to consent to the blood transfusions would violate one of the principal tenets of her Jehovah's Witnesses faith. Some courts have recognized a free exercise right on the part of Jehovah's Witnesses to refuse blood transfusions. ... We do not think it is necessary, however, to decide whether Ms. Munoz has a free exercise right to refuse the administration of blood or blood products, since we have already held that she has a common law and constitutional privacy right to refuse a blood transfusion. Also, we need not decide whether a patient's right is strengthened because the objection to the medical treatment is based on religious principles. ...

"The New York Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in Fosmire v. Nicoleau, supra. The court refused to consider whether the constitutional rights of a Jehovah's Witness, who refused blood transfusions, were violated when the lower court ordered that the transfusion be administered. The court refused to reach the constitutional issues since it held that the patient had a common law and statutory right to decline the blood transfusion. ...

... ...
"The State's interests. The right to refuse medical treatment in life-threatening situations is not absolute. ... We have recognized four countervailing interests: (1) the preservation of life; (2) the prevention of suicide; (3) the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession; and (4) the protection of innocent third parties. ...
"The judge determined that the patient did not want to die. Declining potentially life-saving treatment may not be viewed properly as an attempt to commit suicide. ... Therefore, it is clear that the second interest listed above does not apply in this case. ...
"... The State has an interest in preserving life, especially in a case such as the present one where the patient's affliction is curable. ... The State's interest in preserving life has 'two separate but related concerns: an interest in preserving the life of the particular patient, and an interest in preserving the sanctity of all life.' ... As to the former, the State's concern is weakened when the decision maker (the individual who refuses to consent to the treatment) is also the patient 'because the life that the state is seeking to protect in such a situation is the life of the same person who has competently decided to forgo the medical intervention; it is not some other actual or potential life that cannot adequately protect itself.' ... In cases where a competent adult refuses medical treatment for herself, the State's interest in preserving the particular patient's life will not override the individual's decision. ...
"... preservation of life is the more abstract notion of protecting the sanctity of life. In determining whether this concept applies, we must keep in mind that the right to privacy is an 'expression of the sanctity of individual free choice and self-determination as fundamental constituents of life. The value of life as so perceived is lessened not by a decision to refuse treatment, but by the failure to allow a competent human being the right of choice.' ... 'The duty of the State to preserve life must encompass a recognition of an individual's right to avoid circumstances in which the individual [herself] would feel that efforts to sustain life demean or degrade [her] humanity.'
"In this case, the patient, a fully competent adult, determined for herself that she could not consent to the administration of blood or blood products because to do so would violate a sacred religious belief. The patient decided that she would rather risk death than accept the blood transfusion. We can assume that, for this patient, death without receiving a blood transfusion is preferable to life after receiving the transfusion. The quality and integrity of this patient's life after a blood transfusion would be diminished in her view. Therefore, we conclude that the State's interest in protecting the sanctity of life must give way to the patient's decision to forgo treatment.

"... The State has an interest in maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession by giving hospitals and their staffs a full opportunity to assist those in their care. ... However, we have stated that 'so long as we decline to force the hospital to participate .. there is no violation of the integrity of the medical profession.' ... We have recognized that medical ethics do not require that a patient's life be preserved in all circumstances. ... Last, the ethical integrity of the profession is not threatened by allowing competent patients to decide for themselves whether a particular medical treatment is in their best interests. ... In the circumstances of this case, the State's interest in maintaining the ethical integrity of the profession does not outweigh the patient's right to refuse blood transfusions.
"... The final, and in this case the most compelling, State interest is the protection of the patient's minor child. The State as parens patriae has an interest in protecting the well-being of children. See Prince v. Massachusetts, ... (1944). The issue is whether a competent adult can be prevented from exercising her right to refuse life-saving medical treatment because of the individual's duties to her child.

"The Florida State courts recently have addressed this issue. ... The patient in Wons was a thirty-eight year old woman, mother of two minor children, who suffered from dysfunctional uterine bleeding. The patient's physicians informed her that she required treatment in the form of blood transfusions. The patient, however, refused to consent to the transfusions because of her beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness. It was the physicians' medical opinion that, if the patient did not consent to the blood transfusions, she would probably die. The trial judge granted an order authorizing the transfusion, but a Florida District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the State's interest in protecting the patient's children did not override the patient's right to refuse the medical treatment because the patient's possible death would not result in the abandonment of her two children. ... As the court pointed out, the testimony showed that the patient came from a tightly knit family, all practicing Jehovah's Witnesses, and all of whom supported her decision to refuse the blood transfusion. ... The court also pointed out that the patient's husband and mother were willing to take care of the children in the event that the patient died. ... The court concluded that 'there is no showing of an abandonment of minor children, and, consequently, [the patient's] constitutional right to refuse a blood transfusion is not overridden under the circumstances of this case.' ...

"In Fosmire v. Nicoleau, ... (1990), the New York Court of Appeals apparently has held that the State's interest in protecting minor children will never be allowed to override the right of a competent individual to refuse medical treatment. The court explained that 'at common law the patient's right to decide the course of his or her own medical treatment was not conditioned on the patient['s] being without minor children or dependents.' ...
"We need only state that we agree with the reasoning of the Florida court, and hold that, in the absence of any compelling evidence that the child will be abandoned, the State's interest in protecting the well-being of children does not outweigh the right of a fully competent adult to refuse medical treatment. Our review of the record in this case reveals no such compelling evidence. ... The evidence shows that Ernesto Munoz supported his wife's decision not to consent to the blood transfusion. There is no evidence in the record that Ernesto was unwilling to take care of the child in the event that Ms. Munoz died. We note that the father has the financial resources to take care of the child and to make sure that the child's material needs are satisfied. We also note that Ernesto's sister and brother-in-law supported Ms. Munoz's decision, and were willing to assist Ernesto in taking care of the child.
"There can also be no doubt that, if Ms. Munoz had died, the entire family, including the young child, would have suffered a great loss. However, the State does not have an interest in maintaining a two-parent household in the absence of compelling evidence that the child will be abandoned if he is left under the care of a one-parent household.
'The parens patriae doctrine invoked herein cannot, we think, measure increments of love; it cannot mandate a two-parent, rather than a one-parent, family; it is solely concerned with seeing that minor children are cared for and are not abandoned.' Wons v. Public Health Trust ... In these circumstances the State's interest in protecting the welfare of the patient's child does not outweigh her right to refuse the blood transfusions.
"... The patient had the right to refuse to consent to the blood transfusion even though she would have in all probability died if she had started to hemorrhage. The State's interests in preserving the patient's life, in maintaining the ethical integrity of the profession, and in protecting the well-being of the patient's child, did not override the patient's right to refuse life-saving medical treatment. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and a new judgment declaring the rights of the parties, consistent with this opinion, is to be entered in the Probate Court."

******************

In March 1991, a Jehovah's Witness named Thomas Poole died after falling 50 feet from the rafters of the Broward Performing Arts Center in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The construction worker suffered multiple bone fractures and internal injuries. Doctors at Broward General Medical Center operated on Poole's bone fractures for about two hours, but they did no further surgery after Poole and his wife, Janet Poole, refused to consent for blood transfusions to be administered as needed to save his life. The hospital petitioned a local court for authorization to administer transfusions, but the local judge denied the request. Even the fact that Poole's death would mean someone else would have to rear his two children meant nothing to the judge. The Medical Examiner who performed the autopsy said the decision to not consent to blood transfusions contributed to his death: "There was an awful lot of internal bleeding in the abdomen. He would have needed surgery, and would have needed blood for that surgery." Janet Poole fully supported her husband's decision, stating, "We've been Jehovah's Witnesses for 13 years, and I agree with my husband completely." The Poole's decision left open many questions as to what was the actual cause of Poole's death, and how much worker's compensation insurance was due Janet Poole and her two children. ****************** In June 1991, Cedric Thames, 23, of Bloomington, Illinois, was seriously injured in an automobile accident, when his vehicle was struck by a DUI driver, named Stacey White, 27. Transported to Brokaw Hospital in Normal, doctors informed Thames' Jehovah's Witnesses wife, Lori Thames, and other family members that he would need a blood transfusion to survive. Despite the fact that Cedric Thames was the father of two young children, his family refused to allow the doctors to administer transfusions. Cedric Thames died 18 hours after the accident due to excessive blood loss. The DUI driver was later sued by the Thames' family for "wrongful death", even though Thames would have lived if they only had allowed doctors to administer a blood transfusion. In the criminal trial, the DUI driver was sentenced to 3 years in prison, after the jury refused to convict on the charge of reckless homocide, but did convict on felony driving under the influence of alcohol. Thames Mother, named Willie Gregory (double-checked), and other JWs, screamed "religious prejudice" because White was not convicted on the greater charge that would have sent her to prison for 14 years. Willie declared that the criminal prosecution was really not about White, "Our faith was more on trial than Stacey White." ****************** IN THE MATTER OF MANGIONE was a 1990 New York court decision. Joanne Mangione, and John Mangione, both age 30, were Jehovah's Witnesses living in Buffalo, New York. Joanne Mangione was a licensed practical nurse. In December 1990, Joanne Mangione was admitted to Sisters Hospital to deliver her second child. The Jehovah's Witnesses couple also had a 3-year-old child. Mangione developed a post-labor pneumonia related respiratory infection. Her illness became such that blood transfusions were required to save her life. Both Mangione and her husband refused to consent. The hospital sought and obtained authorization to administer life-saving transfusions from a local court. However, the WatchTower Society drew a line in the sand on this case. Two practicing attorneys, who were Jehovah's Witnesses, came to Mangione's rescue. Local New York attorney, Albert J. Rydzynski, and Atlanta, Georgia attorney, Billy E. Moore raised so much stink that the Hospital was afraid to administer the transfusions, even though a local judge had approved such. The JW attorneys even forced the Hospital to sign an agreement that no transfusions would be administered. During this same time, local JW Elders were meeting with the media and giving their "witness" about the "sins" of blood transfusions. Within a few days, all the involved Jehovah's Witnesses got their wish. Joanne Mangione's name was added to the list of WatchTower martyrs.

******************

On June 30, 1990, a Jehovah's Witnesses mother of four children, including the newborn she had just delivered via caesarian section, chose to die rather than consent to a blood transfusion. Tammy Herbolt, 29, refused the transfusion because it was against her WatchTower beliefs. Her Jehovah's Witnesses husband, Jim Herbolt, agreed with her decision. This tragedy played out at St. Luke Hospital, in Fort Thomas, Kentucky. Doctors and nurses tried to stem the tide of blood coming from the incision and Herbolt's uterus, but only a transfusion would have saved her. Unknown if the grieving husband later filed a malpractice lawsuit.

******************

In June 1991, a Jehovah's Witness named Judy Sowin, 39, of Amelia, Virginia, was seriously injured in an automobile accident which occurred as she, her husband, and their youngest child were on their way to attend a meeting at the Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses. Sowin died three hours later at the Medical College of Virginia Hospital after she refused to consent to the blood transfusions needed to save her life. Sowin left behind her husband to care for the child that was with them, plus other children. ****************** FOSMIRE v. NICOLEAU was a 1990 New York appellate court decision. WatchTower attorney, Donald T. Ridley, represented Denise Nicloeau on appeal. Denise Nicoleau, 36 years old, was a practical nurse and her husband, Herriot Nicoleau, was a radiologist. Both were Jehovah's Witnesses who believe that the biblical injunction to "abstain from blood" (Acts 15:28-29) prohibits blood transfusions. When Nicoleau became pregnant she consulted a physician practicing at Brookhaven Memorial Medical Center to provide prenatal care and deliver the child. Nicoleau informed the doctor that she was a Jehovah's Witness and would not consent to a blood transfusion in connection with the delivery because that would violate her religious beliefs. On the form submitted before admission to the hospital she consented generally to medical procedures that may be necessary but specifically excluded "the administration of blood, pooled plasma or other derivatives." Late in the pregnancy it was determined that the baby would have to be delivered by Cesarean section.

On December 29, 1988, Nicoleau went into labor prematurely and was admitted to the hospital. That evening a Cesarean section was performed and a healthy baby boy was delivered. Following the delivery she began to hemorrhage and at midnight it was determined that further surgery was necessary. She remained in surgery until about 4:00 A.M. Throughout the evening and early morning hours Nicoleau lost a substantial amount of blood and her doctor informed her that in his opinion she would die unless she had a transfusion. However, both she and her husband refused to consent to a transfusion on religious grounds. At the time, except for the loss of blood, Nicoleau was in good health.

When the doctor informed hospital officials of this situation they decided to seek a court order authorizing the transfusions. At about 9:00 A.M. that morning, an attorney representing the hospital made the application to a Supreme Court Justice in Suffolk County. In support of the application the attending physician submitted an affidavit noting that the patient's hemoglobin count had dropped to 4 which is far below the normal range of 12-14. The doctor stated that in his opinion "unless her medical condition improves (which I consider unlikely), she must have a blood transfusion in order to preserve her life."

At about noon that day the court signed an ex parte order authorizing the hospital to administer "necessary blood transfusions" to the patient. The patient and her family received no advance notice of the application and no notice of the fact that the order had been signed until late in the afternoon. At about 6:00 P.M. that evening, nurses attempted to administer the first transfusion. However, 15 Jehovah's Witnesses were standing guard in Nicoleau's room to prevent such. The 15 Jehovah's Witnesses surrounded Nicoleau's hospital bed, and refused to allow the nurses to administer the transfusion. The hospital called the police, and three JWs, including Nicoleau's husband, were arrested and jailed. Two days later the hospital gave her a second transfusion.
On January 2, Nicoleau and her husband appealed to the (lower) Appellate Division to vacate the order. In her supporting papers she indicated that her refusal to consent to blood transfusions was motivated not only by her religious beliefs but also by her concern for the dangers associated with transfusions, particularly the risk of contracting a communicable disease such as AIDS. She asserted that she had no desire to die and would accept medical treatments not involving transfusions, which she claimed were also effective in combatting blood loss. She argued that compelling her to submit to blood transfusions under these circumstances violated her common-law, statutory and constitutional right to make her own medical decisions as well as her constitutional right to practice her religion free of government interference. She urged that there were no identifiable State interests sufficient to overcome these rights.

The (lower) Appellate Division vacated the order by a divided court. The majority held that the trial Court erred in ordering the transfusions without giving the patient or her family notice and an opportunity to be heard before the order was signed, and compounded the error by not providing that they be notified that the order had been signed so that they could seek prompt review before the transfusions were given. On the merits, the majority held that the State had an interest in preserving her life, but that there was no showing that this could only be accomplished by a blood transfusion, since there was no proof in the record that nonblood medical treatments would not have been successful. It also held that the State had an interest in protecting the child from the loss of parental support and care, but that this interest would be satisfied by the father and the child's extended family. The concurring Justice urged that the State had a compelling interest in preserving the patient's life for the benefit of her child, but agreed that the order should be vacated, because it was issued without notice or an opportunity to be heard.

On appeal, the hospital argued that a patient's right to decline lifesaving treatment should be limited to cases where the patient had a terminal or degenerative disease. When the patient was otherwise healthy, the State had a stronger interest in preserving life, which should be held to outweigh the patient's choice. The State's interest was even stronger, the hospital contended, when the patient is a parent, and that the Appellate Division erred in adopting a "one-parent rule." The argument here is that it is always in the child's best interest to have two parents and that the State will intervene to protect the child's welfare. Finally it was urged that the Appellate Division also erred in requiring notice and a hearing whenever a hospital applied for an order in those "emergency" cases, because the delay may cause an additional risk to the patient's life, particularly if the court was required to determine the child's best interests under a "one-parent rule" which might require an extensive inquiry similar to a custody hearing. This appellate court affirmed the lower appellate court, which had vacated the trial court rulings, stating in part:

"Initially, we note our agreement with the Appellate Division's conclusion that in this case the ... Court should not have signed the order ex parte, without giving the patient or her husband notice and an opportunity to be heard. Applications for court-ordered medical treatment affect important rights of the patients and should generally comply with due process requirements of notice and the right to be heard before the order is signed. ... We recognize that due process is a flexible concept and there may be cases in which the patient's condition is so grave that there is no opportunity for prior notice and a hearing. Even then it would seem that the court should make some effort to communicate with the patient or responsible relatives if only to give prompt notice that the order has been signed. In this case, however, the record does not disclose any such exigency. In addition, the patient's medical file recorded a long-standing unequivocal personal decision to decline transfusions. Apparently three hours elapsed between the time the application was made and the time the order was signed and an additional six hours passed before it was executed. Thus there was ample time to provide notice and an opportunity for a hearing, however informal.

"It should be emphasized that it is not always necessary for a doctor or a hospital to obtain a court order before providing treatment to a patient in an emergency. If a patient in need of immediate medical attention is unconscious or otherwise unable to consent, the doctor may treat the condition under the emergency doctrine recognized at common law and by statute, which is based on the assumption that most persons would consent to treatment under these circumstances. ... The emergency doctrine is inapplicable here, however, because the patient clearly stated before admission to the hospital and throughout her stay that she would not consent to blood transfusions.

"Although the patient's competence is not in issue here we note, as we have in the past, that when there is a bona fide question of the patient's competence the doctor or health care facility may seek a court ruling. ... In such a proceeding the court should consider whether the patient has made a decision to decline the medical treatment, is fully aware of the consequences and alternatives, and is competent to make the choice. If the patient is not presently competent the court must determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the patient, when competent, made a firm resolve to decline treatment. ... ... "On the merits we have also concluded that the ... Court should not have ordered the blood transfusions in this case. The question as to whether this order violates the patient's constitutional rights to religious freedom or to determine the course of her own medical treatment raises important and sensitive issues. However, they need not be resolved here because in our view the patient had a personal common-law and statutory right to decline the transfusions. Although this right is not absolute, and may have to yield to superior State interests under certain circumstances, the hospital has not identified any State interest which would override the patient's rights under these circumstances.

"The common law of this State established the right of a competent adult to determine the course of his or her own medical treatment. ... This right has been adopted and preserved by the Legislature. ... Although this rule was originally recognized in personal injury actions brought by patients against doctors for performing unauthorized acts, it has been held equally applicable in cases where doctors or hospitals seek a court order authorizing essential treatment. ... In those cases as well we reaffirmed the basic right of a competent adult to refuse treatment even when the treatment may be necessary to preserve the person's life.

"We have recently held that this 'fundamental common-law right is coextensive with the patient's liberty interest protected by the due process clause of our State Constitution' and that right could be overcome only by a compelling State interest. ... But, as noted, we need not reach the constitutional question here where no statute or regulation is involved and, ... the patient's right to refuse the transfusions may be sustained on the basis of the common-law and statutory rules alone. This common-law right also is not absolute and in some circumstances may have to yield to superior interests of the State. ... But an identified State interest which conflicts with a patient's choice will not always prevail. There are many cases where the State's concern is not sufficient to override the individual's right to determine the course of medical treatment as a patient ... or as the parent of a patient. ... In these and similar cases the courts have to weigh the interests of the individual against the interests asserted on behalf of the State to strike an appropriate balance. "The threshold inquiry is whether there is an identifiable State interest in intervening in the patient's medical choice. If there is, the inquiry must focus on whether the State's interest is sufficiently substantial to outweigh the individual's right. On this point, the extent to which the State has manifested its commitment to that interest through legislation or otherwise is a significant consideration.

The State has a well-recognized interest in protecting and preserving the lives of its citizens. However, we have previously upheld the right of a person to decline life-sustaining treatment against a claim that this is inconsistent with the State's general interest in preserving the lives of its citizens. ... In these instances, it has been noted, a distinction should be drawn between the State's interest in protecting the lives of its citizens from injuries by third parties, and injuries resulting from the individual's own actions. ... When the individual's conduct threatens injury to others, the State's interest is manifest and the State can generally be expected to intervene. But the State rarely acts to protect individuals from themselves, indicating that the State's interest is less substantial when there is little or no risk of direct injury to the public. This is consistent with the primary function of the State to preserve and promote liberty and the personal autonomy of the individual. ... In many if not most instances the State stays its hand and permits fully competent adults to engage in conduct or make personal decisions which pose risks to their lives or health. The State will intervene to prevent suicide ... or the self- inflicted injuries of the mentally deranged. ... But merely declining medical care, even essential treatment, is not considered a suicidal act or indication of incompetence. ... "The hospital notes that most of our cases recognizing this right involved older persons who were suffering from terminal illnesses or conditions in which there was little or no hope of recovery. .... It argues that the right to decline lifesaving medical treatment should be limited to such conditions; when, in the opinion of the patient's doctors, a particular medical treatment will completely restore the patient's health, the State's interest in preserving life is stronger and should prevail over the patient's wishes.

"Actually the cited cases dealt with an extension of the rule, requiring the doctors and hospitals to respect the right even when the patient becomes incompetent if, while competent, the patient had clearly stated a desire to decline life-sustaining treatment under specified circumstances. In each case we held that this was a matter of personal choice, and that the patient's wishes should be honored if there was clear and convincing evidence that the patient had made a firm resolve to decline life-sustaining treatment. Where there was such proof, we ordered that life-sustaining measures be discontinued; ... but where the patient's statements were equivocal and did not clearly show a firm resolve to make such a choice under the circumstances ... we ordered that medical care continue.

"In those cases the patients' physical condition was considered relevant only because the patients were incompetent when the court applications were made and we were therefore required to determine whether those were the circumstances in which the patients intended to decline the medical care. The requirement was imposed by the patients, not by the State. Consideration of the patient's physical condition in those cases was necessary to give effect to the patient's wishes. The right of a patient to decline life-sustaining treatment was recognized in these cases, not because the State considered their lives worthless, but because the State valued the right of the individual to decide what type of treatment he or she should receive under particular circumstances.

"The hospital's principal argument is that the State has an interest in preserving the life of the patient for the benefit of her child. In other words, a competent adult could never refuse lifesaving treatment if he or she were a parent of a minor child. Concededly, this was the opinion of the concurring Justice at the Appellate Division, and there is authority for this proposition in some of the lower court decisions of this State and in decisions from other jurisdictions. ... However, there appears to be disagreement among the courts that recognize the exception as to whether the perceived State's interest is to preserve the family unit intact (the two-parent rule proposed by the hospital in this case) or to simply insure that the child is not left parentless (the one-parent rule adopted by the Appellate Division in this case). Some decisions suggest the court apparently would apply the restriction whenever the patient has a dependent. Other courts perceiving the State's interest to be in favor of honoring the patient's wishes, have completely rejected the proposed restriction. ... "In our prior cases we have alluded to the problem, ... but this is the first case in which a patient refusing lifesaving treatment has a minor child, and thus the first case in which we are called upon to decide the issue.

"There is no question that the State has an interest in protecting the welfare of children. However, at common law the patient's right to decide the course of his or her own medical treatment was not conditioned on the patient being without minor children or dependents. ... Similarly, when the Legislature codified the common-law rule it imposed no such restriction. ... And the hospital can point to no law or regulation which requires a parent to submit to medical treatment to preserve the parent's life for the benefit of a minor child or other dependent. If, as the hospital urges, the State has an interest in intervening under these circumstances, it has never expressed it. In the absence of any statute or decision from this court limiting the rights of patients who happen to be parents, the hospital turns to the law of domestic relations, and seeks to equate a parent who declines essential medical care with a parent who intentionally abandons a child. It is argued that since the State, as parens patriae, will not allow a parent to abandon a child, it will not permit "this most ultimate of voluntary abandonments". ... This argument extends the concept of abandonment far beyond the boundaries recognized in this State, and into areas where it would conflict with other substantial interests.

"Although the State will not permit a parent to abandon a child, the State has never gone so far as to intervene in every personal decision a parent makes which may jeopardize the family unit or the parental relationship. The laws of adoption and divorce show that the State recognizes competing interests and, in some instances, accords them priority. ... Thus the State's concern with maintaining family unity and parental ties is not an interest which it enforces at the expense of all personal rights or conflicting interests.

"The State's interest in promoting the freedom of its citizens generally applies to parents. The State does not prohibit parents from engaging in dangerous activities because there is a risk that their children will be left orphans. There are instances, as the hospital notes, where the State has prohibited the public from engaging in an especially hazardous activity or required that special safety precautions be taken by participants. But we know of no law in this State prohibiting individuals from participating in inherently dangerous activities or requiring them to take special safety precautions simply because they have minor children. There is no indication that the State would take a more intrusive role when the risk the parent has assumed involves a very personal choice regarding medical care. On the contrary, the policy of New York, as reflected in the existing law, is to permit all competent adults to make their own personal health care decisions without interference from the State.

"In sum, the patient, as a competent adult, had a right to determine the course of her own treatment, which included the right to decline blood transfusions, and there is no showing that the State had a superior interest, in preventing her from exercising that right under the circumstances of this case. The citizens of this State have long had the right to make their own medical care choices without regard to their physical condition or status as parents. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

Denise Nicoleau went on to file a civil lawsuit against Brookhaven Memorial Hospital, her obstetrician, and the Hospital's attorneys to recover damages for alleged violations of her civil rights. In 1992, an appellate court dismissed the action against the attorneys. Outcome against the Hospital and doctor are unknown.

******************

MORE PARENTAL OBLIGATIONS COURT CASE SUMMARIES ON NEXT PAGE - 4B

BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS:

PARENTAL OBLIGATIONS

PAGE 2 of 2

****************** ****************** TEXAS v. DAVIS was a 1988-91 Texas court decision. At some point prior to October 30, 1988, a Jehovah's Witness, named Lillie Mae Davis, of Houston, separated from her husband Nathan Lee Davis, 31, affiliation unknown. On that date, Nathan Davis spotted Lillie Davis, and her daughter, Kaleela, 10, who apparently was not Nathan Davis' daughter, riding in a car driven by Albert Matthews (who thereafter relocated to Phoenix, Arizona) on Veterans Memorial Parkway. Wondering what his estranged wife and step-daughter were doing riding with Al Matthews (who reportedly turned out to be her boyfriend), Davis attempted to get Matthews to stop his auto, but he apparently would not stop. In his efforts to stop the Matthews vehicle, Nathan Davis, who was a railroad locomotive driver, "accidentally" made contact with the Matthews vehicle a number of times. Finally, Matthews crashed head-on into a third vehicle driven by two females. All five people were injured, and were transported to Hermann Hospital. Lillie Mae Davis was thrown from the Matthews vehicle when it collided with the third vehicle, and she received a broken leg and internal injuries. Lillie Davis refused to consent to needed blood transfusions -- at the scene, and later in the ER. Lillie Davis died from blood loss four hours after arriving at Hermann Hospital. Given the specifics above, it is unknown who reared the daughter that she left behind. In March 1991, in this state prosecution, a jury passed over a number of possible felony convictions, and convicted Nathan Lee Davis of misdemeanor negligent homicide. Davis was eventually sentenced to 30 days in jail, eight months probation, and 200 hours community service. He also was being sued civilly by the two females in the third vehicle. ****************** WERTH v. TAYLOR ET AL was a 1987-91 Michigan appellate court decision. In August 1985, Cindy Werth, the mother of two children, became pregnant with twins. About two months before the expected date of delivery, Cindy went to Alpena General Hospital to preregister. She filled out several forms, including a "Refusal to Permit Blood Transfusion" form. Cindy went into labor on May 8, 1986, and entered Alpena General Hospital on that date. While she was being admitted, Donald Werth signed another "Refusal to Permit Blood Transfusion" form. Cindy gave birth to her twins on the evening of May 8, 1986. Following delivery, Cindy was found to be bleeding from her uterus, and eventually an emergency D&C was performed after it had been re-confirmed that Cindy would not consent to a transfusion if such became necessary. However, the D&C did not stop Cindy's uterine bleeding, and her life was at risk. At that point, a blood transfusion was administered to save the unconscious Werth's life. The Werth's showed their appreciation by suing the hospital and every doctor present in the operating room for "battery" and medical malpractice. The local trial court ruled against the Werths, who appealed. The Michigan appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. Using Dorone, the court held: Only the contemporaneous refusal of treatment by a fully informed, competent adult patient is sufficient to override evidence of medical necessity, and no action lies for battery for treating a patient without such refusal. In other words, the Michigan court ruled that Werth's refusal would have had to been made at the point that death would have been an absolute certainty under conditions where Werth was fully informed and absolutely competent. Otherwise, doctors and hospitals should not be penalized for saving lives. ****************** In March 1989, a 29 year-old Jehovah's Witness Mother, named Lora Lee Jaudon. chose to die at Pascack Valley Hospital, in New Jersey, and leave her two children to be reared by someone else. Lora Lee Jaudon had a 8-year-old son, Herbert Timothy Jaudon, and a 6-year-old daughter, named Nicole Danial Jaudon. Jaudon's doctor, Dr. Eugene Smith, said that she would have survived the blood infection if only Jaudon had allowed him to administer a blood transfusion to her. However, supported by her Jehovah's Witnesses husband, Herbert Jaudon, and her own JW Mother, Adele Christianson, Lora Jaudon refused to give consent based on the family's WatchTower Society beliefs. Dr. Eugene Smith was torn up about watching a patient die, whom he could have easily saved. A newspaper article titled its report "THE VICTIMS SHE LEFT BEHIND". Donald Ridley, a WatchTower Society attorney, argued to reporters that a Jehovah's Witnesses' right to refuse blood transfusions is sacrosanct, regardless of the other people involved. Don Ridley stated:

"Does your right of informed choice diminish as the number of your kids grows?"

Interestingly, those judges with IQs in the three digit range have answered "YES!!!" ****************** PUBLIC HEALTH TRUST OF DADE COUNTY v. WONS was a 1989 Florida appellate court decision. WatchTower attorney Donald T. Ridley submitted an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., the parent corporation of the Jehovah's Witnesses. A Jehovah's Witness named Norma Wons entered Jackson Memorial Hospital, operated by the Public Health Trust of Dade County, with a condition known as dysfunctional uterine bleeding. Doctors informed Norma Wons that she was bleeding to death; that she had lost 90% of her red blood cells; and that she would require a blood transfusion, or she would, in all probability, die. Although Wons was the mother of three children, includind two minors still living at home, she declined the treatment on grounds that it violated her WatchTower religious principles to receive blood from outside her own body. At the time she refused consent, Norma Wons was conscious and able to reach an informed decision concerning her treatment.

Public Health Trust petitioned the circuit court to force Wons to undergo a blood transfusion. At the hearing Wons' husband, Heinrich Wons, testified that he fully supported his wife's decision to refuse the treatment, and that, in the unfortunate event she were to die, their two children would be cared for by him and Mrs. Wons' mother and two brothers, who had all also expressed support for Norma Wons decision to refuse to consent to a blood transfusion. Nevertheless, the court granted the petition, ordering the hospital doctors to administer the blood transfusion, which was done while Wons was unconscious, and literally at the brink of death. The trial judge reasoned that minor children have a right to be reared by two loving parents, a right which overrides the mother's rights of free religious exercise and privacy. Norma Wons survived and recovered solely due to the administering of the blood transfusion. Thereafter, she appealed to the Third District court, which reversed the order. After holding that the case was not moot due to the recurring nature of Mrs. Wons' condition, the district court held that Mrs. Wons' constitutional rights of religion and privacy could not be overridden by the state's purported interests. This appellate court agreed.

In Florida, an individual's right to refuse medical treatment must be analyzed in terms of four criteria wherein the right to refuse medical treatment may be overridden by a compelling state interest. These factors are (1) Preservation of life, (2) protection of innocent third parties, (3) prevention of suicide, and (4) maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession. These four factors are intended merely as factors to be considered while reaching the difficult decision of when a compelling state interest may override the basic constitutional rights of privacy and religious freedom.

Public Health Trust asserted that the children's right to be reared by two loving parents is sufficient to trigger the second compelling state interest. This court replied: "While we agree that the nurturing and support by two parents is important in the development of any child, it is not sufficient to override fundamental constitutional rights. ... As the district court noted in its highly articulate opinion below:

'Central to Ramsey and the above line of cases in other jurisdictions is a delicate balancing analysis in which the courts weigh, on the one hand, the patient's constitutional right of privacy and right to practice one's religion, as against certain basic societal interests. Obviously, there are no preordained answers to such problematic questions and the results reached in these cases are highly debatable. Running through all of these decisions, however, is the courts' deeply imbedded belief, rooted in our constitutional traditions, that an individual has a fundamental right to be left alone so that he is free to lead his private life according to his own beliefs free from unreasonable governmental interference. Surely nothing, in the last analysis, is more private or more sacred than one's religion or view of life, and here the courts, quite properly, have given great deference to the individual's right to make decisions vitally affecting his private life according to his own conscience. It is difficult to overstate this right because it is, without exaggeration, the very bedrock on which this country was founded.'

"We hold that the state's interest in maintaining a home with two parents for the minor children does not override Mrs. Wons' constitutional rights of privacy and religion." ****************** In August 1989, Sheri Mattingly, an Anaheim, California, Jehovah's Witness mother of four children, chose to die rather than accept a blood transfusion. Mattingly, her four children, and two others, who were packed into Mattingly's Toyota Celica, were returning from a meeting at their Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses, when the Toyota was struck by a DUI driver. Mattingly, 32, and the other 6 occupants of her car, were taken to UCI Medical Center. There, Mattingly, whose injuries were consistent with a driver who was not wearing a seatbelt, refused to consent to a blood transfusion needed to save her life. Mattingly died as a result of her refusal to accept a blood transfusion. Two months later, the 21 year old female who struck Mattingly's Toyota, was sentenced to 10 years in prison for gross vehicular manslaughter. ****************** In December 1989, Lisa Biffle, 25, an 8+ months pregnant Jehovah's Witness, was struck in the abdomen by a random gunshot while she was sitting in a car outside the South Jamaica Housing Project in Queens, New York. Biffle's husband was also struck, but only once in his foot. Two gang-member drug dealers were later arrested for the random drive-by shooting. At Queens Hospital Center, Lisa Biffle was given a caesarean section, and the baby was delivered without injury. However, Biffle needed a blood transfusion to survive the excessive blood loss, but she refused to give her consent. She died nine hours later, leaving her wounded husband with a newborn baby to rear. ****************** In August 1988, Juan Ortega, a 38-year-old father of four, died at North Broward Medical Center, due to excessive blood loss. Ortega was injured while working at a Publix grocery distribution center in Deerfield Beach, Florida. Ortega, a forklift operator, had his lower right leg severely mangled when it got caught in a conveyer belt, while he was feeding pallets into a pallet-loading machine. Ortega and his wife, Tila Ortega, refused to allow doctors to administer blood transfusions needed in the attempt to save Juan Ortega's life. Tila Ortega said the hospital blames her and her religion for the death. Tila Ortega said she knows in her heart that she did the right thing when she refused doctors permission to give her husband a blood transfusion. As Jehovah's Witnesses, she said, "no" was the only possible answer the Ortegas could give.

****************** IN THE MATTER OF PAVONE was a 1986 Florida court decision. Susan Pavone, 46 years old, was admitted to Broward Count's Northwest Regional Hospital on March 11, 1986, with a severe bleeding ulcer. After refusing to consent to necessary blood transfusions, Pavone transferred to Holy Cross Hospital in Fort Lauderdale. There, Pavone's condition worsened, and her death was likely unless transfusions were administered. Supported by her 14 year old daughter, Carol Pavone, also a Jehovah's Witness, Susan Pavone pleaded with her husband not to let the doctors administer blood transfusion to her, as she drifted in and out of consciousness. "No blood, Joe, no blood. You're not going to let them give me blood." Fortunately, Joseph Pavone was NOT a Jehovah's Witness, and he was not going to sit by and allow his wife to die needlessly. Joseph Pavone petitioned a local court for authorization to administer blood transfusions. An emergency hearing was convened in Susan Pavone's hospital room, and thereafter the judge issued an order authorizing transfusions only in the event such were necessary to save Pavone's life. They were, and they did. Susan Pavone eventually recovered and was discharged in good health. The judge cited the interests of the state and society, as well as those of the husband and the fourteen year old daughter. Chuck Kohnert, one of Susan Pavone's WatchTower Elders, told reporters: "Mrs. Pavone made the right decision." With regard to Joseph Panone, Kohnert stated: "We're not judge and we're not jury. He will face God on Judgment Day." ****************** In May 1985, employees at University Hospital in Boston donated $1430 to a Dorchester, Massachusetts Jehovah's Witness father of 11 children,who had been in their ICU for a month, because he would not accept the blood transfusions required to treat his kidney condition. James H. Williams, 45, needed the money so he could fly to New Jersey, where a doctor supposedly would use artificial blood to treat his kidney ailment. The Jehovah's Witness father evidently was willing to die and leave the rearing of his 11 children to someone else rather than violate the doctrines of a religion that would not even pay his expenses for doing as they said. ****************** ST. MARY'S HOSPITAL v. RAMSEY was a 1985 Florida appellate court decision. Ramsey was a twenty-seven years old male Jehovah's Witness, who was refusing a medically required blood transfusion that would save his life. St. Mary's Hospital petitioned the court for authority to administer blood transfusions, but the trial court refused, and this appellate court affirmed that ruling, stating in part: "The trial judge held that:

1. Mr. Ramsey is intelligent, rational and lucid and has made a competent decision not to accept a blood transfusion knowing he will die.

2. The state and petitioners have not demonstrated sufficient compelling interests to outweigh Mr. Ramsey's constitutional entitlement to privacy and to make this decision without governmental interference.

"The basic question to be answered in this case is: Can an adult patient in full command of his faculties refuse a blood transfusion? We answer in the affirmative subject to the four caveats set forth in Perlmutter I: preservation of life, protection of the parties, prevention of suicide and the ethics of medical practice. "PRESERVATION OF LIFE: The preservation of life is not ... an unswerving mandate. We have hitherto held that an adult patient has a constitutional right of privacy, a freedom to choose and a right of self-determination. ... Thus if an adult, competent patient refuses a blood transfusion, it would appear he has a right to do so, providing there is no overriding reason why his life should be preserved. ... "The patient's wishes in this case are rendered even more compelling because of the presence of deeply held religious convictions. In this connection, we read with approval the case ofIn the Matter of Osborne(**SEE BELOW), ... (1972), where the court spoke about the thirty-four year old Jehovah's Witness' preference for everlasting life and salvation rather than a few more waking hours on this earth. It is hard to fault such a deeply held conviction. ... "PROTECTION OF THIRD PARTIES: This is probably the most difficult hurdle to overcome in the case at bar. As we said in Perlmutter I, the protection of third parties is exemplified when the refusal of treatment and subsequent death results in the abandonment of minor children. ... In the case at bar, there is a minor daughter. Yet, it is difficult to categorize the refusal of treatment here as an abandonment. First, the primary physical residence of the child is with the mother in another state; as a result the father seldom sees the child. Second, there is evidence in the record that the mother, and both families, will help to support the child. Third and finally, there is evidence that the patient owns a small annuity which names the child as beneficiary. As a consequence, we cannot fault the trial judge for not finding abandonment. ... (Why did this court not mention that Ramsey was obligated to pay child support payments to help support that daughter for many years to come?) **Charles P. Osborne was a 34-year-old Jehovah's Witness who was admitted to Cafritz Memorial Hospital with severe injuries and internal bleeding caused when a tree fell on him. When he refused to allow the ER doctors to administer a blood transfusion, the Hospital sought a court order to save his life. However, Osborne's wife, brother, and grandfather (who were all Jehovah's Witnesses) were present for the hearing. They stated the views of the patient and agreed with them, explaining that those views are based on strong religious convictions. The grandfather explained that the patient "wants to live very much. ... He wants to live in the Bible's promised new world where life will never end. A few hours here would nowhere compare to everlasting life." His wife stated, "He told me he did not want blood — he did not care if he had to die." Thus, the trial court refused the Hospital's petition, and an appellate court affirmed. Ramsey and his family got their death wish. What are the odds that a 34-year-old male had dependent children?

******************

APPLICATION OF WINTHROP UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL was a 1985 New York court decision. Limited details. A Jehovah's Witness named Susan Hess was admitted to Winthrop University Hospital due to a severe case of kidney stones only one month after delivering her second child. Blood transfusions are rarely needed during the kidney stone surgery she was to have, but the surgeon refused to operate without authorization, in case blood was needed in an emergency situation. Hess and her husband refused to authorize a transfusion on religious grounds. The Hospital then petitioned a local court for guardianship and authorization to administer a blood transfusion if such became medically required to save her life. After taking testimony from Hess and her husband, the court granted the petition. This seems to be another case where the judge came to the realization that the Jehovah's Witness would accept a blood transfusion if such were court ordered. Note pertinent verbiage in this decision:

"Respondent is married, the mother of two young children, one being only one month old. She is currently hospitalized for kidney stones requiring surgical removal. Neither she nor her husband object to the surgery but refuse to permit any blood transfusion on religious grounds. She is competent. "While transfusions are rare in the proposed surgery, the surgeon refuses to operate without authorization. Therefore, without Court ordered authorization no surgery will be performed and her life is threatened, unless she finds another surgeon, which she is, of course, free to do. But while she remains under the care of her present surgeon and hospital, the issue remains.
"Courts are generally without power to order compulsory medical treatment over a competent adult patient's objection. ... However, whether a competent adult patient's religious right must yield to the State's interest in acting as parens patriae by ordering compulsory medical treatment to save the life of the mother of infants, has not been reported in this State.
"InPowell v. Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center, ... (1965), emergency blood transfusions were ordered for a mother of six children who refused to authorize same on religious grounds. But that decision was based upon a finding that the patient would accept the transfusions if Court ordered rather than the State act as parens patriae."

****************** IN THE MATTER OF FUENTES was a 1983 Maryland court decision. While most courts have refused to grant court-ordered blood transfusions for Jehovah's Witnesses mothers whose baby is not itself endangered, this judge did grant such. Interestingly, the judge did so after the Jehovah's Witness husband, who reportedly worked for a "family services" governmental agency, stated that if a transfusion was ordered, he would not challenge the judge's decision. Frank Fuentes Jr., who also just happened to be an Elder of the JWs, was supported by his fellow JW Elders at the Gaitherburg Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses. In August 1983, Marsha Ellen Fuentes, 28, was near death at Shady Grove Adventist Hospital due to blood loss after childbirth. Although both Frank Fuentes and Marsha Fuentes had refused to give consent to a blood transfusion, they apparently were appreciative of the fact that the hospital sought a court-ordered blood transfusion. Judge John F. McAuliffe, awakened by hospital officials at his home in the early A.M. hours, rushed to the hospital to hold an emergency hearing. The hospital's petition was granted after Frank Fuentes Jr. gave the judge his promise not to contest the decision. For whatever reasons, this Judge seemed to have a sixth sense as to exactly how to save this JW's life, and do so without violating the JW's WatchTower beliefs. He stuck around and made sure no transfusions were administered until there was no question but that Fuentes would die without one. He and the hospital kept it quiet as to how many transfusions were actually administered after the hysterectomy (two or more). The Judge also agreed that the state had a compelling interest in saving the life of a young mother now with her fifth child under the age of nine. Then, once the emergency was past, the Judge terminated the order. More JWs need to understand that there is more than one way to skin a chicken, or, let someone else be the WatchTower Martyr. ****************** IN RE DAVIS was a 1982 Illinois court decision. An Akron, Ohio Jehovah's Witness couple named Joseph Davis and Elaina Davis were involved in an automobile accident in the Chicago area. The JW wife/mother was killed, and Joseph Davis, 42, had his left leg so severely injured that it required amputation. Davis lost approximately 80% of his blood in the accident, but as a Jehovah's Witness, he refused any blood transfusions at the hospital. However, the Hospital applied to a local judge for permission to adminster necessary blood transfusions in order to save Davis' life. Judge Walter P. Dahl of Cook County Circuit Court ruled that since Davis was now the sole provider for five of his six children, 2, 4, 10, 16 and 17 years old, that the children of Joseph Davis had a greater right to have their father live than Davis had to refuse the blood. The administering of the emergency blood transfusions kept Davis alive long enough for later transfusions to consist of blood substitutes which were acceptable to Davis. ****************** IN RE CAINE was a pre-1985 court decision, during which a 35 year-old Jehovah's Witness Father of three was court-ordered to receive a blood transfusion due to his parental repsonsibilities outweighing his desire to commit "backdoor suicide". ****************** In August 1979, in Bloomington, Illinois, after 32 hours of labor, doctors performed a caesarean section on a Jehovah's Witness named Janice Sue Malcome, who was 39 years-old, and weighed 290 lbs. Blood clotting in her lungs further forced doctors to give her blood thinners. Due to excessive blood loss, doctors told Janice Sue Malcome that she would need a blood transfusion or she would die. While husband, Richard Malcome, counseled his wife against consenting to a transfusion, Janice Malcome's non-JW mother and sister did everything they could to convince her to consent. They finally won Janice over, but the argument had taken too long. Janice died two hours after receiving the transfusion.Richard Malcome was left alone to rear his new infant daughter, Melissa Renee Malcome, and her four siblings. ****************** IN THE MATTER OF MITCHELL was a 1978 Virginia court decision. In October 1978, Brenda Mitchell, 24, a Jehovah's Witness, gave birth to a daughter, but hemorhaged and lost an excessive amount of blood. When informed that a blood transfusion might be necessary to save her life, Mitchell refused to consent because of Bible passages she believed prohibit her from receiving blood. A Richmond hospital petitioned four different courts for authorization to administer a transfusion, but all four refused the petition. Those judges obviously gave no weight to the parental obligations that Brenda Mitchell owed to her newborn daughter. Fortunately, Mitchell recovered without receiving a transfusion. ****************** In March 1977, Luz Santana, 26, of Lorain, Ohio, died of massive blood loss at Elyria Memorial Hospital less than two hours after delivering Sandra Santana, via caesarian, one month early. Luz Santana was fully supported in her decision not to consent to a blood transfusion by her husband, Miguel Santana, who was a local JW Elder. In a telephone interview, Santana's JW sister in Puerto Rico, Wilfredo Rodriguez, stated to a reporter, "In the Bible, it is very clear that someone's blood isn't pure and harm would come upon the persons who took the blood." ****************** IN THE MATTER OF SUSAN FRYE was a 1977 Pennsylvania court appellate court decision. In June 1977, a Jehovah's Witness, named Susan Frye, 24, was admitted to Pittsburgh's Montefiore Hospital suffering severe blood loss from a bleeding lesion. His wife having refused the blood transfusions needed to preserve her life, Trevor Frye, who was NOT a JW, petitioned a local Judge for authorization to save the life of his wife and mother of his two young children. Judge John Flaherty refused. Trevor Frye then petitioned Judge Cercone, who decided that the state had an interest in preserving the life of a parent of two young children. Any necessary transfusions were court authorized. ****************** IN RE HAMRICK was a 1977 Washington state decision, and a somewhat puzzling situation. In March 1977, Deborah Hamrick, 17, wife of Randy Hamrick, was involved in an automobile accident in which she and her 3 month-old daughter, Phadra Hamrick, were both seriously injured, and 18 month old Randy Hamrick, Jr. was only slightly injured. At Centralia General Hospital, a blood transfusion was started upon Deborah Hamrick as soon as she arrived due to massive hemmoraging from a ruptured spleen. However, when Hamrick's Jehovah's Witness family members arrived, and saw that she was receiving a blood transfusion, they stopped such. Apparently, doctors revived Deborah Hamrick, and when asked her desires in front of her family, she rejected any further blood transfusions. Doctors at Centralia General Hospital told Hamrick that she would certainly die if she did not allow them to operate using blood transfusions, but that with such, she had a 80% chance of survival. She and the family decided to transfer to a Seattle hospital that they thought could operate without blood. Centralia prepped Hamrick for the transfer, using blood substitutes, but she died from massive blood loss during the transfer. Phadra Hamrick also needed a blood transfusion, so the hospital sought and obtained court authorization for such, and she recovered - though, without a mother. Randy Hamrick, Jr. was also treated and released. Several interesting comments resulted from this scenario from both involved doctors, and the local Jehovah's Witnesses. Dr. Larry Nelson told a reporter that WatchTower teachings regarding blood transfusions "were a form of human sacrifice", and that JWs who died obeying WatchTower rules were committing "suicide". When asked to respond, local JW Elder and genius, Wayne Rees, dodged the issue by stating, "Can you think of anything closer to suicide than overeating?" Responding to Nelson's remark that JWs were "incompetent" to make the decision to refuse blood transfusions in the multitude of varying life-n-death scenarios that arise, Rees stated that no other group than doctors knew more about blood transfusions than Jehovah's Witnesses. Rees also went into great details misquoting Bible verses in an attempt to equate a blood transfusion with the "eating of animal blood". Wayne Rees further stated:

"The Bible says the soul of the body is in the blood. ... Most any doctor will admit that blood is an organ ... . A blood transfusion is actually an organ transplant. Yet, most people have the right to reject an organ transplant." [At that time, the WatchTower Society forbid organ transplants. Today, they allow such.]

****************** HAMILTON v. MCAULIFFE was a 1976 Maryland appellate court decision. Hubert Hamilton, a 35 year old Jehovah's Witness, was gunshot in his chest. Physicians determined that Hamilton could not survive without immediate surgery and a blood transfusion. Hubert Hamilton consented to the surgery, but refused to authorize a blood transfusion, even though he was informed by his physicians that he would die if surgery was undertaken and a blood transfusion was not given in the course of the surgery.

Hubert Hamilton's wife and two brothers filed a petition in a local court seeking authority for the physicians to proceed with the transfusion, notwithstanding Hamilton's refusal to consent. The court appointed counsel to represent Hamilton and an emergency hearing was held in the hospital on December 12, 1973, at which Judge John F. McAuliffe presided. The judge was convinced that Hamilton fully understood the ramifications of his decision not to consent to the blood transfusion. However, although Hamilton was separated from his wife, they had a two-year-old child for whom Hamilton was the sole support.

Judge McAuliffe authorized the transfusion; concluding that: "... since death would likely follow unless a transfusion was authorized, I should authorize the hospital and physician to proceed with transfusions as if the patient had given consent, and that the substantial interest of the state [presumably to protect innocent third parties] warranted the exercise of equitable jurisdiction."

Thereafter, Hamilton appealed the lower court decision, but the appeal was dismissed as "moot". Not giving up, Hamilton then filed a declaratory judgment action in a local court asking that McAuliffe's decision be declared "erroneous". Outcome unknown, but predictable.

****************** IN RE WILLIAM J. DELL was a 1975 Pennsylvania court decision. In January 1975, Bill Dell was admitted to North Hills Passavant Hospital, where he was informed that he had lost so much blood from a bleeding ulcer that he would die within hours without a transfusion. Dell refused to consent based on his WatchTower beliefs (that Armageddon would occur in October). Dell's wife, Karen Dell, a registered nurse, petitioned a local Judge for authorization for the needed transfusions, and such was granted. Apparently, the Judge must have discerned that a husband willing to die and leave his family for such ridiculous reasons must have one or more mental issues. ****************** In August 1975 (just two months prior to Armageddon), a Jehovah's Witness named Kathy Fenelon, 22, of Dubuque, Iowa, delivered a newborn boy at home with the aid of a midwife. When Kathy experienced severe hemorraging, her non-JW husband, Michael Fenelon, 25, took her to Madison General Hospital. There, doctors agreed not to seek court intervention on the transfusion issue, and after much effort and medical care, Fenelon apparently recovered. ****************** HOLMES v. SILVER CROSS HOSPITAL was a 1972 Illinois federal district court decision. Limited details. Full decision not available. Ernest J. Holmes, a twenty year old Jehovah's Witness, was seriously injured in an automobile accident in August 1969. Due to excessive loss of blood, Holmes was told that he would need a blood transfusion to survive, which he promptly refused citing his religious beliefs as one of Jehovah's Witnesses. Ernest Holmes was recently married to Kathleen Holmes, and they had an infant child. However, Kathleen Holmes also refused to consent, as did Ernest's parents, brother, and sister. Ernest and Kathleen even signed a form releasing the Hospital and doctors from liability if they were to perform surgery and operations without any blood transfusions. Ernest eventually lost consciousness about four hours after arriving at the hospital, and in desperation the Hospital petitioned a local court to declare Ernest incompetent as a "neglected minor", in order to have a guardian appointed for the purpose of authorizing a blood transfusion. The court granted the Hospital's petition, and the guardian authorized a blood transfusion. Despite the transfusions and the doctors best efforts to save his life, Holmes died from the injuries and blood loss attributable to the accident. Holmes' family was not notified of the emergency court hearing; thus were unable to contest such. Kathleen Holmes filed a federal lawsuit against the Hospital, at least two doctors, the guardian, and even the Trial Judge; claiming they had all conspired to deprive the deceased Ernest J. Holmes of his civil rights by medically treating the decedent in a manner inconsistent with his religious beliefs, while acting under color of State law. Ruling on the defendants' motions to dismiss, the district court ruled that the trial judge and the court-appointed guardian enjoyed judicial immunity in this suit. Motions from the defendant hospital and doctors to dismiss were denied. The district court eventually held that the hospital and doctors violated this decedent's civil rights. The decision is sometimes cited to acknowledge a court's right to consider the affect that the death of a Jehovah's Witness parent would have on their minor children, but the fact that this decedent had an infant child evidently did not change this decision.

******************

IN THE MATTER OF CHARLES P. OSBORNE was a 1972 District of Columbia appellate court decision. Charles Osborne was a 34 year old father of two young children. Osborne was admitted to Cafritz Memorial Hospital with injuries and internal bleeding caused when a tree fell on him. As the need for whole blood became apparent, Osborne and his wife both refused to give their consent for the necessary transfusion. Both gave as reasons their religious beliefs as Jehovah's Witnesses. The Hospital petitioned the local court for guardianship and authority to administer medically required transfusions.

When the petition was brought to the judge's home the night of the accident, the patient's wife, brother, and grandfather were present. They stated the views of Osborne, and agreed with them, explaining that those views are based on strong religious convictions. The grandfather explained that Osborne wanted very much to live, but that, "He wants to live in the Bible's promised new world where life will never end. A few hours here would nowhere compare to everlasting life." Osborne's wife testified: "He told me he did not want blood — he did not care if he had to die."

Concerned with the patient's capacity to make such a decision in light of his serious condition, and also recognizing the possibility that the use of drugs might have impaired Osborne's judgment, the judge went to the hospital to talk to Osborne and his doctors. Osborne was aware of the implications of his refusal and was fully competent. His beliefs were longstanding. His father had even died a few months before, refusing blood, a decision which the same family members supported. Testimony was given which indicated that the family would care for Osborne's two young children if he did die.

The judge even sought out the solution some Jehovah's Witnesses had hinted at in order to save their lives. [See GEORGE below.] The judge asked Osborne if he would consider himself blameless before God if the court ordered the transfusion against his wishes. Instead of answering like most Jehovah's Witnesses answered similar questions -- then the JW would not sin -- Osborne said he would still be accountable before God. Such would cause him to lose everlasting life in the new world - even if he "unwillingly" received a transfusion.

The judge thereafter denied the Hospital's petition. On emergency appeal, the appellate court affirmed the denial. Fortunately, Osborne recovered without any blood tranfusions, and was discharged from the hospital.

******************

IN RE NEUMANN was a 1971 Ohio court decision.In October 1971, Mrs. Jeffrey Neumann, 20, of Cleveland, Ohio, chose to die and leave motherless two infant children rather than accept a blood transfusion. Neumann died from blood loss three weeks after delivering her second child. Husband, Jeffrey Neumann, age 23, survived, as did 2 year old daughter, Lara Michelle Neumann, and the recently birthed baby.

Officials at Cleveland's Lakewood Hospital actually sought and obtained a court order to administer the life-saving transfusions, thus "shouldering the responsibility" before God, but they decided not to adminster the needed transfusions after they were threatened with one or more lawsuits by several JW officials present at the hospital to make sure such did not occur.

Jeffrey Neumann, a Jehovah's Witnesses minister who fully supported his wife's decision, stated: "I don't think any person loves anyone as much as I love my wife." Local Cleveland spokesman for the Jehovah's Witnesses, Eugene Tenke, explained that because a blood transfusion is used "to nourish and feed the body", the sect considers this "eating blood", which is prohibited by the Bible. What a bunch of geniuses!

******************

In March 1968, Mrs. James F. Christian, 28, a Jehovah's Witness Mother of two, who was also a Registered Nurse, died at Phoenix Good Samaritan Hospital after refusing to consent to a blood transfusion. Cause of death was excessive blood loss from unspecified hemorraging. Unknown whether she had just delivered a child. Fully supported by husband, James F. Christian. Family was originally from Des Moines, Iowa. At the time of death, hospital was seeking court intervention.

******************

In December 1967, a Jehovah's Witness father of two children, named Cruz Guerrero, of Compton, California, underwent surgery to remove a benign tumor from his stomach, which had been causing bleeding leading to a severe loss of blood. Guerrero would not consent to a blood transfusion during or after the surgery, which would have cost only $75.00. After this JW Father of two lapsed into a semicoma from a severe loss of blood, Doctors at Harbor General Hospital transported the JW to a U. S. Navy station fifteen miles away, and placed him in a "recompressure chamber", which forced 14 times the regular amount of oxygen into what blood remained in Guerrero's body. Cost to taxpayers? Estimated at $15-20,000.00 (that's 1967 dollars).

******************

IN RE MARTHA RIDGE was a 1966 Washington state court decision. In February 1966, a Jehovah's Witness named Martha Ridge, 35, was critically ill, and needed surgery during which a blood transfusion would likely be needed. When Ridge refused to consent to any transfusions, the Enumclaw hospital sought court intervention. A Seattle judge authorized any needed transfusions based on the reasoning that the state had an interest in ensuring that this Mother of 5 children survived to rear them.

******************

POWELL v. COLUMBIAN PRESBYTERIAN MEDICAL CENTER was a 1965 New York court decision. Limited details. In December 1965, a Jehovah's Witness named Willie Mae Powell was admitted to Columbian Presbyterian Medical Center to deliver her sixth child. Although the planned delivery was via caesarian section, the Hospital had agreed to perform such with a signed liability release, despite the possibility of excessive blood loss, and despite the fact that Powell had refused to consent to blood transfusions due to her religious beliefs as one of Jehovah's Witnesses.

Powell did in fact suffer excessive blood loss, and Powell was in danger of dying. Powell's husband and other family members were NOT Jehovah's Witnesses, and they and hospital staff pleaded with Powell to give her consent. She refused. Thereafter, Powell's husband petitioned a local court to authorize life-saving blood transfusions. The court granted the petition after coming to the realization that Powell would accept a transfusion if such was court ordered, so that Powell was not responsible for such. This judge did not take this case lightly, but as he stated:

"This matter generated a barrage of legal niceties, misinformation and emotional feelings on the part of all concerned -- including the Court personnel. Nor could I forget for one moment my convictions with regard to the individual’s right to be let alone or -- crucially important -- that a human life hung in the balance.Never before had my judicial robe weighed so heavily on my shoulders. Years of legal training, experience and responsibility had added a new dimension to my mental processes -- I, almost by reflex action, subjected the papers to the test of justiciability, jurisdiction and legality. I read Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., ..., and was convinced of the proper course from a legal standpoint. ... It became clear to me that the crux of the problem lay, not in Mrs. Powell's religious convictions, but in her refusal to sign a prior written authorization for the transfusion of blood. She did not object to receiving the treatment involved--she would not, however, direct its use. I was also convinced that the hospital, having obtained a signed release of liability..., took the view that it had fulfilled its obligations to this patient and would not, under these circumstances, administer blood transfusions even if necessary to save the patient's life. How legalistic minded our society has become, and what an ultra-legalistic maze we have created to the extent that society and the individual have become enmeshed and paralyzed by its unrealistic entanglements! I was reminded of 'The Fall' by Camus, and I knew that no release -- no legalistic absolution -- would absolve me or the Court from responsibility if I, speaking for the Court, answered 'No' to the question 'Am I my brother’s keeper?' This woman wanted to live. I could not let her die!"

******************

UNITED STATES v. GEORGE was a 1965 Connecticut federal District Court decision. On March 15, 1965, Elishas George, the 39 year oldfather of four children, voluntarily admitted himself into the Veterans Administration Hospital in West Haven, Connecticut. Although bleeding seriously from his gastrointestinal tract, George refused blood transfusions. Both George and his wife were Jehovah's Witnesses, the religion which prohibits blood transfusions. Both George and his wife, Elizabeth, signed releases, relieving the hospital and its employees of any civil liability for any injury which followed from the lack of blood transfusions. On March 17, 1965, at approximately 11:30 A.M., an attorney for the government, on behalf of the Hospital, orally applied to the federal district court for an order granting permission to administer blood transfusions in order to save George's life. Upon being informed that the patient's condition was "precarious" but not extreme, the court refused to act on the oral application. Thereafter the government brought a civil action with service upon both Mr. and Mrs. George, and set the matter down for hearing on March 18, 1965. However, at approximately 6:30 P.M., on March 17, 1965 the Court received a telephone call from the government's attorney and was informed the patient's condition had become critical. Further, the government had prepared a written application for a temporary restraining order, supported by an affidavit from the treating physician, which stated the Court's order was now necessary to save the patient's life.

The Court arrived at the hospital at 8:00 P.M. and until 10:15 P.M. interviewed five doctors, Mrs. George, Mr. George, Mrs. Gradie George, mother of the patient, and several members of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect. Both Mr. and Mrs. George expressly declined the Court's offer to appoint counsel of their own choosing or to be represented by an attorney selected by the Court.

George’s mother was not a Jehovah's Witnesses, thus was not opposed to a blood transfusion. Medical testimony indicated that at least five pints of whole blood was needed. Tests indicated the patient had already lost 60-65% of his red blood cells. Any further bleeding would lead to shock and probably death. At the time of the hearing, George was coherent, rational and rather strong. George stated that he would not agree to be transfused, but he would in no way resist a court order permitting it, because "it would be the Court’s will and not his own." The order was signed, and the transfusion administered. By March 22, George's health was no longer in danger, and the temporary order was dissolved. This decision is somewhat unique in that it is one of the few that actually considered the moral quandry in which Jehovah's Witnesses place hospitals and doctors, stating in part:

"Mr. George appeared to the Court to be coherent, rational and rather strong. However, doctors in attendance agreed his outward appearance was deceiving and his internal condition was most serious. When the Court introduced himself, George's first remarks were that he would not agree to be transfused but would in no way resist a court order permitting it, because it would be the Court's will and not his own. His "conscience was clear," and the responsibility for the act was "upon the Court's conscience." He stated he would rather die than agree to a transfusion. The Court advised George it had no power to force a transfusion upon him, and he was free to resist the transfusion, even by the rather simple physical maneuver of placing his hand over the area to be injected by the needle. George stated he would "in no way" resist the doctors' actions once the Court's order was signed.

"Mrs. George, citing certain passages from the Bible, was adamant in her opposition to the transfusions. She insisted that the Court had no right to order the transfusion in violation of their religious beliefs. Two other Jehovah's Witnesses, visiting the patient, concurred in Mrs. George's remarks. ... "In the difficult realm of religious liberty it is often assumed only the religious conscience is imperiled. Here, however, the doctor’s conscience and professional oath must also be respected. In the present case the patient voluntarily submitted himself to and insisted upon medical care. Simultaneously he sought to dictate to treating physicians a course of treatment amounting to medical malpractice. To require these doctors to ignore the mandates of their own conscience, even in the name of free religious exercise, cannot be justified under these circumstances. The patient may knowingly decline treatment, but he may not demand mistreatment."

****************** IN RE JANET KING was a 1964 California court decision. Reported details are sketchy. Either the reporter was not that sharp, or he was really sharp. In March 1964, Janet King was driving her 5 year-old daughter to the dentist when they were involved in a serious crash. Nothing was said about injuries to the child - just that she was reported to be doing "quite well". Due to "critical injuries", St. Rose Hospital officials sought court intervention when Tony King refused to consent to transfusions for his wife. Apparently, the court heard this case, but declined to intervene. A JW Overseer was mentioned to have presented arguments to the judge on behalf of the Kings, who had converted only 3-4 years previous. The case was described as dropped. I still wonder about the child, and whether there might have been two cases. The reporter also noted that while Janet was in the emergency room that a group of "friends and relatives" had gathered to pray for her in a room next to the ER. Right! They were JWs, and they were there to make sure no transfusion was given. King was last reported in satisfactory condition, but as is typical in these scenarios, ongoing blood loss could have changed the outcome.

******************

APPLICATION OF THE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTORS OF GEORGETOWN COLLEGE was a 1964 District of Columbia appellate court decision. Limited details. Jesse Jones, age twenty-five years old, and mother of a seven month old infant, was admitted to the hospital suffering from a ruptured ulcer, which had caused her to lose two-thirds of her blood. As Jehovah’s Witnesses, both Jones and her husband, James, refused to consent to a blood transfusion.

Attorneys for Georgetown Hospital filed a petition in equity to the United States District Court, a court of general jurisdiction. The application sought a decree in the nature of an injunction and declaratory judgment to determine the legal rights and liabilities between the Hospital and doctors and Mrs. Jones and her husband. The treatment proposed by the hospital in its application was not a single transfusion, but a series of transfusions. The hospital and doctors sought a court determination before undertaking either this course of treatment, or some alternative. The District Court denied the petition.

Attorneys for Georgetown Hospital then applied for an emergency writ seeking relief from the action of the United States District Court denying the Hospital's application for permission to administer blood transfusions to an emergency patient. The application recited that "Mrs. Jesse E. Jones is presently a patient at Georgetown University Hospital," "she is in extremis," according to the attending physician "blood transfusions are necessary immediately in order to save her life," and "consent to the administration thereof can be obtained neither from the patient nor her husband." The patient and her husband based their refusal on their religious beliefs as Jehovah's Witnesses. The petition requested that the attending physicians "may" administer such transfusions to Mrs. Jones as might be "necessary to save her life."

Judge Wright, of the Court Of Appeals, went to Georgetown Hospital, where he conferred with Jones and her husband, and Hospital staff and several physicians. All of the physicians agreed that Jones' condition was critical. Without a blood transfusion, she would die. Even with a transfusion, Jones had only a little better than 50 percent chance of surviving.

Jones' husband told the judge of his religious objections, but he said that "... if the court ordered the transfusion, the responsibility was not his."

The judge tried to talk with Mrs. Jones, but her grave condition made it difficult to communicate:

"The only audible reply I could hear was, 'Against my will.' It was obvious that the woman was not in a mental condition to make a decision. I was reluctant to press her because of the seriousness of her condition and because I felt that to suggest repeatedly the imminence of death without blood might place a strain on her religious convictions. I asked her whether she would oppose the blood transfusion if the court allowed it. She indicated, as best I could make out, that it would not then be her responsibility. ...
"... Mrs. Jones had no wish to be a martyr. And her religion merely prevented her consent to a transfusion. If the law undertook the responsibility of authorizing the transfusion without her consent, no problem would be raised with respect to her religious practice. Thus, the effect of the order was to preserve for Mrs. Jones the life she wanted without sacrifice of her religious beliefs."

The President of Georgetown University pleaded with Jones' husband to consent to a transfusion. Father Bunn tried to explain to him how a blood transfusion was not the same thing as drinking or eating blood. Jones refused to budge from his prior refusals.

Judge Wright then met with several doctors, the Hospital's attorneys, and Jones' husband. The Judge then signed a temporary order authorizing only those transfusions needed to save Jones' life, reasoning:

"... a life hung in the balance. There was no time for research and reflection. Death could have mooted the cause in a matter of minutes, if action were not taken to preserve the status quo. To refuse to act, only to find later that the law required action, was a risk I was unwilling to accept. I determined to act on the side of life."

This temporary order allowed Jones' husband to petition the Court of Appeals for a full hearing anytime during the series of transfusions which might follow. One or more transfusions were administered, and Mrs. Jones survived. The Jones moved for a rehearing by the entire Court of Appeals, but their request was denied. Interestingly, rumor has it that many of Judge Wright's peers were extremely displeased with his decision, but they were afraid to challenge a decision which saved the life of a mother of a young infant, and possibly establish an appellate court precedent.

In his decision, Judge Wright reviewed case evidence that supported compulsory medical treatment for children. He reasoned that since Jones was "in extremis" and hardly "compos mentis", she could be compared to a child. Jones was no more able to competently decide what was appropriate medical treatment for herself than a child. If parents could not forbid necessary medical treatment for a child, then a husband had no right to forbid such for his wife.

Wright further noted court cases involving children and the parens patriae doctrine. The state did not allow parents to abandon their children. The refusal of medical treatment by Mrs. Jones could ultimately result in "voluntary abandonment". Jones had a responsibility to the state to care for her infant, thus the state had an interest in preserving her life.

Judge Wright also took note of the above highlighted comments made by both Jones and her husband regarding "responsibility" for the court-ordered blood transfusions -something more Judges should do more often. As did Jones and her husband, the vast majority of Jehovah's Witnesses believe that if the blood transfusions are court-ordered, then "Jehovah" will not hold the recipient responsible for the supposed "sin". So long as the Jehovah's Witness, and their JW family, are allowed to establish that they have protested and refused the administering of transfusions, then a Judge may then save the Jehovah's Witnesses life by ordering the transfusion, and thereby take on the "responsibility" of such with "Jehovah".

****************** In September 1963, Harold Mather, 38, a WatchTower Convention attendee from Oregon, was struck and seriously injured by a mentally ill driver in Los Angeles, California . Some news reports hinted that Mather was convinced by his wife, Neva Mather, to refuse to consent to a needed blood transfusion. Some reported that Mather was in shock, and thus could not have known what was going on. It was also reported that Mather's nine year-old son begged Mather at the hospital to consent to a transfusion so that he would not die. In a followup newspaper article, the JWs appeared to want to address these negatives. A JW who had been involved in the incident stated that what had been reported "was slightly blown out of proportion." The JW continued, ""In the first place, the Mathers have no son, as the news stories reported. They have a daughter, Linda, who is 9, and she wasn't at the hospital when Harold and his wife talked about the transfusion." [That doesn't mean that the daughter did not speak to the father at some point thereafter - before he died.] The JW did not address the issue whether Harold Mather was in shock after the accident, thus incapable of refusing transfusions. ****************** IN RE BILLY FAULKNER was a 1962 Mississippi court decision. In April-May 1962, another no-transfusion drama played out which involved a 22 year-old father of three; a Jehovah's Witness named Billy Faulkner, who lived in Meridian, Mississippi. Faulkner was hospitalized with bleeding ulcers. Doctors would not operate unless Billy consented to blood transfusions, which he refused. Young Faulkners parents were not JWs, and they did everything they could to convince him to change his mind. However, Billy had converted to the JWs in order to marry Maxine Faulkner, who was now the mother of his three children. Maxine seemed to enjoy the attention given her by newspaper and even television reporters as the drama first played out. They recorded her stating on one hand that she was "positive" that Billy would not die, and on the other hand, that if Billy did die, then it would be "God's will". Maxine Faulkner also told reporters that she was cutting and saving all the news clippings for when her three young children grew up. Well, she got to use them. Billy died a slow painful death of 7-8 weeks. Those clippings must really have comforted those three pitiful orphans. Oh, the Meridian hospital petitioned for court intervention, but the Mississippi Judge ruled that he could do nothing so long as Billy was a competent adult. Too bad the judge was not a "thinker". The state has a large interest in seeing to it that its citizens live to rear the children they have brought into this world. ****************** This 1960 newspaper report comes from Rochester England. I have tried to resist posting JW incidents from outside the United States (especially the multiple "hospital kidnappings"), but occasionally an incident just screams to be posted here. Was this incident an example of "faith", or was it suicide resulting from despair -- despair from having just lost her one-year-old and possibly her three-year-old, or even possibly "pre-existing despair"?

Because of her husband's religion, a mother of five children died Tuesday night after refusing the blood transfusion that might have saved her life. "My wife's decision was a shining example as an act of faith," said Henry Humphries, a Jehovah's Witness. The sect opposes transfusions. "THE DECISION was hers," Humphries asserted. "But she was aware of my belief, and she would respect my wishes as head of the household. That is scriptural, for the Bible says: 'You wives obey your husbands in all things'." "We could not force Mrs. Humphries to have a transfusion against her will," said a hospital spokesman. HUMPHRIES' wife, Eliza, 37, was injured Sunday when the family motorcycle and a truck collided. The couple's youngest child, Russell, 1, riding with his mother in the sidecar, was killed and another son, Richard, 3, is in the hospital with head injuries. Humphries escaped almost unhurt. "The surgeon told me that if my wife was given a blood transfusion, she would probably live, and if she did not have one, she would probably die," Humphries said. MY WIFE believed in our religion, but she had not become a dedicated member as I did three years ago. "I told her what the doctor wanted to do and she said, 'No, I will not take blood. Just give me a drink and stroke my hair.' Then she closed her eyes and became unconscious. She never came round again."

****************** In September 1959, less than 6 months after moving his family from California to Arkansas, in "JW-speak", in order "to serve where the need is great" (otherwise known by JW locals as "to serve where the great are needed"), Gerald Trask, 27, his wife, and their three children were all injured in a tragic automobile accident. Gerald refused to consent to necessary blood transfusions, and slowly bled to death from internal injuries over a four day period. Jerry Trask, 3, underwent intensive surgery. No transfusion was needed, but the hospital was prepared to obtained a court-order if such was needed. Unknown what happened to wife and other two children. ****************** Details are sketchy, but apparently, in 1959, three JW children in Newberry, Michigan, were left parentless after the father died in September, after an automobile accident, and their mother died in October, from blood loss, after giving birth to the third child, named Lonie Ray Cummings. Wesley Cummings, 1, survived, as did a sister, age 3. It is tragedies like these that are never told because such gives credence to the reasoning that adult JWs should be transfused by court order if they have minor children to rear. ****************** In July 1958, Mrs. Elizabeth Denno, 43, of Haverhill, Massachusetts, died of excessive blood loss caused by a bleeding ulcer in her stomach and intestine. Elizabeth Denno died leaving her husband, Gardner, 45, to care for two minor children. Four adult children also survived. Elizabeth Denno was first hospitalized in September 1957, when she initially refused the recommended blood transfusions because she was a Jehovah's Witness. During the many weeks Denno spent in and out of Hale Hospital, several clergymen and even a Rabbi visited with Denno, and tried to explain to her that the WatchTower Society was misinterpreting the Bible on the topic of blood. Denno paid no attention, but preferred to lay down her life for the benefit of the WatchTower Society. Denno ignored the pleadings of her non-JW husband, and she ignored her parental responsibilities to her minor children. It is not known how many of her adult children were JWs, and supported her decision to die. Given months of publicity, it is surprising that no judges or attorneys in Massachusetts stepped forward and argued to a court that her life should be spared for the benefit of her minor children. ****************** MARTIN ET AL v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION was a 1956 California appellate court decision. The petitioners in this case were the widow and children of Charles C. Martin. While in the scope and course of his employment, Charles Martin sustained serious injuries, including a ruptured spleen, when the scaffold upon which he was working suddenly collapsed. Martin and his wife were informed at the hospital that an operation would be necessary, and that a transfusion of whole blood would be necessary. Martin and his wife advised the hospital authorities and the attending physician that they were Jehovah's Witnesses, and that a transfusion of blood was against their religious beliefs, and that if it was a question of permitting a blood transfusion or dying, Martin would choose death. Before Martin was taken to surgery he and his wife signed a release, in which the following is stated: "I, Charles Martin, refuse to have a transfusion of blood, even tho it may mean the loss of my life, because of my religious beliefs." An operation was then performed, the physicians using blood plasma and other substitutes for whole blood. Upon the opening of the abdomen the cavity was found to be full of blood, and there was a laceration of the spleen pulp with active bleeding. The spleen was surgically removed and, about two hours after the operation, Martin went into acute shock. The attending physician ordered a blood transfusion in the hope of saving his life, but the hospital authorities declined to consent to its being given because of the refusal of Martin and his wife to permit such transfusion, and shortly thereafter Charles Martin died.

At that time in California (since revised for JWs and others), a pertinent part of the worker's compensation law stated:

"No compensation is payable in case of the death or disability of an employee when his death is caused, or when and so far as his disability is caused, continued, or aggravated, by an unreasonable refusal to submit to medical treatment, or to any surgical treatment, if the risk of the treatment is, in the opinion of the commission, based upon expert medical or surgical advice, inconsiderable in view of the seriousness of the injury."

It was established by medical evidence that transfusion of substitutes for whole blood would not suffice to prevent shock, that transfusion of whole blood is the usual procedure in spleen operations and that the risks of such blood transfusions are minimal compared with the benefits thereof, and that the transfusion of whole blood in adequate amounts during and after surgery would probably have saved Charles Martin's life. Therefore, the Commission ruled that Martin's death was "proximately" caused by his refusal to accept proper medical treatment, rather than the accident itself. That meant zero death benefits for Martin's children (and wife), who had not participated in their parents' shortsighted decision. Martin's wife appealed. The Court of Appeal of California affirmed the Commission's ruling, and the Supreme Court refused to hear further appeal. This appellate court reasoned, in part:

"Petitioners entirely overlook the fact that not only are Martin's rights to compensation involved but the employer's liability for the payment of compensation is also involved. Certainly it was not unreasonable for the Legislature to fix as a condition to the employer's liability that the death of an employee must arise out of his employment and that it should not exist where death is the result of the voluntary act of the employee in refusing medical attention. Here the commission not only found that Martin's refusal of medical care was unreasonable but that his death was due not to the injury received in the scope and course of his employment but by his refusal of transfusions of whole blood. Martin was not obligated to work in an employment that rendered him subject to the Workmen's Compensation Act, and if he accepted such employment he accepted it, insofar as his right to compensation is concerned, subject to the conditions imposed by the Legislature upon the right to such compensation.

"It is petitioners' contention, however, that if the statute is construed as permitting the commission to hold that an employee's refusal to accept medical aid is unreasonable where the acceptance of such aid is contrary to his religious beliefs, the statute denies him his constitutional right of religious freedom and to the equal protection of the laws. There is no merit in this contention, for 'although freedom of conscience and the freedom to believe are absolute, the freedom to act is not ... .' Under the statute here Martin was free to believe and worship as he chose, and he was further free, if he so chose, to practice his belief; but if he exercised that choice and his death resulted from his choice, petitioners were
not entitled, as a matter of right, to the benefits of the workmen's compensation laws. ... ... "... Martin was free to accept the tenets of his church and believe in them, and he was free to exercise his right to practice those beliefs, but that did not give him a right to impose, contrary to the statute, a liability upon his employer for his death resulting from his voluntary practice of his religion. ... "

******************

In June 1956, a Nevada Jehovah's Witness, and mother of two children, named Helen Bendele died at Elko General Hospital from excessive blood loss. Bendele's pickup truck was struck by an oncoming train after the truck stalled on a railroad crossing. Bendele's injury was limited to a severed artery in one leg, but she refused to consent to a blood transfusion. The report noted that Bendele had been one of the main prosecution witnesses in a recent kidnapping-rape trial. ****************** In April 1952, Fred Newhouse, 24, a Jehovah's Witness in San Antonio, Texas, was seriously injured in an vehicle accident between a school bus and the milk truck that he was driving. Newhouse needed kidney surgery, but he refused to consent to blood transfusions needed during the surgery, and to replace blood lost during the accident. Despite having two young children, Newhouse's wife, Irene Newhouse, fully supported her husband's decision. Apparently, Irene Newhouse had been reared as a Jehovah's Witness, but Fred had been reared as a Methodist. Fred Newhouse only converted to the JWs when he married Irene. A battle played out in the media between Irene Newhouse, and Fred's mother, Frieda Newhouse, who was a Practical Nurse. Fred's mother did everything that she could possibly think of to convince Fred to change his mind. Frieda offered to donate her own blood for the transfusion. She made a request to the Air Force to grant furlough to Fred's favorite brother, so that he could come talk with Fred. A month after the accident, Fred was still alive, but listed as "critical". His internal bleeding had stopped, but doctors wanted permission to administer a blood transfusion during the needed kidney surgery. Outcome unknown.

******************

RECOMMENDED READING:

Blood Transfusions: A History and Evaluation of the Religious, Biblical, and Medical Objections (Jehovah's Witnesses perspective)

Blood, Medicine, and the Jehovah's Witnesses: The Hidden History of the Watchtower's Position on the Blood Issue

Jehovah's Witnesses and the Problem of Mental Illness

JEHOVAH'S WITNESS PARENTS WILL ALLOW THEMSELVES TO DIE
AND THEIR CHILDREN TO BE REARED BY SOMEONE ELSE
RATHER THAN ACCEPT A BLOOD TRANSFUSION. JEHOVAH'S WITNESS PARENTS WILL ALLOW THEMSELVES TO DIE
AND THEIR CHILDREN TO BE REARED BY SOMEONE ELSE
RATHER THAN ACCEPT A BLOOD TRANSFUSION.

New Here

shamus100

purplesofa

reniaa

wha happened?

avishai

rolling rock

isaacaustin

isaacaustin

isaacaustin

isaacaustin

Share this