by Sea Breeze 405 Replies latest watchtower bible
Halcon
Do love, fear and hate...hope and dread ...fall under the category of 'physical' or 'metaphysical'?
They are metaphysical in the sense that feelings cant be observed.
However, they are closely related to physical in the sense that a physical event may cause feelings of fear, anxiety, arousal etc. The 'feelings' we experience are caused by neuro-chemical reactions.
Joey,
The feelings we experience are caused by neuro-chemical reactions.
Exactly!
And when the movement of neuro-chemical transmitters is in any way hindered, conditions like depression result.
that I know of you would be correct, HOWEVER
Alan Duffie (name might be spelt wrong, may be 1 "f", and may have the wrong surname, but will correct if I'm wrong - cant find article)
(ex- Jw)
Rolf
Greg Stafford
(Active, who have a university education in Greek)
Edgar Foster
How is the NWT inaccurate when trinitarian translations render it similarly?
How many of those organisations are trinitarian dominated? all of them? well there's our answer to that one.
How many of Bible translations add words? NEWFLASH: ALL of them!
How many Bible translations are inconsistent in translation: NEWSFLASH: ALL of them!
@Blotty
Your appeal to translations like Goodspeed’s or Young’s Bible does not invalidate my argument regarding the NWT's theological bias. Translation choices often depend on context, and while proskyneō indeed has a semantic range, its specific meaning is determined by the context in which it is used. Goodspeed's rendering of Matt. 4:10, "do homage," might seem similar to the NWT's "obeisance," but the comparison is superficial. The NWT consistently renders proskyneō as "obeisance" when applied to Jesus, while it translates the same word as "worship" when referring to God the Father or even false idols (e.g., Matt. 4:10; Rev. 9:20). This selective translation reveals a clear theological motivation to deny the deity of Christ, a motivation not present in Goodspeed's broader body of work. Goodspeed's translation reflects early 20th-century idiomatic preferences, not a systematic theological bias.
Regarding proskyneō itself, it is incorrect to claim that the word’s "full extent goes to the Father, NO ONE else." The NT repeatedly demonstrates that Jesus receives worship consistent with divine honor, not merely homage. In Matt. 14:33, the disciples worship Jesus after He calms the storm, declaring, "Truly, you are the Son of God." This worship transcends mere respect or homage for a human figure, as it acknowledges Jesus' divine identity. Similarly, in John 20:28, Thomas exclaims, "My Lord and my God!" in direct address to Jesus. The claim that such acts are limited to homage fails to account for the divine implications of these contexts. Additionally, Rev. 5:13-14 portrays both "the One seated on the throne" (God the Father) and "the Lamb" (Christ) receiving identical worship from all creation. If proskyneō here merely meant homage, the shared adoration would undermine the exclusive worship due to God, as emphasized throughout Scripture.
The reference to 1 Chron. 29:20 as a supposed parallel misunderstands the context and semantics of proskyneō. In that passage, both God and Solomon are recipients of proskyneō, but the nature of the act differs. The assembly blesses Yahweh, recognizing His supreme deity, while they bow to Solomon as a gesture of homage acknowledging his anointed kingship. The distinction lies in the intent and the object of the act. When directed toward Yahweh, proskyneō signifies divine worship. When directed toward Solomon, it reflects respect for his God-given authority. The NT, however, consistently presents Jesus as receiving worship in divine contexts (e.g., Matt. 28:9, 28:17; Rev. 5:13-14), not as a subordinate human king.
As for your assertion that "obeisance" and "worship" are synonyms, while true in certain contexts, this oversimplifies the issue. Theologically, "obeisance" implies respect or submission to a superior, whereas "worship" in biblical contexts often denotes adoration due exclusively to God. The NWT's selective use of "obeisance" when referring to Jesus diminishes His divine status, contrary to the broader NT witness. This selective translation is not consistent with the principle of letting context determine meaning, as evidenced by the NWT's inconsistent rendering of proskyneō across various passages.
Your claim that Heb. 1:6 involves a "reapplication" misunderstands the text's theological intent. Heb. 1:6 explicitly commands all angels to worship Jesus, quoting the Septuagint's version of Deut. 32:43. In its original context, this passage refers to worship directed toward Yahweh. By applying it to Jesus, the author of Heb. unmistakably affirms His divine identity. The NWT's rendering of proskyneō as "do obeisance" here is inconsistent with its own principles, as the same word is translated as "worship" when applied to God in other passages.
The claim that it is impossible to doubt while worshiping something (Matt. 28:17) misunderstands the nature of faith and human experience. Doubt and worship are not mutually exclusive; in fact, they often coexist in the journey of faith. Matt. 28:17 describes the disciples' reaction to encountering the risen Christ. It captures a deeply human moment, where awe and reverence (expressed through worship) exist alongside hesitation or uncertainty (described as doubt). This tension is not only understandable but expected when individuals confront something as extraordinary as the resurrection of Jesus. Doubt does not necessarily negate worship. It is possible to worship while grappling with questions or confusion. Worship arises from recognition of worthiness and reverence for God, while doubt reflects the natural struggle to fully comprehend divine mysteries. In this case, some of the disciples may have struggled to reconcile the reality of Jesus' resurrection with their prior understanding, but this did not prevent them from worshiping him as Lord. The Bible frequently portrays faith as a dynamic process, not a static state. For example, Thomas initially doubted Jesus' resurrection until he saw and touched him (John 20:24-29). Yet, Thomas’s doubt ultimately led to one of the most profound declarations of faith in Scripture: "My Lord and my God!" Similarly, the disciples’ moment of doubt in Matt. 28:17 did not disqualify them from their mission; Jesus immediately commissioned them to make disciples of all nations in the following verses (Matt. 28:18-20). Far from being an "oxymoron," this passage reflects the authenticity of the disciples' experience. It demonstrates that faith does not require the absence of doubt but the willingness to trust God despite uncertainty. The inclusion of this detail in Matthew's Gospel also highlights the integrity of the biblical narrative, which does not shy away from portraying the disciples' struggles honestly.
The suggestion that I am driven by theological motivation rather than objective scholarship is ironic, given the demonstrable theological bias of the NWT. Objective scholarship evaluates translation choices in their literary, historical, and theological contexts. While all translations involve interpretive decisions, the consistent pattern of the NWT to downplay the divinity of Jesus, even when the original text does not warrant such a reading, points to deliberate theological revisionism.
"How many of those organizations are Trinitarian dominated? All of them? Well, there's our answer to that one."
This statement implies that the predominance of Trinitarianism automatically invalidates their conclusions. However, the widespread acceptance of Trinitarianism is not simply due to its popularity but is rooted in historical, theological, and biblical scholarship. Trinitarian theology emerged from deep engagement with Scripture and was affirmed by early church councils (e.g., Nicaea and Constantinople) based on their collective understanding of biblical texts. The claim here is akin to dismissing all modern science because most scientists might agree on a particular principle (like gravity). Agreement does not imply collusion but rather consensus based on evidence. Similarly, the dominance of Trinitarianism among Christian organizations reflects the overwhelming biblical and theological support for this doctrine, not arbitrary groupthink.
"How many Bible translations add words? NEWSFLASH: ALL of them!"
It is true that all Bible translations involve interpretation. However, "adding words" in translations often results from the necessity of making texts intelligible in the target language. For instance, Greek and Hebrew use structures and idioms that require adjustment for proper understanding in English or other languages. The critical issue is whether these additions clarify or distort the original meaning. Trinitarian translations generally strive to remain faithful to the context and grammatical nuances of the original languages. The accusation here oversimplifies translation work and assumes malicious intent, which is not a fair critique.
For example, the NWT introduces interpretations not supported by mainstream biblical scholarship (e.g., "a god" in John 1:1). Critics of the NWT argue that these changes reflect theological bias rather than linguistic necessity. Mainstream translations like the NIV, ESV, or NASB undergo rigorous academic scrutiny and rely on broad scholarly input, reducing the likelihood of significant doctrinal bias.
"How many Bible translations are inconsistent in translation? NEWSFLASH: ALL of them!"
No translation is perfect because languages evolve, and no two languages are identical in structure, idioms, and cultural context. That said, some translations are more consistent than others. Mainstream Trinitarian translations undergo extensive peer review by experts in ancient languages, history, and theology to ensure consistency and fidelity.
On the other hand, the NWT has been rightly criticized for being inconsistent specifically in verses relevant to Jehovah’s Witness theology. For example, John 1:1 is rendered as "a god" in the NWT, but other similar grammatical constructions (like John 1:6) are not translated with "a" in front of "God." Or, Col. 1:16 adds the word "other" to make Jesus a created (while He is begotten) being ("all [other] things"), despite the absence of this word in Greek manuscripts. Thus, while all translations face challenges, some are deliberately inconsistent to promote specific doctrinal views.
You basically argue that if even one Trinitarian translation translates something like the NWT, then from then on I am forbidden to question the NWT! This is a logical fallacy known as tu quoque ("you too", like “but you farted too!”), which suggests that if others commit similar errors, your errors are excused. The issue is not whether some Trinitarian translations might share linguistic choices with the NWT but whether those choices are justifiable based on the original texts. For example if a Trinitarian translation renders something erroneously like the NWT, it would also face the same scholarly critique as the NWT. The point is whether the translation aligns with the grammatical and contextual evidence. However, mainstream translations like the NIV, NASB, or ESV do not adopt such a rendering because it fails the test of Greek grammar and context. A tu quoque defense does not address the primary issue: Does the NWT accurately reflect the biblical manuscripts? Pointing out hypothetical errors in other translations does not validate the NWT’s theological deviations.
Your argument hinges on a relativistic view of translation, suggesting that all translations are equally flawed, and therefore none can be critiqued. However, this approach avoids the real question: Which translation most accurately conveys the meaning of the original texts? Trinitarian translations have centuries of scholarly rigor behind them, while the NWT has been criticized for theological bias. Rather than deflecting criticism with "tu quoque," the focus should remain on the evidence for or against the accuracy of specific translations.
Regarding the dismissive tone in the second part of your comment, respectful dialogue is essential for meaningful engagement. Constructive criticism is welcome, but dismissing others' views without addressing the substance of their arguments undermines the opportunity for genuine discussion. Fact-checking and thoughtful analysis are integral to meaningful discourse, and this response aims to provide both.
Halcon: Interesting...so the simple thought of something makes that which we are thinking of physical?...
No. Thoughts and feelings are the product of a physical object (the brain). Thoughts and feelings, themselves, are not physical things. I suppose we could identify them as metaphysical, but that requires us to get into a discussion on semantics. Is pain physical, or metaphysical? We quickly start having to draw some very fine lines.
Of course, we could just define thoughts and feelings as metaphysical, for the sake of argument. This would allow us to demonstrate the problem with the metaphysical: how to we determine its properties, and how do we measure its magnitude?
Edit to add: one other question, if thoughts and feelings are metaphysical: we know that they are the product of physical objects, systems, and/or processes. Is there any way to demonstrate metaphysical phenomena that are not the product of the physical world? After all, if the one property of the metaphysical that we can define is that it is the product of the physical world, then that would necessarily apply to all metaphysical phenomena until shown otherwise, no?
NO SCHOLARLY ORGANIZATION INCLUDING ANY COLLEGES OR UNIVERSITIES RECOGNIZES THE NWT AS A LEGIT TRANSLATION….sorry, but that’s the facts
ttwsyf
However, they are closely related to physical in the sense that a physical event may cause feelings of fear, anxiety, arousal etc. The 'feelings' we experience are caused by neuro-chemical reactions.
The feelings of empathy, kindness and consideration are simply byproducts of a chemical reaction?
Is there any way to demonstrate metaphysical phenomena that are not the product of the physical world? After all, if the one property of the metaphysical that we can define is that it is the product of the physical world, then that would necessarily apply to all metaphysical phenomena until shown otherwise.
This is a good question. Because now we are legitimizing all metaphysical phenomena since it comes from the physical brain. Or not.
But if not, why? Shouldn't the brain be sufficient to legitimize all thoughts and emotions?
No one wants to pick up the topic of the Logos as sustainer of creation?
We can go down the rabbit hole of defining 'real' but as was said, the issue is objective reality. Surely no believer would wish their belief in God be equated with fantasy and illusion. Yet that seems to be the direction your argument is going. My fantasies may be 'real' to me but in any objective sense I do not have a relationship with Michelle Pheiffer. Nor did my love for my first-grade teacher have any 'real' basis. It was naive interpretation of biochemical reactions and wishful thinking. Do you wish us to equate your belief in God/s to be equated with fantasy?
Halcon: Because now we are legitimizing all metaphysical phenomena since it comes from the physical brain.
I'm not sure if legitimizing is the right word. If the human brain is the source of all of our gods and related beings and worlds, that wouldn't necessarily make them real. Considering the number of such beings and concepts we have developed over human history, it's clear that (nearly?) all of them are make-believe. The question would be, are there any that are real? How would we confirm that, if we have defined them in such a way to make it impossible to do so?
